Supreme Court - Daily Orders
M/S Changer Vidut Kranti Pvt Ltd vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh on 13 February, 2024
Author: Abhay S. Oka
Bench: Abhay S. Oka
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 831 OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3095 of 2019)
M/S CHANGER VIDUT KRANTI PVT LTD. & ANR. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
3. By the impugned order, a petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short `Cr.P.C.”) has been dismissed. A complaint was filed by an Inspector under the Factories Act, 1948 (For short “Act of 1948”) before the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class in accordance with sub-section 1 of section 105 of the Act of 1948. The Inspector conducted inspection in the factory premises of the appellant No.1 on 03rd February, 2017. According to the case of the State, for granting sanction for prosecution, a proposal was sent to the Labour Commissioner- Signature Not Verified cum-Chief Inspector Factories on 13th February, 2017 by the Digitally signed by Rajni Mukhi Date: 2024.02.20 16:12:50 IST Reason: Labour Officer. The sanction was received on 11th May, 2017 and 1 Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.3095/2019 the complaint was filed on 22nd May, 2017.
4. Under Section 106 of the Act of 1948, the limitation of three months has been provided from the date on which the alleged commission of offence comes to the knowledge of the Inspector. In this case, admittedly, the complaint was not filed within the statutory period of three months and that was the ground of challenge before the High Court. In the impugned order, the High Court relied upon sub-section 3 of section 470 of Cr.PC. and held that the period which is required for grant of sanction will have to be excluded by virtue of sub-section 3 of Section 470 of Cr.P.C. and that is how, the petition for quashing was dismissed by the High Court.
5. The submission of learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that on its plain reading, sub-section 1 of section 105 of the Act of 1948, the need to take previous sanction arises only when the complaint is filed by any officer other than an Inspector. He submitted that in this case, admittedly, the complaint was filed by an Inspector. He would, therefore, submit that the view taken by the High Court is completely erroneous.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the internal procedure prescribed by a circular requires the Inspector to seek consent/sanction for lodging the complaint which in the facts of the case was obtained. He 2 Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.3095/2019 would, therefore, submit that factually time was consumed from 13th February, 2017 to 11th May, 2017 for obtaining the consent/sanction. He submitted that the High Court was right in holding that the said period will have to be excluded. He also submitted that the appellants are indulging in gross illegality and therefore, no interference is called for.
7. We have considered the submissions. Sections 105 and 106 of the Act of 1948 are relevant for deciding the issue involved in this appeal. Sections 105 and 106 read as under:
“105. Cognizance of offences (1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act except on complaint by, or with the previous sanction in writing of, an Inspector.
(2) No Court below that of a Presidency Magistrate or of a Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Act.” “106. Limitation of prosecutions- No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector;
Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.
Explanation- For the purposes of this section,-
(a) in the case of a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the offence continues;
(b) where for the performance of any act time is granted or extended on an application made by the occupier or manager of a factory, the period of limitation shall be computed from the date on which the time so granted or extended expired.” 3 Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.3095/2019
8. In this case, admittedly the complaint before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate was filed by an Inspector. On its plain reading, sub-section 1 requires previous sanction in writing of an Inspector only when the complaint is filed by any officer other than an Inspector. Hence, when the complaint is filed by an Inspector, sanction is not required at all.
9. Reliance was placed by the respondents on sub-section 3 of section 470 of Cr.P.C. which reads as under:
“3.Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under any law for the time being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.“
10. Obviously the sanction referred in sub-section 3 is a sanction which is a condition precedent for filing a complaint as prescribed by a statute. Sub-section 3 of the Section 470 of Cr.P.C. will not apply to a sanction which is the requirement of an internal circular of the department.
11. There is another issue which needs to be highlighted here. Section 106 of the Act of 1948 is a complete code as far as the period of limitation for filing a complaint under sub-section 1 of section 105 is concerned. The proviso to section 106 and clauses (a) and (b) of the explanation to the section provide for a period of limitation exceeding three months. The proviso will not 4 Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.3095/2019 apply as here there is no allegation in the complaint of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector. It is not the case of the respondents that this is a case of continuing offence.
Therefore, clause (a) of explanation will not apply. Even Clause
(b) will not apply. Clause (b) will apply when an occupier or manager of a factory seeks time to make compliance and when the time is granted by the Authority under the Act of 1948. The limitation in such a case, starts running immediately after expiry of the extended period. Therefore, in this case, the limitation will be governed by section 106. The Act of 1948 is a special Act and is a complete code in relation to the limitation for filing a complaint for the offences under it.
12. Even assuming that sub-section 3 of section 470 of Cr.P.C was applicable to a complaint under section 105, in this case, there was no statutory requirement of obtaining consent or sanction for institution of the complaint.
13. Therefore, in this case, the limitation of three months was available in terms of section 106 of the Act of 1948 from 3 rd February, 2017. The complaint was filed on 22nd May, 2017. As stated earlier section 106 does not provide for extension of time except in cases covered by the proviso and explanations (a) and
(b). The proviso and explanation (a) and (b) are not applicable in this case.
5 Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.3095/2019
14. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. The complaint bearing No. 64-III/2017, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh is hereby quashed on the ground that the same was barred by limitation.
15. Appeal is accordingly, allowed.
...................J. [ABHAY S.OKA] ...................J. [UJJAL BHUYAN] NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 13, 2024 6 ITEM NO.13 COURT NO.7 SECTION II-C S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.3095/2019 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 15-11-2018 in CRMMO No. 413/2017 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla) M/S CHANGER VIDUT KRANTI PVT LTD & ANR. Petitioner(s) VERSUS THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. Respondent(s) (IA No. 46242/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT) Date : 13-02-2024 These matters were called on for hearing today. CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY S. OKA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN For Petitioner(s) Mr. M.C. Dhingra, Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Dhingra, AOR Mr. Arvind Kumar Singh, Adv.
Mr. Mahendra Ram, Adv.
Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Rishabh Kumar Singh, Adv.
Mr. Joginder Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Raghvendra Shukla, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Ketan Paul, AOR Mr. Chakshu Purohit, Adv.
Ms. Shubhi Pandey, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Leave granted.
Appeal is allowed in terms of signed order.
Pending application(s) stand disposed of.
(RAJNI MUKHI) (AVGV RAMU)
COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed order is placed on the file)
7