Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Narayana Rao Patalay (Died) Per L.Rs. ... vs Naresh Thapper And 4 Ors. on 6 June, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(6)ALD16, 2003(2)ALT110
ORDER Y. Somayajulu, J.
1. This revision arises out of the order in R.A.No.134 of 1994 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad.
2. Narayana Rao Pataley (hereinafter called the deceased), filed R.C.No.231 of 1988 under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (the 'Act'), seeking eviction of the respondent from the non-residential premises bearing No.3-6-341 (hereinafter called 'building') alleging that he, who was not in occupation of any other non-residential premises, had let out the building to the respondent for 11 months on a monthly rent of Rs.950/- besides the amenity charges under a lease deed dated 1-7-1984, needs it for running a Charitable Clinic and Diagnostic Centre therein with the help and assistance of his son Dr.Manohar Pataley, a qualified Doctor and grand son Anil, a Medico, who assured their cooperation in running and continuing the charitable clinic as trustees both during his life time and thereafter also. Respondent filed his counter contending that he took the building on lease on 9-7-1977 under two lease deeds on a monthly rent of Rs.350/- and thereafter the rent, which was being enhanced periodically, was ultimately fixed at Rs.950/- per month with effect from 1-7-1984. As he did not agree to further enhance the rent, the deceased, with a view to coerce him to vacate the building or to inconvenience him, refused to receive rent from July, 1987 onwards and refused to receive the rent sent by of money order. Hence he sent the rent by way of a cheque, which was encashed. In view thereof he issued a notice calling upon the deceased to name a Bank where he could deposit the rent, but the deceased failed to respond, but received the rent for August to October when sent by money order. As the deceased and his family members have extensive properties he could choose some other building to locate the charitable clinic, allegedly conceived by him. The petition is filed only with a view to seek his eviction by hook or crook and hence is liable to be dismissed.
3. The deceased examined himself as PW.1 and marked Exs.P1 to P11. Respondent examined himself as RW.1 and another witness as RW.2 and marked Exs.R1 to R19. The learned Rent Controller having held that the deceased was not in occupation of a non-residential building either of his own or the possession of which he is entitled to on the date of petition, dismissed the petition on three grounds i.e., (1) the deceased failed to show that he had created a Trust for the purpose of running a charitable clinic and diagnostic centre, (2) his need of the building is not bona fide, and (3) running of a charitable clinic is not 'business' within the meaning of Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, the deceased filed R.A.No.134 of 1988 before the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, and died during the pendency of the appeal, whereupon Revision petitioners filed I.A.No.1140 of 1995 to implead them as the legal representatives of the deceased and to permit them to continue the appeal filed by the deceased. Respondent filed a counter opposing the said petition. By his order dated 14-8-1996 the learned Chief Judge allowed I.A.No.1140 of 1995 and permitted the revision petitioners, i.e., the charitable trust created by the deceased, and son and grandson of the deceased, to come on record and continue the appeal R.A.No.134 of 1998. Thereafter appeal was dismissed on merits on three grounds (1) the evidence on record does not establish that the 1st revision petitioner-Trust has no other property except the building, (ii) the need of the building is not bona fide, and (iii) the deceased, who has a premises of his own, cannot seek eviction of the respondent from the building. Hence this revision.
4. The point for consideration is whether the revision petitioners are entitled to seek eviction of the respondent from the building?
5. POINT:
The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners is that since a Hindu can create a charitable trust under a Will, and can also dedicate property for a charitable purpose during his life time, and since dedication of property for a charitable purpose per se brings into existence a charitable trust, and since the recitals in Ex.P6 (Will executed by the deceased) clearly show that the building was set apart by the deceased for the 1st revision petitioner Trust, it is clear that 1st revision petitioner came into existence, and became the 'landlord' of the respondent after the death of the deceased. He contended that running of a charitable clinic also is 'business' within the meaning of Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act, and since there is no evidence on record to show that 1st revision petitioner has any other premises of its own except the building, the learned Chief Judge was in error in dismissing the appeal, and was in error in holding that the requirement of the revision petitioners is not bona fide, and contended that since the purpose for which the deceased filed the R.C. subsists even till today, respondent is liable to be evicted from the building. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the deceased filed the R.C. only with a view to coerce the respondent to pay more rent and contended that the fact that there are no bona fides in the deceased filing the R.C. is evident from the fact that the deceased who could have started the charitable clinic intended to be established by him in the premises that came into his possession after the filing of the R.C., without doing so had let it out to another tenant, and contended that since there is no evidence on record to show that the Trust intended to be created by the deceased came into existence during his life time, there was no cause of action for the deceased filing the R.C., seeking possession of the building for the purpose of non-existing Trust, the R.C., was rightly dismissed by the two Fora below. He contended that since the crucial date for the bona fide need of a landlord is the date of petition, even if the 1st respondent came into existence after the death of the deceased, revision petitioners cannot by continuing the proceedings initiated by the deceased seek eviction of the respondent and if at all revision petitioners have to file a separate petition for eviction of the respondent.
6. From the averments in para 5 of the petition it is seen that the intention of the deceased was to run a charitable clinic and diagnostic centre in the building even during his life time, and that that Trust should continue after his life time. Para 5 of Ex.P6, Will dated 14-1-1986 executed by the deceased shows that the building was bequeathed to the 1st revision petitioner with a direction to his son and grand son i.e., revision petitioners 2 and 3 to run the 1st revision petitioner Trust in the building. The R.C. was filed on 8-3-1988 i.e., about two years after the execution of the Will by the deceased. As per Section 2(v) of A.P. Charitable Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (CHRIE Act) -
'charitable purpose' includes (a) relief of poverty or distress, (b) education, (c) medical relief and (d)advancement of any other object of utility or welfare to the general public or a section thereof, not being an object of an exclusively religious nature".
Since the intention of the deceased was to give medical relief to the poor, it would be a 'charitable purpose' within the meaning of Section 2(v) of CHRIE Act. At pages 30 and 31 of P.B.Mukharji on 'THE HINDU LAW OF RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS', Tagore Law Lectures, Third Edition, 1970 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for revision petitioners, it is stated as follows:
"Under the Roman Law an individual, by dedicating property for a charitable purpose, could bring into existence a foundation or institution which in law would be regarded as the owner of the dedicated property. A similar conception is present in the German "Stiftung" where a fund ear-marked for a special purpose is deemed to be its own owner. There is no such conception in English Law which recognizes only one class of legal persons viz., the corporations which are really personifications or groups or series of individuals, and are classified into corporation aggregate and corporation sole. Obviously neither a Hindu religious institution nor a Hindu idol can come within the scheme of artificial persons as framed and adopted by English Law. Mr.Justice West in his classic judgment in MONOHAR GANESH VS. LAKSHMIRAM (I.L.R. 12 Bom. P.247) pointed out that "the Hindu Law like the Roman Law and those derived from it recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights of property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical person and subjects called foundations." The religious institutions like mutts, choultries and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman Law. The idea is the same, namely when property is dedicated for a particular purpose the proerty itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created".
At page 77 it is stated-
"A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it, and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least protect it so far, at any rate, as is consistent with his own Dharma or conception of morality (MANOHAR GANESH vs. LAKHMIRAM I.L.R. 12 Bom. 247, 263).
There are a large number of decided cases where it has been held, that to constitute valid dedication of property by a Hindu for religious or charitable purpose no document in writing or registered (sic) is necessary.
In view of the above position of law, the deceased could validly dedicate the building to the 1st revision petitioner even during his life time de hors Ex.P6 Will, and if it was earlier so dedicated also, it would have had the status of a juristic person.
7. At page 434 of Mantha Ramamurti's 'LAW OF WILLS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN', 4th Edition, 1988, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for revision petitioners, it is stated as follows-
"Dispositions made to charitable purposes are strongly favoured in point of construction, and have been upheld even where the bequest would, upon the ordinary principles which govern the construction of testamentary disposition, be void for uncertainty. (MRS.ELKINS vs. REV. DR.CULLEN, 40 I.C. 791) at p.795 ; ATTORNEY GENERAL vs. MATHEWS, (1677) 2 Dev. 167; MACDUFF vs. MACDUFF (1896) 2 Ch. 451 at p.463.
One general rule is that a gift which is wholly charitable is never void for uncertainty in the object. "A charitable bequest may fail by lapse, or because the purpose which the testator had in mind has become impossible or because the subject matter of the gift is uncertain, but a charitable bequest is never void for uncertainty in the object (JARMAN , 6th Ed., pp.225-26; 7th Ed. p.215)"
Since the deceased, as P.W.1 admitted his executing Ex.P6 Will, it stood proved. As stated earlier, as per para 5 of Ex.P6 the building should vest in the 1st revision petitioner and should be run and managed by revision petitioners 2 and 3. Therefore the building undoubtedly stood vested in the 1st revision petitioner after the death of the deceased. Since the learned Chief Judge, after contest by the respondent, allowed I.A.No.114 of 1995 filed by the revision petitioners seeking leave to come on record in their capacity as legal representatives of the deceased and permit to them to prosecute the appeal filed by the deceased, there can be no two opinions about the 1st revision petitioner coming into existence. The position would have been the same had the deceased been alive and obtained possession of the building and commenced the activity of running the charitable clinic in the building because on his starting the charitable clinic, 1st revision petitioner would have come into existence and automatically the building would have vested in the 1st revision petitioner and the deceased would have ceased to be the owner of the building. So K.V.KRISHNA RAO vs. THE SUB-COLLECTOR, ONGOLE1, G.PRABHAKARA RAO vs. L.I.C., MACHILIPATNAM2 DEOKI NANDAN vs. MURLIDHAR3and SRINIVASAGAM ASARI AND ANOTHER vs. CHINNAMMAL AND ANOTHER4 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners on the question of dedication of property to a charitable purpose need not be referred in this order.
8. As per Section 14 of CHRIE Act, all properties belonging to or given or endowed to a charitable or religious institution or endowment shall vest in the charitable or religious institution or endowment, as the case may be. Since the building stood vested in the 1st revision petitioner consequent on the death of the deceased, by virtue of the provisions of Section 8 of CHRIE Act, the Commissioner of Endowments can exercise his power of general superintendence on the 1st revision petitioner Trust and also the building. The contention of the respondent that the R.C. was filed by the deceased with an oblique motive of letting it out to some other tenant at a higher rent cannot be believed or accepted, because it would have come under the general superintendence of the Commissioner of Endowments, who would not permit the building being used for a purpose other than it was endowed i.e., running a charitable clinic. If the building were to be let out to a third party for rent, the Commissioner would evict the tenant and direct the running of a charitable clinic there. Revision petitioners 2 and 3 should be reminded that they have to register the 1st revision petitioner with the Assistant Commissioner of the region..
9. The R.C. is filed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, which reads-
"for the purpose of a business, which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence"
In view of the language employed in the above sub-Section it is easy to see that the SINE QUA NON for seeking eviction of a tenant under the above sub-clause is the bona fide need for the premises by the landlord for his proposed 'business'. As stated earlier the learned Rent Controller held that running of a charitable clinic is not 'business' within meaning of the above sub-clause. The learned Chief Judge without going into the question whether running of a charitable clinic is 'business' or not, dismissed the appeal on other grounds. So technically it has to be taken that the learned Chief Judge confirmed the above finding of the Rent Controller. In V.F. & G. INSURANCE CO. vs. M/s.FRASER & ROSS5 and SHANTILAL THAKORDAS AND OTHERS vs. CHIMANLAL MAGANLAL TELWALA6, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners it is held that, if the definition of a word used in a statute is not exhaustive, depending on the subject or context, a different meaning can be given to that word. In S.MOHAN LAL vs. R.KONDIAH7 it was held that the word 'business' in the above sub-clause is used in a wide sense, and so practicing the profession of an Advocate also would come in the meaning of 'business' in the said sub-Section. The word 'business is not defined in the Act. Standard Desk Dictionary by Funk & Wagnalls gives meaning of 'business'- as "1.An occupation, trade, or profession. 2.Any of the various operations or details of trade or industry. 3.A commercial enterprise or establishment; a firm, factory, store etc. 4.The amount or volume of trade. 5.A proper interest or concern; responsibility; duty. 6.A matter or affair. In the theater, the movements, facial expressions, etc., apart from dialogue, by which actors interpret a part....."
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Edition, edited by R.E.Allen, the word 'business' means-
"1. One's regular occupation, profession or trade. 2. A thing that is one's concern. 3.(a) A task or duty, (b) a reason for giving (what is your business?). 4. Serious work or activity (get down to business). 5. derog (a) an affair, a matter (sick of the whole business), (b) a structure (a lath-and-plaster business). 6. A thing or series of things needing to be dealt with (the business of the day). 7. Buying and selling, trade (good stroke of business).8. A commercial house or firm."
Since there is nothing in the Act to show that profit making activity alone is 'business' contemplated by the above extracted sub-clause in Section 10(3) of the Act, running a charitable clinic would also be 'business' within the meaning of the above sub-clause because it is a 'task' or 'duty'. This view of mine receives support from G.PAPA CHARI vs. THE COUNTRY TOBACCO MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION8 where also it is held that the activity of an Association formed to render aid and afford facilities to its members would fall within the meaning of 'business' used in the above sub-clause. So, the view taken by the learned Rent Controller and impliedly confirmed by the learned Chief Judge that running of a charitable clinic is not 'business' within the meaning of the above clause in the Act is not correct and I hold that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant on the ground that he bona fide requires the tenanted premises for running a public charitable clinic therein.
10. Inasmuch as the deceased, without starting the charitable clinic conceived by him in the portion shown as godown and store in Ex.P7 after it was vacated by Hoechst Company during the pendency of R.C., had let it out to Dyanora Company, the learned Rent Controller held that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. The learned Chief Judge in para 6 of the order under Revision held -
"It is not at all established by the appellants with reliable evidence on record that there is no other property belonging to the Trust excepting the demised premises. The alternative argument of appellants that they have no objection if the tenant seeks possession of the demised premises in the event of charitable clinic proposed not being established by the appellants within a stipulated period cannot be accepted inasmuch as the ground of bona fide requirement pleaded was not proved by the material evidence on record. Further more, the bona fide requirement must be immediate and pressing".
The deceased specifically alleged that he, with an intention to run a charitable clinic bequeathed the building to the Trust under his Will Ex.P6. The deceased, as P.W.1, stated during cross-examination that he would transfer the building to the Trust after it is vacated by the respondent. Therefore it is clear that the deceased intended to run the charitable clinic in the building only, but not anywhere else.
11. If in a petition filed seeking his eviction a tenant, in order to non-suit his landlord, takes a defence that he (the landlord) is in possession of another building, the burden of proof would be on the tenant to establish that fact. It is not the case of the respondent that 1st revision petitioner has some other premises apart from the building, which was bequeathed to it by the deceased. In fact in I.A.No.1140 of 1995 filed by the revision petitioners before the Chief Judge, the respondent did not take a plea that the 1st revision petitioner is in possession of some other premises and as such revision petitioners have no right to continue the appeal proceedings. When I.A.No.1140 of 1995 was allowed and the revision petitioners were permitted to come on record as legal representatives of the deceased and to continue the appeal proceedings instituted by the deceased, and when in that petition no plea was taken by the respondent that the 1st revision petitioner has some other premises apart from the building, the finding of the learned Chief Judge in above extracted para 6, that the revision petitioners failed to establish that they have no other property except the building is prima facie incorrect and is unsustainable.
12. Section 10(5)(a) of the Act reads-
"(a) Where a landlord who has obtained possession of a building in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3) does not himself occupy it and for the purpose specified in the order within one month of the date of obtaining possession, or having so occupied it, vacates it without reasonable cause within six months of such date, the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building and the Controller shall make an order accordingly notwithstanding anything in Section 3."
Thus by Section 10(5)(a) a 'tenant' evicted under Section 10(3) of the Act is statutorily empowered to recover possession of the premises from which he was ousted, from his erstwhile landlord, if he (the erstwhile landlord) failed to occupy the premises within one month after his obtaining possession thereof for the purpose for which he sought the eviction of his erstwhile tenant, or vacates it without reasonable cause within six months of its occupation, the question of not accepting to abide by the conditions in that Section does not arise more so because 1st revision petitioner, which is a Charitable Trust, would be governed by the provisions of the CHRIE Act, and so revision petitioners, of their own accord, and without reference to the Commissioner of Endowments cannot deal with the building in a manner they like, nor can they use the building for any other purpose.
13. When 1st revision petitioner does not have any other premises of its own except the building, and when it was given permission to prosecute the appeal preferred by the deceased after his death, it cannot but be said that the need of the 1st revision petitioner of the building to run a charitable clinic is bona fide. The learned Chief Judge who held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord must be immediate and pressing, did not elaborate as to why and how he thought that it is not so in this case. Landlords file petitions seeking eviction of their tenants for their immediate and pressing bona fide requirement. But unfortunately, for various reasons, it takes several years, though not decades, for the causes to be decided by Courts. A landlord cannot be non-suited on the ground that by the time the case reached the final stage his 'immediate and pressing' ceased to exist as held in GAYA PRASAD vs. PRADEEP SRIVASTAV8 relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents in another context.
14. KURIAKOSE KURIAN vs. SARAMMA CHACKO9 relied on by the learned counsel for respondent has no application to the facts of this case. In that case a landlord filed the petition for eviction of his tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent under Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease, and Rent Control) Order, 1950, which was allowed by the Rent Controller. Appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed by the appellate authority. Revision filed by tenant before the District Judge was also dismissed. During the pendency of Revision, Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance came into force, which was later replaced by an Act, the provisions of which are the same as that of the Ordinance. Under Section 11 of the said Act certain new rights were conferred on tenants. One such right was a right to deposit arrears of rent within one month from the date of order of eviction passed on the ground of his default in payment of rent, and to get the order of eviction vacated. In that case the tenant within three days of dismissal of his revision by the District Judge, after making the necessary deposit in the District Court, filed an application for vacating the order of eviction as per the provisions of the new Act. As per Section 11(2)(b) of the said Act the deposit has to be made before the 'Rent Control Court'. The question therefore was whether the deposit made by the tenant before the District Court can be considered as deposit in the 'Rent Control Court'. The Full Bench held that the expression 'the Rent Control Court' used in Section 11(2)(b) of the Act does not necessarily mean the original Rent Control Court in all the provisions where that expression occurs, and that expression will have that meaning only where that restricted meaning would not lead to any anomaly or absurdily, and so in the context expression 'Rent Control Court' used in Section 11(2)(b) would include both appellate and revisional authorities. SHAIK JEHANGIR vs. SMT.S.KAUSHILYA BAI10 , relied on by the learned counsel for respondent, also has no application to the facts of this case. In that case the Subordinate Judge (appellate authority under the Act) found that claim for bona fide requirement of the landlord under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act did not survive after he executed a registered sale deed in favour of a third party purchaser. Treating the alienation as a subsequent event the High Court, on revision by landlord, remanded the case for fresh disposal. After remand subsequent purchaser was added as a respondent. Taking into consideration the proviso to Section 10(3)(iii) of the Act, which places an embargo on a transferee from the landlord by a document inter vivos, instituting proceedings for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his personal necessity for a period of three months from the date of purchase, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the tenant, and dismissed the eviction petition filed by the landlord giving liberty to the subsequent purchaser to institute fresh proceedings for eviction of the tenant. Proviso to Section 10(3) of the Act has no application to the revision petitioners because they are claiming through Ex.P6 Will of the deceased, which is not a document inter vivos.
15. Learned counsel for the respondent relying on GAYA PRASAD (8 supra) contended that the crucial date for considering the bona fide need of a landlord is only the date of petition, and since 1st revision petitioner was not in existence on the date of petition, revision petitioners are not entitled to any relief. Ex facie the said contention appears to be correct. But on deeper examination, I am of the opinion that the requirement of the deceased and also that of 1st revision petitioner, of the building is bona fide, for the following reasons. A landlord has a right to choose any premises of his for the purpose of the business he intends to commence, and so the tenant against whom he (landlord) files a petition for eviction under the above extracted sub-clause in Section 10(3) of the Act cannot be heard to say that the landlord should have chosen the building in the occupation of some other tenant for his business. Since I held that running of charitable clinic is 'business' for the purpose of Section 10(3) of the Act, the deceased was entitled to seek eviction of the respondent on the ground that he intends to run a charitable clinic in the building. It is no doubt true that the burden of proof that his need was bona fide was on the deceased. The reasoning of the learned Rent Controller, which impliedly was confirmed by the learned Chief Judge, for holding that the need of the deceased was not bona fide appears to be erroneous. If portions shown as B, C, D and northern part of A shown in Ex.P7 were in the occupation of different tenants and if the godown and store portion shown in Ex.P7 was let out to a stranger tenant, there may be a scope for an inference being drawn against the deceased in respect of bona fide need, but such inference cannot be drawn in this case. Though the area in occupation of Hoechst Company is not mentioned in Ex.P7, respondent elicited its area during the cross-examination of P.W.1. The relevant portion of deposition of P.W.1 reads-
"The portion shown as godown and stores in Ex.P7 was occupied by Hoechst and he vacated the same during pending of this case. Again it was let out to the Associates of Dyanora Company during pending of this case. I have executed a lease deed in respect of the above godown in 1990. I can't say whether the extent of it is 500 sq. yards. It may be more than 1000 or so sq. Yards."
Obviously 'square yards' is a mistake for 'square feet' because Ex.P7 the area is shown in square feet. During the earlier part of his cross-examination P.W.1 stated that portions shown as B, C and D in Ex.P7 were let out to Dyanora T.V. in about 1977. During cross-examination on a subsequent day he stated that portions shown as 'A' 'B' 'C' 'D' in Ex.P7 were let out to Dyanora Vision and their associates, and that 'D' marked portion in Ex.P7 was under the tenancy of Infer Agencies, and after that tenant vacated 'D' marked portion shown in Ex.P7 in 1981-82, that 'D' marked portion also was let out to Dyanora Vision. The portions shown as A,B,C,D in Ex.P7 are contiguous. Portion shown as 'A' in Ex.P7 is in three parts from South to North. Southern-most part consists of some rooms and open area, water closet and bath room. The middle portion consists of stores and godown. The northern-most portion is a shop room. From the cross-examination of P.W.1 it is clear that except the middle portion shown as 'store' and 'godown' in Ex.P7, the remaining portion of 'A', along with portions shown as B, C and D in Ex.P7 were in the possession of Dyanora Company and (or) its associates, while an area of about 1000 sq.ft shown as 'store' and 'godown' in 'A' marked portion of Ex.P7 was in possession of Hoechst Company as tenant. When Dyanora and its associates were in occupation of the entire ground floor area except the godown and store portion shown in Ex.P7, on vacation of the godown and stores by Hoechst Company during the pendency of R.C., Dyanora Associates making a request to the deceased to let out that portion to them, obviously for godown purpose, cannot be ruled out, because it would be very convenient for them to have godown near the place of business. Since the deceased contemplated running of the charitable clinic in the building only and bequeathed the building to the 1st revision petitioner, and had already filed a petition seeking eviction of the respondent, he might have thought that he could lease out the godown and store shown in Ex.P7 to Dyanora Associates under an impression that he can run the clinic in the building after obtaining possession thereof. So no mala fides can be attributed to the deceased for his letting out the godown and store portion in Ex.P7 to Dyanora Associates after vacation by Hoechst Company. As per the ratio in GAYA PRASAD (8 supra) the need of the deceased on the date of petition only would be relevant. Therefore his letting out the godown and store marked portion in Ex.P7, which fell vacant some years after his filing of R.C., to the same tenant, who is in occupation of the entire remaining area in the ground floor cannot be a ground for holding that the need of the deceased of the building was not bona fide. Since the deceased ear-marked the building for the charitable clinic, he cannot be expected to start the charitable clinic intend to be started by him in the building, in any premises that falls vacant during the pendency of the R.C. Hence the deceased not starting a charitable clinic in the godown and stores portion shown in Ex.P7, during the pendency of the R.C., cannot be taken as a ground to non-suit the deceased.
17. Recently the Supreme Court in JOGINDER PAL vs. NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL11 considered the scope of the expression 'for his own use, used in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and held that that expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning, and the requirement of the premises need not be the requirement of the landlord alone, in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation, and that he himself must physically occupy the premises, and that the requirement of a member of the family or of a person on which he is dependant, or who is dependant on him can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord 'for his own use'. The ratio in that decision applies to the facts of this case also because the deceased sought eviction of the respondent from the building on the ground he wants to run a charitable clinic therein. When the charitable Trust comes into operation, it, no doubt, becomes a separate entity and would be juristic person. But the Trust being a creation of the deceased, would be his baby, and so the need of the Trust would also be the need of the deceased. The deceased, thus, satisfied all the ingredients required for seeking eviction of the respondent from the building under the above extracted clause of Section 10(3) of the Act. So, had the deceased been alive and had he himself filed this revision, for the reasons mentioned above, it would have to be allowed. After the death of the deceased during the pendency of the appeal, since the cause of action survived revision petitioners were allowed to come on record and continue the appeal. Therefore revision petitioners, on the same cause of action on which the deceased filed the R.C. can seek eviction of the respondent from the building. They need not file a fresh petition seeking eviction of the respondent on the ground that 1st revision petitioner came into existence after the death of the deceased. Therefore I hold that the revision petitioners are entitled to seek eviction of the respondent from the building. The point is answered accordingly.
18. In the result, the revision is allowed. The order in R.A.No.134 of 1994 on the file of the Court of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, is set aside and R.C.No.231 of 1988 on the file of the Court of the Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad is allowed. The respondent shall vacate the R.C. schedule building and put the revision petitioners in possession thereof before the end of December, 2002. No costs. A copy of this order shall be communicated to the Commissioner of Endowments for information.