Allahabad High Court
Irfan And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 1 March, 2023
Author: Samit Gopal
Bench: Samit Gopal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 69 Serial No. 13 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD *** APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 7589 of 2023 Irfan And 3 Others .....Applicant Through :- Ali Qambar Zaidi v/s State of U.P. and Another .....Opposite Party Through :- G.A. CORAM : HON'BLE SAMIT GOPAL, JUDGE ORDER 1. List revised. 2. Sri Ali Qambar Zaidi, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri B.B. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the State and perused the record. 3. The present application under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicants Irfan, Jaipal, Nawab and Islam with the prayer to quash the summoning order dated 13.01.2023 as well as charge sheet No. 1 dated 15.12.2022 and all further proceedings in Case No. 1766 of 2023 arising out of Case Crime No. 249 of 2022, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 452, 471, 147, 506 IPC P.S. Kandhla, District Shamli, pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shamli and with a further prayer to stay the further proceedings of the said case, during the pendency of the present application. 4. The First Information Report in the present case was lodged by the opposite party no.2 Abbas against the applicants and Mohd. Tayyab on the basis of an application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. stating therein that he wanted purchase a house, the accused persons told him of a house having an area of 116.86 square yards in mohallah Shekhjaadgan, Kasba Kandhla and stated of having equal shares in the same and in possession of it along with Smt. Jareena and told him that they are the legal heirs of Abdul Waheed. They decided to sell the house of Mohd. Tayyab for Rs. 10,20,000/- and after getting the said amount a sale deed was executed by Smt. Jareena and Mohd. Tayyab which was registered. The first informant is since then living with his family in the said house. The accused are now threatening him to vacate the house by stating that Mohd. Tayyab is not son of the deceased Abdul Waheed and is neither his legal heir, he is son of Saukat. Abdul Waheed had no children. The accused persons by cheating in order to earn money illegally got the sale deed executed by Mohd. Tayyab showing him to be son of Abdul Waheed instead of Saukat. They also got a forged Aadhar Card, a forged Voter ID made in which the name of father of Mohd. Tayyab was shown as Abdul Waheed in place of Saukat. They have thus cheated the government also. He has come to know that Mohd. Tayyab is a resident of village Lisarh and has studied upto Class-5. In the school records, the name of his father is mentioned as Saukat Ali. In the registration certificate of his motorcycle also his father's name is mentioned as Saukat Ali. In an application under the Special Marriage Act his father's name is mentioned as Saukat. There is already a First Information Report lodged against Mohd. Tayyab as Case Crime No. 618 of 2007, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC in which also his father's name is mentioned as Saukat. The accused persons are Bhumafia and are of criminal nature who forcibly have taken over the land of many people. The accused persons have cheated the first informant of Rs. 10,20,000/- and have committed forgery and now want to oust him from the house. On 15.05.2022 at about 06:00 pm they forcibly entered in his house and threatened him either to vacate the house or they would get him implicated in a false case punishable with life imprisonment. The matter was investigated and a charge sheet dated 15.12.2022 was filed against the applicants and Mohd. Tayyab on which the trial court vide its order dated 13.01.2023 took cognizance and summoned the applicants and Mohd. Tayyab to face trial. The applicants are thus before this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the applicants argued that the dispute between the parties is a civil dispute. It is argued that the applicant no. 1/Irfan is the owner and bonafide purchaser of the house stated to have been purchased by the opposite party no.2. The applicant no.2/Jaipal was the previous owner of the said house which was sold by him to the applicant no.1. The applicant no. 3 and 4 are the witnesses to the sale deed. It is argued that in the year 2019 a residential house measuring about 101.35 square meter was sold by Mohd. Tayyab which was situated in Mohallah Sheikhzadgan to the applicant no.2/Jaipal for which a sale deed was executed on 20.11.2019. Subsequently, another sale deed dated 29.12.2021 was executed by which Jaipal/applicant no.2 sold 97.74 square meter to the applicant no.1/Irfan. The applicant no. 1 took possession of the said property. He also purchased another property measuring 7.015 square meter. On 31.12.2021 the applicant no.1 came to know that the house which he purchased from Jaipal/applicant no.2 has been sold by Tayyab and his mother to Abbas the opposite party no.2 by executing the sale deed. It is argued that the said sale deed is a void sale deed. It is further argued that the applicant no.1 filed a suit seeking permanent injunction against the opposite party no.2 and other persons and also for cancellation of the sale deed executed by Mohd. Tayyab in favour of the opposite party no.2. The said suit is pending before the concerned civil court. It is argued that the present proceedings do not make out a case against the applicants. The allegations are absurd and inherently false in the present matter. The proceedings initiated before the trial court be quashed. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer for quashing and argued that the applicants are named in the First Information Report. There are allegations against them. It is argued that the first informant/opposite party no.2 has been cheated by the accused persons and Mohd. Tayyab. Even he was threatened by them. There are allegations in the First Information Report against them. The matter was investigated and the charge sheet has been submitted against them and Mohd. Tayyab on which the trial court has taken cognizance and summoned them to face trial. It is argued that as such the allegations are made out against them. 7. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and perusing the records, it is evident that the applicants are named in the First Information Report and there are allegations against them. The matter was investigated and charge sheet has been submitted against the applicants and Mohd. Tayyab. Prima facie, allegations are made out against the applicants. The order impugned summoning the applicants is an order on merits passed by the trial court by which the applicants have been summoned. 8. The Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta : (2004) 1 SCC 691 has in paragraphs 8 to 13 has held that High Court cannot appreciate evidence but can evaluate material and documents on records to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, it is not proper for High Court to act upon documents annexed to the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the annexures to the petition cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. The same read as under: "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239] this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR para 6) 10. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of the rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. (See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .) It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceedings instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court which decide the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142 : AIR 1990 SC 494], State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304], State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497], Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415], Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401 : AIR 1999 SC 1216].] (emphasis supplied) 12. These aspects were also highlighted in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] . 13. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal [(1992) 3 SCC 317 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 636] it was observed that when the materials relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude the complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under Section 482 of the Code, which cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. When the factual position of the case at hand is considered in the light of principles of law highlighted, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in quashing the investigation and proceedings in the connected case (Crime No. 116 of 1994) registered by the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta, Gwalior. We set aside the impugned judgment. The State shall be at liberty to proceed in the matter further. (emphasis supplied)" 9. In the case of U.P. Pollution Control Board Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Modi : (2009) 2 SCC 147, Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of Maharashtra : (2013) 14 SCC 44, Sonu Gua Vs. Deepak Gupta and others : (2015) 3 SCC 424 it has been held by the Apex Court that while issuing summons to accused u/s 204 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate has only to see whether allegations made in complaint are prima facie sufficient to proceed against the accused. Magistrate need not enquire into merits or demerits of case. 10. In the cases of Bhushan Kumar Vs. State of NCT of Delhi : (2012) 2 SCC 424, Nupur Talwar Vs. CBI : (2012) 11 SCC 465, Dy. Chief Controller Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal : (2003) 4 SCC 139 and Kanti Bhadra Shah Vs. State of W.B. : (2000) 1 SCC 722 it has been held by the Apex Court that in determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. There is no legal requirement imposed on a magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons. The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a speaking order. Section 204 Cr.P.C. does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. 11. Further in the case of Priti Saraf & anr. Vs. State of NCT of Delhi & anr. : 2021 SCC Online SC 206 the Apex Court while considering the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. relying upon the judgements rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Bhajan Lal and Others : (1992) Suppl (1) SCC 335 and Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others : (2021) 2 SCC 427 has held that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an extraordinary power which has to be exercised with great care and circumspection before embarking to scrutinise the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in deciding whether the case is the rarest of rare case, to scuttle the prosecution at its inception. It has further been held that existence of a civil remedy and initiation of it will not in any manner be an abuse of process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing such proceedings. 12. Thus, it is trite law that at the stage of quashing only the material of the prosecution has to be seen and the court cannot delve into the defence of the accused and then proceed to examine the matter on its merit by weighing the evidence so produced. The disputed questions of facts of the case cannot be adjudged and adjudicated at this stage while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and only the prima facie prosecution case has to be looked into and as it is. Evidence needs to be led to substantiate the defence of the accused. 13. Looking to the facts of the case, the prima facie allegation against the applicant and the law as stated above, no case for interference is made out. The present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is thus dismissed. (Samit Gopal) Judge Allahabad 01.03.2023 M. ARIF Whether the order is speaking : Yes Whether the order is reportable : No