Chattisgarh High Court
Anil Tuteja vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 15 May, 2026
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2026:CGHC:23373
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MCRCA No. 492 of 2026
Order reserved on 01/05/2026
Order delivered on 15/05/2026
1 - Anil Tuteja S/o Late H.L. Tuteja Aged About 63 Years R/o House No.
35/1396, Beside Farishta Nursing Home, Katora Talab, Civil Lines, District-
Raipur (C.G.)
... Applicant(s)
versus
1 - Central Bureau Of Investigation Through Superintendent Of Police, Cbi,
Eo-Iii, New Delhi
... Non-applicant(s)
For Applicant(s) : Mr. Arshdeep Singh Khurana, Advocate along
with Mr. Ankush Borkar, Advocate.
For Non-applicant(s) : Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
C.A.V. Order
1. This is the First Anticipatory bail application of the applicant Anil Tuteja, under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, apprehending his arrest in the offence of Crime Number RC2212024E0024, dated 18-12-2024, registered at Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi, (hereinafter called as "CBI") for the offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 and 120-B of the Digitally signed by IPC, Section 7 and 7A, of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.05.19 14:32:57 +0530 2 amended in the year 2018), Section 4, 7, 8 and 11 of the Chhattisgarh Gambling (Prohibition) Act, 2022 and Section 4-A of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 {as amended Public Gambling (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1976}.
2. The instant anticipatory bail application is filed by the applicant directly to this Court as per the direction given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its order dated 09-03-2026, passed in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 19892 of 2025, whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted liberty to the applicant to approach this Court for grant of regular/anticipatory bail. As the case may be.
3. Brief facts of the case of the prosecution are that an FIR of Crime No 112/2022 was registered on 29.07.2022 at Police Station Mohan Nagar, Durg (C.G.) under Section 4-A of the Public Gambling (C.G. Amendment) Act, 1976, and Section 420, 120-B of the IPC and also for Section 66-D of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Enforcement Directorate had registered the Enforcement Case Information Report (hereinafter referred to as 'ECIR') No. ECIR/RPZO/10/2022. Initially, treating the FIR No. 112/2022 of P.S. Mohan Nagar, Durg and the final report dated 29.07.2022 as a scheduled/predicate offence, the respondent ED registered the ECIR No. RPZO/09/2022, which was renumbered as ECIR No. RPZ0/10/2022 vide corrigendum dated 07.11.2022 issued by the ED.
4. On 20.10.2023, the ED has filed its first prosecution complaint against 14 accused persons, alleging that the online gambling app in the name of Mahadev Online Book is established for illegal betting in different live games like; poker, card games, chance games, betting on cricket, badminton, tennis, football, etc. and also to provide facility for playing a 3 number of card games like; teen patti, dragon tiger, virtual cricket games using cards, etc. It is also alleged that the Mahadev Online Book advertised these betting websites through closed WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages.
5. Thereafter, the ED filed three supplementary prosecution complaints on different dates, under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money- Laundering Act, 2002 (in short "PMLA-2002"), against a total of 31 additional accused persons for the commission of the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of PMLA-2002. On 19.01.2024, the learned Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence mentioned in the main prosecution complaint as well as the first supplementary complaint and summoned the accused persons.
6. The Anti-Corruption Bureau, Economic Offence Wing, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, on the information shared by the ED under Section 66 (2) of the PMLA-2002, on 04-03-2024, registered an offence of Crime No. 06/2024, for the offence under Section 120-B, 34, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC, Section 7 and 11 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in the year 2018), against 19 named and other accused persons including the bureaucrats, police officials and other individuals. In the said Crime No. 06/2024, registered at ACB/EOW, Raipur, the original Charge-Sheet has been filed on 19-07-2024, and the first supplementary Charge-Sheet has been filed on 08-10-2024.
7. The allegation in the FIR of Crime No. 06/2024 registered at ACB/EOW was that the promoters of the Mahadev Book App, namely Ravi Uppal, Shubham Soni, Saurabh Chandrakar and Anil Kumar Agrawal, established and operated a large-scale organized online betting network by creating various online platforms and websites for illegal 4 betting on live games. The betting operations were promoted and conducted through digital applications and social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Telegram, and were managed through a network of panel operators, branch operators, and checkers functioning under the control and supervision of the promoters. The investigation reveals that after the COVID-19 lockdown in the year 2020, the syndicate expanded substantially and generated illegal proceeds estimated at nearly Rs. 450 crores per month, out of which a major portion was allegedly retained by the promoters while the remaining amount was distributed among panel operators and other associates. Numerous bank accounts were opened using forged and fabricated documents for layering and routing the proceeds of crime, and several bank accounts were procured on commission basis for conducting transactions related to betting activities. The illegally generated funds were allegedly transferred through multiple banking channels and hawala networks to the United Arab Emirates. It has also been alleged that substantial amounts derived from illegal betting were utilized for promotion and advertisement of betting websites, including organizing extravagant star-studded events where celebrities and influential personalities were paid from the proceeds of crime. The investigation additionally reveals that the accused persons invested large amounts of the illegal proceeds in companies, shell entities, share markets, immovable properties, and cryptocurrencies in an attempt to project the tainted money as untainted assets. In order to shield the illegal betting operations from legal and statutory action, the promoters allegedly paid huge amounts as "protection money" to certain police officials, administrative officers, and influential political 5 persons through hawala operators and intermediaries, including certain police personnel. By abusing their official positions and receiving illegal pecuniary benefits, several persons are alleged to have acquired disproportionate and unlawful assets, some of which have already been provisionally attached by the Enforcement Directorate. The investigation also refers to the involvement of Harishankar Tibrewal, who allegedly operated another betting platform known as Sky Exchange, in respect of which properties worth approximately Rs. 580 crores have been attached by the Enforcement Directorate. Thus, prima facie, the material collected during the investigation discloses the existence of a well-organised criminal conspiracy involving illegal online betting, generation and laundering of huge proceeds of crime, use of shell entities and hawala channels for concealment of funds, and active connivance of various associates and public servants.
8. Thereafter, vide notification dated 11-12-2024, issued under Section 5(1) and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, with the consent of the State Government of Chhattisgarh, the above-said Crime No. 06/2024 of ACB/EOW, was transferred to CBI, and then the CBI registered the Crime No. RC2212024E0024 on 18-12-2024, for the offence punishable under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201 and 120-B of the IPC, Section 7 and 7A, of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in the year 2018), Section 4, 7, 8 and 11 of the Chhattisgarh Gambling (Prohibition) Act, 2022 and Section 4-A of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 {as amended Public Gambling (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1976}, in which the applicant is apprehending his arrest.
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9. Since various FIRs have been registered by the State Police, ED, ACB/EOW, Raipur, the petitioner approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Crl.) No. 19892/2025 claiming protection against any further arrest or coercive action in connection with various FIRs, including the ECIR/RPZO/10/2022, registered by ED, and Crime No. 06/2024 registered on 04-03-2024 by the ACB/EOW, Raipur, which relates to the "Mahadev App" case. In the SLP (Crl.) No. 19892/2025, the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed an order on 09-03-2026 by which the SLP is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court for the grant of regular/anticipatory bail, as the case may be. Hence, this anticipatory bail application was directly filed before this Court.
10. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the applicant is a retired IAS officer and served 34 years as a Civil Servant in the State of Chhattisgarh. He retired from the post of Joint Secretary, Department of Commerce and Industries, Chhattisgarh, in May 2023. On the behest of the ruling party, numerous FIRs have been registered against the applicant by local police, ED, ACB/EOW and CBI. For the last 10 years, he has been facing litigation initiated by different investigation agencies. He would further argue that the investigating agencies, having failed to justify indefinite custody in any single case, have resorted to successive and overlapping arrests by reviving stale allegations pertaining to alleged scams dating back to the period 2019- 2023, including the Custom Rice Milling Scam, Coal Scam, Mahadev Online Betting Scam and DMF Scam, solely with the object of perpetuating the Applicant's incarceration. It is contended that, although these FIRs were registered as far back as January, 2024, 7 active steps for arrest were initiated only after a lapse of nearly 1.5 to 2 years and significantly at stages when the Applicant was on the verge of securing bail in previously instituted cases, thereby demonstrating a deliberate attempt to "evergreen" custody. Reliance has been placed upon the affidavit dated 25.09.2024 filed by the State of Chhattisgarh before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in WP (Crl.) No. 506/2021 alleging the Applicant's involvement in multiple scams, as also on the fact that despite such allegations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by order dated 16.09.2025, passed in SLP (Crl.) No. 6323/2020, directed the Applicant's release after approximately four weeks of custody in the alleged NAN ED case, which, according to the Applicant, demonstrates that the continuing arrests are punitive in nature and violative of the Applicant's right to personal liberty.
11. Learned Counsel for the Applicant has further argued that the Applicant has been falsely sought to be implicated in the alleged Mahadev Online Betting Scam despite there being no material whatsoever connecting him to the allegations forming subject matter of the investigation. It is submitted that neither in FIR No. 112/2022 dated 30.03.2022, which constituted the foundational FIR relating to the Mahadev Book case, nor in the chargesheet dated 29.07.2022 filed therein, was the Applicant arraigned as an accused or attributed any role. It is further contended that even after registration of ECIR No. ECIR/RPZO/10/2022 by the ED on 06.10.2022 and subsequent addendums thereto, as well as in several connected FIRs registered across different States and the prosecution complaints filed by the ED, the Applicant was neither named as an accused nor was any overt act or allegation attributed to him. Learned Counsel submits that even FIR 8 No. 06/2024 registered by ACB/EOW, Raipur and the chargesheets filed pursuant thereto do not disclose any allegation against the Applicant, thereby demonstrating that the present proceedings are wholly mala fide and intended solely to harass the Applicant and perpetuate his incarceration. It is argued that only after the Hon'ble Supreme Court appeared disinclined to interfere with the anticipatory bail granted to the Applicant in the NAN ECIR matter did the State and the ED file affidavits before the Hon'ble Supreme Court alleging that the Applicant had "conceptualised, conspired and committed" various scams, including the Mahadev Scam, despite the absence of any credible material against him. It has further been submitted that even after transfer of investigation to the CBI pursuant to notification dated 11.12.2024, search operations conducted at the Applicant's premises on 26.03.2025 and interrogation of the Applicant yielded no incriminating material and no proceedings have till date been initiated against him, which according to the Applicant clearly establishes that the continued attsmpt to implicate him is an abuse of process undertaken with the sole object of extending his pre-trial custody through successive proceedings.
12. Learned Counsel for the Applicant has also submitted that the Applicant has been subjected to prolonged and successive incarceration for a period exceeding 23 months owing to a concerted and mala fide exercise undertaken by multiple investigating agencies acting in tandem with one another. It is submitted that each subsequent arrest has been strategically timed at stages when the Applicant was on the verge of securing release or obtaining bail in the preceding case, thereby frustrating the effect of judicial orders and converting the grant 9 of bail into a mere "paper bail". According to the Applicant, the arrest in the Custom Rice Milling Scam FIR was effected when the Applicant was about to be released in the Chhattisgarh Liquor FIR, while the subsequent arrest in the DMF Scam FIR was carried out when the Applicant's bail application in the only surviving case was reserved for orders by this Court, clearly demonstrating a deliberate pattern of "insurance arrests" intended solely to evergreen custody and ensure indefinite pre-trial detention. Learned Counsel submits that such conduct amounts to a colourable exercise of power and manifest abuse of process in violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and is contrary to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Uday Chand v. Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah and Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand. It is further argued that despite the Applicant having remained in judicial custody for a substantial period, having already been interrogated by the CBI in relation to the CBI Mahadev FIR, and despite searches conducted at his premises, no incriminating material has surfaced and no proceedings have been initiated against him therein, which itself demonstrates the absence of any substantive case against the Applicant. It is thus contended that there existed no impediment preventing the agencies from investigating while the Applicant was already in custody, and the continuing threat of arrest in successive cases is being retained only as a tool of harassment and to perpetuate the Applicant's incarceration.
13. It is also argued that all other accused persons have been granted bail by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the applicant is also entitled to 10 anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. The similarly situated accused Satish Chandra Verma has been granted anticipatory bail vide order dated 08-10-2025, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 4424/2025.
14. Learned Counsel for the Applicant has lastly submitted that the entire attempt to implicate the Applicant in the alleged Mahadev Scam is wholly unsupported by any contemporaneous material and is demonstrably an afterthought introduced only to justify continued incarceration. It is submitted that although the Directorate of Enforcement registered the subject ECIR on 06.10.2022 and thereafter filed one Prosecution Complaint and three supplementary Prosecution Complaints against several accused persons, the Applicant was never named as an accused nor attributed any role therein. Similarly, in as many as seven FIRs and chargesheets which formed the predicate offences for the said ECIR, the Applicant was neither arraigned as an accused nor was any allegation levelled against him. Learned Counsel submits that even FIR No. 06/2024 registered by ACB/EOW, Raipur based on a communication issued by the ED under Section 66(2) of the PMLA, and the two charge sheets filed therein against 18 accused persons, do not contain the Applicant's name or disclose any overt act attributable to him. It is further argued that, after transfer of investigation to the CBI, searches conducted at the Applicant's premises on 26.03.2025 and interrogation of the Applicant in Central Jail, Raipur, also failed to yield any incriminating material, thereby completely undermining the prosecution theory and establishing absence of any cogent or legally admissible material against the Applicant. Learned Counsel has also pointed out that even in the reply filed by the CBI before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 11 19892/2025, no allegation relating to the Mahadev Scam was made against the Applicant. According to the Applicant, except for the affidavit dated 25.09.2024 filed by the State of Chhattisgarh, there exists no material connecting the Applicant with the alleged Mahadev Scam, and even the said affidavit does not disclose any factual basis or substantive material for the allegations levelled therein. It is thus contended that the belated allegations are inherently contradictory and implausible, inasmuch as a person now alleged to have "conceptualized" the entire scam was never named either in the FIRs or in the charge-sheets despite investigation continuing for more than two years. Therefore, the applicant may be granted anticipatory bail in the present offence of Crime Number RC2212024E0024, dated 18-12- 2024, registered at the Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi.
15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/CBI opposes the submissions of learned counsel of the applicant and would submit that the present anticipatory bail application is devoid of merit. The FIR in question was initially registered as FIR No. 06/2024 at Police Station State Economic Offence Bureau, Raipur, pursuant to material received from the Enforcement Directorate in ECIR/RPZO/10/2022, disclosing commission of serious cognizable offences involving criminal conspiracy, cheating, forgery, corruption and illegal online betting operations connected with the Mahadev Book App syndicate. Subsequently, by Notification No. F-4-156/Home/C/2024 dated 04.10.2024 issued by the Government of Chhattisgarh under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946, and the corresponding notification issued by the Central Government under Section 5 of the DSPE Act, the investigation was transferred to the CBI and re-registered as RC No. 12 2212024E0024 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201, 120-B IPC, Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and provisions of the Chhattisgarh Gambling (Prohibition) Act, 2022 and Section 4(a), 5 of the Public Gambling Act. Investigation has revealed a massive illegal betting racket operated by accused Ravi Uppal, Saurabh Chandrakar and their associates through online platforms, generating illegal proceeds estimated at approximately Rs. 450 crores per month, which were routed through fake bank accounts, hawala channels and foreign transactions to UAE, besides being used for promotion and protection of the betting syndicate.
16. It is further submitted that during the course of investigation, the role of the present applicant, Anil Tuteja, has surfaced as a suspect and several crucial aspects relating to financial trails, digital evidence, conspiracy linkages and illegal protection money are still under active investigation. The investigation has disclosed that the promoters of Mahadev Book App secured protection from police officials, administrative officers and influential political persons by paying huge amounts of illegal gratification through hawala operators and intermediaries. The Respondent submits that the applicant cannot seek blanket protection merely on the basis of his past service record or retired status. Holding a high public office does not grant immunity from investigation where allegations pertain to abuse of official position and corruption nexus. The allegations made by the applicant regarding mala fide investigation, political vendetta, fabrication of evidence and "evergreening of arrest" are wholly baseless, misleading and unsupported by any material. The fact that the applicant has not yet been arraigned as an accused in earlier FIRs or ECIRs itself 13 demonstrates that the investigating agencies have acted fairly, independently and strictly in accordance with law.
17. The Respondent further submits that the applicant has failed to demonstrate any genuine or reasonable apprehension of arrest warranting exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C. The investigation in the Mahadev matter has been ongoing since 2022, and despite several FIRs, complaints and proceedings by multiple agencies, no arbitrary action has been taken against the applicant. The present application is therefore based only upon speculative apprehensions and an attempt to create obstacles in the ongoing investigation. The plea of parity raised by the applicant is equally misconceived because the role of each accused or suspect is distinct and has to be examined independently in light of the material collected during the investigation. The applicant's contention that no incriminating material exists is premature at this stage, particularly when searches, examination of witnesses and collection of digital and financial evidence are still continuing under judicial supervision.
18. Lastly, the Respondent/CBI submits that the applicant does not satisfy the settled parameters governing grant of anticipatory bail. The offences involved are grave economic offences affecting public interest and involving deep-rooted criminal conspiracy, corruption and laundering of illegal betting proceeds. The applicant is an influential person and there exists a substantial likelihood of influencing witnesses, tampering with digital and documentary evidence, and obstructing the course of investigation. Since several accused persons are absconding and the investigation is at a crucial stage, custodial interrogation may become necessary depending upon the evidence 14 collected. The apprehensions projected by the applicant are imaginary and intended solely to secure an omnibus protection order against lawful investigation. In these circumstances, the Respondent respectfully prays that the anticipatory bail application deserves to be dismissed.
19. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case diary and has gone through the material annexed with the bail application.
20. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon perusal of the case diary, FIR, material collected during investigation and the documents placed on record, this Court finds that the present case pertains to a large-scale and organized illegal online betting syndicate popularly known as the "Mahadev Online Book App" scam, involving allegations of criminal conspiracy, illegal betting operations, forgery, cheating, laundering of proceeds of crime and corruption involving public servants and influential individuals. The material collected during the investigation prima facie discloses that the promoters of the Mahadev Book App, namely Ravi Uppal, Saurabh Chandrakar and their associates, established and operated multiple online betting platforms and applications through a network of panel operators, branch operators and checkers functioning across several States and foreign jurisdictions. The investigation further reveals that the syndicate generated illegal proceeds to the tune of approximately Rs.450 crores per month after the COVID-19 lockdown period and that such proceeds were routed through fake bank accounts, shell entities, hawala channels and overseas transactions to the UAE. The prosecution has also alleged that huge amounts of money generated from betting activities were utilized for organizing promotional events, 15 advertisements and acquisition of properties and other assets with an attempt to project tainted money as untainted assets. The allegations further disclose that certain public servants, police officials and influential political persons received illegal gratification in the nature of "protection money" in order to shield the illegal betting operations from legal action. Considering the nature and magnitude of the allegations, the offences alleged cannot be treated as ordinary offences and constitute grave economic offences affecting the financial and administrative fabric of society.
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs. CBI, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 439 has held in para 34 and 35 of its judgment that "34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.
35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, 16 reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.
22. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v.
Union of India", 2023 (12) SCC 1, has held that:
"300. Thus, it is well settled by the various decisions of this Court and policy of the State as also the view of international community that the offence of money-laundering is committed by an individual with a deliberate design with the motive to enhance his gains, disregarding the interests of nation and society as a whole and which by no stretch of imagination can be termed as offence of trivial nature. Thus, it is in the interest of the State that law enforcement agencies should be provided with a proportionate effective mechanism so as to deal with these types of offences as the wealth of the nation is to be safeguarded from these dreaded criminals.
As discussed above, the conspiracy of money-laundering, which is a three-staged process, is hatched in secrecy and executed in darkness, thus, it becomes imperative for the State to frame such a stringent law, which not only punishes the offender 17 proportionately, but also helps in preventing the offence and creating a deterrent effect."
23. The record further reflects that the present FIR initially came to be registered as Crime No.06/2024 at Police Station ACB/EOW, Raipur on the basis of information shared by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 66(2) of the PMLA pursuant to ECIR No. ECIR/RPZO/10/2022. Thereafter, considering the inter-State ramifications, complexity of the financial transactions and the involvement of multiple accused persons operating through organized channels, the investigation was transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation by notifications issued under Sections 5 and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and the same was re-registered as RC No. RC2212024E0024 dated 18.12.2024. The investigation is still in progress, and the prosecution has specifically contended that crucial aspects relating to digital evidence, financial trails, hawala transactions, conspiracy linkages and the role of several persons, including public servants, are yet to be fully unearthed. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that offences involving economic fraud, corruption and organized criminal conspiracy are generally committed in secrecy and require thorough investigation involving scrutiny of electronic devices, banking transactions and interlinked financial structures. At this stage, when the investigation is admittedly continuing, and the prosecution asserts that custodial interrogation may become necessary depending upon the evidence collected, this Court is of the considered opinion that the grant of anticipatory bail may adversely affect the course of investigation.
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24. In the case of "Gurubaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab" 1980 (2) SCC 565, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
"31. In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting antici-patory bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reason-able apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and "the larger interests of the public or the State" are some of the 19 considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail. The relevance of these considerations was pointed out in The State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, AIR 1962 SC 253 which, though, was a case under the old Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code. It is of paramount consideration to remember that the freedom of the individual is as necessary for the survival of the society as it is for the egoistic purposes of the indi-vidual. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may think fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail.
32. A word of caution may perhaps be necessary in the the consideration whether the applicant is likely to abscond. evaluation of There can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it. In his charge to the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899 (to which Krishna Iyer, J. has referred in Gudikanti¹), Lord Russel of Killowen said: (SCC p. 243, para 5) ........it was the duty of magistrates to admit accused persons to bail, 20 wherever practicable, unless there were strong grounds for supposing that such persons would not appear to take their trial. It was not the poorer classes who did not appear, for their circumstances were such the to tie them to the place where they carried on their work. They had the golden wings with which to fly from justice.
This, incidentally, will serve to show how no hard and fast rules can be laid down in discretionary matters like the grant or refusal of bail, whether anticipatory or otherwise. No such rules can be laid down for the simple reason that a circumstance which, in a given case, turns out to be conclusive, may have no more than ordinary signification another case.
33. We would, therefore, prefer to leave the High Court and the Court of Session to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion which, by their long training and experience, they are ideally suited to do. The ends of justice will be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consonance with principles governing the grant of bail which are recognised over the years, than by divesting them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. It is customary, almost chronic, to take a statute as one finds it on the ground that, after all, "the legislature in its wisdom"
has thought it fit to use a particular 21 expression. A convention may usefully grow whereby the High Court and the Court of Session may be trusted to exercise their discretionary powers in their wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted to their care by the legislature in its wisdom. If they err, they are liable to be corrected.
34. This should be the end of the matter, but it is necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.
35. Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested for a non- bailable offence. The use of the expression "reason to believe" shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere 'fear' is not 'belief', for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of 22 applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual's liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.
36. Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.
37. Thirdly, the filing of a first information report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an FIR is not yet filed.
38. Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an FIR is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.
39. Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of "anticipatory bail" to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, insofar as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 23 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.
40. We have said that there is one proposition formulated by the High Court with which we are inclined to agree. That is proposition (2). We agree that a 'blanket order of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed. This flows from the very language of the section which, as discussed above, requires the applicant to show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. That is why, normally, a direction should not issue under Section 438(1) to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever". That is what is meant by a 'blanket order' of anticipatory bail, an order which serves as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity, in fact any eventuality, likely or unlikely regarding which, no concrete information can possibly be had. The rationale of a direction under Section 438(1) is the belief of the applicant founded on reasonable grounds that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. It is unrealistic to expect the applicant to draw up his application with the meticulousness of a pleading in a civil case and such is not requirement of the section. But specific 24 events and facts must be dis-closed by the applicant in order to enable the court to judge of the reasonableness of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua non of the exercise of power conferred by the section.
41. Apart from the fact that the very language of the statute compels this construction, there is an important principle involved in the insistence that facts, on the basis of which a direction under Section 438(1) is sought, must be clear and specific, not vague and general. It is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to them can be avoided A blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of investigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been committed by the applicant and when, an order of tail which comprehends allegedly unlawful activity of any description whatsoever, will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits, say, a murder in the presence of the public. Such an order can then become a charter of lawlessness and a weapon to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicated when the order was passed. Therefore, the court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or offences in respect the order will be exercised in a vacuum."25
25. In the case of "Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)", 2020 (5) SCC 1, the Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
"35. Mr. Hiren Raval, learned amicus curiae, highlighted that while there are passages in Sibbia (supra), which support the arguments of the petitioners, that orders under Section 438 can be unconditional and not limited by time, the court equally struck a note of caution, and wished courts to be circumspect while making orders of anticipatory bail. In this regard, learned senior counsel highlighted paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decisions in Sibbia.
36. Elaborating on his submissions, the amicus submitted that whether to impose any conditions or limit the order of anticipatory bail in point of time undoubtedly falls within the discretion of the court seized of the application. He however submitted that this discretion should be exercised with caution and circumspection. Counsel submitted that there could be three situations when anticipatory bail applications are to be considered: one, when the application is filed in anticipation of arrest, before filing FIR; two, after filing FIR, but before the filing of the charge sheet; and three, after filing charge sheet. It was submitted that as a matter of prudence and for good reasons, articulated in Salauddin, K.L. Verma, Adri Dharan Das and decisions adopting their reasoning, it would be salutary and in public interest for courts to 26 impose time limits for the life of orders of anticipatory bail. Counsel submitted that if anticipatory bail is sought before filing of an FIR the courts should grant relief, limited till the point in time, when the FIR is filed. In the second situation, i.e. after the FIR is filed, the court may limit the grant of anticipatory bail till the point of time when a charge sheet is filed; in the third situation, if the application is made after filing the charge sheet, it is up to the court, to grant or refuse it altogether, looking at the nature of the charge. Likewise, if arrest is apprehended, the court should consider the matter in an entirely discretionary manner, and impose such conditions as may be deemed appropriate.
37. Mr. Raval submitted that in every contingency, the court is not powerless after the grant of an order of anticipatory bail; it retains the discretion to revisit the matter if new material relevant to the issue, is discovered and placed on record before it. He highlighted Section 439(2) and argued that that provision exemplified the power of the court to modify its previous approach and even revoke altogether an earlier order granting anticipatory bail. It was submitted that the bar under Section 362 of the Code (against review of an order by a criminal court) is inapplicable to matters of anticipatory bail, given the nature and content of the power under Section 439(2).
38. Mr. Raval also submitted that power under Section 438 cannot be exercised to undermine any criminal investigation. He 27 highlighted the concern that an unconditional order of anticipatory bail, would be capable of misuse to claim immunity in a blanket manner, which was never the intent of Parliament. Counsel submitted that besides, the discretion of courts empowered to grant anticipatory bail should be understood as balancing the right to liberty and the public interest in a fair and objective investigation. Therefore, such orders should be so fashioned as to ensure that accused individuals co-operate during investigations and assist in the process of recovery of suspect or incriminating material, which they may lead the police to discover or recover and which is admissible, during the trial, per Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He submitted that if these concerns are taken into account, the declaration of law in Mhetre - particularly in Paras 122 and 123 that no condition can be imposed by court, in regard to applications for anticipatory bail, is erroneous; it is contrary to Para 42 and 43 of the declaration of law in Sibbia's case (supra). It was emphasized that ever since the decision in Salauddin and other subsequent judgments which followed it, the practise of courts generally was to impose conditions while granting anticipatory bail: especially conditions which required the applicant/ accused to apply for bail after 90 days, or surrender once the charge sheet was filed, and apply for regular bail. Counsel relied on Section 437(3) to say that the conditions spelt out in that provision are to be 28 considered, while granting anticipatory bail, by virtue of Section 438(2).
39. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General, submitted that the decision in Mhetre (supra) is erroneous and should be overruled. It was submitted that though Section 438 does not per se pre-
suppose imposition of conditions for grant of anticipatory bail, nevertheless, given Section 438(2) and Section 437(3), various factors must be taken into account. Whilst exercising power to grant (or refuse) a direction in the nature of anticipatory bail, the court is bound to strike a balance between the individual's right to personal freedom and the right of investigation of the police. For this purpose, in granting relief under Section 438(1), appropriate conditions can be imposed under Section 438(2) to ensure an unimpeded investigation. The object of imposing conditions is to avoid the possibility of the person or accused hampering investigation. Thus, any condition, which has no reference to the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial, cannot be countenanced as permissible under the law. Consequently, courts should exercise their discretion in imposing conditions with care and restraint.
40. The law presumes an accused to be innocent till his guilt is proved. As a presumably innocent person, he is entitled to all the fundamental rights including the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the 29 Constitution. Counsel stated that at the same time, while granting anticipatory bail, the courts are expected to consider and keep in mind the nature and gravity of accusation, antecedents of the applicant, namely, about his previous involvement in such offence and the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice. It is also the duty of the Court to ascertain whether accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating him by having him so arrested. It is needless to mention that the Courts are duty bound to impose appropriate conditions as provided under Section 438(2) of the Code.
41. The counsel argued that there is no substantial difference between Sections 438 and 439 of the Code as regards appreciation of the case while granting or refusing bail.
Neither anticipatory bail nor regular bail, however, can be granted as a matter of rule.
Being an extraordinary privilege, should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court must be properly exercised after proper application of mind to decide whether it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail. In this regard, counsel relied on Jai Prakash Singh v State of Bihar26. Counsel relied on 2012 (4) SCC 325 State of M.P. & Anr. v Ram Kishna Balothia & Anr. 27 where this court considered the nature of the right of anticipatory bail and observed that:
"7......We find it difficult to accept the contention that Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an 30 integral part of Article 21. In the first place, there was no provision similar to Section 438 in the old Code of Criminal Procedure......Also anticipatory hail cannot he granted as a matter of right.
It is essentially a statutory right conferred long after the coming into force of the Constitution. It cannot he considered as an essential ingredient of Article 21 of the Constitution. and its non- application to a certain special category of offences cannot he considered as violative of Article 21."
42. The decisions in Savitri Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra & Anr 28, and Sibbia were referred to, to argue that before granting an order of anticipatory bail, the court should be satisfied that the applicant seeking it has reason to believe that he is likely to be arrested for a non-bailable offence and that belief must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere "fear" is not belief; it is insufficient for an applicant to show that he has some sort of vague apprehension that someone is going to accuse him, for committing an offence pursuant to which he may be arrested. An applicant's grounds on which he believes he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence, must be capable of examination by the Court objectively.
Specific events and facts should be disclosed to enable the Court to judge of the reasonableness of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua non of the exercise of power conferred by the Section. It was 31 pointed out that the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested. The following passages in Savitri Agarwal (supra) were relied upon:
"24. While cautioning against imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of the section, because, in its opinion, overgenerous infusion of constraints and conditions, which were not to be found in Section 438 of the Code, could make the provision constitutionally vulnerable, since the right of personal freedom, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions, the Constitution Bench laid down the following guidelines, which the courts are required to keep in mind while dealing with an application for grant of anticipatory bail:
***
(iv) No blanket order of bail should be passed and the court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or the offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. While granting relief under Section 438(1) of the Code, appropriate 32 conditions can be imposed under Section 438(2) so as to ensure an uninterrupted investigation. One such condition can even be that in the event of the police making out a case of a likely discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the person released on bail shall be liable to be taken in police custody for facilitating the recovery.
Otherwise, such an order can become a charter of lawlessness and a weapon to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possible be predicated when the order was passed.
***
(ix) Though it is not necessary that the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) of the Code be limited in point of time but the court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of FIR in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may, in such cases, be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonable short period after the filing of the FIR."
43. It was also argued on behalf of the Govt of NCT and the Union, that this court had expressed a serious concern, time and again, that if accused or applicants who seek anticipatory bail are equipped with an unconditional order before they are 33 interrogated by the police it would greatly harm the investigation and would impede the prospects of unearthing all the ramifications involved in a conspiracy. Public interest also would suffer as consequence. Reference was invited to State of A.P. v. Bimal Krishna Kundu29 in this context. Likewise, attention of the court was invited to Muraleedharan v.
State of Kerala30 which held that "7......Custodial interrogation of such an accused is indispensably necessary for the investigating agency to unearth all the links involved in the criminal conspiracies committed by the person which ultimately led to the capital tragedy."
It was highlighted that statements made during custodial interrogation are qualitatively more relevant to those made otherwise. Granting an unconditional order of anticipatory bail would therefore thwart a complete and objective investigation.
44. Mr. Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor General, urged that the general drift of reasoning in Sibbia was not in favour of a generalized imposition of conditions- either as to the period (in terms of time, or in terms of a specific event, such as filing of charge sheet) limiting the grant of anticipatory bail. It was submitted that the text of Section 439(2) applied per se to all forms of orders-
including an order or direction to release an applicant on bail (i.e. grant of anticipatory 34 bail), upon the court's satisfaction that it is necessary to do so. Such order (of cancellation, under Section 439(2) or direction to arrest) may made be where the conditions made applicable at the time of grant of relief, are violated or not complied with, or where the larger interests of a fair investigation necessitate it.
Analysis and Conclusions Re Question No 1: Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438, CrPC should be limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the Trial Court and seek regular bail.
45. The concept of bail, i.e. preserving the liberty of citizen - even accused of committing offences, but subject to conditions, dates back to antiquity. Justinian I in the collections of laws and interpretations which prevailed in his times, Codex Justinianus (or 'Code Jus') in Book 9 titled Title 3(2) stipulated that "no accused person shall under any circumstances, be confined in prison before he is convicted".
The second example of a norm of the distant past is the Magna Carta which by clause 44 enacted that "people who live outside the forest need not in future appear before the Royal Justices of the forest in answer to the general summons unless they are actually involved in proceedings or are sureties for someone who has been seized for a forest offence." Clear Parliamentary recognition of bail took shape in later enactments in the UK 35 through the Habeas Corpus Act 1677 and the English Bill of Rights, 1689 which prescribed that "excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted".
46. Bail ipso facto has not been defined under the Code. It is now widely recognized as a norm which includes the governing principles enabling the setting of accused person on liberty subject to safeguards, required to make sure that he is present whenever needed. The justification for bail (to one accused of commission or committing a crime is that it preserves a person who is under cloud of having transgressed law but not convicted for it, from the rigors of a detention."
26. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the applicant is that he has not been named in the earlier FIRs, prosecution complaints or charge-sheets filed by the Enforcement Directorate and ACB/EOW and that his implication at this stage is mala fide and intended only to perpetuate his incarceration through successive arrests. However, merely because the applicant has not yet been arraigned as an accused in earlier proceedings does not ipso facto establish his innocence or disentitle the investigating agency from conducting further investigation if material subsequently surfaces regarding his involvement. The prosecution has categorically stated that during the course of investigation, the role of the present applicant has emerged as a suspect and that further investigation is being carried out regarding financial transactions, illegal protection money and conspiracy linkages. The allegations raised by the applicant regarding 36 political vendetta, fabricated implication and "evergreening of arrest"
are matters requiring evidence and cannot be conclusively adjudicated at the stage of consideration of anticipatory bail. The material placed before this Court does not presently justify recording any finding that the investigation is wholly mala fide or that the proceedings are entirely without jurisdiction. Rather, the record demonstrates that multiple agencies, including the Enforcement Directorate, ACB/EOW and the CBI, have undertaken investigations into different aspects of the alleged scam over a considerable period of time. Therefore, at this preliminary stage, the Court is not inclined to accept the contention that the present proceedings are solely intended to harass the applicant.
27. This Court is also unable to accept the submission that the applicant is entitled to anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. The law is well settled that parity cannot be claimed in a mechanical manner, particularly in cases involving criminal conspiracy and economic offences where the role attributed to each accused may stand on a different footing. The prosecution has specifically asserted that the role of the applicant is under active investigation and cannot be equated with that of other accused persons who may have been granted regular or anticipatory bail in separate proceedings. Similarly, the fact that searches conducted at the premises of the applicant have not yet resulted in filing of a charge-sheet against him cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive proof that no incriminating material exists against him. Investigation into economic offences often involves extensive examination of digital data, financial transactions and interlinked evidence spread across various jurisdictions and entities. At this stage, the Court cannot enter into a meticulous examination of the evidentiary 37 value of the material collected or record findings regarding the sufficiency thereof. The Court is only required to assess whether the allegations disclose a serious cognizable offence and whether custodial interrogation or unrestricted investigation may be necessary in the facts of the case.
28. In the matter of "CBI v. Anil Sharma" 1997 (7) SCC 187, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that success in an interrogation would be reduced if a person is enlarged on anticipatory bail. This court is privy to the fact that the interrogation of a person accused of an offence of such a nature is required to unearth the offence committed.
29. In the case of "P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement" 2019 (9) SCC 24, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
78. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain (1998) 2 SCC 105, it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail.
79. The learned Solicitor General submitted that the "Scheduled offence" and "offence of money laundering" are independent of each other and PMLA being a special enactment applicable to the offence of money laundering is not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail.
The learned Solicitor General submitted that money laundering being an economic offence committed with much planning and deliberate 38 design poses a serious threat to the nation's economy and financial integrity and in order to unearth the laundering and trail of money, custodial interrogation of the appellant is necessary.
80. Observing that economic offence is committed with deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless to the consequence to the community, in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and others (1987) 2 SCC 364, it was held as under:-
"5. ....The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest."
81. Observing that economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited 39 with different approach in the matter of bail, in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI (2013) 7 SCC 439, the Supreme Court held as under:-
"34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep- rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.
35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations."
30. It is equally significant to note that the offences alleged against the applicant are grave economic offences involving deep-rooted conspiracy, corruption and misuse of official position. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that economic offences constitute a class apart and are required to be viewed seriously as they affect the economy and public confidence in the system. The prosecution has 40 specifically contended that the applicant is an influential person having served in a high administrative capacity, and there exists a possibility of influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence and obstructing the investigation. The evidence in the present case is stated to be largely digital and financial in nature, susceptible to manipulation and concealment. Furthermore, several accused persons are reportedly absconding, and the investigation is at a crucial stage. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the grant of anticipatory bail at this juncture may impede a fair and effective investigation. The discretionary relief under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, cannot be granted as a matter of routine, particularly when serious allegations involving public corruption and organized economic offences are under investigation.
31. Accordingly, having regard to the nature and gravity of the allegations, the magnitude of the alleged economic offence, the stage of investigation, the requirement of further probe into digital and financial evidence, and the possibility of interference with the investigation, this Court is not inclined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the applicant. This Court is of the considered opinion that the applicant has failed to make out a case warranting the grant of anticipatory bail.
32. Consequently, the present anticipatory bail application of the applicant Anil Tuteja, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok