Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mahant Mangal Dass S/O Sh. Charan Dass ... vs Om Parkash Gabbar And Others on 22 November, 2011
Author: K. Kannan
Bench: K. Kannan
Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M)
Date of Decision.22.11.2011
Mahant Mangal Dass s/o Sh. Charan Dass and others
.....Petitioners
Versus
Om Parkash Gabbar and others .....Respondents
Present: Mr. S.D. Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Surinder Sharma, Advocate and
Mr. Bindu Goel, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Navdeep Sukhna, DAG, Punjab
for respondent Nos.2 to 6.
Mr. GPS Bal, Advocate
for respondent No.7.
Mr. Tarunveer Vashist, Advocate
for respondent No.8.
None for respondent No.9.
2. Civil Revision No.776 of 2010
Mahant Mangal Dass s/o Sh. Charan Dass and others
.....Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and others .....Respondents
Present: Mr. S.D. Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Surinder Sharma, Advocate and
Mr. Bindu Goel, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Navdeep Sukhna, DAG, Punjab
for respondent Nos.1 to 6.
Mr. GPS Bal, Advocate
for respondent No.7.
Mr. Tarunveer Vashist, Advocate
for respondent No.8.
Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -2-
3. Civil Revision No.777 of 2010
Mahant Mangal Dass s/o Sh. Charan Dass and others
.....Petitioners
Versus
Sardool Singh Excise and Taxation Minister, Punjab r/o 592, Block-A,
Ranjit Avenue, Amritsar and others
.....Respondents
Present: Mr. S.D. Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Surinder Sharma, Advocate and
Mr. Bindu Goel, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Tarunveer Vashist, Advocate
for respondent No.1.
Mr. Navdeep Sukhna, DAG, Punjab
for respondent Nos.2 to 6.
Mr. GPS Bal, Advocate
for respondent No.7.
None for respondent No.8.
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. KANNAN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment ? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
-.-
K. KANNAN J.(ORAL)
1. All the three revision petitions arise out of order passed at the interlocutory stage in the suit instituted by the petitioners. The petitioners' suit had been for an injunction restraining the Government of Punjab or any Committee constituted by it to receive any sums or donations and for a restraint against the defendants from carrying on any construction in any part of the area known as Ram Tirath and in the place where a holy Sarover is situate. The petitioners claimed in the suit that the temple had been installed in place, which was believed to Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -3- be the place where Sita Mata lived in the Ashram of Balmiki and gave birth to Love and Kush. The plaintiffs' basis for the claim was that their ancestors one Dandu Ram established a temple in the year 1547 and a Sarover was established around the temple. It is contention that the temple and the Sarover have been places of worship for a large milieu over the generations.
2. It is an admitted case that the Government had issued notification on 20.01.1982 whereby the Governor of Punjab constituted a Committee under the name and style of Sri Ram Tirath Improvement and Development Committee and later in supersession of this Committee, yet another notification was made on 07.07.2003. The notifications were themselves the subject of challenge through a writ petition at the instance of persons, who incidentally were the brothers of the present plaintiffs and in that writ petition, there was a representation made at the instance of the Government that the Committee was not contemplating to destroy the Sarover but on the other hand, they were taking steps to cleanse the same and intended to erect a Ram Tirath Temple. The petitioners in that writ petition had withdrawn the proceedings on 16.03.2004 based on the representation of the State. The suit came to be instituted about the same time when the writ petition was also filed for an injunction and in the plaint, the petitioners had contended, inter alia, that the Punjab Government had no right to issue notification since the Ram Tirath itself was the private property and that all other persons namely Bhan Ram, Baldev Gir and Kans Dass were the Mahants. The petitioners had filed jamabandies in evidence of the fact that the properties were shown as the properties Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -4- belonging to Ram Tirath as Abadi Deh and some private persons including the petitioners had been referred as gair mumkin marushi. The trial Court granted the relief of injunction but in the appeal filed by the respondents, the injunction was vacated.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs as petitioners would make a pointed reference to the error, which according to him, was fundamental in assuming that the jamabandi entries referred to the properties as belonging to the Panchayat. The learned counsel would also urge that the Appellate Court was in error in thinking that there were stray entries referring to the petitioners as being in possession while they were consistently shown as persons in possession for several decades. Learned counsel would also contend that the petitioners were not in any way breaching any act of the State or the Committees for cleaning up the Sarover but there had very serious objection to any attempt of the respondents to make installations , for it would amount to breach the sanctity of the Sarovar and the established practice of worship.
4. Against the contentions raised by the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents would point out that the petitioner had been contended in the plaint that they were themselves the owners and proprietors of the place, which is in an expanse of 880 kanals and 7 marlas and after the Government had issued the notification and Committees had been set up, substantial improvements had been done in large parcels of land including setting up 25 bed hospital that caters to poor people and undertaking several welfare projects in and around the temple. It is also contended that the petitioners cannot treat Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -5- themselves as owners for there exists no proof for such a contention and the initiatives of the State through notifications and establishing Committees have gone only for improvement of the administration of the Mandir and the Sarover. The suit itself is not for any challenge to the notifications issued and even the attempt of the petitioners' brothers in filing the writ petition challenging the notification was subsequently withdrawn. The suit has not been filed in any representative capacity for the benefit of their own villagers or devotees but the suit is sought to be maintained in the names of the petitioners themselves claiming to be owners of the Ram Tirath and the Sarover. The revenue entries do not show such ownership in the petitioners themselves and neither the State nor the Committee was ever interested in ejecting the petitioners in actual possession of various small parcels of land where they have constructed their own houses for living. This concession made by the respondents has also been recorded in the order of the Appellate Court and when the Appellate Court was rejecting the plea of the petitioners, it was on the basis that the petitioners produced on proof of prima facie ownership in relation to the property. There is a whole public support for the initiatives of the State and the Committee in cleaning up the Sarover, establishing the temple and installing Balmiki's idol. The suit is a mala fide exercise to stall the development projects.
5. At the interlocutory stage, the most relevant consideration shall always be the entitlement of a plaintiff to secure the relief on prima facie proof of title on the basis of which an injunction is sought. Balance of convenience and maintenance of status quo shall be in the Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -6- cases where the petitioners adduced such a proof of prima facie entitlement. The proof of possession in relation to certain portions of the properties itself is not dispute and I have the word of the counsel appearing for the defendants to say that the petitioners' possession in the respective portions where they are actually in possession will not be disturbed at any time during the pendency of suit. The issue still is whether the direction for retention of a status quo could be given and whether the petitioners established a prima facie ground to sustain such a relief. If the claim in the suit that they were the owners of the property, it cannot obtain any strength through the documents filed. The question would only be whether the petitioners have a prima facie case to manage the whole properties free of any obstruction from the State. Indeed there is not even a reference in the plaint that the petitioners were claiming exclusive right of management of the temple. Just not at the time of suit but two decades earlier, the State had brought in a notification and constituted a Committee for its administration. If the petitioners had been truly aggrieved about any form of interference from the State and that they had any exclusive right to such management, the petitioners could not have waited this long to allow for a second notification to come in the year 2003 as well. After making an aborted attempt to stall the notification through a writ petition, which was later withdrawn, the suit has come to be filed on a different basis. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners is guarded in his approach to make any concession of whether the petitioners were prepared to contend that they were not themselves the owners of the property and they were interested only in the exclusive Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -7- administration. I have already noticed that there is not even an averment that they staked exclusive claim to management of the temple and its properties. The fact of possession of some parcels of land is only stating a minuscule part of the whole story. The case will have to be tested on the basis on which the petitioners filed the suit and whether the retention of status quo will advance the cause of the petitioners' contentions in suit. The issue of status quo itself cannot be a relevant factor, disassociating it from the issue of the prima facie contention. Retention of status quo is relevant where the petitioner could assure that the respondents, during the pendency of proceedings can act in such a way that can jeopardize the petitioners' interest. If the petitioners' interest in the property cannot be any more than protection of the property in their possession, allowing for status quo to continue at the instance of the petitioners cannot avail to them. It is easy in all cases to contend that the status quo is maintained with a direction to the trial Court to dispose of the case expeditiously. This is more a wishful thinking than a real happening in the way the Courts function. We have ever to grapple with the serious malady of long pendency of cases and prolonged trials. We may have come by legislative dispensation that contemplates conduct of trials of suit on a day to day basis. They still remain an unrealized activity. A case that is decided with an interim order of inunction in force is itself an incentive for the plaintiff to prolong the trial for several years. Interim order itself bcomes a justification for retention of status quo for several judicial tiers. The status quo, therefore, will have to be used with enormous caution and circumspection. I cannot allow for a status quo in case Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -8- where the petitioners themselves cannot establish a prima facie case. The relief of injunction, which is refused at the Appellate Court, I would find to be justified and I have no reason to interfere with the same. In fine, I would emphasize that these observations are limited for disposing of interlocutory proceedings and they would not be taken as any ground for disposing of the suit on merits. The suit will be disposed of uninfluenced in any way by the observations made by this Court.
6. The civil revisions are dismissed.
7. The State is a party in this case. Some of the petitioners have serious apprehension that the dismissal of the petitions are likely to be mistaken as though the petitioners are promoting a vexatious litigation and as persons, who are causing an obstruction to some of the initiatives of the State, they could be harassed by the police. I have already observed that the lower Appellate Court has recorded an undertaking made on behalf of the Committee members that the petitioners' possession from the various portions of the property would not be disturbed. Even the dismissal of the petition ought not to be taken as constituting a final adjudication on the merits of the contentions, for I have tried to examine the issue merely from a prima facie point of view from the documents produced before the Court when there has been no support of these documents through oral evidence. The State shall exercise a restraint and shall also ensure that the petitioners do not come to any harm either in their dignified living or in the manner of their enjoyment of the property, which, hitherto, they claim has been purely for charitable and religious purposes commencing from their predecessor, who they claim as having established the institution some Civil Revision No.760 of 2010 (O&M) -9- time in the year 1547. These words in the closing become necessary to allay the apprehension of some of the petitioners expressed in Court at the conclusion of the judgment.
(K. KANNAN) JUDGE November 22, 2011 Pankaj*