Karnataka High Court
Shri Govindappa vs Smt Venkatamma on 20 April, 2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF APRIL, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
R.S.A.NO.992 OF 2020 (PAR)
BETWEEN:
1. SHRI.GOVINDAPPA
ADOPTED SON OF
CHOWDAPPA AND
NATURAL SON OF
VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
2. SMT.P.N.VENKATALAKSHMAMMA
W/O VENKATARAMANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
3. SHRI GURAPPA
S/O GURANABHOVI
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
4. SHRI P N JAYARAMAPPA
S/O CHIKKANARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
ALL THE APPELLANTS ARE
RESIDING AT
PATHAMUTHAKAPALLI VILLAGE
YELDURU HOBLI
SRINIVASPURA TALUK
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563138
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. PARVATHY R.NAIR, ADVOCATE FOR
SREEVASTA ASSOCIATES)
2
AND:
1. SMT.VENKATAMMA
W/O SHRI VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
RESIDING AT
PEDDAKONDACHERLU VILLAGE
PUNGANURU TALUK
CHITTOOR DISTRICT
ANDHRA PRADESH - 517247
2. SHRI.VENKATARAVANAPPA
S/O SHRI VENKATAPPA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
3. SHRI NAGARAJA
S/O SHRI VENKATAPPA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
4. SHRI H RAMACHANDRAPPA
S/O SHRI HANUMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
5. SHRI H CHALAPATHI
S/O SHRI HANUMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
RESPONDENT NOS.2 TO 5
RESIDING AT
PATHAMUTHAKAPALLI VILLAGE
YELDUR HOBLI
SRINIVASAPURA TALUK
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563138
6. SHRI KRISHNA REDDY
S/O SHRI CHANGA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
RESIDING AT
3
NERNAHALLI VILLAGE
YELDUR HOBLI
SRINIVASAPURA HOBLI
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563138
7. SMT.ESHWARAMMA
W/O SHRI VENKATARAMAPPA
D/O LATE CHOWDAPPA
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
RESIDING AT
UPPUKUNTE VILLAGE
YELDURU HOBLI
SRINIVASAPURA TALUK
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563138
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. L.M.RAMAIAH GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R.1;
SRI.UMESH B.N., ADVOCATE FOR R.7;
NOTICE IN RESPECT OF R.2 TO R.6 IS SERVED AND
UNREPRESENTED)
THIS RSA IS FILED U/S 100 OF CPC., AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 29.06.2020 PASSED IN
R.A.NO.16/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT
JUDGE, KOLAR, DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 01.01.2019 PASSED IN
O.S.NO.45/2017 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL
JUDGE AND CJM, KOLAR.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 16.09.2022, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
4
JUDGMENT
This captioned second appeal is filed by defendant Nos.1, 2, 5 and 6 feeling aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, wherein the plaintiff's suit for partition and separate possession in O.S.No.45/2017 is decreed granting her legitimate half share in the suit schedule properties.
2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred as they are ranked before the Trial Court.
3. The genealogical tree of the family is as under;
Chowdappa ______________________________/______________________________ / / Naremma Chowdamma 1st wife 2nd wife / / ________________________ Venkatamma / / (plaintiff) Rathnamma Eswaramma / (died without issues) (D.10) / ________________________________________________/_______ / / / / / Srinivas Reddy Govindappa Narayana Reddy Naragaraja Mallikarjuna 5
4. The plaintiff has instituted suit by specifically contending that one Chowdappa was the original propositus of the family consisting of the plaintiff and defendant No.1. It is further pleaded that Chowdappa had two wives namely Naremma and Chowdamma. Naremma had two daughters, while Chowdamma had a daughter by name Venkatamma, who is the plaintiff in the present suit.
5. It is also contended that the propositus late Chowdappa had no male issues and therefore, he adopted one Govindappa, who is the second son of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further pleaded that Chowdappa also fostered one Ramappa and out of love and affection towards Ramappa, some of the properties were bequeathed in his favour. The plaintiff claimed that the suit schedule properties are joint family properties of plaintiff and defendants and therefore, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are in joint possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule properties. After the death of Chowdappa, it is the defendant No.1, who was 6 managing the joint family properties as a kartha and defendants started acting adversely to the interest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff demanded her legitimate share in the suit schedule properties. The present suit is filed alleging that defendant No.1 went on postponing and refused to effect partition by metes and bounds.
6. On receipt of summons, defendant No.1 tendered appearance and filed written statement. Defendant No.1 admitted that proposed Chowdappa had two wives. Defendant No.1 further admitted that plaintiff is the daughter of Chowdappa through Chowdamma. Defendant No.1 further admitted that he is the natural son of the plaintiff and further admitted adoption and claimed that he is the son of Chowdappa. Defendant No.1, however, disputed the right of the plaintiff over the suit schedule properties. Defendant No.1 claimed that the plaintiff is born prior to 1956 and therefore, she has no share in the 7 properties and therefore, she is not entitled for share as claimed in the present suit.
7. Defendant No.10 has also contested the proceedings by filing written statement. Defendant No.10 has disputed the alleged adoption as claimed by defendant No.1. Defendant No.10 has disputed the relinquishment deed dated 25.08.1997. Defendant No.10, however, claimed that she is also entitled for half share along with the plaintiff.
8. The plaintiff and defendants to substantiate their respective claims have let in oral and documentary evidence. The Trial Court having appreciated the oral and documentary evidence has partly answered issue Nos.1 and 2 in the Affirmative. While answering issue No.1 in the affirmative, the Trial Court held that defendant No.1 has failed to substantiate that he is the adopted son of Chowdappa. While examining the copy of the registered 8 adoption deed dated 29.11.1983, the Trial Court has drawn adverse interference against defendant No.1. The Trial Court was of the view that for want of original registered adoption deed, the presumption is not available and therefore, the Trial Court proceeded to hold that defendant No.1 has failed to establish his status of adopted son. While examining Ex.D.1, the Trial Court referring to cross-examination of defendant No.1, found that Chowdappa admittedly had two wives and both were alive when alleged adoption was taken and therefore, the Trial Court was of the view that Section 7 of the Hindu Adoption Act, which contemplates that the consent of wife is pre-requisite condition is not complied. The Trial Court having declined to declare the status of defendant No.1 as adopted son of Chowdappa proceeded to hold that the plaintiff and defendant No.10 are entitled for half share each. Consequently, suit is decreed.
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9. Defendant No.1 feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court being a final fact finding authority has independently assessed the adoption deed vide Ex.D.1 dated 29.11.1983. The Appellate Court, however, on independent assessment of materials on record found that defendant No.1 was aged more than 15 years as on the date of execution of Ex.D.1 and therefore, the Appellate Court proceeded to hold that defendant No.1 could not have been taken in adoption as he was aged 15 years unless there is a custom. Therefore, the Appellate Court was also of the view that the alleged adoption is contrary to Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
10. The Appellate Court while examining the plaintiff's right in the property found that she is a child born out of a void marriage. The Appellate Court found that Chowdappa's second marriage with the mother of plaintiff 10 Chowdamma was during the life time of his 1st wife by name Naremma and therefore, proceeded to hold that the plaintiff is a child born out of void marriage. The Appellate Court placing reliance on the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of REVANASIDDAPPA VS. MALLIKARJUN1 proceeded to hold that the plaintiff is entitled for share in the properties left behind by her father.
11. The Appellate Court has also taken cognizance of the objection raised by defendant No.1 in R.A.No.16/2019 in regard to adopting the evidence recorded in the earlier suit bearing O.S.No.103/2010. Referring to the order sheet, the Appellate Court found that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 never objected to take on record the evidence recorded in the earlier suit. Therefore, the Appellate Court was of the view that since the lis is pending since 2010 and having regard to the fact that there is nothing on record to indicate that adoption of evidence has resulted in 1 (2011) 11 SCC 1 11 mis-carriage of justice, the objection raised by defendant No.1 cannot be entertained at this juncture. The Appellate Court while confirming the observations and findings by the Trial Court proceeded to dismiss the appeal. These concurrent findings are under challenge by defendant Nos.1, 2, 5 and 6.
12. This Court vide order dated 01.08.2022 has admitted the appeal to consider the following substantial questions of law and additional substantial question of law on 08.08.2022:
Whether the trial conducted by the Trial Court after re-presentation of plaint and the judgment recorded by the Trial court based on evidence already recorded in the suit before return of plaint suffers from serious infirmities and the same is contrary to the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/S. Exl Careers and Another v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 2904/2020, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that 12 after return of plaint on re-presentation, the plaint has to be considered as a fresh plaint and the trial has to be de novo and the evidence recorded in the earlier suit has to be discarded?
Whether the Courts below erred in holding that defendant No.1 has failed to prove that he is the adopted son of Chowdappa and the said finding is contrary to the clinching evidence on record?
13. The learned counsel appearing for the defendants reiterating the grounds urged in the second appeal and referring to the substantial questions of law framed by this Court would place reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of JOGINDER TULI VS. S.L.BHATIA AND ANOTHER2. Referring to the principles in the above cited judgment, he would point out that the plaint is returned for presentation to the proper Court. The evidence already adduced cannot be looked into and suit 2 (1997) 1 SCC 502 13 has to proceed de novo before the competent Court. He has also placed reliance on the following judgments;
I) OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION
LIMITED V. MODERN CONSTRUCTION AND
COMPANY; (2014) 1 SCC 648.
II) EXL CAREERS AND ANOTHER V.
FRANKFINN ALIATION SERVICES PVT. LTD; CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2904 OF 2020.
14. Placing reliance on the above cited judgments, he would contend that once plaint is returned, the evidence that is lead before the Court that did not have jurisdiction cannot be looked into and the evidence recorded in the earlier suit has to be dealt in terms of the Rule 205 of the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice.
15. While elaborating the difference between Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code and Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC., he has placed reliance on the judgment rendered 14 by the Delhi High Court in the case of VOGEL MEDIA INTERNATIONAL GMBH AND ANOTHER v. JASU SHAH AND OTHERS3. Placing reliance on the principles in the above said judgment, he would contend that return of plaint for want of jurisdiction whether pecuniary or territorial cannot be equated to the transfer of the suit or proceedings.
16. To counter the arguments of the plaintiff and defendant No.10, he would further contend that the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence or even res judicata would apply where an order has been passed by the Court, which had no Authority. While questioning grant of half share to the plaintiff, he has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of SURJIT LAL CHHABDA V. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX4. Placing reliance on the said judgment, he would contend that the daughters after marriages 3 ILR (2004) II DELHI 560 4 (1976) 3 SCC 142 15 ceases to be member of the joint family and therefore, he would point out that the plaintiff cannot be claim to be joint family member. Therefore, he would contend that the preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court granting half share suffers from perversity and therefore, he would conclude his arguments by contending that the suit is liable to be dismissed.
17. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff while countering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants would bring to the notice of this Court that both parties have requested the Trial Court to consider the evidence recorded in a suit bearing O.S.No.103/2010. He would contend that the plaint came to be represented on 27.01.2017 and it was only thereafter P.W.1 was further cross-examined only after representation of the plaint before the Court having pecuniary jurisdiction. He would further point out that 16 plaintiff has been cross-examined by the defendant before the Court, which had jurisdiction. He would also bring to the notice of this Court that the defendant has filed a memo on 12.03.2018 to adopt the evidence let in O.S.No.103/2010. Having suffered decree, defendant No.1 has raised a ground in the appeal filed in R.A.No.16/2019 in regard to adoption of evidence recorded in the earlier suit. Therefore, he would contend that the memo filed by the defendant on 12.03.2018 amounts to a waiver. Defendant No.1 is estopped from questioning the evidence adopted in the second suit. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE OF PANJAB VS. DAVINDER PAL SINGH BHULLAR AND OTHERS5, he would contend that initially, the waiver is an intentional relinquishment of right. It involves conscious abandonment of an existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege. If defendant never objected to take on record the 5 AIR 2012 SC 364 17 evidence recorded in the earlier suit and having suffered verdict cannot now raise objection for the first time in the second appeal. He would further point out that defendant No.10 by way of counter claim has also led her evidence and cross-examined her witness and therefore, in a partition suit, if claim of the defendant No.10 is allowed granting half share, then defendant No.1 cannot claim that no fresh evidence is led in the second suit.
18. In so far as plea of adoption concerned, he would point out that there is a concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts blow and therefore, defendant No.1 cannot now claim that the findings on adoption is recorded without framing an issue. He would vehemently argue and contend that defendant No.1 was very much aware about the claim and rival claims and dispute in regard to his status. He has let in evidence by producing certified copy of the adoption, which is marked as Ex.D.1. Therefore, non framing of issue on adoption will not vitiate the entire proceedings. He would 18 pray to dismiss the second appeal. To buttress his arguments, he has placed reliance on the following judgments:
(i) M.VANAJA VS. M SARALA DEVI (AIR 2020 SC 1293)
(ii) SHARANAYYA VS. SHEKHARAYYA (2020 (3) AKR 594)
19. Defendant No.10 arguing in the same vein would also contend that plaintiff was cross-examined by defendant Nos.1, 2, 5 and 6 and therefore, proceedings came to be continued with the consent of the parties. He would further point out that defendant No.1 was also subjected to cross- examine and defendant No.2 was examined as D.W.2 and defendant No.6 was examined as D.W.3. He would point out that D.Ws.2 and 3 were also subjected to cross- examination, while defendant No.10 was examined as D.W.4. Therefore, referring to these significant details, he would also argue and contend that there was a fresh trial in 19 the second suit and in absence of any objection raised by defendant No.1 at the earliest point of time, defendant No.1 cannot be permitted to question the procedure for recording evidence by the Trial Court for the first time in the second appeal.
20. Learned counsel appearing for defendant No.10 has also taken this Court to para No.13 of the Trial Court Judgment, wherein the Trial Court has taken cognizance of memo filed by defendant No.1 consenting for admitting the evidence of defendant No.1 already recorded in O.S.No.103/2010. He would further point out that there is a distinction between lack of jurisdiction and lack of inherent jurisdiction. Therefore, referring to the instances, he would contend that it is only where there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings would vitiate and consequently, the decree rendered has to be declared as void. On these points, he has placed reliance on the following judgments;
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i) SUBHASH MAHADEVASA HABIB VS. NEMASA
AMBASA DHARMADAS REPORTED IN (2007) 13
SUPREME COURT CASES 650.
ii) MANI VS. KISHANLAL REPORTED IN AIR 1997
RAJASTHAN 19.
iii) HASHAM ABBAS SAYYAD VS. USMAN ABBAS SAYYAD AND OTHERS REPORTED IN (2007) 2 SUPREME COURT CASES 355
21. He would also place reliance on the judgment in the case of OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LIMITED VS. MODERN CONSTRUCTIONS AND COMPANY6 and contended that if a party has committed a wrong, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong. Referring to Section 21(2), he would contend that absence of pecuniary jurisdiction does not amount to inherent lack of jurisdiction and therefore, the defendants cannot be permitted to raise the objection for the first time in the second appeal. On these set of grounds, he would 6 (2014) 1 SCC 648 21 request this Court to answer the substantial question of law against the defendants and dismiss the second appeal.
22. In the light of the substantial question of law framed by this Court, this Court needs to examine whether the trial conducted by the Court of first instance in taking on record only examination-in-chief of plaintiff and defendants tendered in earlier suit on record in the subsequent fresh suit before the Court on a representation of plaint stands vitiated. I deem it to advert to some of the events, which would have a direct bearing to decide the substantial question of law formulated by this Court. After plaint was returned in O.S.No.103/2010, the plaint was represented before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kolar, which was numbered as O.S.No.45/2017.
23. The cross of the plaintiff recorded in the earlier suit is not a part of the record. In fact, P.W.1 tendered the examination-in-chief recorded in earlier suit and was 22 extensively cross-examined by defendant Nos.1, 2, 5 and 6 in the present suit. Defendant No.1 and other contesting defendants did not question the examination-in-chief recorded in earlier suit. Therefore, the entire cross- examination was done before the Court, which had jurisdiction to adjudicate the actual controversy between the parties.
24. Defendant No.1 has also not tendered a fresh examination-in-chief after return of the plaint. Defendant No.1 filed a memo adopting his examination-in-chief tendered in O.S.No.103/2010. It would be useful for this Court to cull out the memo dated 12.03.2018, which reads as under;
MEMO I, undersigned Govindappa, the defendant No.1 submits that I am already adduced the evidence in O.S.No.103/2010 and also produced the documents Exhibits D.1 to D.8 on the file of Hon'ble Civil Judge and J.M.F.C Srinivasapura. The same may kindly be adopt as evidence of me in this case in the ends of justice and equity."
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25. Therefore, what is tendered by defendant No.1 is only examination-in-chief in a fresh suit bearing O.S.No.45/2017. One more crucial fact, which clinches the controversy in regard to adoption of evidence recorded in the earlier suit is that defendant No.1 is cross-examined by the plaintiff and the records also reveal that defendant Nos.2 and 3 were examined and cross-examined in the year 2018 after re-presentation of the plaint. Defendant No.10 has also examined one witness whose evidence is recorded after re-presentation. Therefore, the substantial evidence is recorded by the Court after re-presentation.
26. Now, the question that would arise for consideration is;
As to whether examination-in-chief tendered in earlier suit amounts to an evidence?
My answer is no.
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27. Mere examination-in-chief does not constitute as an evidence unless it is tested in cross-examination. Even if examination-in-chief of plaintiff and defendant No.1 is taken on record, which was in fact recorded in the earlier suit, at the most amounts to irregularity and the same does not constitute substantial procedural error, which would vitiate the entire proceedings conducted by the Court after representation.
28. If defendant No.1 has not objected at the time of cross-examination of the plaintiff, he cannot be permitted now to object at this stage. Defendant No.1, who is guilty of not objecting at the earliest point of time, cannot take advantage and frustrate a lawful trial by a Competent Court.
29. Defendant No.1 himself has filed a memo and has requested the Court to take on record his examination-in- chief recorded in the earlier suit. Having filed a memo, 25 defendant No.1 cannot be permitted to question the judgment not on the merits but on the ground of procedural error. Defendant No.1 in the light of the facts narrated supra has participated in the proceedings. He has also availed the benefit of examination-in-chief tendered by him in the earlier suit. Therefore, there is a waiver and as such, defendant is estopped from questioning the adoption of evidence, if any, by the Court after re-presentation. Defendant No.1 has extensively cross-examined plaintiff and therefore, he is estopped from raising objection in regard to the procedure adopted by the Trial Court, which is obviously at the instance of the plaintiff and defendant No.1. In fact, the claim of defendant No.1 that earlier evidence is adopted is found to be totally misconceived. It is only examination-in-chief of plaintiff and defendant No.1, which is taken on record. Therefore strictly speaking examination-in-chief does not amount to an evidence and therefore, the principles laid down by the Full Bench in the 26 case of EXL CAREERS AND ANOTHER VS. FRANKFINN AVIATION SERVICES PVT. LTD (cited supra) is not applicable to the present case on hand.
30. An affidavit is merely affidavit when it is filed in Court. An affidavit would become part of the material on record only when a party or witness appears for cross- examination. It is necessary for a party either to confirm or deny the contents of the affidavit. After his confirmation or denial of the contents of the affidavit, whatever is recorded becomes an evidence and its evidentiary value has to be assessed by the Court. Close reading of Order XVIII Rule 4 of CPC, it becomes clear that the affidavit by itself is no evidence.
31. In the present case on hand, in fact, the Court on re-presentation of plaint has proceeded de nova as plaintiff and defendant No.1 are cross-examined only after plaint was represented. If after representation, the plaintiff 27 and defendants are cross-examined, then I am inclined to afford a liberal interpretation having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case on hand to prevent a wrong doer from taking advantage of his own wrong.
32. Defendant No.1 has not objected nor he has raised grounds when presenting an appeal before the Appellate Court questioning the procedure adopted by the Trial Court in regard to recording an evidence. In absence of ground urged, the Appellate Court has, in fact, entertained the said plea and has also dealt with the said issue. The Appellate Court has declined to entertain the plea in regard to recording of evidence by the Trial Court after representation.
33. In so far as adoption is concerned, both Courts have concurrently held that defendant No.1 has failed to prove that he is the adopted son of propositus Chowdappa. The Appellate Court had dealt with Sections 5, 6, 7 and 10 28 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. Referring to Section 10(iv), the Appellate Court found that age of defendant No.1 as on the date of alleged adoption was more than 15 years. The Appellate Court has also found that defendant No.1 has not pleaded the custom and usage in taking adoption of a person aged more than 15 years.
34. It is a trite law that mere recital or registration of the document evidencing adoption by itself would not be proof enough to show that mandatory requirement as stipulated under Section 10(iv) stands complied with. Defendant No.1 has not pleaded custom indicating that in that community, which is permissible to take adoption of a boy aged about 15 years and therefore, the exception, which is engraved in some part of provisional Section 10 of Act is not satisfied. There is also no pleading and evidence indicating that the adoption of a person at any age is judicially recognized under Mysuru Karnataka Area. Therefore, both the Courts were justified in declining to 29 declare defendant No.1 as adopted son of propositus Chowdappa. On examination of the materials on record, this Court would find that there is one more significant detail, which is not dealt by both the Courts. The plaintiff is the genitive mother of defendant No.1. Chowdappa is the father of plaintiff and grand father of defendant No.1. Therefore, under the alleged adoption, a son would become a brother to a genitive mother. Therefore, the question as to whether it is permissible under law was also one of the question, which was required to be dealt by the Trial and Appellate Court.
35. Be that as it may, adoption of defendant No.1 is not proved. Though issue is not framed in that regard, defendant No.1 has let in evidence extensively by producing the certified copy of the adoption deed. Substantial evidence is let in by defendant No.1 to establish and prove that he is the adopted son and therefore, even in absence of issue, the findings recorded on adoption does not stand 30 vitiated merely because issue is not framed in that regard. Therefore, the substantial question of law and additional substantial question of law formulated by this Court are answered in the Negative and against defendant No.1.
36. For the foregoing reasons, I pass the following;
ORDER
The Second appeal is devoid of
merits and accordingly, stands
dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
NBM