Madras High Court
Pushpathal vs Samiyathal ... 1St on 22 February, 2022
Author: G.R.Swaminathan
Bench: G.R.Swaminathan
1 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 22.02.2022
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN
S.A.(MD)Nos.381 & 382 of 2010 and 910 & 911 of 2011
S.A.(MD)No.381 of 2010
1. Pushpathal
2. N.Nagarajan ... Appellants / Appellants /
Defendants 1 & 2
Vs.
1. Samiyathal ... 1st Respondent / 1st Respondent /
Plaintiff
2. Periyammal ... 2nd Respondent / 2nd Respondent /
3rd Defendant
Prayer: Second appeal filed under Section 100 of
C.P.C., to set aside the Judgment and Decree passed in
A.S.No.52 of 2008 dated 30.11.2009 on the file of the
Principal Sub Court, Karur, confirming the Judgment and
Decree passed in O.S.No.41 of 2007 dated 28.04.2008 on the
file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Karur and to allow
the second appeal.
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2 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010
S.A.(MD)No.382 of 2010
Nallasamy (died)
1. Pushpathal
2. N.Nagarajan ... Appellants / Appellants /
Defendants 2 & 4
Vs.
1. Samiyathal ... 1st Respondent / 1st Respondent /
Plaintiff
2. Periyammal ... 2nd Respondent / 2nd Respondent /
3rd Defendant
Prayer: Second appeal filed under Section 100 of
C.P.C., to set aside the Judgment and Decree passed in
A.S.No.55 of 2008 dated 30.11.2009 on the file of the
Principal Sub Court, Karur, confirming the Judgment and
Decree passed in O.S.No.191 of 2006 dated 28.04.2008 on the
file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Karur and to allow
the second appeal.
S.A.(MD)No.910 of 2011
Periyammal ... Appellant / Appellant /
3rd Defendant
Vs.
1. Samiyathal ... 1st Respondent / 1st Respondent /
Plaintiff
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3 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010
2. Pushpathal
3. N.Nagarajan ... Respondents 2 & 3 /
Respondents 2 & 3 / Defendants 1 & 2
Prayer: Second appeal filed under Section 100 of
C.P.C., to set aside the Judgment and Decree passed in
A.S.No.53 of 2008 dated 30.11.2009 on the file of the
Principal Sub Court, Karur, confirming the Judgment and
Decree passed in O.S.No.41 of 2007 dated 28.04.2008 on the
file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Karur and to allow
the second appeal.
S.A.(MD)No.911 of 2010
Periyammal ... Appellant / Appellant /
3rd Defendant
Vs.
1. Samiyathal ... 1st Respondent / 1st Respondent /
Plaintiff
Nallasamy (Died)
2. N.Nagarajan
3. Pushpathal ... Respondents 2&3 /
Respondents 2 & 3 / Defendants 1,2 & 4
Prayer: Second appeal filed under Section 100 of
C.P.C., to set aside the Judgment and Decree passed in
A.S.No.54 of 2008 dated 30.11.2009 on the file of the
Principal Sub Court, Karur, confirming the Judgment and
Decree passed in O.S.No.191 of 2006 dated 28.04.2008 on the
file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Karur and to allow
the second appeal.
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4 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010
( in all S.As.)
For Appellants : Mr.K.K.Ramakrishnan
For R-1 : Mr.K.Suresh
For R-2 : Mr.K.Guhan
***
COMMON JUDGMENT
These four second appeals arise out of O.S.No.191 of 2006 and O.S.No.41 of 2007 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Karur. Both these suits were instituted by the contesting respondent Samiyathal. O.S.No.191 of 2006 was filed for the relief of partition. According to Samiyathal, she is entitled to 1 / 2 share in the suit properties. O.S.No.41 of 2007 was filed for restraining the defendants from removing and cutting down trees and rocky portions available in the suit properties. Samiyathal is none other than the sister of Nallasamy. Both were born to Karuppanna Gounder. While Nallasamy was born through the first wife, Samiyathal was born through the second wife. The second defendant Nagarajan is none other than the son of Nallasamy. Prior to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 4/28 5 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 the filing of the partition suit, some of the suit items have been alienated by Nallasamy in favour of his mother-in-law, namely, Periyammal. Therefore, she was shown as the third defendant. Nallasamy filed written statement controverting the plaint averments, while Periyammal filed written statement claiming to be a bona fide purchaser. Based on the divergent pleadings, issues were framed. Samiyathal examined herself as P.W.1 and one Velusamy was examined as P.W.2. Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.3 were marked. During the pendency of the suit, Nallasamy passed away and his wife Pushpathal was brought on record. She was examined as D.W.1. Periyammal examined herself as D.W.3. Ramasamy was examined as D.W.2. Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.3 were marked. After consideration of the evidence on record, the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 28.04.2008 granted preliminary decree as prayed for in O.S.No.191 of 2006. O.S.No.41 of 2007 was also decreed and the defendants were restrained from cutting down or removing trees and rocky portions in the suit properties till passing of the final decree. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, Periyammal filed A.S.Nos.53 and 54 of 2008 before the Principal Sub Court, Karur. Pushpathal and Nagarajan, wife https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 5/28 6 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 and son of Nallasamy filed A.S.No.52 and 55 of 2008. All the four appeals were dismissed by the first appellate Court vide common judgment and decree dated 30.11.2009. Challenging the same, these second appeals have been filed.
2. S.A.(MD)No.381 of 2010 is directed against A.S. No.52 of 2008 which arose out of O.S.No.41 of 2007. It was admitted on 27.04.2010 on the following substantial questions of law:-
“ 1. Whether, both the Courts below are correct in granting the decree of 1/ 2 share against the provision of the Hindu Succession Act, 1955?
2. Whether both the Courts below are right in granting decree for injunction without any evidence adduced on behalf of the first respondent? ”
3. S.A.(MD)No.382 of 2010 is directed against A.S. No.55 of 2008 which arose out of O.S.No.191 of 2006. It was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:-
“1. Whether both the Courts below are correct in granting the decree of partition to the first https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 6/28 7 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 respondent without considering the non-applicability of Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005?
2. Whether both the Courts below are correct in granting the decree of 1 / 2 share against the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1955? ”
4. S.A.(MD)No.910 of 2011 is directed against A.S. No.53 of 2008 which arose out of O.S.No.41 of 2007. It was admitted on 27.09.2011 on the following substantial questions of law:-
“ a) Whether the Courts below are correct in granting the decree for injunction without prayer for declaration of Ex.B.1 as null and void and the cancellation of Ex.B.1?
b) Have not both the Courts below wrong in granting decree for injunction without any cause of action for grant of relief of injunction? and
c) Have not both the Courts below wrong in granting decree for injunction without any https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 7/28 8 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 discussion in respect of the issues raised in O.S.No. 41 of 2007?
5. S.A.(MD)No.911 of 2011 is directed against A.S. No.54 of 2008 which arose out of O.S.No.191 of 2006. It was admitted on 27.09.2011 on the following substantial questions of law:-
“ a) Have both the Courts below correct in holding that Ex.B.1 sale deed was executed for defrauding and defeating rights of the plaintiff without proof supporting pleading and upon the weakness of defendant case?
b) Have both the Courts below committed serious error of law based on the judgment upon the weakness on lustic and age old women evidence especially plaintiff neither pleaded nor proved through her evidence of execution of Ex.B.1 for defeating her share in suit schedule properties? and
c) Whether the Courts below correct in granting decree for partition in respect of the properties covered under the bona fide purchase of https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 8/28 9 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 the appellant under the Ex.B.1 without considering the non-applicability of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 and the amended provision of Hindu Succession Act, 2005 upon the admitted case of the first respondent that he had marriage before commencement of Tamil Nadu Act and the ousting of the first respondent by the vendor of the appellant by his uninterrupted possession of statutory period of more than 50 years? ”
6. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents.
7. Shri.K.K.Ramakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the legal heirs of the deceased Nallasamy contended that if the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act is properly construed, one can come to the safe conclusion that it did not intend to confer any benefit on the daughters who were already married on the date when it came into force. He took me through the case laws which define what is a joint Hindu https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 9/28 10 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 family. According to him, a joint Hindu family would include only an unmarried daughter and not a married daughter. He would also further add that the Courts below have completely omitted to consider the plea of ouster which was pleaded in the written statement by Nallasamy. He called upon this Court to answer the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellants and set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Courts below.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant Periyammal in S.A.(MD)Nos.910 & 910 2011 contended that Periyammal was a bona fide purchaser and that Samiyathal had failed to question the sale deed which was executed in her favour by Nallasamy. Therefore, he submitted that the properties purchased by Periyammal must be kept out of preview of the partition decree.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted that the impugned judgment and decree are well reasoned and that they do not call for any interference.
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10. I carefully considered the rival contentions and went through the evidence on record.
11. There is no dispute that the suit properties originally belonged to Karuppanna Gounder and that he passed away in the year 1986. He died intestate. His first wife was Sembayee through whom the first defendant Nallasamy was born. Later Karuppanna Gounder married Pappayee and through her, the plaintiff Samiyathal was born. Nagarajan second defendant is the son of Nallasamy. I need not labour much on the first contention advanced by Shri.K.K.Ramakrishnan, learned counsel. All these issues have been allowed to rest in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2020-5-L.W.300 (Vineeta Sharma V. Rakesh Sharma and Others). The Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically held that the very purpose of enacting 2005 amendment was to place a daughter on par with a son in all respects. In other words, even a married daughter would also acquire the very same rights as that of son by virtue of her very birth in the family. The following extracts from the aforesaid decision would furnish a complete answer to the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 11/28 12 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 contention advanced by Shri.K.K.Ramakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the legal heirs of the deceased first defendant :-
“53. Before the amendment, Section 6 provided that on the death of a male Hindu, a coparcener's interest in Mitakshara coparcenery shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary under the uncodified Hindu law and not in accordance with the mode of succession provided under the Act of 1956. It was provided by the proviso to Section 6, in case a male Hindu of Mitakshara coparcenary has left surviving a female relative of Class I heir surviving a female relative of Class I heir or a male relative who claims through such female relative of Class I. The schedule containing categories of Class I heirs is extracted hereunder:
“ THE SCHEDULE (See Section 8) HEIRS IN CLASS I AND CLASS II Class I https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 12/28 13 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 Son, daughter, widow; mother; son of a pre- deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son, son of a pre-deceased daughter, daughter of a pre-deceased daughter; widow of a pre-deceased son, son of a predeceased son of a pre-deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son; [son of a pre- deceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter, daughter of a pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter, daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre- deceased daughter, daughter of a pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased son.
54. In view of the provisions contained in Section 6 when a coparcener is survived by a female heir of Class I or male relative of such female, it was necessary to ascertain the share of the deceased, as such, a legal fiction was created. The Explanation I provided legal fiction of partition as if it had taken place immediately before his death, notwithstanding whether he had the right to claim it or not. However, a separated Hindu could not claim an interest in the coparcenary based on intestacy in the interest left by https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 13/28 14 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 the deceased.
55. The amended provisions of Section 6(1) provide that on and from the commencement of the Amendment Act, the daughter is conferred the right.
Section 6(1)(a) makes daughter by birth a coparcener "in her own right" and "in the same manner as the son." Section 6(1)(a) contains the concept of the unobstructed heritage of Mitakshara coparcenary, which is by virtue of birth. Section 6(1)(b) confers the same rights in the coparcenary property "as she would have had if she would have had if she had been son". The conferral of right is by birth, and the rights are given in the same manner with incidents of coparcenary as that of a son and she is treated as a coparcener in the same manner with the same rights as if she had been a son at the time of birth. Though the rights can be claimed, w.e.f. 9.9.2005, the provisions are of retroactive application; they confer benefits based on the antecedent event, and the Mitakshara coparcenary law shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter as a coparcener. At the same https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 14/28 15 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 time, the legislature has provided savings by adding a proviso that any disposition or alienation, if there be any testamentary disposition of the property or partition which has taken place before 20.12.2004, the date on which the Bill was presented in the Rajya Sabha, shall not be invalidated.
56. The prospective statute operates from the date of its enactment conferring new rights. The retrospective statute operates backward and takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws. A retroactive statute is the one that does not operate retrospectively. It operates in futuro. However, its operation is based upon the character or status that arose earlier. Characteristic or event which happened in the past or requisites which had been drawn from antecedent events. Under the amended Section 6, since the right is given by birth, that is an antecedent event, and the provisions operate concerning claiming rights on and from the date of Amendment Act.
57. The concept of retrospective and https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15/28 16 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 retroactive statute was stated by this Court in Darshan Singh etc. V. Ram Pal Singh & Anr., (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 191), thus:
“35. Mr Sachar relies on Thakur Gokulchand V. Parvin Kumari, AIR 1952 SC 231, Garikapatti Veeraya V. N.Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540, Jose Da Costa V. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim, (1976) 2 SCC 917, Govind Das V. ITO, (1976) 1 SCC 906, Henshall V. Porter, (1923) 2 KBD 193, United Provinces V. Mst. Atiga Begum, AIR 1941 FC 16, in support of his submission that the Amendment Act was not made retrospective by the legislature either expressly or by necessary implication as the Act itself expressly provided that it shall be deemed to have come into force on January 23, 1973; and therefore there would be no justification to giving it retrospective operation. The vested right to contest which was created on the alienation having taken place and which had been litigated in the court, argues Mr.Sachar, could not be taken away. In other words, the vested right to contest in appeal was not affected https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16/28 17 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 by the Amendment Act. However, to appreciate this argument we have to analyse and distinguish between the two rights involved, namely, the right to contest and the right to appeal against lower court’s decision.
Of these two rights, while the right to contest is a customary right, the right to appeal is always a creature of statute. The change of the forum for appeal by enactment may not affect the right of appeal itself. In the instant case we are concerned with the right to contest and not with the right to appeal as such. There is also no dispute as to the propositions of law regarding vested rights being not taken away by an enactment which is ex facie or by implication not retrospective. But merely because an Act envisages a past act or event in the sweep of its operation, it may not necessarily be said to be retrospective. Retrospective, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, means looking backward; contemplating what is past; having reference to a statute or things existing before the Act in question. Retrospective law, according to the same dictionary, means a law which looks backward or https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 17/28 18 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came into force. Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Retroactive statute means a statute which creates a new obligation on transactions or considerations already past or destroys or impairs vested rights.
36. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn., Vol. 44, at paragraph 921) we find:
“921. Meaning of ‘retrospective’.— It has been said that ‘retrospective’ is somewhat ambiguous and that a good deal of confusion has been caused by the fact that it is used in more senses than one. In general, however, the Courts regard as retrospective any statute which operates on cases or facts coming into existence before its commencement in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions previously entered into https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 18/28 19 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 or of other past conduct. Thus a statute is not retrospective merely because it affects existing rights; or is it retrospective merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.”
37. We are inclined to take the view that in the instant case legislature looked back to January 23, 1973 and not beyond to put an end to the custom and merely because on that cut off date some contests were brought to abrupt end would not make the Amendment Act retrospective. In other words, it would not be retrospective merely because a part of the requisites for its action was drawn from a time antecedent to the Amendment Act coming into force. We are also of the view that while providing that “no person shall contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral or any appointment of an heir to such property”, without preserving any right to contest such alienations or appointments as were made after the coming into force of the Principal Act and before the coming into force of the Amendment Act, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 19/28 20 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 the intention of the legislature was to cut off even the vested right; and that it was so by implication as well. There is no dispute as to the proposition that retrospective effect is not to be given to an Act unless, the legislature made it so by express words or necessary implication. But in the instant case it appears that this was the intention of the legislature. Similarly courts will construe a provision as conferring power to act retroactively when clear words are used. We find both the intention and language of the Amendment Act clear in these respects.”
60. Section 6(2) provides when the female Hindu shall hold the property to which she becomes entitled under Section 6(1), she will be bound to follow rigors of coparcenary ownership, and can dispose of the property by testamentary mode.
69. The argument raised that if the father or any other coparcener died before the Amendment Act, 2005, the interest of the father or other coparcener would have already merged in the surviving https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 20/28 21 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 coparcenary, and there was no coparcener alive from whom the daughter would succeed. We are unable to accept the submission because it is not by the death of the father or other coparcener that rights accrue. It is by the factum of birth. It is only when a female of Class I heir is left, or in case of her death, male relative is left, the share of the deceased coparcener is fixed to be distributed by a deemed partition, in the event of an actual partition, as and when it takes place as per the proviso to unamended Section 6. The share of the surviving coparcener may undergo change till the actual partition is made. The proviso to Section 6 does not come in the way of formation of a coparcenary, and who can be a coparcener. The proviso to Section 6 as originally stood, contained an exception to the survivorship right. The right conferred under substituted Section 6(1) is not by survivorship but by birth. The death of every coparcener is inevitable. How the property passes on death is not relevant for interpreting the provisions of Section 6(1). Significant is how right of a coparcener is acquired under https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 21/28 22 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 Mitakshara coparcenary. It cannot be inferred that the daughter is conferred with the right only on the death of a living coparcener, by declaration contained in Section 6, she has been made a coparcener. The precise declaration made in Section 6(1) has to be taken to its logical end; otherwise, it would amount to a denial of the very right to a daughter expressly conferred by the legislature. Survivorship as a mode of succession of property of a Mitakshara coparcener, has been abrogated with effect from 9.9.2005 by Section 6(3).
73. It was vehemently argued that if the daughter is given the right to be a coparcener by birth and deemed to become a coparcener at any point in the past, in the normal working of the law, uncertainty would be caused. In our opinion, no uncertainty is brought about by the provisions of Section 6 as the law of Mitakshara coparcenary makes the share of surviving coparceners uncertain till actual partition takes place. Uncertainty in the right of share in a Mitakshara coparcenary is inhered in its underlying https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 22/28 23 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 principles, and there is no question of upturning it when the daughter is treated like a son and is given the right by birth; to be exercised from a particular date, i.e., 9.9.2005. It is not to resurrect the past but recognising an antecedent event for conferral of rights, prospectively. There is no doubt about it that advancement brings about the enlargement of the size of the coparcenary and disabling it from treating the daughter unequally. Even otherwise, its size could be enlarged by the birth of a son also. By applying Section 8, the joint possession was not repudiated by the fact that a female, whether a wife or daughter, inherited the share of coparcener under the proviso to original Section 6. She was an equal member of the joint Hindu family and deemed statutory partition did not bring disruption of the coparcenary. “
12. I also do not find any merit in the plea of ouster. It is true that such a plea has been put forth in the written statement. But then, the Courts below rightly brushed aside the same. The conclusion of the Courts below can be sustained https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 23/28 24 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 for more than one reason. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, even if the 2005 amendment had not come into force still Samiyathal would be entitled to 1/4th share in the suit properties. That is why, when one of the ancestral properties was alienated in the year 2002, it was a joint alienation executed by Nallasamy as well as Samiyathal. This document was marked as Ex.A.2. If Samiyathal had no right whatsoever in the ancestral properties, Nallasamy need not have joined her. He could have unilaterally sold away the item covered by Ex.A.2. Since Samiyathal had rights in the ancestral properties, she was also treated as co-owner by Nallasamy. In any event, by virtue of 2005 amendment, the legal position underwent a fundamental transformation. Even if I assume that Samiyathal was never entitled to the suit property, as per 2005 amendment she is always deemed to have a right by virtue of her birth. The amendment travels back in point of time. Since the suit was filed in the year 2006 itself, the plea of ouster pales into insignificance. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff drew my attention to the decision reported in 2002 LiveLaw https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 24/28 25 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 (SC) 165 ( B.R.Patil V. Tulsa Y. Sawkar and Others ). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held as follows:-
“ 24. The possession of a co-owner however long it may be, hardly by itself, will constitute ouster. In the case of a co-owner, it is presumed that he possesses the property on behalf of the entire body of co-owners. Even non- participation of rent and profits by itself need not amount to ouster. The proof of the ingredients of adverse possession are undoubtedly indispensable even in a plea of ouster. However, there is the additional requirement in the case of ouster that the elements of adverse possession must be shown to have been made known to the co-owner. This is apparently for the reason that the possession of a co-owner is treated as possession of other co- owners. While it may be true that it may not be necessary to actually drive out the co-owner from the property as noticed in Mohd. Zainulabudeen (since deceased) by lrs. V. Sayed Ahmed https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 25/28 26 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 Mohideen and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 345 mere continuance in the possession of a co-owner does not suffice to set up a plea of ouster. The possession of the co-owner will also be referable to lawful title. ... ”
13. Applying the aforesaid ratio, I can safely hold that the plea of ouster has not at all been established. The Courts below rightly granted decree in both the suits in favour of the plaintiff. Since the substantial questions of law in S.A. (MD)Nos.381 and 382 of 2010 are answered against the appellant, S.A.(MD)Nos.381 and 382 of 2010 are dismissed.
14. Coming to the appeals filed by Periyammal, she claimed to be a bona fide purchaser. The facts clearly belie her claim. Periyammal is none other than the mother-in-law of Nallasamy. The alienation in her favour had taken place just one year prior to the filing of the suit. She was obviously aware of the rights of the plaintif Samiyathal. Once the right of the plaintiff in the suit properties is sustained, any alienation made behind the back of the plaintiff will have to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 26/28 27 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 abide by the outcome of the partition suit. It was certainly open to Samiyathal to ignore the sale made by her brother in favour of his mother-in-law. The substantial questions of law in S.A.(MD)Nos.910 and 911 of 2010 are answered against the appellant. S.A.(MD)Nos.910 and 911 of 2010 are dismissed. No costs.
22.02.2022
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes/ No
PMU
Note: In view of the present lock down owing to COVID-19 pandemic, a web copy of the order may be utilized for official purposes, but, ensuring that the copy of the order that is presented is the correct copy, shall be the responsibility of the advocate/litigant concerned.
To:
1. The Principal Sub Judge, Karur.
2. The Principal District Munsif, Karur.
3. The Record Keeper, V.R.Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 27/28 28 S.A.(MD)No.381 OF 2010 G.R.SWAMINATHAN,J.
PMU S.A.(MD)No.381 of 2010 22.02.2022 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 28/28