Mr. Sunil @ Silent Sunil vs State Of Karnataka on 25 April, 2026

[Cites 21, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Mr. Sunil @ Silent Sunil vs State Of Karnataka on 25 April, 2026

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

Reserved on : 03.02.2026
Pronounced on : 25.04.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.515 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

MR. SUNIL @ SILENT SUNIL
S/O MR. KRISHNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF FLAT NO. 701,
B-WING, TOWER-6,
GODREJ WOODMAN ESTATE APARTMENTS,
HEBBALA KEMPAPURA,
BENGALURU - 560 024.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI MAYUR D.BHANU, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY WILSON GARDEN POLICE STATION,
BENGALURU CITY,
THROUGH
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS,
2

HIGH COURT BUILDING,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001.

2 . MR. N. B. MAGADUM
SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
WILSON GARDEN POLICE STATION,
BENGALURU - 560 027.

... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1 AND R-2;
SRI K.RAM SINGH, ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING APPLICANT
IN IA NO.2/2023)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO a) QUASH THE FIR AND INFORMATION IN
CR.NO.300/2022 OF WILSON GARDEN POLICE STATION,
BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 3, 25(1B)(a) OF ARMS ACT
R/W SECTION 120(b) IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF VI
ADDL.C.M.M., BENGALURU METROPOLITAN AREA, AT BENGALURU
TO THE EXTENT OF IMPLICATING THE PETITIONER AS ACCUSED
NO.5 IS CONCERNED.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 03.02.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
3

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioner is before the Court calling in question

registration of a crime in Crime No.300 of 2022 for offences

punishable under Sections 3 and 25 (1B) (a) of the Arms Act, 1959.

2. Heard Sri Mayur D. Bhanu, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State

Public Prosecutor for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri K. Ram Singh,

learned counsel appearing for impleading applicant in I.A.No.2 of

2023.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

On 28-12-2022 a suo motu complaint comes to be registered

by the Wilson Garden Police Station invoking the afore-quoted

provisions against one Sameerulla Khan @ Sameeulla Khan. On

registration of the crime against the said Sameeulla Khan

investigation would commence and the said Sameeulla Khan takes
4

the name of the petitioner to have been involved in the offence. The

statement of the said Sameeulla Khan projected that the petitioner

wanted to plot or hatch a conspiracy to do away the life of one

Naga due to old rivalry. In furtherance of the said conspiracy, the

petitioner got pistol and bullets which have been seized from the

possession of the accused No.1. These are attributed to the

petitioner and he is drawn as accused No.5 later. The drawing of

the petitioner as accused No.5 in Crime No.300 of 2022 has driven

the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

4. The learned counsel Sri Mayur D. Bhanu, appearing for the

petitioner would vehemently contend that accused No.1/Sameeulla

Khan comes to be arrested in relation to a warrant issued in

C.C.No.9584 of 2022. He was remanded to Police custody on

06-01-2023. The name of the petitioner was revealed by the said

accused No.1 and in the remand application, the name of the

petitioner then comes to be inserted, without there being any

corroboration whatsoever, but solely based on the statement of

accused No.1 under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. He would submit

that the petitioner is not involved in the alleged offence. He has
5

been drawn into the web of crime solely after the representation

made by the petitioner to the Home Secretary seeking direction to

the Police to stop harassing him and not to falsely implicate him in

every case. Immediately thereafter, comes the subject instance of

the petitioner being drawn into the web of proceedings. On merit of

the matter, he would submit that a confessional statement of the

co-accused cannot be the sole basis to draw him in the web of

crime without there being any corroborative material.

5. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor

Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would vehemently refute the submission in

contending that whether there is any material or not is yet to be

investigated into. Accused No.1 during investigation or when the

statement being recorded reveals the name of the petitioner. The

petitioner is a rowdy sheeter. There are several cases against him

being a rowdy sheeter. Therefore, he is necessary for an

investigation in the least in the case at hand. The investigation is

not conduced in the light of interim order granted in the year 2023

itself. Corroboration would get revealed only after the investigation.

He would seek dismissal of the petition.
6

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the

material on record.

7. The afore-narrated facts lie in narrow compass at this

juncture. The petitioner was not one of the accused, when the suo

motu complaint was drawn by Wilson Garden Police. Prior to

drawing of suo motu complaint, the petitioner had gone on

representing to the respondent with regard to police implications of

the petitioner and deliberately calling him for a rowdy parade

without any rhyme or reason. The issue that has now driven the

petitioner to this Court is a suo motu crime registered against one

Sameeulla Khan. The petitioner was not aware of the said person

being drawn as accused No.1 then. The Police recorded the

statement of Sameeulla Khan, accused No.1 in Crime No.300 of

2022. He would reveal the name of the petitioner, on the score that

there was old rivalry between the parties. It is then the name of the

petitioner is inserted in the remand application. The remand

application reads as follows:

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7

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8

In the entire narration of the remand application there is no whisper

of the role of the petitioner. But, his name is inserted at the time of

placing the remand application before the learned Magistrate. It is

admitted fact that the name of the petitioner comes to be inserted

only on the confession of accused No.1 during recording of the

statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.

8. Whether a person can be dragged into the web of

proceedings, albeit at a nascent stage, solely on the statement of

another accused, need not detain this Court for long or delve deep

into the matter.

8.1. The Apex Court in SURINDER KUMAR KHANNA v.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE

INTELLIGENCE1 has held as follows:

".... ..... ....

10. In Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR
1952 SC 159 : 1952 Cri LJ 839] , this Court relied upon the
decision of the Privy Council
in BhuboniSahu v. R. [BhuboniSahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC
12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155.] and laid down as under:
(AIR p. 160, paras 8-10)

1
(2018) 8 SCC 271
9

"8. Gurubachan's confession has played an important
part in implicating the appellant, and the question at once
arises, how far and in what way the confession of an
accused person can be used against a co-accused? It is
evident that it is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the
term because, as the Privy Council say
in BhuboniSahu v. R. [BhuboniSahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine
PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155.] : (SCC OnLine PC)

'...It does not indeed come within the definition of
"evidence" contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is
not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of
the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-
examination.'

Their Lordships also point out that it is

'obviously evidence of a very weak type. ... It is a much
weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver,
which is not subject to any of those infirmities'.

They stated in addition that such a confession cannot be
made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used
in "support of other evidence". In view of these remarks, it
would be pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it
is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension
still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in
support of other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing
gaps? Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in
the present case, a witness who, though not an
accomplice, is placed in the same category regarding
credibility because the Judge refuses to believe him except
insofar as he is corroborated?

9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by
Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan
Chuckerbutty [Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR
(1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588.] where he said that such a
confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other
evidence against a co-accused "or, to put it in another way,
as Reilly, J. did in PeriaswamiMoopan, In
re [PeriaswamiMoopan, In re, 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 :
ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77.] : (SCC OnLine Mad)

'...the provision goes no further than this--where
there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if
believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of
10

confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the
scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.'

10. Translating these observations into concrete
terms they come to this. The proper way to approach a
case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence
against the accused excluding the confession altogether
from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a
conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of
belief independently of the confession, then of course it
is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases
may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the
other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it
would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an
event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it
to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify
himself in believing what without the aid of the
confession he would not be prepared to accept."

11. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh [Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR
1952 SC 159 : 1952 Cri LJ 839] was approved by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in HaricharanKurmi v. State of
Bihar [HaricharanKurmi v. State of Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 623 at
pp. 631-633 : AIR 1964 SC 1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] wherein
it was observed: (Haricharan case [HaricharanKurmi v. State of
Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 623 at pp. 631-633 : AIR 1964 SC 1184 :
(1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] , AIR p. 1188, para 12)

"12. As we have already indicated, this
question has been considered on several occasions by
judicial decisions and it has been consistently held
that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which
is substantive evidence against a co-accused person.
In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution
relies upon the confession of one accused person
against another accused person, the proper approach
to adopt is to consider the other evidence against
such an accused person, and if the said evidence
appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to
hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge
framed against the said accused person, the court
turns to the confession with a view to assure itself
that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from
the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir
Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan
11

Chuckerbutty [Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR
(1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588.] a confession can only be used
to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused".
In PeriaswamiMoopan, In re [PeriaswamiMoopan, In re,
1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77.]
Reilly, J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes not
further than this: (SCC OnLine Mad)

'...where there is evidence against the co-accused
sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the
kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown
into the scale as an additional reason for believing that
evidence.'
In BhuboniSahu v. R. [BhuboniSahu v. R., 1949
SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155.] the
Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir John
Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that: (SCC
OnLine PC)

'... a confession of a co-accused is obviously
evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come
within the definition of "evidence" contained in Section
3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on
oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot
be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker
type of evidence than the evidence of an approver,
which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section
30, however, provides that the court may take the
confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt,
makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the
section does not say that the confession is to amount to
proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The
confession is only one element in the consideration of
all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the
scale and weighed with the other evidence.'

It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions
contained in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be
regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because
whatever is considered by the court is evidence;
circumstances which are considered by the court as well as
probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense.
Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that
generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the
fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of
the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a
case against an accused person, the court cannot start
with the confession of a co-accused person; it must
begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution
and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the
quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is
permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive
assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial
12

mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That,
briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained
in Section 30. The same view has been expressed by this
Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 :
AIR 1952 SC 159 : 1952 Cri LJ 839] where the decision of the
Privy Council in BhuboniSahu case [BhuboniSahu v. R., 1949
SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155.] has
been cited with approval."

12. The law so laid down has always been followed
by this Court except in cases where there is a specific
provision in law making such confession of a co-accused
admissible against another accused. [ For
example: State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253, paras 424
and 704 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691]

13. In the present case it is accepted that apart
from the aforesaid statements of co-accused there is no
material suggesting involvement of the appellant in the
crime in question. We are thus left with only one piece of
material that is the confessional statements of the co-
accused as stated above. On the touchstone of law laid
down by this Court, such a confessional statement of a
co-accused cannot by itself be taken as a substantive
piece of evidence against another co-accused and can at
best be used or utilised in order to lend assurance to the
Court."

8.2. The Apex Court in DIPAKBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA

PATEL v. STATE OF GUJARAT2 has held as follows:

".... .... ....

46. In CBI v. V.C. Shukla [CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3
SCC 410 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 761 : AIR 1998 SC 1406] , a Bench of
three learned Judges, after approving Pakala Narayana
Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC
OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66 : AIR 1939 PC 47] , had
occasion to consider the distinction between confession and
2
(2019) 16 SCC 547
13

admission. This Court went on to hold as follows: (V.C. Shukla
case [CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
761 : AIR 1998 SC 1406] , SCC pp. 437-38, para 45)

"45. It is thus seen that only voluntary and
direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession but
when a confession falls short of actual admission of
guilt it may nevertheless be used as evidence against
the person who made it or his authorised agent as an
"admission" under Section 21. The law in this regard
has been clearly -- and in our considered view
correctly -- explained in Monir's Law of
Evidence (New Edn. at pp. 205 and 206), on which Mr
Jethmalani relied to bring home his contention that
even if the entries are treated as "admission" of the
Jains still they cannot be used against Shri Advani.
The relevant passage reads as under:

'The distinction between admissions and confessions is
of considerable importance for two reasons. Firstly, a
statement made by an accused person, if it is an
admission, is admissible in evidence under Section 21 of
the Evidence Act, unless the statement amounts to a
confession and was made to a person in authority in
consequence of some improper inducement, threat or
promise, or was made to a police officer, or was made at a
time when the accused was in custody of a police officer. If
a statement was made by the accused in the
circumstances just mentioned its admissibility will depend
upon the determination of the question whether it does not
amount to a confession. If it amounts to a confession, it
will be inadmissible, but if it does not amount to a
confession, it will be admissible under Section 21 of the
Act as an admission, provided that it suggests an inference
as to a fact which is in issue in, or relevant to, the case
and was not made to a police officer in the course of an
investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Secondly, a statement made by an accused
person is admissible against others who are being jointly
tried with him only if the statement amounts to a
confession. Where the statement falls short of a
confession, it is admissible only against its maker as an
admission and not against those who are being jointly tried
with him. Therefore, from the point of view of Section 30
of the Evidence Act also the distinction between an
admission and a confession is of fundamental
importance'."
(emphasis in original and supplied)
14

47. Section 21 of the Evidence Act provides as follows:

(1) An admission may be proved by or on behalf
of the person making it, when it is of such a
nature that, if the person making it were
dead, it would be relevant as between third
persons under Section 32.

(2) An admission may be proved by or on behalf
of the person making it, when it consists of a
statement of the existence of any state of
mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at
or about the time when such state of mind or
body existed, and is accompanied by conduct
rendering its falsehood improbable.

(3) An admission may be proved by or on behalf
of the person making it, if it is relevant
otherwise than as an admission."

48. Thus, what amounts to an admission can be used
against the maker of the admission or his representative in
interest. As to what constitutes an admission is to be found in
Section 17 of the Evidence Act, which defines "admission" as
follows:

"17. Admission defined.--An admission is a
statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic
form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue
or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons,
and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned."

49. In Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi [Bharat Singh v.
Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405], the true nature of the evidentiary
value of admission, and whether without confronting the maker
of the admission, it could be used, has been referred to and this
is what this Court had to say: (AIR p. 410, para 19)
15

"19. Admissions have to be clear if they are to be
used against the person making them. Admissions are
substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17
and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not
conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion
that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence
irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in
the witness box or not and whether that party when
appearing as witness was confronted with those statements
in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions.
The purpose of contradicting the witness under Section 145
of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose
of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence
of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to
contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence
and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the
veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an
admission made by a party is a matter different from its use
as admissible evidence."
(emphasis supplied)

50. From the statement of the law contained in V.C.
Shukla [CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
761 : AIR 1998 SC 1406] , it becomes clear as to what
constitutes confession and how if it does not constitute
confession, it may still be an admission. Being an admission,
it may be admissible under the Evidence Act provided
that it meets the requirements of admission as defined in
Section 17 of the Evidence Act. However, even if it is an
admission, if it is made in the course of investigation
under the CrPC to a police officer, then, it will not be
admissible under Section 162 CrPC as it clearly prohibits
the use of statement made to a police officer under
Section 161 CrPC except for the purpose which is
mentioned therein. Statement given under Section 161,
even if relevant, as it contains an admission, would not
be admissible, though an admission falling short of a
confession which may be made otherwise, may become
substantive evidence."
16

8.3. In KARAN TALWAR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU3 the

Apex Court has held as follows:

".... .... .....

10. As is evident from the said Section, the alleged
offence is consumption of narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance other than those specified in or under clause (a) of
Section 27, NDPS Act, and therefore, the question is whether
any material is available to charge the appellant thereunder.
The contention of the appellant is that he has been
arraigned as accused No. 13 based on the confession
statement of co-accused viz., accused No. 1. Certainly, in
the absence of any other material on record to connect
the appellant with the crime, the confession statement of
the co-accused by itself cannot be the reason for his
implication in the crime. This view has been fortified by
the law laid down in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of
Maharashtra3, wherein it was stated that a co-accused's
confession containing incriminating matter against a
person would not by itself suffice to frame charge against
him. The materials on record would reveal that the investigating
agency had not subjected him to medical examination and
instead, going by complaint Witness No. 23, he smelt the
accused. The less said the better and we do not think it
necessary to comment upon adoption of such a course. We need
only to say that even if he tendered such evidence, it would not
help the prosecution in anyway. There is absolutely no case that
any recovery of contraband was recovered from the appellant.
As regards the confession statement of the appellant in
view of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 there
can be no doubt with respect to the fact that it is
inadmissible in evidence. In this context it is worthy to
refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Singh v. Central
Bureau of Narcotics4. In the said decision, this Court held
that Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act would make
confessional statement of accused before police
inadmissible in evidence and it could not be brought on
record by prosecution to obtain conviction. Shortly stated,

3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3803
17

except the confessional statement of co-accused No. 1 there is
absolutely no material available on record against the appellant.

11. When this be the position, the question is whether
the two Courts were justified in holding that there is prima
facie case against the appellant to proceed against him. In this
contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to the decision of this
Court in DipakbhaiJagadishchandra Patel v. State of
Gujarat5 Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the said decision are relevant
for the purpose of this case and they read thus:--

"23. At the stage of framing the charge in
accordance with the principles which have been laid down
by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does
not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the
material before it. The material to be sifted would be the
material which is produced and relied upon by the
prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense
that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing
arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after
a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the
prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the
accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied
that with the materials available, a case is made out for the
accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However,
a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The
material must be such as can be translated into evidence at
the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure
subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the
Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the
accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must
be the suspicion which is premised on some material which
commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the
prima facie view that the accused has committed the
offence.

24. Undoubtedly, this Court has in Suresh Budharmal
Kalani [Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of
Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337], taken the view that
confession by a co-accused containing incriminating matter
against a person would not by itself suffice to frame charge
against it. We may incidentally note that the Court has
relied upon the judgment of this Court in Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira Singh v. State of
M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275]. We notice that the observations,
which have been relied upon, were made in the context of
18

an appeal which arose from the conviction of the appellant
therein after a trial. The same view has been followed
undoubtedly in other cases where the question arose in the
context of a conviction and an appeal therefrom. However,
in Suresh Budharmal Kalani [Suresh Budharmal
Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337], the
Court has proceeded to take the view that only on the basis
of the statement of the co-accused, no case is made out,
even for framing a charge."
(underline supplied)

12. As noted hereinbefore, the sole material
available against the appellant is the confession
statement of the co-accused viz., accused No. 1, which
undoubtedly cannot translate into admissible evidence at
the stage of trial and against the appellant. When that be
the position, how can it be said that a prima facie case is
made out to make the appellant to stand the trial. There
can be no doubt with respect to the position that standing
the trial is an ordeal and, therefore, in a case where there
is no material at all which could be translated into
evidence at the trial stage it would be a miscarriage of
justice to make the person concerned to stand the trial."

8.4. In BERNARD LYNGDOH PHAWA v. STATE OF

MEGHALAYA4 the Apex Court has held as follows:

".... .... ....

28. Yet again, as we found, the confession of A1 is purely
exculpatory and accuse A2 of having strangulated his friend,
leading to his death. The exculpatory statements made by A1 to
absolve himself from the liability and accuse A2 of having
caused the death, cannot at all be relied on against A2. Insofar
as A2 is concerned, he does not speak of the murder having
been committed and merely admits that the deceased took his
last breath in A2's lap, which is not a confession as such. True,
if the incidence of death as spoken in both confessions is
eschewed and the other aspects of the three having been
4
2026 SCC OnLine SC 116
19

together on the crucial evening, even if accepted, can only be
used for corroborating the circumstantial evidence otherwise
established, which we find to be totally absent in the above
case. Neither has the last seen theory been proved nor has the
recoveries or the seizures established as having any connection
with the crime proper.

29. It has been held in a host of decisions as
noticed in Manoharan that a confession can form a legal
basis of a conviction if the Court is satisfied that it was
true and was voluntarily made. However, it was also held
that a Court shall not base a conviction on such a
confession without corroboration [Pyarelal
Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan]. Quoting the Privy
Council, it was held in Kanda Pandyachi @
Kandaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu that 'a confession
has to be a direct acknowledgment of guilt of the offence
in question and such as would be sufficient by itself for
conviction. If it falls short of such a plenary
acknowledgment of guilt it would not be a confession
even though the same is of some incriminating fact which
taken with other evidence tends to prove his guilt.' (sic
para 11). In the instant case there is no such
acknowledgment of the crime proper nor is there any
shred of evidence to establish the various circumstances
put forth by the prosecution.

30. The confession allegedly made by the appellants
is of no use in bringing home a conviction, especially
when there was no corroboration available, of the
statements made, from other valid evidence. There was
thus no single circumstance available, incriminating the accused
in the death of their friend, the son of PW5.

31. Having discussed the evidence, we fail to see any
circumstance having been found from the evidence led, in the
prosecution before the Trial Court to arrive at a hypothesis of
guilt. The High Court proceeded on the premise that the Trial
Court lost its way on the minor details and failed to see the
larger picture, which was obviously and eventually admitted in
the confession statements. The admissions were only that made
in the confessional statements, of the death having occurred in
20

the presence of the accused, on the day the deceased was found
missing, which we have found to be not worthy of acceptance."

8.5. In K.S. ROHITH @ ONTE v. STATE OF KARNATAKA5

this Court has held as follows:-

".... .... ....

7. The Apex Court in the case of Dipakbhai
Jagdishchandra Patel v. State Of Gujarat1 has held as follows:

"46. In CBI v. V.C. Shukla [CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3
SCC 410 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 761 : AIR 1998 SC 1406], a Bench of
three learned Judges, after approving Pakala Narayana
Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC
OnLine PC 1 (1938-39) 66 IA 66 : AIR 1939 PC 47], had
occasion to consider the distinction between confession and
admission. This Court went on to hold as follows: (V.C. Shukla
case [CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
761 : AIR 1998 SC 1406], SCC pp. 437-38, para 45)

"45. It is thus seen that only voluntary and direct
acknowledgement of guilt is a confession but when a
confession falls short of actual admission of guilt it may
nevertheless be used as evidence against the person
who made it or his authorised agent as an "admission"
under Section 21. The law in this regard has been
clearly -- and in our considered view correctly --
explained in Monir's Law of Evidence (New Edn. at pp.
205 and 206), on which Mr Jethmalani relied to bring
home his contention that even if the entries are treated
as "admission" of the Jains still they cannot be used
against Shri Advani. The relevant passage reads as under:

5
2024 SCC OnLine Kar. 31865
21

at a time when the accused was in custody of a police officer. If
a statement was made by the accused in the circumstances just
mentioned its admissibility will depend upon the determination
of the question whether it does not amount to a confession. If it
amounts to a confession, it will be inadmissible, but if it does
not amount to a confession, it will be admissible under Section
21 of the Act as an admission, provided that it suggests an
inference as to a fact which is in issue in, or relevant to, the
case and was not made to a police officer in the course of an
investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Secondly, a statement made by an accused person is
admissible against others who are being jointly tried with him
only if the statement amounts to a confession. Where the
statement falls short of a confession, it is admissible only
against its maker as an admission and not against those who
are being jointly tried with him. Therefore, from the point of
view of Section 30 of the Evidence Act also the distinction
between an admission and a confession is of fundamental
importance'."
(emphasis in original and supplied)

47. Section 21 of the Evidence Act provides as follows:

"21. Proof of admissions against persons making
them, and by or on their behalf.-- Admissions are relevant
and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or
his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or
on behalf of the person who makes them or by his
representative in interest, except in the following cases--
(1) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the
person making it, when it is of such a nature that, if
the person making it were dead, it would be relevant
as between third persons under Section 32.
(2) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the
person making it, when it consists of a statement of
the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or
in issue, made at or about the time when such state of
mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct
rendering its falsehood improbable.
(3) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the
person making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an
admission."

"17. Admission defined.-- An admission is a statement,
oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which
suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact,
and which is made by any of the persons, and under the
circumstances, hereinafter mentioned."

49. In Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi [Bharat
Singh v. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405], the true nature of the
evidentiary value of admission, and whether without
confronting the maker of the admission, it could be used, has
been referred to and this is what this Court had to say: (AIR p.
410, para 19)

"19. Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used
against the person making them. Admissions are substantive
evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of
the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof
of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions
duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether
the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and
whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted
with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to
those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness
under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different
from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is
substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous
statement used to contradict a witness does not become
substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of
throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is
to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter
different from its use as admissible evidence."
(emphasis supplied)

50. From the statement of the law contained in V.C.
Shukla [CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 : 1998 SCC
(Cri) 761 : AIR 1998 SC 1406], it becomes clear as to
what constitutes confession and how if it does not
constitute confession, it may still be an admission. Being
an admission, it may be admissible under the Evidence
Act provided that it meets the requirements of admission
as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act. However,
even if it is an admission, if it is made in the course of
investigation under the CrPC to a police officer, then, it
will not be admissible under Section 162 CrPC as it
clearly prohibits the use of statement made to a police
officer under Section 161 CrPC except for the purpose
which is mentioned therein. Statement given under
23

Section 161, even if relevant, as it contains an
admission, would not be admissible, though an
admission falling short of a confession which may be
made otherwise, may become substantive evidence."

On the same lines the Apex Court earlier in Surinder Kumar
Khanna v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate Of Revenue
2
Intelligence has held as follows:

"10. In Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR
1952 SC 159 : 1952 Cri LJ 839], this Court relied upon the
decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [Bhuboni
Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at
p. 155.] and laid down as under: (AIR p. 160, paras 8-10)

"8. Gurubachan's confession has played an important part
in implicating the appellant, and the question at once arises,
how far and in what way the confession of an accused person
can be used against a co-accused? It is evident that it is not
evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because, as the
Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [Bhuboni
Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at
p. 155.] : (SCC OnLine PC)

'...It does not indeed come within the definition of
"evidence" contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is
not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the
accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.'

Their Lordships also point out that it is

'obviously evidence of a very weak type. ... It is a much weaker
type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is
not subject to any of those infirmities'.

They stated in addition that such a confession cannot be made
the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in "support
of other evidence". In view of these remarks, it would be
pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it is necessary
to expound this further as misapprehension still exists. The
question is, in what way can it be used in support of other
evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be used
to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a
witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same
24

category regarding credibility because the Judge refuses to
believe him except insofar as he is corroborated?
9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir
Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty
[Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1911) 38 Cal
559 at p. 588.] where he said that such a confession can only
be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-
accused" or, to put it in another way, as Reilly, J. did in
Periaswami Moopan, In re [Periaswami Moopan, In re, 1930
SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77.]: (SCC
OnLine Mad)

'...the provision goes no further than this--where there is
evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to
support his conviction, then the kind of confession described
in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional
reason for believing that evidence.'

10. Translating these observations into concrete terms
they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this
kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused
excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see
whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on
it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession,
then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid.
But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on
the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it
would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event
the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend
assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in
believing what without the aid of the confession he would not
be prepared to accept."

11. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh [Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR
526 : AIR 1952 SC 159 : 1952 Cri LJ 839] was approved
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Haricharan
Kurmi v. State of Bihar [Haricharan Kurmi v. State of
Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 623 at pp. 631-633 : AIR 1964 SC
1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] wherein it was observed:
(Haricharan case [Haricharan Kurmi v. State of
Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 623 at pp. 631-633 : AIR 1964 SC
1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344], AIR p. 1188, para 12)

substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In
dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution
relies upon the confession of one accused person
against another accused person, the proper approach to
adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an
accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be
satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the
said evidence may sustain the charge framed against
the said accused person, the court turns to the
confession with a view to assure itself that the
conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other
evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins
in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty [Emperor v. Lalit
Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588.] a
confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other
evidence against a co-accused". In Periaswami Moopan, In re
[Periaswami Moopan, In re, 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR
(1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77.] Reilly, J., observed that the
provision of Section 30 goes not further than this: (SCC
OnLine Mad)

In Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [Bhuboni Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC
12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155.] the Privy Council has expressed
the same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed
that: (SCC OnLine PC)

'... a confession of a co-accused is obviously
evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come
within the definition of "evidence" contained in
Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be
given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it
cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much
weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an
approver, which is not subject to any of those
infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the court
may take the confession into consideration and thereby,
no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act;
but the section does not say that the confession is to
amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence.
The confession is only one element in the consideration
of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the
scale and weighed with the other evidence.'

It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained
in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as
26

amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is
considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are
considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to
evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may
be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the
provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not
evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result,
therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an
accused person, the court cannot start with the
confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with
other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it
has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and
effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn
to the confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to
reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is
the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The
same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira Singh v. State of
M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC
159 : 1952 Cri LJ 839] where the decision of the Privy Council
in Bhuboni Sahu case [Bhuboni Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine
PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155.] has been cited with
approval."

12. The law so laid down has always been followed by this
Court except in cases where there is a specific provision in law
making such confession of a co-accused admissible against
another accused. [For example: State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC
253, paras 424 and 704 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691]

13. In the present case it is accepted that apart from the
aforesaid statements of co-accused there is no material
suggesting involvement of the appellant in the crime in
question. We are thus left with only one piece of material that
is the confessional statements of the co-accused as stated
above. On the touchstone of law laid down by this Court, such a
confessional statement of a co-accused cannot by itself be
taken as a substantive piece of evidence against another co-
accused and can at best be used or utilised in order to lend
assurance to the Court."

A coordinate Bench of this Court considering all the other
judgments on the issue rendered by the Apex Court has held in
the case of Srinivasa @ Kulloa Seena v. State Of Karnataka3 as
follows:
27

"13. On 10.6.2018, the accused No. 4 was arrested at3.05 a.m.
On the basis of his voluntary statement, accused Nos. 2, 3, 6 and 7
and the petitioner as accused No. 1 are arrayed. The spot mahazar
was conducted on 10.6.2018between 7.00 a.m. to 8.15 a.m. Even on
the date of spot mahazar, the name of the petitioner was not
mentioned by the eye witness - CW1. On 10.6.2018, the inquest
panchanama was conducted at KIMS hospital between 1.00 p.m. to
3.00p.m., and at the time of inquest, CW3-father, CW4-sister and
CW5 mother, suspected the name of petitioner on the basis of hear
say statement.

14. The voluntary statements of the accused Nos. 2, 3,6 and 7
were recorded on 13.6.2018, and the accused No. 2 in the voluntary
statement is alleged to have stated that, at the instance of accused
No. 1 and other accused, they have hatched the criminal conspiracy to
kill Jayanth son of CW3. Except the statement of CWs. 3 to 5, who
suspected the involvement of the petitioner on hearsay information,
and the voluntary statement of accused No. 2, the police have not
placed any corroborative material to substantiate that, at the instance
of accused No. 1, the criminal conspiracy was hatched to do away the
life of the deceased Jayanth. The police during the course of
investigation, have recorded the statement of many as 47witnesses,
and none of the witnesses have spoken about the involvement of
accused No. 1 in the commission of the aforesaid crime.

15. The High Court of Delhi in the case of V K Verma (supra) at
para-66 has held as follows:

"66. From the aforesaid analysis, it is clear that at the stage of
framing of charge, the Ld. Judge is merely required to overview the
evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, or in other words, whether a prima
facie case is made out against the accused. it is also settled that at the
time of framing of charges there is requirement of satisfaction only
regarding the probability of the accused having committed the offence
and not of the proof of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt, yet
while framing the charge some material must still be available so as to
appeal to the judicial conscience on which a prima facie case is
established against the accused."

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Rajasthan v. Fatehakaran Mehdu (2017) 3 SCC 198 (supra) at para-26
has held as follows:

"26. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 397 Cr. P.C. has been time and again explained by
this Court. Further, the scope of interference uynder
Section 397 Cr. P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is
also well settled. AT the stage of framing of a charge, the court is
concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to
focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong
28

suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put
to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage,
at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that
at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an
opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an
offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in
consonance with the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure."

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 while considering
the scope of provisions contained in Section 227 of Cr. P.C. at
para-10 has held as follows:

"10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose
of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay
down a rule of universal application. By and large however if
two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that
the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some
suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will
be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the
Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and
experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and
the documents produced before the Court, any basic
infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however
does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry
into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence
as if he was conducting a trial."

"18. The coordinate Bench of this Court in Crl.RPNo.
1008/2008 (22.10.2008), in identical circumstances, at paras-11
to 13 has held as follows:

11. Except the above statements no other material is there on
record to come to the conclusion that there are grounds to
presume that this petitioner committed the offence of conspiracy
along with all or any of the accused Nos. 1 to 8 in plotting the
scheme for murdering the deceased. Besides this, in support of his
contentions Sri. H.P. Leeladhar, learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon the following decisions
29

1. (2008) 2 Crimes 263 (SC) Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish
Joshi v. State of Maharashtra.
2. (1996) 3 Crimes 85 (SC) Satish Mehra v. Delhi
Administration.
3. (1998) 1 Crimes 219 (SC) Central Bureau of
Investigation v. V.C. Shukla.
4. 1997 Cri LJ 2559 L.K. Advani v. Central Bureau of
Investigation
12. In first of the above said decisions i.e. in (2008) 2 Crimes
263 (SC) it is observed at paragraph 18 as under:--

para 18: "The basic ingredients of the offences of criminal
conspiracy are: (i) an agreement between two or more persons;
(ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done
either (a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which in not illegal in itself
but is done by illegal means. It is therefore, plain that meeting of
minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done an
illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of criminal
conspiracy. Yet as observed by this Court in Shivanarayan
Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, a conspiracy is
always hatched in secrecy and it is impossible to adduce direct
evidence of the common intention of the conspirators. Therefore,
the meeting of minds of the conspirators can be inferred from the
circumstances proved by the prosecution, if such inference is
possible".
If the statements of the said witnesses, are examined in the
light of these observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it could
be seen that they do not disclose the facts from which the
commission of the offence of conspiracy could be inferred against
the present petitioner (A9)
13. In he second of the said decisions i.e. (1996) 3 Crimes
85 (Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration) the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has observed at para Nos. 12 and 13 as under-
para 12: "The object providing such an opportunity as is
envisaged in section 227 of the Code is enable the Court to decide
whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the case
ends there it gains a lot of time of the Court and saves much
human efforts and cost. If the materials produced by the accused
even at that early stage would clinch the issue, why should the
Court shut it out saying that such documents need be produced
only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial
proceedings. Hence, we are of the view that Sessions Judge would
be within his powers to consider even materials which the accused
may produce at the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the
Code.
para 13: But when Judge, is fairly certain that there is no
prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the
Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose
of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion
on a future date. We are mindful that most of the Sessions Courts
in India are under heavy pressure of work-load. If the Sessions
Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in
futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or ship
the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself".
30

In the light of these observation, it could be seen in the
instant case that the statements of the said witnesses even taken
at their face value, do not make out grounds to presume that this
petitioner committed the offences of conspiracy.

19. The coordinate Bench of this Court in Crl.PNo. 10860/2022
(2.1.2023) at para - 14 has held as follows:

14. On perusal of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the above said cases to the facts and circumstances of the case,
where, except a voluntary statement of the co-accused saying
that this petitioner- accused came to Bangalore along with
accused No. 1 in the year 2017, there is no material collected by
the Investigating Officer to connect the accused with the crime
and even accused Nos. 3 to 9 came to Bengaluru at the instance
of accused No. 1 for recovery of arrears of commission and there
is no allegation against this petitioner that this petitioner sent
those accused persons and also accused No. 3 contacted accused
No. 1 after the incident, but not this petitioner and no CDR
produced to show that this petitioner contacted accused Nos. 3 to
9 in respect of either prior to the commission of offence or after
the commission of offence. Therefore, it clearly reveals that the
petitioner being the son of accused No. 1 has been falsely
implicated by the CW-2 did not lodge any complaint and he has
narrated the incident only after the commission of incident by
hearing the dame from CW. 1, Therefore, considering the facts as
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and other cases stated supra, absolutely,
there is no material on record to connect the accused with the
crime either to frame charges under
Section 120B or 109 or 302 read with Section 149 of IPC.
Therefore, I am of the view, conducting proceedings against this
petitioner-accused No. 2 is nothing but abuse of process of law
and the same is liable to be quashed

20. It is settled law that the confession statement
recorded under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act is
inadmissible in law. Section 114 Illustration (b) of
the Indian Evidence Act specifies that, the statement of an
accomplice is unworthy or credit, unless he is corroborated
in material particulars. In the instant case, except the
voluntary statement of accused No. 2, who is alleged to
have stated that, the other accused conspired to do away
the life of the deceased, Jayanth, at the instance of accused
No. 1, there is no corroborative material placed along with
the charge sheet to establish that, the accused No. 1
instigated the other accused to do away the life of the
deceased, Jayanth. In the absence of any corroborative
material, except the statement of co-accused, the
continuation of criminal proceedings will be an abuse of
process of law. In the absence of any prima facie case to
proceed against the accused No. 1, the learned Sessions
Judge has committed an error in exercising the power
31

conferred under Section 227 of Cr. P.C. and the same is not
sustainable in law. Accordingly, I pass the following:
ORDER

i) Criminal petition is allowed.

ii) The impugned order dated 13.5.2022 passed in SC No. 24/2019 by the learned 68th Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge at Bengaluru (CCH-68) on the application filed by the accused No. 1 under Sections 227 and 228 of Cr. P.C. is hereby set aside and consequently the application is allowed and the accused No. 1 is discharged of the offences alleged against him."

Though several judgments bear reference in the order passed by the coordinate Bench, the judgment in the case of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel (supra) does not find a place. In the light of admitted fact that the petitioner was in Police custody on the date and time when the crime comes to be registered and since he is dragged in only on the strength of the voluntary statement of the co-accused, the charge against the petitioner would tumble down. The submission of the learned High Court Government Pleader would have become acceptable that this Court should not entertain the petition at this juncture, but the glaring facts clinching enough they are, would enure to the benefit of the petitioner as he should not be permitted to undergo the rigmarole of trial when there being no material against him except the voluntary statement of the co- accused."

(Emphasis supplied at each instance) The afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court and that of this Bench or the coordinate Benches of this Court would clearly reveal that at whatever stage the proceeding is, unless there is corroborative material, prima facie no person could be drawn into the proceedings as accused, on the sole statement of the co-accused.

9. In the case at hand, the petitioner is drawn allegedly on the ground that he had given pistol to accused No.1 to kill one Naga with whom he had old rivalry. How the petitioner is drawn into the web of proceedings is as follows:

                                   "....           ....            ....

             = ಾಂಕ:-06-01-2023
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ಸ; Dೇ@/ೆಯ#-

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                               ು ಈ 7gಾರ F@ದ \ೈ,ೆಂT ಸುBೕXನು
                                                    ಸುBೕXನು          ಾಗನನು[ ಈEೇn
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                                                                                   ು
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     ಸಂಚು    ಾC&ಾIf F@ ರುcಾ4 ೆ.ೆ

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                                  ಾMನ           ಾZF Vೕ ೆEೆ /ಾ"ೕ ೇಷM ಸಕ X ಬ@

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ಜರುfಸ,ಾhತು ಈ ಪ ಕರಣದ#- ಎ-1 ಮತು4 ಎ-5 ಆ ೋ3ತರು ಹJೇ &ೆ;ೕಷದ Zನ[,ೆಯ#- 7ಲOM Eಾಡ M ಾಗ ಎಂ ಾತನನು[ /ೊ,ೆ ಾಡುವ ಬEೆp ಸಂಚು ಾCರುವAದHಂದ ಈ ಪ ಕರಣದ#-

ಕರಣದ#- ಕಲಂ 120[1 1] ಐ3 ಯನ[ DೆಚುuವH ಾf ಅಳವC /ೊಂಡು ತB(ೆ /ೈEೊಂCರುತ4&ೆ."

ೆ (Emphasis added) Accused No.1 makes a statement that the petitioner and one Naga had old rivalry and, therefore, he is likely to conspire to do away 33 the life of Naga. This is what is considered in the judgments quoted supra, to hold that a person cannot be drawn as accused merely because of a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.

of a co-accused. In the light of the above discussion, the petition deserves to succeed, as the respondents have not placed any material beyond what accused No.1 had rendered statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

(ii) Proceedings in Crime No.300 of 2022 pending before the VI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed qua the petitioner.

(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings against any other accused.

Consequently, pending applications if any, also stand disposed.

Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ

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