Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Jagadish vs State Of Karnataka on 29 August, 2019
Author: Sanjay Kishan Kaul
Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, K.M. Joseph
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4367-4372 OF 2016
JAGADISH … Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. … Respondents
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
1. Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma, both widows of Late Ramaiah, were holding the land as permanent tenants under the Inamdar, B.K. Nagaraj. These lands are situated in Sy.Nos.77/1, 77/2 and 77/3 of Agrahara Dasarahalli Village, Bangalore. The enactment of Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (for short, ‘the Inams Abolition Act’) which was brought into force with effect from 1.2.1959 abolished such personal inams and the land stood vested with the State of Karnataka free from all Signature Not Verified encumbrances under Section 1(4) of the Inams Abolition Act. Digitally signed by GULSHAN KUMAR ARORA Date: 2019.09.06 16:05:48 IST Reason: However, certain class of persons were entitled to apply for occupancy rights including the class of permanent tenants and 2 thereby obtain ownership of lands upon payment of specified premium to the Government. It is in pursuance to these provisions that Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma filed two applications for grant of occupancy rights under Section 5 of the Inams Abolition Act.
2. Before this aspect stood concluded, on 17.7.1961, late Papaiah purchased the land in Sy. No.77 measuring 37½ guntas from Smt. Gundamma and her son Sri Ramaiah. The father of the private respondents, one Nanjusa purchased this land from late Papaiah. The remaining extent of 03 acres and 11 guntas of land in Sy.No.77 was also purchased directly by the father of the private respondents.
3. It was only on 4.8.1962 that the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition passed the order on the applications filed by Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma registering them as occupants khatedar under Section 10 of the Inams Abolition Act. The rights were, thus, perfected and they being already in possession of the land, improvements were made on the same including setting up of a weaving factory by the sons of Respondent No.4.
4. The next development which may be taken note of was the coming into force of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter refers to as ‘the SC & ST Act’) which was brought into 3 force on 01.01.1979. The constitutional validity of this Act was upheld in Manchegowda & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.1. It should be useful to reproduce some of the discussions made in the judgment with regard to the SC & ST Act, more specifically in para 7 of the judgment, which reads as under :-
“7. The validity of the Act has been challenged mainly because of the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act which purport to declare transfers of “granted land” made either before or after the commencement of the Act in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant null and void and confer powers on the authority to take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof and to restore such lands to the original grantee or his legal heirs and where it is not reasonably practicable to so restore the land to a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to the grant of such land. It may be noted that the validity of the Act insofar as it imposes prohibition on transfer of granted land after the commencement of the Act has not been challenged and the principal objection to the validity of the Act is taken because of the provisions in the Act seeking to nullify the transfers of granted lands effected before the commencement of the Act.”
5. The aforesaid discussion would, thus, show that the controversy arose on account of the provisions of the SC & ST Act being made applicable even to grants made prior to the commencement of this Act. It is in that context that in para 24, it was observed as under :-
1 (1984) 3 SCC 301 4 “24. Though we have come to the conclusion that the Act is valid, yet, in our opinion, we have to make certain aspects clear. Granted lands which had been transferred after the expiry of the period of prohibition do not come within the purview of the Act, and cannot be proceeded against under the provisions of this Act. The provisions of the Act make this position clear, as Sections 4 and 5 become applicable only when granted lands are transferred in breach of the condition relating to prohibition on transfer of such granted lands.
Granted lands transferred before the commencement of the Act and not in contravention of prohibition on transfer are clearly beyond the scope and purview of the present Act.
Also in case where granted lands had been transferred before the commencement of the Act in violation of the condition regarding prohibition on such transfer and the transferee who had initially acquired only a voidable title in such granted lands had perfected his title in the granted lands by prescription by long and continuous enjoyment thereof in accordance with law before the commencement of the Act, such granted lands would also not come within the purview of the present Act, as the title of such transferees to the granted lands has been perfected before the commencement of the Act. Since at the date of the commencement of the Act the title of such transferees had ceased to be voidable by reason of acquisition of prescriptive rights on account of long and continued user for the requisite period, the title of such transferees could not be rendered void by virtue of the provisions of the Act without violating the constitutional guarantee. We must, therefore, read down the provisions of the Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of granted lands made in breach of the condition imposing prohibition on transfer of granted lands only in those cases where the title acquired by the transferee was still voidable at the date of the commencement of the Act and had not lost its 5 defeasible character at the date when the Act came into force. Transferees of granted lands having a perfected and not a voidable title at the commencement of the Act must be held to be outside the pale of the provisions of the Act. Section 4 of the Act must be so construed as not to have the effect of rendering void the title of any transferee which was not voidable at the date of the commencement of the Act.”
6. In a recent judgment of this Court in the context of the same Act, this aspect has been referred to in Satyan vs. Deputy Commissioner & Ors.2.
7. One of the aspects debated in Satyan (supra), is whether in the context of the aforesaid legal position, settled transactions should be permitted to be disturbed after a long period of time. The various judgments were referred to in this behalf albeit the suo motu power be exercised by the Commissioner’s office in paragraph 12 of Satyan’s case (supra). The said paragraph is extracted as under :-
“12. The second limb of the submission of Mr. Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant, was that settled transactions cannot be disturbed after a long period of time. The transactions were of the year 1997. They were sought to be unsettled after almost eight (8) years, by preferring an application in the year 2005. To support this plea, he referred to the following judicial pronouncements:
a. Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 2 AIR 2019 SC 2797 6 667 11, – the question posed to be decided in the appeal is referred to in para 1 and the question has been answered in para 19. Both paras 1 and 19 are read as under: “1. In all these appeals, the following question of law arises for consideration:
“Whether the Collector can exercise suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 at any time or such power is to be exercised within a reasonable time.” … … … … “19. It is also necessary to note that the suo motu power was sought to be exercised by the Joint Collector after 13-15 years. Section 50-B was amended in the year 1979 by adding sub-section (4), but no action was taken to invalidate the certificates in exercise of the suo motu power till 1989. There is no convincing explanation as to why the authorities waited for such a long time. It appears that sub-section (4) was added so as to take action where alienations or transfers were made to defeat the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. The Land Ceiling Act having come into force on 1-1-1975, the authorities should have made inquiries and efforts so as to exercise the suo motu power within reasonable time. The action of the Joint Collector in exercising suo motu power after several years and not within reasonable per;iod and passing orders cancelling validation certificates given by the Tahsildar, as rightly held by the High Court, could not be sustained.” The ratio, thus, is that such suo moto powers have to be exercised within a reasonable period of time.
b. Situ Sahu & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., 7 (2004) 8 SCC 340 – the exercise of power in respect of transactions, which required prior 12 sanction of the Deputy Commissioner was again observed to be one which had to be exercised within a reasonable period of time.
c. Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. (2018) 12 scc 527 – the view expressed is the same as in the aforesaid two judgments in para 13, as under:
“13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights.” d. Vivek M. Hinduja v. M. Aswatha & Ors. (cIVIL Appeal No.2166/2009, decided on 6.12.2017 (reported in 2019 (1) Kant LJ 819 (SC) – the provisions of the said Act were in issue, where suo moto action was sought to be taken in 1998, in respect of transactions of the vintage 1967, and this was held to be a long delay, which did not warrant the exercise of such power.”
8. We have discussed the aforesaid aspect in some detail as it has a direct bearing to the factual controversy in the present case.
9. Now, once again, let us turn back to the factual matrix. It appears that there was an endeavour to disturb the possession of 8 the private respondents which compelled them to file a civil suit being OS No.5875/1994 on 25.6.1994 before the City Civil Court, Bangalore. A decree was passed for permanent injunction in favour of the private respondents and against the persons claiming similar rights as the appellant before us (who is in the line of succession of the original two ladies, namely, Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma) opining that the private respondents before us have proved their lawful possession of the property and were entitled to a permanent injunction. Aggrieved by the said decree, the defendants in that suit, who are grandchildren of G. Ramaiah and Gundamma laid a challenge in the first appeal before the High Court which was also dismissed on 19.03.2004 albeit on the ground of delay.
10. The appellant before us, as a legal heir of the original beneficiaries being Smt. Gundamma and Smt. Siddamma, sought directions from the deputy Commissioner to enquire about the violation of the provisions of the SC & ST Act. This application was filed by the appellant on 13.10.2009. Thus, this is the first time that the appellant has sought to claim exercise of rights under the SC & ST Act.
11. On enquiry, the Assistant Commissioner, vide order dated 09.09.2010 opined in his favour. The challenge laid by the private 9 respondent Nos. 4 to 9 also did not succeed. It was deemed appropriate to take recourse to a remedy of appeal. The appeal was thereafter dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner on 8.10.2010 and once again a writ petition was filed by them before the High Court but vide order dated 16.8.2011, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. It is thereafter that the private respondents fate took a turn for the better when they succeed in the writ appeal in terms of order dated 5.7.2013. The appellant has, thus, filed the present appeal.
12. There are number of issues raised before us calling for the inter se play of the Inams Abolition Act and the SC & ST Act. We, however, do not see the need to examine them as, according to us, the appellant is disentitled to any relief on the short ground of having knocked the doors of the concerned authorities three decades after the SC & ST Act came into force. It is this very aspect which forms subject matter of debate in a number of judgments and finally in Satyan’s case (supra), (they have been discussed Para 12 extracted hereinabove). It was recognized that there was no limitation of time prescribed but it should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is in that context that period of 20 years have been said to be too long a period for calling for interference by the concerned authorities. Leave the said period, in 10 the present case, we are confronted with the factual situation of 30 years period between the rights accruing and the exercise of rights. In the meantime, the lands have been developed by the private respondents who, according to us, is bona fide purchaser of the land and created infrastructure on the same. It does seem now an endeavour of the appellant to only extract some amount knowing fully well the kind of establishment which has come up on the land in question. We cannot be a part to such endeavour. We are, thus, of the view that in the conspectuous of the legal position discussed aforesaid and the facts referred to by us, the appellant is disentitled to any relief on this short ground of an inordinate delay in seeking to avail of their remedy in limine. Insofar as the other aspects raised in the present appeals are concerned, we are leaving the questions of law open since we are not required to comment on the same for adjudication of the present controversy.
13. The appeals are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
……………………………………,J.
(Sanjay Kishan Kaul) ……………………………………,J.
(K.M. Joseph) New Delhi;
August 29, 2019
ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.11 SECTION IV-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 4367-4372/2016
JAGADISH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. Respondent(s)
(LIST THE APPEALS IN THE MONTH OF AUGUST, 2019(R/P 8.2.2019) ) Date : 29-08-2019 These appeals were called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH For Appellant(s) Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, AOR Mr. Sudhanshu Prakash, Adv.
Mr. Kartik Anand, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Aman Lekhi, Adv.
Vamshi Chendarellu, Adv.
Mr. Sudhir Naagar, AOR Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR Mr. Md. Afzal Ansari, Adv.
Mr. Mandndra Pal Gupta, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable judgment leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
(GULSHAN KUMAR ARORA) (ANITA RANI AHUJA)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)