Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
K Aruna Kumari, Nellore Dist 1 Other vs K Ramamma, Chennai 19 Others on 29 September, 2023
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THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
C.R.P.No.3459 of 2016
ORDER:
Aggrieved by the order and decree dated 17.06.2016 passed in O.S.No. 95 of 2009 on the file of the Court of I Additional District Judge, Nellore, SPSR Nellore District, (in short 'the court below') the present revision is filed.
2. The petitioners herein are the plaintiffs; respondents herein are the defendants before the court below.
3. The petitioners/ plaintiffs filed the suit for partition and separate possession in respect of the plaint schedule property. In the said suit, an application has been filed under order VII, rule 14 and Section 151 of C.P.C to condone the delay in filing the documents and receive the same in evidence. The said application the court below held that the document dated 10.06.2008, which is produced by the petitioners to get it marked in the cross examination of DW-3 is not admissible in evidence for want of stamp duty and registration. Assailing the same, the present revision came to be filed.
4. Heard Mr. V. Siva Prasad Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mrs. Marella Radha, learned counsel for the 6th respondent.
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5. During hearing learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the court below failed to appreciate that at the time of cross examination of DW-3, petitioners/ plaintiff confronted the Lok Adalath Awards passed in O.S.No.103 of 2021 and other suits, upon showing them DW-3 admitted that same as he is one of the party in that awards, the plaintiffs requested the court below to mark the documents, but the court below erred in rejecting the request of the plaintiffs by passing the impugned order, the purpose of which the petitioners sought for marking of said documents is for collateral purpose to prove that the family of the Katuru Vengama Naidu i.e father-in-law of the 1st petitioner are joint family and joint family properties were not partitioned in the year 1996 as contended by the respondents in their written statement. The evidence of DW-3 becomes relevant for adjudication of the issues involved in the litigation only by marking the Lok Adalath Awards passed in O.S.No.103 of 2001 and other suits. Therefore the court below has not dealt the issue in right perspective, while passing the order in the impugned application and the same is liable to be set aside.
6. Learned counsel for the 6th respondent would contend that the court below rightly rejected the plea of the petitioner as the said document is not registered, as such it is not admissible in 3 evidence for want of stamp duty and penalty. Therefore, the revision is liable to be dismissed.
7. Perused the record.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Som Dev and Others vs. Rati Ram and Another"1 wherein it was held as follows:
"12. On a plain reading of Section 17 of the Registration Act, with particular reference to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) it is clear that a decree or order of a court and a compromise decree that relates only to the subject-matter of the suit need not be registered on the ground that it is a non-testamentary instrument which purports to or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right to or in immovable property or which acknowledges receipt or payment of any consideration on account of a transaction which brings about the above results. But if a suit is decreed on the basis of a compromise and that compromise takes in property that is not the subject-matter of the suit, such a compromise decree would require registration. Of course, we are not unmindful of the line of authorities that say that even if there is inclusion of property that is not the subject- matter of the suit, if it constitutes the consideration for the compromise, such a compromise decree would be considered to be a compromise relating to the subject-matter of the suit and such a decree would also not require registration in view of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. Since we are not concerned with that aspect here, it is not necessary to 1 (2006) 10 SCC 788 4 further deal with that question. Suffice it to say that on a plain reading of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) all decrees and orders of the court including a compromise decree subject to the exception as regards properties that are outside the subject-matter of the suit, do not require registration on the ground that they are hit by Sections 17(1)(b) and (c) of the Act. But at the same time, there is no exemption or exclusion, in respect of clauses (a), (d) and (e) of Section 17(1) so that if a decree brings about a gift of immovable property, or lease of immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year or reserving an early rent or a transfer of a decree or order of a court or any award creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing rights to and in immovable property, that requires to be registered.
And also has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Ravinder kaur Grewal and Others v. Manjit Kaur and Others"2 wherein it was held as follows:
"26. In para 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: (Kale case, SCC pp. (126-
27).
"10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:
(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and 2 (2020) 9 SCC 706 5 equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;
(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence; (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;
(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made "under the document' and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;
(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;
(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family 6 arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.'"
....
31. As regards the decision in Bhoop Singh and Som Dev v. Rati Ram, the same dealt with the question of necessity to register any decree or order of a court governed by clause
(vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act, 1908 ("the 1908 Act"). In the present case, however, clause (v) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the 1908 Act is attracted. Section 17 as applicable when the cause of action arose (prior to amendment of 2001) reads thus:
"PART III OF REGISTRABLE DOCUMENTS
17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.-- (1) * * * (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to-- (i)-(iv) * *
(v) any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or"....
9. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the petitioners are not claiming the properties through the above said Awards and relying upon those documents that the Katuru Vengama Naidu family is in joint possession of plaint schedule properties. Therefore those documents are 7 necessary to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case. Hence the revision is liable to be allowed.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the 6th respondent vehemently opposed to allow the revision and placed reliance on the decision of composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in "Suram Bapu Reddy v. Janagam Laxmi"3 wherein it was held as follows:
"11. But in the order under reference, the learned Judge took note of Section 17(1)(f) of the Registration Act, 1908 and the amendment made to Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act under the A.P. Amendment Act No. 4/1999 and came to the conclusion that after the amendment to the Registration Act, even a compromise decree required compulsory registration and that the documents on which appropriate stamp duty is not paid and which are not registered, are not admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act and Section 49 of the Registration Act respectively. The interpretation given in Ayitham Venkaiah to the expression "conveyance" was found by the learned Judge not to be in tune with the object of the amendment. Therefore, the learned Judge referred the matter to the Division Bench.
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18. Section 21(1) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, declares that every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court. It also provides that where a compromise or settlement is arrived at by a Lok Adalat, 3 2019 (2) ALT 149 8 in a case referred to it under Section 20(1), the Court Fee paid in such cases shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870. 18-A. Court Fee and stamp duty stand on completely different footing. The object of charging Court Fee is partly to compensate the establishment for the expenditure involved in the administration of justice and partly to ensure that there is a check on frivolous litigation. 'Fee' has always been held to be a charge for the special services rendered by Government or Government agencies. But the object of charging stamp duty is to secure revenue for the State on transactions, the consideration in respect of which, are determined by market forces created by the activities of the State. To put it simply, the activities undertaken by the State in any locality determines both the rate and the marketability of properties and hence the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is actually a fiscal enactment charging transactions to tax.
11. Therefore, learned counsel for the 6th respondent vehemently contended that as per ratio laid down by this court, cited supra, every Award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court. Further where a compromise or settlement is arrived at by a Lok Adalat, in a case referred to it under Section 20(1), the Court fee paid in such cases shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870. Therefore the revision is not maintainable and same is liable to be dismissed.
12. As could be seen from the averment made in the affidavit by the petitioners, it is very clear that they are not claiming the properties through the Lok Adalath Awards, but to show the evidence that the Katuru Vengama Naidu family is in 9 joint possession of the plaint schedule properties as stated in the affidavit. Whereas the court below clearly mentioned in its order that when the partition deed dated 10.06.2008 becomes part and parcel of the Award, the Award is liable for registration because the parties have divided their properties by metes and bounds. Therefore the court below considered the fact that the Award passed in the Lok Adalath under which the properties are divided between the members of the family of the defendant therein is liable for registration and it cannot be received in evidence. Even under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, an instruction for partition is also liable to be registered. Therefore the document dated 10.06.2008 is not admissible in evidence.
13. Therefore, the decision relied by the learned counsel for the 6th respondent would amply demonstrate with regard to binding nature of the document and same is applicable to the facts of this case.
14. After close scrutiny of the impugned order would go to show that there is no impropriety or irregularity in the order of the trial court. Therefore, interference of this Court is unwarranted.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, the C.R.P is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 10
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.
___________________________________ DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO Date:29.09.2023.
KK 11 THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO C.R.P.No.3459 of 2016 Date 29.09.2023.
KK