Karnataka High Court
Mr.Ravindra Kumar N. vs Muniyappa on 1 July, 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF JULY, 2019
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.K. SUDHINDRARAO
R.S.A.No.86/2013
BETWEEN:
Mr. RAVINDRA KUMAR N
S/O N NARASIMHA MURTHY
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
R/AT THYAGARAJANAGARA
DEVANAHALLI TOWN
BANGALORE RURAL
DISTRICT - 562 110.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI ANANTH MANDAGI, SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI KIRAN V RON, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
S/O MUNIKENCHAPPA
R/AT THIMMAPPANAHALLI
SULIBELE HOBLI
HOSKOTE TALUK
BANGALORE RURAL
DISTRICT - 562 114.
2. MUNIYAMMA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
D/O MUNIKENCHAPPA
W/O MADURAPPA
R/AT MALLEPURA
2
REDDIHALLI POST
CHENNARAYAPATNA HOBLI
DEVANAHALLI TALUK
BANGALORE SOUTH DIST.-562 135.
3. MUNNA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
D/O MUNIKENCHAPPA
W/O MUNIYAPPA
R/AT KONAGANABELE
REDDEHALLI POST
CHENNARAYAPATNA HOBLI
DEVANAHALLI TALUK
BANGALORE RURAL DIST.-562 135.
4. MUNIYAMMA
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
D/O MUNIKENCHAPPA
W/O MUNIYAPPA
R/AT No.217, A .K COLONY
DODDABANASAWADI
BANGAL0RE - 560 043 .
5. MUNINARAYANAMMA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
D/O MUNIKENCHAPPA
W/O MUNIRAJU
R/AT ATTIBELE VILLAGE ,
POST, SULIBELE HOBLI
HOSKOTE TALUK
BANGALORE RURAL DIST. - 562 114.
6. MUNKENCHAPPA
S/O PILLAPPA
SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRs.
VIDE COURT ORDER DTD.20.01.2014
R1-5, 7 & 8 ARE TREATED AS
LRs OF DECEASED R6
3
7. MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
S/O MUNIKENCHAPPA
R/AT KANNAMANGALA VILLAGE
KASABA HOBLI
DEVANAHALLI TALUK
BANGALORE RURAL DIST. - 562 135.
8. KOORAMMA
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS
MUNIKENCHAPPA
R/AT THIMMAPPANAHALLI
SULIBELE HOBLI
HOSKOTE TALUK
BANGALORE RURAL DIST. - 562 114.
9. M/S.OZONE URBANA INFRA
DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS MFAR
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PVT. LTD. AND OZONE URBANA LAND
DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE LTD.),
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE
COMPANIES ACT HAVING ITS REGD.
OFFICE AT No.38, ULSOOR ROAD
BANGALORE - 42
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
SINGATORY, Mr.BALAJI V.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VINOD PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R1-5;
SRI S K V CHALAPATHY SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI P P HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR R-9;
VIDE COURT ORDER DTD.20.01.2014
R1-5, 7 & 8 ARE TREATED AS LRs OF DECEASED R6;
NOTICE TO R8 DISPENSED WITH
VIDE COURT ORDER DTD. 13.3.2014:
R-7- SERVICE HELD SUFFICIENT)
4
THIS RSA IS FILED U/S. 100 OF CPC AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT & DECREE DATED 17.10.2012 PASSED IN
R.A.No.24/2011 ON THE FILE OF PRINCIPAL DISTRICT
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT,
BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE APPEAL FILED AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 2.12.2010 PASSED
IN OS.No.2496/2005 ON THE FILE OF II ADDITIONAL
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT,
BANGALORE.
THIS RSA COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS DAY, THE
COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.10.2012 passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, in R.A.No.24/2011, wherein the appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.2496/2005 on 02.12.2010 by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, came to be dismissed.
2. In order to avoid confusion and overlapping, the parties herein are referred to with their ranking as held by them before the trial Court.
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3. O.S.No.2496/2005 came to be filed by the plaintiffs before the trial Court for partition. There are five plaintiffs. The defendants to begun with are three in number and in later circumstances of the case, their number has gone to eight.
4. The substance of the case of the plaintiffs is, 2nd and 3rd defendants are the children of 1st defendant. 1st defendant had two wives, namely, Muniakkayamma and Gangamma. 1st defendant married Gangamma after the death of 1st wife - Muniakkayamma. 2nd and 3rd defendants are the children of Muniakkayamma and plaintiffs are the children of Gangamma.
5. It is stated that the suit schedule properties are the joint family properties. When 2nd defendant tried to alienate suit item No.2 to deprive plaintiffs' share, they demanded partition. They pleaded joint possession, right of partition and claim their share. 6
6. In the trial court, 1st and 3rd defendants remained exparte. 2nd defendant appeared and failed to file his written statement. However, 4th defendant impleaded himself and filed his written statement stating that suit item No.2 was the self acquired property of the 2nd defendant and Grant Certificate has been issued by order dated 20.6.1996. The revenue records are changed in his favour and the said grant is subject to non alienation for 15 years. It is also the contention of the 4th defendant that 2nd defendant sold the said land to him for his legal necessities under the registered Sale Deed dated 13-10-2006 within the period of prohibition by taking due permission from the Government and hence the suit in respect of item No.2 is barred by limitation.
7. The trial Judge was accommodated with the oral evidence of PW1 and documentary evidence of 7 Exs.P1 to P7 on behalf of plaintiffs and no oral or documentary evidence are produced by the defendants. The trial Judge on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and other materials, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/8th share each in the suit item No.1 property and 1/7th share each in suit item No.2. An enquiry was also ordered for ascertaining mesne profits.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Judge, 4th defendant preferred an appeal before the first Appellate Court in R.A.No.24/2011, contending that he is the purchaser of item No.2 of the schedule property from 2nd defendant under the registered sale deed.
9. The first appellate Court for the reasons assigned in its judgment dated 17.10.2012, dismissed R.A.No.24/2011. Being aggrieved by the said judgment 8 and decree, defendant No.4/appellant has presented this appeal.
10. However, the next person found in the cause title to the appeal Memorandum as 9th respondent is one M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Private Limited (formerly known as Mfar Infrastructure Development Pvt. Ltd. and Ozone Urbana Land Development Private Ltd.) said to be a corporate enterprise having its registered office at No.38, Ulsoor Road, Bangalore-42, represented by its Authorised Signatory Mr. Balaji V. The said 9th respondent got impleaded in the appeal on an application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC claiming that he is the purchaser of item No.2 of the schedule property from 4th defendant under the registered sale deed dated 03.01.2008 which came to be allowed by this Court.
Thus the defendant No.4 was impleaded before the trail Court. However, respondent No.9 under this appeal 9 came on record before this Court as 9th respondent on allowing the application. Regard being had to the fact that he was neither defendant before the trial Court nor the first appellate Court.
Insofar as his position is concerned, it is to be adjudicated as to when he has secured valid title over item No.2 of the schedule property by virtue of the registered sale deed dated 03-01-2008 from the 4th defendant. The situation is that the nature of schedule item No.1 has been held to be joint family property. Further the sale deed do not appears to have been made for good reasons by 4th defendant in favour of 9th respondent. Finally it is submitted that grant dated 20.6.1996 of the schedule item No.2 was cancelled and this has been the concurrent submission by counsel for both sides.
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11. This Court while admitting the appeal has framed the following substantial question of law on 17.01.2013:
In the absence of any pleadings in the plaint asserting that item No.2 of the plaint schedule property which is admittedly granted in favour of defendant No.2 by the Government, stating that the grant was for and on behalf of the family and the same was the joint family property, whether the Courts below were right and justified in recording a finding that it was a joint family property and therefore the sale made in favour of the appellant by defendant No.2 was not binding on the plaintiffs?
12. At the time of hearing, this Court has also framed additional substantial questions of law on
18.6.2019 which are as under:
(i) Whether the grant of made in favour of defendant No.2 was an exclusive grant to the defendant No.2 or it had the effect of being beneficial to the entire joint family?
(ii) Whether the defendant No.2or defendant No.4 or both of them had subsisting interest in the 11 schedule property. In case of otherwise, whether the proceedings are vitiated?
13. Learned counsel Sri. Ananth Mandagi for Sri. Kiran Ron, for 4th defendant/appellant would submit that item No.2 of the schedule property even cannot be presumed to be belonging to joint family as it was granted out and out in favour of 2nd defendant for an upset price.
14. It is also submitted that said property was sold by 2nd defendant in favour of 4th defendant/appellant under the registered sale deed for a sum of Rs.40.00 Lakh. Learned counsel would further submit that 4th defendant got impleaded in the original suit. Learned counsel would further submit that when the grant of land was made to 2nd defendant, it was exclusively meant for 2nd defendant who had absolute power to sell the said item of property. Learned counsel also would submit that the said item of property was 12 fully permissible for sale, more particularly, permission was granted by the Government to sell the same after verification.
15. Learned counsel for 4th defendant/appellant and 9th respondent herein would submit that, the very joint family connecting to the subject matter does not arise for the very reason that the property was sold by 2nd defendant in favour of 4th defendant who in turn sold it to the 9th respondent. Learned counsel would further submit that the purpose of grant in order to qualify to be considered as a joint family property should have borne the details in the grant, otherwise, it was a grant for an individual.
16. It was also submitted that 2nd defendant was never a joint family member. Learned counsel would further submit that if at all they have raised the concept of joint family it was not their specific plea in the plaint that schedule property was granted for the benefit of the 13 entire joint family. Thus, the main bone of contention is in respect of item No.2 of the schedule property, nature of property that was admittedly granted by the Government and whether it was granted exclusively for the 2nd defendant or the benefits enure to the entire family.
17. In the circumstances, the crucial factor would be, in case, the grant was exclusively made to 2nd defendant, plaintiffs will be dislodged. However, in case, schedule property is held to be a grant that was made in favour of the joint family and symbolically the judgment of the appellate court would stand confirmed and the position of appellant or 9th respondent will be unsettled.
18. The learned counsel would also submit that the trial Court for that matter even the first Appellate Court erred in considering the legal aspects of the case 14 by referring as two karthas which is unknown to the concept of joint family.
19. It was seriously contended by learned counsel for 4th defendant/appellant and impleaded 9th respondent that the subject matter was absolutely available for transfer and in this connection, the competent authority/Government perused the legal aspects and granted the permission to the 2nd defendant to sell the same.
20. The learned Counsel for plaintiffs/respective respondents would submit that the 4th defendant/ appellant and 9th respondent who got impleaded do belong to group of estate dealers who were known for real estate business and pursuant to their greed over item No.2 of the schedule property, defendant Nos.2 and 4 are in aggravated collusion. In the process started making wrong claims over the property and are illegally claiming item No.2 of the schedule. In the said process 15 they are raising irrelevant and redundant aspects of absence of joint family and claiming the nature of item No.2 of the schedule property as 'self acquired property of 2nd defendant' and obtained the permission from the Government to sell the said property.
21. Ninth respondent is the purchaser of the item No.2 of the schedule property having purchased it from 4th defendant under the registered sale deed dated 03.01.2008. Thus, for the purpose of better understanding, it is necessary to place the facts of the case.
22. The suit originally was filed for partition. Item No.2 of the schedule is the land to the extent of 3 acres 20 guntas in Sy. No. 90 (New No.158) situated at Kannamangala village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore Rural District. 4th defendant is the purchaser under the registered sale deed dated 11.10.2006 for Rs.40.00 lakh from the 2nd defendant. 16 9th respondent is the purchaser of the said item of property from 4th defendant under the registered sale deed dated 03.01.2008 for Rs.2.55 crores.
23. The bone of contention between the parties in relation to item No.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule are, they are the joint family property belonging to the family of the plaintiffs, which consists of plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 as contended by plaintiffs. But, it is the contention of the 4th defendant/appellant herein that, item No.2 of the suit schedule property was granted on 21.3.1996 in favour of 2nd defendant for upset price and it was for 2nd defendant alone and it is neither a joint family property nor plaintiffs have any right over it. The grantee of the land/2nd defendant sold it to 4th defendant on 11.10.2006 for Rs.40.00 lakh, who in turn, sold it to M/s. Ozone Urbana Infrastructure, who is the 9th respondent under this appeal for a cash consideration of Rs.2.55 crorers on 03.01.2008 17
24. 4th defendant is the appellant before the first Appellate Court and also before this Court and he has purchased the said item of property from 2nd defendant and sold it to the person impleaded as 9th respondent before this Court i.e. M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Development Private Limited.
25. Application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is filed before the first Appellate Court, but the said IA is not disposed of. The learned counsel for 4th defendant/ appellant would submit that first appellate court erred in not disposing of the said application till the end. But discusses about the documents filed along with it.
26. Item No.2 of the schedule property was sought to be sold in favour of 4th defendant by the 2nd defendant and he has sought for permission and permission was granted as per Official memorandum dated 16.7.2006 issued by the competent authority and it is placed before the Court. From the said official 18 memorandum, the following points are amply clear, viz.,:
(i) It was issued on 3.7.2006 there is reference of 2nd defendant Muniyappa S/o.
Munikenchappa, seeking permission to sell 3.20 acres of land in survey No.157 of Kannamangala village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, to one N.Ravindra Kumar (in the circumstances 4th defendant)
(ii) Reference to government letter bearing No.SRD 763/LGB 2006 dated 26.9.2006;
(iii) Letter by Assistant commissioner, Doddaballapur Division in No.LND:CR:269/2005-06 dated 18.10.2005;
(iv) Evcn letter by the office of the Deputy Commissioner dated 29.9.2006, the letter without number, but dated 3.10.2006 for having remitted the amount to the Government.
27. The permission was granted by the Government on the declaration of 2nd defendant and placing his intention to sell the schedule property as it was not fit for agriculture. Further, 2nd defendant- Muniyappa S/o Munikenchappa was permitted to sell 19 the said item of property to one N.Ravindra Kumar S/o Narasimhamurthy- 4th defendant, subject to condition of paying 50% of the market value of the schedule property as it was sought to be sold within the prohibited period of 15 years.
28. The further domain of this appeal is to examine the legality of the material events involved or connecting to the appeal. In this connection, the permission granted to 2nd defendant to sell item No.2 of the schedule property is subject to the payment of 50% of the market value of the same. The amount of deposit of the same is stated as Rs.7.00 lakh. However it is seen, it is sold for a cash consideration of Rs.40.00 lakh as per sale deed dated 11.10.2006. However, it is seen that 50% of the market value as calculated by 2nd and 4th defendant is, Rs.7.00 lakh. Further property was sold by 4th defendant -Ravindra kumar to the 9th respondent-M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Development 20 Private Limited under the registered sale deed dated 03.01.2008 for a consideration of Rs.2.55 crorers. Incidentally, this sale deed by the 4th defendant in favour of 9th respondent defendant is dated 03.01.2008 within a span of 2 years 2 months.
29. Learned counsel for appellant Sri.Kiran Ron would submit that plaintiffs have laid their claim without disclosing the nature of land. It is not pleaded by them that the schedule property was granted to the joint family as such, plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 are having undivided right, title and interest over the same. It was mentioned by 4th defendant that the property in question was granted to 2nd defendant under the provisions of Section 94 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, for upset price. The 4th defendant/appellant and 9th respondent contend that it was a grant made to 2nd defendant for upset price and thus it did not belong to joint family. Learned counsel for appellant would 21 submit that though his client has sold the schedule item No.2 to 9th respondent, he is contesting the same by virtue legal duty.
30. In the sale deed dated 03.01.2008, the sale consideration is Rs.2.55 crorers at the rate of Rs.75.00 lakh per acre. Incidentally, one Shaji Baby John S/o. Baby John is made as a confirming party. However, rights and liabilities of the said confirming party are not explained.
31. On the date of filing of the suit, 2nd defendant was aged about 55 years. An application under order 41 Rule 27 CPC was filed before the first Appellate Court on 14.07.2011 along with the certified copies of 08 documents. Incidentally, the said application is filed by appellant who is the 4th defendant.
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32. The first document is the certified copy of the official memorandum bearing No. LND:RUC:SR No. 94-95 (15.A/95-96). The said document is in Kannada, wherein, it is stated that grantee Muniyappa as per the said document dated 21.3.1996 is stated to be in possession of the property for a period of 25 to 40 years as unauthorized occupant.
33. Meanwhile, learned counsel appearing for 4th defendant/appellant and 9th respondent- Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Private Limited, would submit that the land that was granted to 2nd defendant has been cancelled. Item No.2 of the schedule property which is the subject matter and purchased by 4th defendant from 2nd defendant and later 4th defendant has sold it to 9th respondent in this appeal by executing registered sale deed dated 03-01-2008 for Rs.2.55 crores.
34. The learned counsel for 4th defendant/ appellant and 9th respondent would submit that the 23 grant of item No.2 of the schedule property is already cancelled by the Government and that the appeal comes to an end as the subject matter ceases to exist. Further they also submitted for closing the proceedings. It was also brought to the notice that, buildings have come up over the schedule property. However, in the circumstances, the grant was made for agricultural purposes subject to the condition imposed in the grant order.
35. The submission that appeal comes to an end in respect of item No.2 as the grant being forfeited by the Government cannot be accepted since it was also submitted that 2nd defendant has preferred Writ Petition in No.31984/2017.
36. The domain of this appeal would be not regarding the cancellation of grant. However, this Court has to adjudicate whether the land that was granted in the year 1996 was made after considering unauthorized 24 cultivation if made of how many years and the effect of grant whether it was exclusively for the 2nd defendant or for the joint family. As I have discussed above, it is the nature of grant that decides the case.
37. In this connection, it is necessary to analyze that admittedly plaintiffs, (1) Muniyappa S/o. Munikenchappa; (2) Muniyamma D/o. Munikenchappa (3) Muna D/o Munikenchappa; (4) Muniyamma D/o. Munikenchappa and (5) Muninarayanamma are the children of 1st defendant from his 2nd wife Gangamma. Further 2nd and 3rd defendants are also the children of 1st defendant through his first wife. In the background of the family, its avocation and that of grown up number of members are also necessary to be considered to hold whether the land was an exclusive grant for 2nd defendant or having effect of enuring benefit to all the members.
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38. It is the submission of learned counsel for 4th defendant/appellant and 9th respondent that, by virtue of cancellation of grant of the subject matter it ceases to exist thereby proceedings got terminated and thus, there is no matter to be adjudicated in this appeal.
39. In this connection, it is necessary to mention, if they are not having intention to continue with the ownership of item No.2 of the schedule property, the legal process of considering legality of the matter regarding the nature of the grant, the status of the family and related would continue irrespective of the stance of the parties.
40. This Court is not adjudicating the matter on facts. Being well aware of Section 100 CPC the substantial questions of law are to be looked into. In this connection, the substantial question of law framed by this Court on 17.01.2013 and additional questions on 18.6.2019 are as under:
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Substantial question of law on 17.01.2013:
In the absence of any pleadings in the plaint asserting that item No.2 of the plaint schedule property which is admittedly granted in favour of defendant No.2 by the Government, stating that the grant was for and on behalf of the family and the same was the joint family property, whether the Courts below were right and justified in recording a finding that it was a joint family property and therefore the sale made in favour of the appellant by defendant No.2 was not binding on the plaintiffs?
Additional substantial questions of law on 18.6.2019
(i) Whether the grant of made in favour of defendant No.2 was an exclusive grant to the defendant No.2 or it had the effect of being beneficial to the entire joint family?
(ii) Whether the defendant No.2or defendant No.4 or both of them had subsisting interest in the schedule property. In case of otherwise, whether the proceedings are vitiated?
41. The second additional substantial question of law was framed in the light of unequivocal and unanimous submissions by the learned for 4th defendant/appellant and 9th respondent that the grant 27 of land that was made in favour of 2nd defendant- Muniyappa was cancelled on 20.5.2017. If the grant of land was cancelled, it is necessary to mention here that the date of sale deed executed by 2nd defendant in favour of 4th defendant is on 11.10.2006 for a consideration of Rs.40.00 lakh and again, the sale deed executed by 4th defendant/appellant in favour of 9th respondent is on 03.01.2008 for a consideration of Rs.2.55 crorers.
42. It was submitted that in the light of the absence of land from the purview of consideration, it is to be taken as 'the land is not in existence for consideration' and that prompted the framing of another question of law regarding subsisting interest by virtue of the cancellation of the grant. Being mindful of the fact that this Court is not sitting over the domain of adjudicating the validity of cancellation, regard being had to the fact that the appellant though are mindful of 28 cancellation chose to continue the proceedings. Hence, the moot question at this juncture would be, including certain questions and aspects under the provisions of 79-A and 79-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,1961 or the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 may be. But when during the disposal of the proceedings if any illegalities or the irregularities are noticed, this Court is entitled to know why the things were buried under the carpet.
43. At this stage, it is necessary to mention that, there are various circumstances where a genuine contract entered into by the parties. One of the circumstances is, "Doctrine of supervening impossibility". Thus the performance that was valid and possible in the beginning may forms out to invalid and impossible in the circumstance. When the said doctrine is considered the happening of material event to render 29 the performance impossible and also cancellation of grant frustrates the contract of sale from 2nd defendant to 4th defendant and further from 4th defendant to 9th respondent. Thus neither appellant nor 9th respondent can seek relief under their respective sale deeds.
44. Thus when the learned counsel for appellant and 9th respondent have accepted that by virtue of the cancellation of grant on 20.05.2017, the grant that was earlier made to the 2nd defendant no more exists, then it amounts to admitted discharge of the contract of sale dated 11.10.2006 from 2nd defendant to 4th defendant and sale deed dated 03-01-2008 from 4th defendant to 9th respondent.
45. Learned counsel Sri.Kiran Ron for the appellant would submit that the application filed under order 41 Rule 27 was rejected by the first Appellate Court and it was enclosed by 8 document, viz., 30 "(i) Certified copy of LND RUC/SR No.94-95 (15.A/95-96) Saguvali Chit;
(ii) Certified copy of Sketch Block No.2 Muniyappa S/o. Munikenchappa;
(iii) Certified copy of Phodi Sketch;
(iv) Certified copy of Tippani;
(v) Certified copy of MR No.2/96-97;
(vi) Sale permission order dated
13.10.2006;
(viii) Certified copy of sale deed dated 13.10.2006 Muniyappa in favour of N.Ravindra Kumar;
(viii) Certified copy of the cast
certificate."
46. The said records are available in the records of first Appellate Court. Insofar as grant order, Saguvali chit are available in the records and towards the consideration of substantial question of law and also the grant copy, in the ends of principles of natural justice, no prejudice would be caused to the respondents if the application is allowed and the 31 documents are perused. However, none of the documents do not require or call for further explanation as they are the documents issued by the competent authority. Moreover, almost all of them are available in the records.
47. Learned counsel for appellant Sri. Kiran Ron would submit that if once the said application is allowed, the matter has to be remanded to the first Appellate Court for consideration.
48. In this connection, it is to be seen that many of the documents are available before the appellate court, more particularly, those documents do not call for enquiry and they are in respect of the proceedings already taken place. It is not necessary that the matter has to be remanded considering the nature and circumstances of the case. Further the copies of the said documents are in the records as well. Thus the 32 application under order 41 Rule under Section 27 is allowed.
49. Copy of the grant proceedings are also produced along with the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The recommendation date for grant of land is reflected as 28.9.1994. In this connection, learned counsel Sri. Kiran Ron for appellant would submit that the age of the proposed grantees is shown as cultivating unauthorisedly for 25 to 40 years. However, the 2nd defendant-Muniyappa is shown as 2nd grantee and as such he definitely does not fall under the group of exact 25 or 40. It is necessary to mention the dates and mentioning of dates assumes significance. The admitted factor for each of the proposal for grant on 28.9.1994 is as under:
"Four names of grantees proposed under the said documents are:
(i) K.P. Gopalappa S/o Pillamuniyappa,
(ii) Muniyappa, S/o. Munikenchappa;33
(iii) K. Ramachandra, Rajanna S/o.Munishama;
(iv) P.M.Anjinappa S/o. Muniramaiah.
The name of 2nd defendant is at Sl.No.2". The consideration are: unauthorized occupation over the schedule land, duration and fine or penalty as the case may be.
The statement is made as under:
Rate is Rs.10/- per acre per year. Thus, the amount would be Rs.32/- for 3 acres 20 guntas of land for one year at the rate of Rs.10/- per acre. The total penalty or fine amount whatever at the relevant time is: Rs.1,113/-. The total penalty considered as reflected from the saguvali chit is Rs.1,113/-."
In order to arrive the number of years of unauthorized cultivation, it would be 1,113 divided by 32 = 34.78 and thereby the unauthorized cultivation of 2nd defendant would be 32 years.
50. The next arithmetical point of consideration is, admitted age of the 2nd defendant (grantee) Muniyappa son of Munikenchappa is, 55 years as on the date of filing of the suit i.e. on 28.10.2005 in which event as on the date of proposal for grant, the date of 34 proposal of grant is 28.9.1994, his age would be 55-11 years = 44 years. Further, when the unauthorized cultivation on calculation comes to 32 years in which event, at the time of commencement of unauthorized cultivation, the age of 2nd defendant would be 44 years -
32 years = 12 years of cultivation would be 94 -32 = 1962 as such this calculation has direct nexus to the substantial question of law involved in this case, i.e., 'whether the grant was for the joint family or exclusively for 2nd defendant".
51. Invariably, it could be seen that the family for the purpose of blood relation of 2nd defendant did not consisted exclusively 2nd defendant. His father was alive. It is necessary to place on record that legal position for grant is, whether the person seeking grant is agriculturist or his avocation. Thus, the moot question for commencement of unauthorized cultivation would be, "whether Muniyappa 2nd defendant to whom 35 grant is made was solely and personally was in unauthorized occupation of the land in the year 1962 when his age was not more than 12 years". The invariable answer anywhere would be in the negative.
But that does not mean that there was no unauthorized cultivation, but it is recognized by the revenue authorities and the irreconcilable inference would be, the members of family and his father was alive, it is totally improbable even to presume that father of 2nd defendant started cultivation of 3 acres 20 guntas of land through his son of aged 12 years when the father of 2nd defendant was alive and there were other siblings. Moreover, it is also seen that father or other siblings of 2nd defendant were not handicapped.
52. Thus, on this core, contention of the appellant that the land was exclusively granted in favour of 2nd defendant considering his personal cultivation cannot be accepted. On the other hand, 36 what is common in agricultural family is their avocation. Considering their hard work and as a source of livelihood to carry cultivation conditional grants are made in favour of unauthorized occupants if they made application for grant. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, for the purpose of considering the questions of law, the grant of agricultural land infavour of 2nd defendant cannot be treated as exclusive.
53. In support of his case, learned counsel for appellant relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and others [(2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 534], Head Note B is as under:
"B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908- Or.22 Rr.10 and 3 & 4 - Devolution of any interest during pendency of a suit - Seeking leave of court to continue suit, held, not obligatory - R.10, held, is based on principle that the trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject -mater of 37 the suit has devolved upon some other person or entity - Even if no step is taken to seek leave of the court to continue the suit, the suit may be continued by or against the original party- and the successor-in-interest will be bound by and will get the benefit of the decree- Legislature has made clear distinction between Rs.3, 4 and 10."
Further, learned counsel for appellant relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Krishne Gowda vs. Ningegowda [ILR 1987 Karnataka 2883]. Head Note A is as under:
"(A) EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (Central Act No.1 of 1872)- Sections 101 & 102 -
Burden of Proof - Shifting as case continues to develop - On entire evidence adduced, if Court able to conclude Plaintiff's case established, it will be case of plaintiff discharging his burden - - If Court unable to conclude whether version of plaintiff or defendant as true, it will be plaintiff's failure to prove and discharge his burden."
On the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Machado Brothers and others [(2004) 11 Supreme 38 Court Cases 168] wherein it is held at para No.25 as under:
"25. Thus it is clear that by the subsequent event if the original proceeding has become infructuous, ex debito justitiae, it will be the duty of the court to take such action as is necessary in the interest of justice, which includes disposing of infructuous litigation. For the said purpose it will be open to the parties concerned to make an application under Section 151 CPC to bring to the notice of the court the facts and circumstances which have made the pending litigation infructuous. Of course, when such an application is made, the court will enquire into the alleged facts and circumstances to find out whether the pending litigation has in fact become infructuous or not."
54. In support of his case, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 5 relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Subraya M.N. Vs. Vittala M.N. and others [AIR 2016 SC 3236] Head Note A and C are as under:
39
"(A) Registration Act (16 of 1908), S.49, S.17- Family arrangement- Admissibility I evidence- Panchayat resolution reduced in writing - Explaining settlement arrived at between parties and conduct of parties in receiving of money from defendant in lieu of relinquishing their interest in property -
could be taken as family arrangements/settlements - Though not registered, can be used as piece of evidence.
(C) Hindu Law - Partition - One of item of joint family property - Patta in respect of -
was granted to defendant for benefit of family - Suit for partition by plaintiffs 1 to 4-concurent findings by court below that plaintiffs and defendant would be entitled to 1/5th share each in said item - Held, was proper."
Further he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santhosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs.[ (2001) 3 SCC 179] Head Note A to E read as under:.
"A.Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Ss. 100 and 96 - First and second appeals - improper functioning of first appellate court may give rise to substantial question of law- Judgment of first appellate court, held must display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons 40 on all issues and contentions- Where a doubt arises as to whether first appellate court has carried out its functions correctly, such doubt itself may give rise to a substantial question of law- Where in a suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession and permanent injunction, the trial court had decreed the suit, expressly holding that the defendant had produced no documentary evidence in support of his plea of adverse possession and that the oral evidence adduced by him was conflicting in nature and not reliable , the first appellate court was not within jurisdiction in simply reversing the trial court findings on possession and dispossession and adverse possession without recording findings and reasons - Held, High Court ought to have granted plaintiff-appellant an opportunity to formulate a substantial question of law or done so itself - Supreme Court itself formulating the following question:
"Whether on the pleadings and the material brought on record by the defendant, the first appellate court was right in holding that the case of adverse possession was made out by the defendant and the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed as barred by time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, more so when such finding was arrived at in reversal of the findings of the trial court?"
B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908-S.100- Substantial question of law -Respondent, held, is within his rights to show that 41 question formulated by High Court is not involved in the case.
C. Civil Procedure Code, 1908-S.100- Substantial question of law -Held, High Court is not bound to confine itself to dealing only with the question initially framed by it- High Court may hear the appeal on any other such question so long as it is satisfied that the case involves the question and records its reasons for such satisfaction.
D. Civil Procedure Code, 1908-S.100- Substantial question of law -Held, "substantial" in context means having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable - Such question need not, however, be one "of general importance".
E. Civil Procedure Code, 1908-S.100- Substantial question of law-Held, to be substantial, a question lf law must be debatable, one which has not been settled earlier by statute or binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the outcome of the case."
55. In support of his case, learned counsel for respondent No.9 relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of T.S.Subbaraju Vs.T.A.Shivarama Setty and Others [RFA 42 No.197/2002 DD 01/04/2004 = AIR 2004 Karnatka 479]. The case note is as under:
"The plaintiff challenged the judgment of trial Court in dismissing his suit for partition of what he contended an ancestral and joint family properties. Held: The initial burden of proof is to establish the existence of some joint family property capable being the nucleus from which new property or asset could have been acquired-It is not sufficient to show that the joint family have some assets- It is necessary to prove that the assets of the joint family may have formed the nucleus form which the disputed assets may have been acquired. On failure to prove and discharge the initial burden, the trial Court was right in dismissing the suit."
Further, he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of H.Siddiqui (dead) by LRs Vs. A.Ramalingam [(2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 240] Head Note D is as under:
" D.Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Or.41 Rr.31 & 33 and S.96 - Appeal - Proper mode of disposal - Independent 43 assessment of evidence on each point and recording of reasons - Necessity of
- Strict adherence to provisions of Or.41 R.31 - Emphasised - High Court having not disposed of appeal in accordance with law, matter remanded for decision afresh for proper determination and disposal - Practice and Procedure - Appeal - Proper mode of disposal - Independent assessment of evidence and recording of reasons - Necessity of, emphasised"
(Paras 20 and 21) In the case of C.N.Ramappa Gowda Vs C.C.Chandregowda [(2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 265] wherein, para 18 is as under:
"18. The learned counsel in this context has specifically placed reliance on the observations of thsiCourt in Balraj Taneja's (2 (1999) 8 SCC 396 which is of great relevance and value, wherein it was held as follows: (SCC p.410, para 29) "29. As pointed out earlier the court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts 44 set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court. In a case, specially where a written statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing eh facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed inn the court. In a case, specially where a written statement has not been filed by the defendant, the court should be a little cautious in proceeding under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC. Before passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed infavour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of the court's satisfaction and therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, the court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself, it would not be safe for the court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts so as to settle the factual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression ' the court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved' used in sub-45
rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression 'may make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit' used in Rule 10 of Order 8"
In the case of Bondar Singh and others vs.Nihal Singh and others [(2003) 4 SCC 161], it is observed in paras 4 and 7 as under:
" 4. Before we proceed further it is necessary to notice a preliminary argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It was contended that the question of possession is a question of fact and the High Court while exercising power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had no jurisdiction to upset the findings on this question recorded by the lower appellate Court. An appeal under Section 100 CPC can be entertained by the High Court only on a substantial question of law. There can be no quarrel with this legal proposition. The scope of powers of High Court under Section 100 CPC is a matter of settled law. The learned counsel for the appellant cited several judgments in support of his contention. We do not consider it necessary to discuss these decisions because so far as the question of powers of High Courts under Section 100 C.P.C. is concerned, it needs no 46 discussion. If the findings of the subordinate courts on facts are contrary to evidence on record and are perverse, such finding can be set aside by the High Court in appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. A High Court cannot shut its eyes to perverse findings of the courts below. In the present case the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court were contrary to evidence on record and, therefore, perverse and the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the same resulting in the appeal being allowed and suit being decreed.
4. xxx xxx xxxx
5. xxx xxx xxxx
6. xxx xxx xxx "7. As regards the plea of sub tenancy (shikmi) argued on behalf of the defendants by their learned counsel, first we may note that this plea was never taken in the written statement the way it has been put forth now. The written statement is totally vague and lacking in material particulars on this aspect. There is nothing to support this plea except some alleged revenue entries. It is settled law that in the absence of a plea no amount of evidence led in relation thereto can be looked into. Therefore, in the absence of a clear plea regarding sub tenancy (shikmi) the defendants cannot be allowed to build up a case of sub tenancy 47 (shikmi). Had the defendants taken such a plea it would have found place as an issue in the suit. We have perused the issues framed in the suit. There is no issue on the point."
In the case of Makhan Singh(Dead) by LRS Vs. Kulwant Singh [(2007) 10 Supreme Court Cases 602]. The relevant paras 7 and 8 are as under:
"7. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties very carefully, and have also perused the evidence on record. There can be no doubt whatsoever with regard to the plea of Ms. Kamini Jaiswal that the interference of the High Court in second appeal should be clearly minimal and would not extend to a mere re- appraisal of the evidence. We are therefore clear that had the High Court on an appreciation of the evidence, taken a view different from that of the Trial Court and the first appellate court, the exercise would be clearly unjustified. We find, however, that the High Court differing with the courts below has proceeded on the basis and ( we believe correctly ) that the onus to prove that funds were available with the family with which the 29.2/3 marlas of land had been purchased by Dula Singh in the name of his sons lay on the defendant and not on the plaintiff. We find no evidence in this 48 respect save a self serving and stray sentence in the statement of the defendant that the property had been purchased from the income of the Joint Hindu Family. It bears reiteration that the defendant had denied the execution of the two agreements Ex.P-1 and P-2 dated 3.5.1992 at the initial stage but faced with a difficult situation had later admitted that the agreements had been executed, leading to a finding by all three courts to that effect. There is also a clear recital by the defendant in Ex.P-4 that the property belonged to him and specific boundaries of the property were also given therein. The defendant's statement had also been recorded by the Sub-Registrar on Ex.P-4 wherein he stated that he was ready to execute the sale deeds but Kulwant Singh, plaintiff had not appeared to do so. Likewise, in the original written statement a case of denial of the execution of the agreements had been pleaded and it was only by way of an amendment that the plea that the property belonged to the Joint Hindu Family had been raised. In this connection the judgment in D.S. Lakshmaiah case (supra ) becomes relevant. It had been observed that a property could not be presumed to be a Joint Hindu Family property merely because of the existence of a Joint Hindu Family and raised an ancillary question in the following terms:
"7. The question to be determined in the present case is as to who is required to 49 prove the nature of property whether it is joint Hindu Family property or self-
acquired property of the first
appellant."
8. The query was answered in
paragraph 18 in the following terms : " 18. The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available."
Further he relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Krishnegowda vs Ningegowda [ILR 1987 Karnataka 2883]. Head Note B is as under:
(B) HINDU LAW - Acquisition by junior member of joint family: whether property of joint or 50 self - acquired - Proof - Principles for determination.
Further, it is held as follows:
'In the case of acquisition by a junior member of a joint family the fact that the joint family possessed considerable nucleus capable of yielding income sufficient to enable acquisition of property is not by itself sufficient to hold that acquisition by a junior member of such joint family is with the aid of the joint family and the presumption to that effect cannot also be drawn. It shall have to be proved either by showing that it was acquired by the joint family funds or by proving that such junior member was in charge or management of the joint family property or business, though riot the kartha of the family, capable of yielding income so as to enable him to purchase the property. In the latter case, if such junior member was not able to show that he had independent source of income or the consideration to the acquisition of the property had flown from the particular source not connected with joint family property, a presumption shall have to be drawn that such acquisition of property was with the aid of joint family funds inasmuch as in such a case the junior member being in possession and management of the joint family property or business, his position will be akin to that of kartha." (para-7) 51 "7. Therefore, the Trial Court is right in taking into consideration the entire evidence on record for determining as to whether Items 15, 16 and 17 are the joint family properties or the self-acquired properties of the 4th defendant as averred by him. In this case, it is not in dispute that the joint family possessed vast extent of properties. In fact, none of the defendants disputed that Items 1 to 14 were the joint family properties which consisted of irrigated lands, cardamom plantation and paddy fields".
He also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of D.S.Lakshmaiah and another vs. Balasubramanyam and another [AIR 2003 Supreme Court 3800(1)]. Relevant paras are as under:
"8. There was evidence and it has been established that Item No.2 measuring 15 guntas of land was joint Hindu family property but, admittedly, no evidence has been led that the said joint Hindu family property was yielding any income or that any nucleus was available with the aid whereof Item No.1 property could be purchased by the first appellant. Admittedly, no evidence has been led on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs to show income from Item No.2 52 property or value of the property. At the same time no evidence has also been led by the first appellant to prove that he had any separate income so as to acquire Item No.1 property. In absence of evidence either way which party would succeed and which fail, is the question. The legal position is well settled as we will presently notice."
"17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the respondents having failed to discharge the initial burden of establishing that there was any nucleus in the form of any income whatsoever from Item No.2 property and no other nucleus was claimed, the burden remained on the respondents to establish that Item No.1 property was joint family property. In this view, the fact that the first appellant has not led any evidence to establish his separate income is of no consequence insofar as the claim of the respondents is concerned. Under these circumstances, for failure to lead evidence, the respondents' claim of Item No.1 to be joint family property would fail as rightly held by the first appellate court.
18. The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint 53 family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self- acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available."
"19. Another contention urged for the respondents was that assuming item no.1 property to be self-acquired property of appellant no.1, he blended the said property with the joint family property and, therefore, it has become the joint family property. Assuming the respondents can be permitted to raise such a plea without evidence in support thereof, the law on the aspect of blending is well settled that property separate or self-acquired of a member of joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the 54 separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation {see Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddy v. Lakkireddi Lakshamama1 and K.V. Narayanan v. K.V. Ranganadhan & others ((1977) 1SCC244))."
Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Shree Ram Bohra and others [AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1531]. Head Note A is as under:
(A) Hindu Law - Joint family-Existence of two kartas not contemplated by Hindu Law- Distinction between Karta and ordinary manager of property -
Two persons can be managers and represent Hindu joint family trading firm Suit by such two- Decree in favour of firm - Appeal One manager dying -
Other cannot continue to represent firm unless fresh authority therefore is granted - No proof produced of such authority - Appeal must proceed on basis that suit was brought by two plaintiffs."
55
56. However, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K.V.Sudarshan Vs. A. Ramakrishnappa and others in Civil Appeal No.5646/2008 (arising out of SLP(C) No.21197/2006), the grant of land in favour of 2nd defendant in this case speaks by itself in the circumstances of the case that the benefit enure to the joint family.
As subsequent development, further submission is made by learned counsel for 4th defendant/appellant and the 9th respondent that the schedule property has become almost a town ship now. In other words, the gone out is the agricultural look and super structures have come on the schedule property.
57. It was submitted by learned counsel for appellant that the grant of land was cancelled on the ground that earlier the same was granted to the Horticulture Department. However, under the sale deed 56 dated 11.10.2006 it was sold from 2nd defendant to 4th defendant/appellant for Rs.40.00 lakhs and incidentally, in the year 2008, the same land was sold by 4th defendant to 9th respondent- Ozone Urbana Infrastructure Development Private Limited, who voluntarily got impleaded in the appeal as 9th respondent. The above aspect necessitated to make an observation in this regard. It is manifest that the agricultural land that was granted to 2nd defendant is for a upset price of Rs.1,113/- and permission was granted to sell the same on depositing an amount of 50% of the market value. 50% of the market value for getting the permission is shown at Rs.7.00 lakh as could be seen from the official memorandum. In such a case 100% would be of Rs.14,00 lakh. First sale deed was effected on 06-10-2006 for Rs.40.00 lakhs and second sale deed was made on 03.1.2008 for Rs.2.55 crorers, including one Shaji Baby John Son of Baby 57 John, aged about 48 years as a confirming party. But the same is not explained in the proceedings.
58. There is difference between grant of inam land and the grant under Land Reforms Act. In case of inam land, land will be granted to the holder of occupation and in unauthorized occupation. It was also submitted that in order to consider the grant that enures to the benefit of the family, it should be written on the grant, the said submission cannot be accepted. Thus on dissecting the available documents and materials produced along with the application, it reflect that the land was granted not to a single person, more particularly, by considering the age on the basis of the documents filed by the appellant that 2nd defendant was not beyond 12 years of age at the time of starting of unauthorized cultivation. Even submission that the grant of land is of personal nature and in the circumstances, it would be branded as exclusive grant 58 for the 2nd defendant and it does not appears to be meaningful.
59. More particularly, learned counsel for appellant submitted that grant was cancelled on a different reason i.e. on the ground that, earlier, grant was made in favour of Horticulture Department. Thus, on this established ground of granting of schedule land to the 2nd defendant, the invariable answer is, it was a grant that was for joint family and not for personal benefits.
60. At this juncture, it is necessary to observe that the Revenue Authorities at the helm of affairs turned blind either to the irregularities or illegalities. The grant of land is made with a definite object for encouraging agriculture or helping downtrodden people. It is not for the purpose of bringing the shape of land into super structure as has happened in the present case. In the circumstances, what was vehemently 59 submitted by 4th defendant/appellant and 9th respondent in their submission is, the grant was personal one. Regard being had to the fact that the real grantee was tight lipped after the same.
61. Thus, in the circumstances, I find that the appeal directed against the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court in R.A.NO.24/2011 on 17.10.2012 dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Judge in O.S.No.2496/2005 on 29.3.2010 does not suffer from infirmity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Appeal fails on merits and accordingly it is dismissed with costs.
62. In these circumstances, it is not known whether the Revenue Authorities are not observing the affairs or even if they are observing, they feel it unnecessary to probe into the affairs when the 60 provisions of law of social legislation is floated indiscriminately.
The office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka and Principal Secretary, Agricultural Department, Government of Karnataka for information and for necessary action if they chose to do so and keep Court informed of the same.
Sd/-
JUDGE tsn*