Karnataka High Court
Rameshgouda A/F Channabasanagouda ... vs Kumar. Channabasangouda S/O ... on 6 January, 2020
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
RFA NO.100015/2015
-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 06TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
RFA NO.100015 OF 2015 (PAR/POS)
BETWEEN:
RAMESHGOUDA
A/F CHANNABASANAGOUDA PATIL,
AGE 42 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O.: HIREGUNJAL VILLAGE,
TQ.: KUNDGOL, DIST.: DHARWAD.
... APPELLANT
(BY SHRI ARUN A.NEELOPANT
& SHRI SHRIHARSH A.NEELOPANT, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. KUMAR. CHANNABASANGOUDA
S/O. RAMESHGOUDA PATIL,
AGE 06 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT,
R/O.: HIREGUNJAL VILLAGE,
TQ.: KUNDGOL, DIST.: DHARWAD
2. KUMARI AISHWARYA
D/O. RAMESHGOUDA PATIL,
AGE 08 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O.: HIREGUNJAL VILLAGE,
TQ.: KUNDGOL, DIST.: DHARWAD
3. SMT.ANASUYA
W/O RAMESHGOUDA PATIL,
AGE 30 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
RFA NO.100015/2015
-2-
R/O.: HIREGUNJAL VILLAGE,
TQ.: KUNDGOL, DIST.: DHARWAD.
4. SMT.RATNAVVA
CHANNABASANAGOUDA PATIL,
AGE 57 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O.: HIREGUNJAL VILLAGE,
TQ.: KUNDGOL, DIST.: DHARWAD.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI P.S. NAREGAL
& SHRI H.R. GUNDAPPA, ADVOCATES FOR R1 TO R3;
R1 & R2 ARE MINORS, REP. BY R3;
SHRI MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATE FOR R4;
SHRI S.I. AMMINEBHAVI, ADVOCATE FOR C/R4)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER 41 RULE 1 READ WITH
SECTION 96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE
DATED 28.11.2014, PASSED IN O.S.NO.89/2012 ON THE FILE OF
THE II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, HUBLI, DECREEING
THE SUIT FILED FOR PARTITION AND SEPARATE POSSESSION
AND MESNE PROFITS.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY,
K.S.MUDAGAL, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This appeal of the first defendant is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 28.11.2014 passed by the Second Additional Senior Civil Judge, Hubballi, in O.S.No.89/2012. By the impugned judgment and decree, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for partition and RFA NO.100015/2015 -3- separate possession of their shares in the suit schedule properties and also awarded share to defendant No.2.
2. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were plaintiff Nos.1 to 3, the appellant was defendant No.1 and respondent No.4 was defendant No.2 before the trial Court. For the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to henceforth with their ranks before the trial court.
3. The subject matter of the suit were the lands mentioned at Sl.Nos.1 to 4 in the plaint schedule - A and house properties mentioned at plaint schedule - B, situated within the limits of Hiregunjal, Kundgol Taluka.
4. The suit properties originally belonged to one Somanagouda. On his death, his son Bharamagouda @ Ningangouda succeeded to those properties. Bharamagouda's wife was one Parvatevva. The said couple had no issues. They adopted one Channabasanagouda Patil. Defendant No.2 is the wife of said Channabasanagouda Patil. Channabasanagouda Patil and defendant No.2 were not having issues. Therefore, they adopted defendant No.1 on RFA NO.100015/2015 -4- 04.08.2000. Plaintiff No.3 is the wife of defendant No.1. Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 are the son and daughter of defendant No.1 and plaintiff No.3. Channabasanagouda Patil died on 22.08.2006.
5. Plaintiffs filed O.S.No.89/2012 before the trial court claiming that all the suit schedule properties were their ancestral joint family properties and plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were entitled to their shares in those properties and defendant No.1 is acting detrimental to their interest. Therefore, they claimed partition and separate possession of their share in the suit schedule properties.
6. Defendant No.1 contested the suit denying the nature of the properties. However, he admitted the relationship between the parties. He claimed that Bharamanagouda bequeathed the suit properties in favour of his adoptive father Channabasanagouda Patil, thereby he became the absolute owner. He contended that in turn Channabasanagouda bequeathed the properties in his favour and he became the absolute owner and shareholder. RFA NO.100015/2015 -5-
7. Defendant No.2 filed written statement supporting the claim of the plaintiffs. She contended that at the time of execution of the alleged Will, Channabasanagouda was not in sound disposing state of mind. She filed counter claim seeking her share in the suit schedule properties.
8. On the basis of such pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:
i. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they and defendants have constituted joint Hindu family and suit properties are their joint family ancestral properties and are in joint possession and enjoyment of the same?
ii. Whether the defendant No.1 proves that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as contended in para-5 of his written statement?
iii. Whether he further proves that in view of alleged registered Will dated 4.8.2000 said to have been executed by Channabasanagouda he is the absolute owner of suit properties?RFA NO.100015/2015 -6-
iv. Whether the defendant No.2 proves that the suit properties are joint family properties of her, another defendant and plaintiffs and they are in actual possession and enjoyment of the same and so far no partition is taken place in the joint family?
v. Whether the defendant No.2 further proves that the deceased Channabasanagoud had no sound state of mind to execute the registered Will dt.4.8.2000 in favour of defendant No.1 as contended in her counter claim?
vi. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief claimed in the suit?
vii. What order or decree?
9. On behalf of plaintiffs, 3rd plaintiff was examined as PW-1 and Ex.P1 to Ex.P8 were marked. Defendant No.2 was examined as DW-1. Defendant No.1 got himself examined as DW-2 and DWs.3 and 4 - the alleged attesting witnesses to the Will Ex.D3 and got marked Ex.D1 to Ex.D3.
10. The trial court after hearing both the parties decreed the suit holding that suit schedule properties were RFA NO.100015/2015 -7- the ancestral joint family properties and execution of the Will was not proved. The trial court further held that the Will is surrounded with suspicious circumstances and such suspicion was not dispelled by the propounder of the Will.
11. Sri.Arun A.Neelopanth, learned counsel for defendant No.1 - appellant assails the judgment and decree of the court below on the following grounds:
i. As on the date of death of Channabasanagouda Patil, Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were not born.
Therefore, in their hands, properties will not become joint family properties.
ii. Since Channabasanagouda Patil and defendant No.1 acquired the properties under the Will, they are their absolute properties.
iii. On the very day of execution of the Will, Channabasanagouda Patil bequeathed the plaint Schedule 'A' Item No.1 property in favour of defendant No.2. Therefore, trial Court was in RFA NO.100015/2015 -8- error in holding that no provision was made for the wife in the bequest and therefore, the same is suspicious.
iv. The trial court overlooked the admission of DW-2 regarding the nature of the properties.
12. The appellant filed I.A.No.1/2015 in the appeal for adducing additional evidence. Under the application he seeks to produce the following documents;
i. Copy of the relinquishment deed dated 04.08.2000.
ii. Certified copy of the consent Wardi dated 20.09.2006 given by the appellant.
iii. Certified copy of the consent Wardi dated 27.10.2006 given by the appellant.
iv. Certified copy of the statement of the defendant No.2 dated 27.10.2006.
v. Certified copy of the mutation entry no.184.
RFA NO.100015/2015-9- vi. The record of rights in respect in Sy.
No.42/1.
vii. Death extracts of deceased Ninganagouda and deceased Parvatewwa.
viii. Copy of the M.E.No.1436 ix. The copies of the record of rights from 1982 to 2005.
13. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application, it is contended that defendant No.1 was under
the impression that Ex.P1 was sufficient to substantiate his contention, therefore, he did not produce the documents before the trial court. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that those documents are required for adjudication of this matter, therefore, I.A.No.1/2015 may be allowed and records may be received in evidence.
14. In support of his arguments, he relies on following judgments:
i. R.S.Anjayya Gupta vs. Thippaiah Shetty and others1 1 HCR 2019 SC 920 RFA NO.100015/2015 -10- ii. Pentakota Satyanarayana and others vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam and others2 iii. PPK Gopalan Nambiar vs. PPK Balakrishnan Nambiar and others3 iv. Unreported judgment of Kerala High Court in K.C.Bindu and another vs. Leela Kollandi and others4
15. Per contra, Sri.H.R.Gundappa, learned counsel representing respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri.Mallikarjunaswamy B.Hiremath, learned counsel representing respondent No.4 seek to justify the judgment and decree of the trial court on the following grounds:
i. Defendant No.1/DW-2 in his evidence has unequivocally admitted that the properties belonged to Somanagouda, the propositus who was the 4th lineal ascendant of the plaintiffs.
Therefore, the trial court was right in holding that 2 AIR 2005 SC 4362 3 AIR 1995 SC 1852 4 RSA 779/2011 DD 7.3.2017 RFA NO.100015/2015 -11- the suit schedule properties were the joint family properties of plaintiffs and defendant No.1.
ii. The evidence adduced regarding execution of the Will was totally unworthy of credence.
iii. The evidence of attestor showed that the biological father took active role in bringing up the said Will and that was rightly noticed by the trial court.
iv. On the face of it, the Will does not inspire the confidence of the Court.
v. Channabasanagouda Patil, the adoptive father of appellant-defendant No.1 had no competence to bequeath the property since the properties were ancestral properties.
vi. The documents sought to be produced under I.A.No.1/2015 are all concocted documents and they do not fall under any of the criteria of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.RFA NO.100015/2015 -12-
16. Respondents' counsel in support of their arguments rely on the decision of this Court in Siddaramappa and others vs. Smt.Gouravva5
17. Having regard to the rival contentions, the points that arise for our consideration are:
i. Whether the findings of the trial court that suit schedule properties were the ancestral joint family properties of the plaintiffs and defendants is sustainable in law?
ii. Whether the findings of the trial court that defendant No.1 failed to prove Ex.D3 the Will dated 04.08.2000 is sustainable in law?
iii. Whether I.A.No.1/2015 filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC deserves to be allowed?5
ILR 2004 KAR 3611 RFA NO.100015/2015 -13-
18. Regarding Nature of properties :
Since these points overlap on each other, to avoid repetition, they are taken up together for consideration.
19. The contention of the appellant is that suit schedule properties descended on defendant No.1 and his adoptive father Channabasanagouda by succession, therefore, they were the ancestral joint family properties. Whereas defendant No.1 contended that Bharamagouda @ Ninganagouda had no biological children and he adopted Channabasanagouda and bequeathed suit schedule properties to Channabasanagouda under registered Will dated 07.11.1978, thereby line of heritage was obstructed. Thus, he contends that the property became the absolute property of Ninganagouda. It was further contended that since the Ninganagouda bequeathed the properties under the Will, they became the absolute properties of Channabasanagouda and in turn under the Will of Channabasanagouda, defendant No.1 became the absolute owner of those properties.
RFA NO.100015/2015-14-
20. The alleged Will dated 07.11.1978 executed by Ninganagouda was not admitted in evidence much less not proved. Appellants' counsel contended that in Ex.D3 the Will executed by Channabasanagouda in favour of defendant No.1, there is reference to the Will of Ninganagouda and that has to be taken into consideration to accept that Channabasanagouda acquired the properties under bequest by Ninganagouda.
21. Alternatively, learned counsel for the appellant argued that on the death of Ninganagouda, his widow Parvatevva became the absolute owner of the properties, from her they devolved on Channabasanagouda therefore, the properties shall be treated as absolute property of Channabasanagouda in turn of defendant No.1.
22. So far as the alternative second contention, there is no dispute that Ninganagouda and Parvatevva adopted Channabasanagouda during the lifetime of Ninganagouda. Therefore, properties devolved on Channabasanagouda on the death of Ninganagouda as his successor. Therefore, the RFA NO.100015/2015 -15- properties in the hands of Channabasanagouda became the ancestral joint family properties. In such event when they devolve upon defendant No.1, they acquire the character of ancestral joint family properties in the hands of defendant No.1.
23. So far as defendant No.1 acquiring them under Will-Ex.D3, in the later part of this judgment, the execution of the said Will is held not proved. Thus, there is no merit in the contention that the suit properties were the absolute properties of defendant No.1 and suit was not maintainable.
24. Regarding Execution of Will Ex.D3 and I.A. No.1/2015:
To prove the Will-Ex.D3 defendant No.1 relied upon his own evidence and evidence of DW3 and DW4, the alleged attestors. The trial court holds that the evidence of DWs.3 and 4 is unacceptable and as per their evidence, the biological father of defendant No.1 took active role in the alleged execution and presentation of the Will for registration, that is a suspicious circumstance. The trial RFA NO.100015/2015 -16- court further holds that testator excluding defendant No.2 from bequest without assigning any reason is a suspicious circumstance. It was held that said suspicious circumstances were not dispelled.
25. It was contended by defendant No.1 that Channabasanagouda relinquished plaint Schedule 'A' item No.1 property measuring 10 acres 33 guntas in favour of defendant No.2, therefore, the trial court is not justified in holding that Will-Ex.D3 is surrounded with suspicious circumstances and no provision was made for the wife in the Will.
26. According to defendant No.1 himself, the adoption under Ex.D1 and the Will - Ex.D3 and the relinquishment relied upon by him in favour of defendant No.2 were executed on the same day viz., on 04.08.2000. But only Ex.D1 and Ex.D3 were registered and the alleged relinquishment deed was not registered. There is no explanation for not registering the said document on the same day.
RFA NO.100015/2015-17-
27. Before the trial court, 1st defendant did not produce the copy of any such relinquishment deed and there was no explanation for that. If really there was any relinquishment, in the natural course that could have been referred in the Will - Ex.D3 by the testator. Ex.D3 is conspicuously silent about such relinquishment or settlement in favour of defendant No.2. In Ex.D3 the testator does not state why he did not make any provision for the wife.
28. Defendant No.1 relied upon Ex.P1 - RTC for the year 2011-12 to contend that by virtue of said relinquishment deed, defendant No.2 got her name entered in the revenue records. Column No.10 in Ex.P1 states that the name of defendant No.2 was entered in revenue records by virtue of Will dated 06.08.2007 under M.R.No.184/2006-
07. That document does not disclose at whose instance such entry was made. Therefore, the trial court did not attach any importance to that.
29. Though it was contended that defendant No.2 herself gave an application for change of katha, no such RFA NO.100015/2015 -18- application of defendant No.2 was produced under I.A.No.1/2015. Only the copy of alleged statement of defendant No.2 before the Revenue Inspector is produced. The copy of relinquishment deed sought to be produced along with I.A.No.1/2015 was said to be in favour of defendant No.2. Therefore, in ordinary course, original document is supposed to be in the custody of defendant No.2. Defendant No.1 has no explanation as to how he got the copy of said relinquishment deed.
30. When defendant No.2 seriously disputed the genuineness of the said document or any transfer of the property under the said document, defendant No.1 did not choose to call upon defendant No.2 to produce the said document when the matter was pending before the trial court. Absolutely, there is no satisfactory explanation for belated production of the alleged document dated 04.08.2000.
31. Even in the said relinquishment deed, there is no absolute transfer in favour of defendant No.2. It says that RFA NO.100015/2015 -19- only life interest was given to 2nd defendant and on her demise, property vests with defendant No.1. But defendant No.1 took up a contention before the trial court that the property was absolutely relinquished to defendant No.2. Therefore, copy of purported document produced before this Court is inconsistent with the case of defendant No.1 himself. The alleged relinquishment deed and the consequential revenue records surfaced only after the death of Channabasanagouda. Therefore, the documents produced by way of additional evidence suffer the credibility crisis.
32. The only evidence adduced in proof of Ex.D3 was the 1st defendant's self serving evidence and alleged evidence of defendant Nos.3 and 4. According to defendant No.1 himself, he was not an attester or a witness to Ex.D3. The endorsement of the Sub-Registrar on Ex.D3 states that document was presented by the executant on 04.08.2000 at 2.10 p.m. at Kundagol. DW-2 in his cross-examination states that his adoption ceremony on that day took place between 1.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m. He further states that on RFA NO.100015/2015 -20- 04.08.2000, first they got adoption deed registered and then, adoption ceremony took place in the house of defendant No.2.
33. DW-2 states that the adoption ceremony went on from morning till evening and all along during that time, adoptive parents and attestors and other elders were with DW-2 himself. He also states that after adoption ceremony, his adoptive parents did not go to Kundagol. Such admissions of DW-2 himself demolished the case of execution of Will -Ex.D3 by Channabasanagouda on 04.08.2000 and presentation of the documents by him at 2.10 p.m.
34. DW-3 states that on 04.08.2000, Channabasanagouda adopted defendant No.1 and he went to Kundagol at the time of adoption. He states that Channabasanagouda had not called him for the purpose of execution of the Will. He further states that on 04.08.2000, father of defendant No.1 had come to Kundagol. He states that he does not know regarding which property and for what reason, Channabasanagouda executed the Will. He states RFA NO.100015/2015 -21- that Channabasanagouda had never revealed before him about the execution of the Will. Such admissions of DW-3 were very fatal to the case of defendant No.1 regarding the Will.
35. Contrary to the evidence of DW-2, DW-4 another alleged attestor to the Will states that on 04.08.2000, biological father of defendant No.1 was in Kundagol from 3.00 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. and there the Will was executed. Further the evidence of DWs.3 and 4 revealed that they were close to genetic father of defendant No.1. As per their evidence, defendant No.1 and his father took active role in the execution of the Will and in presenting the Will.
36. Considering all these aspects, trial court held that execution of the Will was not proved, that was surrounded by suspicious circumstances which were not dispelled.
37. The larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.VENKATACHALA IYENGAR VS. B.N.THIMMAJAMMA RFA NO.100015/2015 -22- AND OTHERS67in detail expounded, when the Court shall accept the Will and what are the suspicious circumstances. Majority of further judgments on proof of Will are based on ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.Venkatahchala's case.
38. In Paras 20, 21 and 22 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called 6 AIR 1959 SC 443 7 RFA NO.100015/2015 -23- upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated.
20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature, in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind RFA NO.100015/2015 -24- may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator.
The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, Courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator RFA NO.100015/2015 -25- was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter.
21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred, in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English Courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical Courts in England when they RFA NO.100015/2015 -26- exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word 'conscience' in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the Court is the last will of the testator, the Court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive.
22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would RFA NO.100015/2015 -27- always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson, 50 Cal W N 895: (AIR 1946 P C 156) "where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth". It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilent, cautious and circumspect."
[emphasis supplied]
39. Therefore, it is clear that when the Court finds that mode of signature of the testator on the Will is doubtful and if the Will is surrounded with suspicious circumstances, the degree of burden of proof of the execution of the same is higher one.
RFA NO.100015/2015-28-
40. Having regard to the said judgment, this Court does not find it necessary to refer to other judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in that regard. In this case also, as already pointed out, the evidence regarding time and place of execution of the Will and presentation of the Will for registration were contradictory. Secondly, though the Will need not be drafted on stamp paper, it was drafted on the stamp paper.
41. Testator has signed only on the last page and not in each page of Ex.D3. It is only after two scribes signing the Will, testator signs the Will. It looks as if the scribes were executants and testator was a witness. Therefore, execution of the Will - Ex.D3 by Channabasanagouda Patil is doubtful. Added to that, there was exclusion of the widow from succession and nothing was mentioned in the will to explain that the alleged relinquishment of the property in favour of the wife also did not find place in the Will.
42. The evidence on record showed that the propounder and his biological father took active role in RFA NO.100015/2015 -29- founding the Will. Having regard to such material on record, the trial court disbelieved the Will. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that approach of the trial court towards evidence on record with regard to execution of the Will was perverse or contrary to law.
43. In the light of the discussion made above, this Court finds that no useful purpose will be served by receiving the documents produced before this Court by way of additional evidence. The said application does not satisfy the requirements of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Therefore, appeal and I.A.No.1/2015 are dismissed with costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE Vnp*/Prs*