Madhya Pradesh High Court
Brijendra Prasad Verma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 January, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 MP 10, 2020 LAB IC 780
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1
Writ Petition No.21029/2019
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
W.P. No.21029/2019
Brijendra Prasad Verma
Versus
The State of Madhya Pradesh and others
Date of Order 09 .01.2020
Bench Constituted Single Bench
Order delivered by Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay
Dwivedi, J.
Whether approved for reporting Name of counsels for For Petitioner: Shri Swapnil parties Ganguly, Advocate and Shri Rahul Diwakar, Advocate.
For respondents/State : Shri Sourabh Sunder, Government Advocate.
Law laid down Significant Para Nos.
Reserved on : 30.11.2019 Delivered on : 09 .01.2020 (O R D E R) Since the pleadings are complete, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally.
1. This petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking quashment of the order dated 24.09.2019 (Annexure-P-3) whereby the petitioner has been placed under suspension by respondent No.3 i.e. the Divisional Commissioner, Shahdol Division, Shahdol.
2 Writ Petition No.21029/20192. The order impugned has been assailed mainly on the ground that respondent No.3 is not the competent authority to pass the order impugned and to place the petitioner under suspension. Thus, the core question which emerges for adjudication is whether respondent No.3 is competent to place the petitioner under suspension or not?
3. For deciding the issues involved in the case, the important facts are required to be mentioned which are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Sub- Engineer on 06.11.1989 in the erstwhile Special Area Development Authority (SADA). The SADA was later on abolished and the services of the petitioner were merged in State Municipal Services on the post of Sub-Engineer in the year 1996. The petitioner was thereafter promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer vide order dated 22.01.2016.
4. As per the petitioner, his services are governed under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh State Urban Engineering Service (Recruitment and Condition of Service) Rules, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules, 2015'). The petitioner is at present posted in Nagar Palika Parishad, Shahdol and also holding additional charge of Executive Engineer. The Nagar Palika Parishad, Shahdol, had undertaken the work of renovation and beatification of the Mohanram Mandir Talab situated in District Shahdol, for which, fund has been sanctioned by the Collector, Shahdol. Some 3 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 complaints were made and Vidhansabha question was raised alleging that the construction work was done without obtaining the requisite sanction. A three members committee was constituted to examine the issue and report was submitted pointing out some procedural irregularities on the part of the petitioner. On the basis of enquiry report submitted by the committee, it is found that the petitioner was involved in the embezzlement of certain amount of money, in pursuance to which, a departmental enquiry was proposed and vide order impugned dated 24.09.2019, the petitioner has been placed under suspension by respondent No.3.
5. As per the petitioner, Rule 2(d) of the Rules, 2015 defines the term 'Commissioner', which means the Commissioner Urban Administration & Development Madhya Pradesh and further Schedule-I of Rules, 2015 also prescribes the disciplinary authority. So far as the Assistant Engineer is concerned and as per the same, the Commissioner is the disciplinary authority and the State Government is the appointing authority. The petitioner, therefore, contended that the Commissioner Revenue has no authority to take any action against the petitioner and to place him under suspension. In support of his contention, the petitioner has placed reliance upon the orders passed by this Court on various occasions i.e. Jagdish Chandra Vs. Collector, District Dewas and others reported in 2007 (2) MPHT 449, Sheetal Kumar Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh and three others, 2016 SCC Online MP 5449 passed in W.P. No.5289/2016 4 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 and then order passed in W.P. No.4464/2017 (Smt. Anita Baghel Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others) and in W.P. No.5108/2015 (Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. Urban Development Department and others), wherein the High Court has held that the Commissioner (Revenue) cannot exercise the power of suspension in respect of the petitioner.
6. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents/State submits that though the services of the petitioner are governed under the provisions of Rules, 2015, but no separate rules governing the disciplinary proceedings in respect of members of State Urban Engineering Services have been framed by the State Government. Accordingly, the disciplinary proceeding, if any, is required to be initiated, the same would be under the provisions of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short the 'Rules, 1966'). Rule 9 of the Rules, 1966 provides that an employee may be suspended from services by the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority. The petitioner is an Assistant Engineer holding Class-II post and as per schedule appended with Rules, 2015, the appointing authority of the petitioner is the State Government, as such, the State Government is competent to place the petitioner under suspension.
7. The State Government vide notifications dated 20.09.2008 and 15.09.2008 empowered the Divisional Commissioner for placing Class-I and Class-II employees 5 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 under suspension. The Commissioner, as such, not only can exercise the power of suspension against Class-I and Class-II employees, but can also impose minor punishment upon them. It is also stated by the respondent/State that promotion of the members of the State Urban Engineering Services is governed by the Madhya Pradesh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2002 (in short the 'Rules, 2002'). The other conditions of Services of the members of State Urban Engineering Service are governed by M.P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1961 (for brevity the 'Rules, 1961').
8. The petitioner, obviously, promoted by applying the provisions of Rules, 2002 and Rules, 2015 and was kept on probation for a period of two years as per the provisions of Rules, 1961. It is also submitted by the respondents/State that for the officers of State Urban Engineering Service, separate Rules are framed by the State Government known as Madhya Pradesh Municipal Service (Executive) Rules, 1973 (in short the 'Rules, 1973'). The said rules are for recruitment, qualification, seniority, discipline, pay scale, etc. of the employees of the State Urban Engineering Service.
9. As per the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents/State, Rule 32 of the Rules, 1973 designates the Divisional Commissioner to impose penalty mentioned in Clause-1 (ii) of Rule 31. The respondents, therefore, submitted that the Divisional 6 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 Commissioner has been conferred with the powers of the disciplinary authority on the members of the State Urban Engineering Service, and therefore, the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner is proper.
10. In support of his contention, relying upon Rule 36 of the Rules, 1973, he submits that the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the members of the State Urban Engineering Service as per the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 86 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (for brevity 'the Act, 1961'). He further submits that since the petitioner is a member of State Urban Engineering Service and holding Class-II post, therefore, the Divisional Commissioner, is competent to place him under suspension.
11. Arguments heard. Record perused.
12. To justify the competence of the authority i.e. the Commissioner, Shahdol Division, Shahdol, to place the petitioner under suspension, the respondents have filed a notification dated 15.09.2008 whereby the Commissioner (Revenue) has been empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings and also to impose minor punishment under Rule 10 (I-IV) of the Rules, 1966. The said notification is available on record as Annexure-R-2. For the purpose of convenience, the same is being reproduced hereinbelow:-
"Bhopal, the 15th September 2008 No. C-6-1-2008-3-I.-In pursuance of clause (a) and (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and in supersession of this Department's Notification No. 7 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 C-6-5-97-3-I, dated 1st January, 2002, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh hereby empowers all Divisional Commissioners of the State to take disciplinary action and to impose the penalties specified in clause (I) to (IV) of Rule 10 of the said rules on Class I and Class II Government servants (except the officers of the Judicial services, police department and posted in Non- governmental Institutions/Organizations/Undertakings) of the State Government posted within their respective divisions.
By order and in the name of the governor of Madhya Pradesh, AQUEELA HASHMAT, Dy. Secy."
13. Admittedly, the Commissioner has exercised the power under the above notification, but here in this case, the petitioner has contended that the provisions of Rules, 1966, are not applicable to the petitioner, and therefore, under the garb of the aforesaid notification i.e. dated 15.09.2008, if any power has been exercised by respondent No.3, the same is therefore, without any competence and jurisdiction.
14. Rule 3 of Rules, 1966, prescribes the applications of Rules and Rule 3(1)(d) prescribes that it shall not be applicable to "any person for whom special provision is made, in respect of matters covered by these rules, by or under any law for the time being in force or by or under any agreement entered into by or with the previous approval of the Governor before or after commencement of these rules, in regard to matters covered by such special provisions".
15. As per the pleadings made by the parties, it is an admitted position that the services of the petitioner are governed by the provisions of Rules, 2015 and in the 8 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 said Rules, in definition clause-2(d), the Commissioner has been defined as under:-
"Commissioner" means the Commissioner, Urban Administration and Development, Madhya Pradesh". As per Schedule-I appended to the Rules,2015 i.e. Schedule-I, the disciplinary authority for the post of Assistant Engineer, which the petitioner is holding, has been prescribed as the Commissioner and the appellate authority as the State Government."
16. As per the petitioner, before enforcing the Rules, 2015, the services of the petitioner were governed by the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Employees Recruitment And Conditions of Service Rules, 1968 (in short 'the Rules, 1968') and as per the definition clause under sub-rule (f) of Rule 2, "Municipal service"
means the service or group of posts in connection with the affairs of the Municipality other than the State Municipal Service (Executive), meaning thereby except the Chief Municipal Officer, the provisions of Rules, 1968, were applicable to all Municipal service. As per the petitioner, Rule-21 i.e. Repeal and Saving of the Rules, 2015, very categorically provides that all rules corresponding to these rules in force immediately before their commencement are hereby repealed in respect of matters covered by these rules and as such, the issues which are not covered by the provisions of Rules, 2015 shall be governed under the Rules, 1968. The petitioner, therefore, submitted that Rule 51 of the Rules, 1968, prescribed the Disciplinary authorities. For the sake of convenience, Rule 51 is being reproduced hereinbelow:-
"51. Disciplinary authorities.-Subject to the 9 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 provisions of the Act and these rules the Municipal Council shall have the powers to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 49 on any municipal employee holding post specified in sub-section (4) of section 94 of the Act and in the case of other municipal employees the Standing Committee shall have the power to impose any of the said penalties on him."
17. As pointed out by the petitioner that Rule, 51 of the Rules, 2015 clearly provides that it is the Municipal Council which is the disciplinary authority to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 49 to any Municipal Employees holding post specified under sub-section (4) of Section 94 of the Act, 1961 and for other Municipal Employees, it is the Standing Committee which shall exercise the power to impose punishment prescribed under Rule 49. It is further contended by the petitioner that as per Rule 53 of the Rules, 1968, which deals with the suspension pending disciplinary proceedings and the provisions very categorically provide that the disciplinary authority shall be competent to suspend the services of any municipal employee, if it is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place the municipal employee under suspension. The petitioner, therefore, contended that in view of the above, since the petitioner is a municipal employee, cannot be placed under suspension by the Commissioner (Revenue).
18. By and large, the petitioner's argument is founded on the equation that when Rules, 1968, very categorically provides the procedure for initiating disciplinary proceeding and inflicting penalties thereof and further provides the disciplinary authority, then no 10 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 other authority can exercise the power as has been provided under the provisions of Rules, 1966. In this regard, the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision rendered in case of Jagdish Chandra (supra), in which, the power of suspension against the Head Clerk-cum- Accountant posted at Nagar Panchayat Bagli, District- Dewas, had been exercised by the Collector, District- Dewas, in pursuance to the power provided to him by way of notification issued by the State Government under the provisions of Rules, 1966. The High Court dealing with the various provisions of Act, 1961, and further the provisions of Rules, 1968, especially Rules 51 and 53, arrived at a conclusion that the Collector cannot exercise such power against the municipal employee. He further placed reliance upon the case of Sheetal Kumar Jain (supra), in which, the power of suspension was exercised by the Collector, Jhabua, against the municipal employee. The High Court relying upon a decision passed in the case of Jagdish Chandra (supra) has also quashed the order reiterating the view taken by the High Court in the said case.
19. The petitioner further placed reliance upon a judgment reported in 2008 (4) MPLJ 169 parties being State of M.P. and Others vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others, in which, the Division Bench taking note of the provisions of the Rules, 1968, has held that the members of State Municipal Service (Engineering) are the employee of Municipality and they are covered with the definition of municipal employee as provided under the Rules, 1968 11 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 and therefore, as per the petitioner, he being municipal employee, cannot be placed under suspension by the Commissioner (Revenue) exercising the power by way of notification issued under the provisions of Rules, 1966.
20. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/State submits that the petitioner is an Assistant Engineer, which is a Class-II post and his appointing authority is the State Government. It is also stated by the respondents/State that the promotion has been granted to the petitioner under the provisions of Rules, 2002, and as such, he is an employee of the State Government and falls within the category of employees appointed under Section 86 of the Act, 1961 and as per the learned counsel for the respondents/State, Rule 3 of Rules, 1966, very categorically provides that it shall be applicable to all the Government employees. The learned counsel for the respondents has also contended that as per Section 95 of the Act, 1961, the State Government has been empowered to make rules regarding qualification, recruitment, etc., therefore, the petitioner cannot say that the notification issued by the State Government empowering the Commissioner (Revenue) to suspend Class-I and Class-II employees of the State Government, shall not be applicable to him as the petitioner does not fall within the category of employee appointed under Section 94 of the Act, 1961. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the respondents/State that Rules, 2015, framed under Section 355 read with sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Act, 1961, therefore, the provisions of 12 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 Rules, 1968, will not be applicable to the petitioner. At the same time, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that Rule 52 of the Rules, 1968, talks about the procedure for imposing minor penalties, saying that without prejudice to the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the procedure for imposing minor penalties shall be regulated according to the procedure laid down in the Rules, 1966.
21. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the provisions of the Rules, 1968, are applicable to the employees appointed by the Municipal Council under Section 94 of the Act, 1961. As per the respondents, if the provisions of the Rules, 1973, are seen, then the petitioner being an executive, his services are governed by the said rules and as such, he has placed reliance upon Rule 32 (1) of the Rules, 1973, which is quoted hereinbelow:-
"32. Authority who may impose penalties.-(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules the penalties mentioned in clauses (i) to (ii) of rule 31 may be imposed on a member of the service by the appointing authority [or Divisional Commissioner Director]."
22. The learned counsel for the respondents/State relied upon the judgments reported in (2004) 12 SCC 278 parties being N. Mani v. Sangeetha Theatre & Others and further in the case of Ram Sunder Ram v. Union of India and others reported in (2007) 3 SCC
255.
23. If argument of the learned counsel for the 13 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 respondents is taken into consideration as a whole, it reflect that as per his contention, the petitioner is not an employee of Municipality, but he is an employee of State Government, as the State is the appointing authority and as such, Rules, 1968, would not be applicable and the provisions of Rules, 1966, would be applicable to him and his suspension by the Commissioner (Revenue) is proper.
24. As per the discussions made hereinabove and considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it is clear that the petitioner is an employee of Municipality and comes within the definition of Municipal Employee, because admittedly the petitioner is a member of executive service as per the law laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra), wherein the Division Bench has observed as under:-
"16. In the present case, there is a specific rule which provides that only State Municipal Service (Executive) are excluded from the definition of "municipal service" and "municipal employee" and other categories i.e. State Municipal Service (Health) and State Municipal Service (Engineering) are included in the said definition. Respondents employees belong to category (c) i.e. State Municipal Service (Engineering), hence, they are covered by the definition of "municipal service"
and "municipal employee". Hence, so long as said definitions are not challenged, the respondents employees cannot claim that they are the employees of the State Government, even though they are getting the same salary and benefits as are available to the State Government employees.
17. In the present case, the learned single Judge has not considered the effect of the definition of "municipal employee" and "municipal service" as defined in Rule 2(e) and (f) of 1968 Rules and has held the petitioners (respondents herein) as Government employees' only because the State 14 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 Government is in overall control over these employees and thus has committed grave error."
The view of the Division Bench is very specific and as per the definition provided under Rule 2(e) and (f), the petitioner is not a member of executive service, it is only the Chief Municipal Officer, who has been considered to be a member of executive service and considered to be an employee of the State Government and he does not fall within the definition of Municipal Employee, but the petitioner is a municipal employee and member of State Municipal Service (Engineering).
25. In view of the law laid down by the Court in case of Jagdish Chandra (supra), which is as under:-
"7. It is seen from the record that vide Annexure P-2 the post on which petitioner was appointed, has been notified under Sub- section (4) of Section 94 of the Act. As per Section 95 of the Act, the State Government is empowered to frame the rules to regulate the Service Conditions the employees of the Municipalities. In exercise of those powers, the Government of M.P. has framed the rules, which are known as M.P. Municipal Employees Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1968. Rule 51 specifies the Disciplinary Authority and Rule 53 deals with suspension, pending disciplinary inquiry, however aforesaid rules are being quoted hereinbelow :-
"51. Disciplinary authorities.- Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules the Municipal Council shall have the powers to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 49 on any municipal employee holding post specified in Sub-section (4) of the Section 94 of the Act and in the case of other municipal employees the Standing Committee shall have the power to impose any of the said penalties on him.
53. Suspension pending disciplinary proceeding.- (1) If having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances 15 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 in any case, the Disciplinary Authority which initiates any disciplinary proceeding is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension a municipal employee against whom such proceedings are stated, it may pass an order place him under suspension."
8. Bare perusal of the said Rules indicates that Municipal Council shall have the power to impose any of the penalty under Rule 49 on any Municipal Employee holding the post specified under Sub-section (4) of the Section 94 of the Act; and in other cases Standing Committee shall have the same power. As per Rule 53, the Disciplinary Authority is competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances of the case if any, such authority may also place the employee of the Municipal Council under suspension against whom, the disciplinary proceedings have initiated. In view of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the employees of the Municipal Council, who were appointed under Section 94 Sub- section (4) of the Act, are governed by the aforesaid Rules.
9. On going through the order of suspension Annexure P-5, it is apparent that the Collector has exercised its power conferred to him under Rule 9(1) of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. This circular dated 23-5-96 Annexure R-5 indicates the delegation of power of Rules 9 and 10 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 made by the Government to the Collector of the district to suspend Class III and IV Government employees. But in the present case, undisputedly petitioner is the Municipal employee and his service is governed by the provisions of Municipalities Act, and by the Recruitment Rules, whereby the power to suspend the municipal employee is vested to the Municipal Council or President-in-Council, i.e., the Disciplinary Authority for such employees. The respondents have not filed any document indicating the delegation of powers of Section 94(4) and (5) of the Act, and of Rule 51 or 53 of the Recruitment Rules. Thus by virtue of delegation of power, made to the Collector vide Annexure R-5, dated 23-5-96 of Rules 9 and 10 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, the Collector ipso facto cannot acquires the power to suspend 16 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 municipal employees, whose services are governed by the provisions of the Municipalities Act, 1961 and the Rules made thereunder. In view of the foregoing, the power as exercised by the Collector Dewas (respondent No. 1) to place the petitioner under suspension is without any authority under the law and the order of suspension passed by him is without jurisdiction.
10. Now the arguments as advanced by the learned Counsel for respondents with respect to exercise of powers under Sections 322 and 323 of the Act is also required to advert here. Under Section 322 of Chapter XII of the Municipalities Act, 1961 the powers of inspection and supervision are with the Divisional Commissioner, the Collector and any other officer as specified by the Government for inspection of the record and other proceedings of the Council. Such power of inspection and supervision can be exercised for the purposes ascribed under Section 322(a), (b), (c) and (d). As per Section 323, the Divisional Commissioner or any other officer authorised by the State Government can suspend the execution of resolution, order or prohibit any act, which is to commence by the Council. However, by the language of Sections 322 and 323 of the Act, the respondent No. 1 do not have power to pass the order of suspension of the employees of Municipal Council. It is required to explain here that under the power of supervision, the Commissioner, the Collector or any other officer authorised by the Government, have been entrusted with the power of supervision to look after the proceedings and to supervise the work of the Council under benevolence of Sections 322 and 323 of the Acts. The power of Disciplinary Authority to suspend a municipal employee is not vested with the Collector. Thus, the arguments as advanced by the Government Advocate is meritless and of no substance.
11. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparent that employee of the Municipal Council can be placed under suspension by the Disciplinary Authority, if such authority is satisfied having regard to the nature of charges and the circumstances of the case. The Government of M.P. has not delegated the power of Disciplinary Authority to the Collector, District Dewas under the Act and Recruitment Rules for municipal employees. The powers to place him under suspension is vested with the Municipal Council or with the Standing 17 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 Committee as per Rule 51 of the Rules. The word "Standing Committee" has now been substituted as "President-in-Council" by M.P. Amendment No. 20/1998, of Section 70 of the Municipalities Act. Thus, the power to place the petitioner under suspension may be exercised by the Municipal Council or by the President Council and not by the Collector, i.e., respondent No. 1. In the present case, power to suspend the petitioner has been exercised by respondent No. 1, which is without any authority under the law, therefore the order to place the petitioner under suspension passed by the Collector Dewas (respondent No. 1) is without jurisdiction and void."
it is clear that the notification issued under the provisions of Rules, 1966, empowering the Commissioner to exercise the power of suspension or to impose minor penalty upon Class-I and Class-II employees are not applicable to the municipal employees. The respondents/State has also admitted that the services of the petitioner are governed with the provisions of Rules, 2015 and these rules have not been framed under the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, but it is framed under the provisions of the Act, 1961. As per the applicability of the Rules, 1966, sub-rule (d)(i) of Rule 3 excluded the employees whose services are governed under the special provisions. The provisions of Rules, 2015, are special provisions made for the employees working under the State Urban Engineering Service, in which, the disciplinary authority has also been defined in Schedule-I which is the Commissioner for the petitioner and the Commissioner has also been defined in the Rules, 2015, itself. Therefore, the analogy as laid down by the High Court in case of Jagdish Chandra (supra) and later on 18 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 followed in case of Sheetal Kumar Jain (supra) is also applicable in the present case because in those cases, power has been exercised by the Collector to place municipal employee under suspension, but here the said power has been exercised by the Commissioner against the petitioner, who is also a municipal employee. Therefore, in my opinion, the Commissioner (Revenue) is not the competent authority to place the petitioner under suspension.
26. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents/State that the petitioner is a State employee as he has been appointed by the State Government, is also not acceptable in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra). The law, on which, the respondents are relying upon i.e. N. Mani (supra) is not applicable in the present case because it is not a case in which the authority having power to place the employee under suspension has issued the order quoting wrong provisions, whereas it is a case in which the question of competence of the authority has been raised and in view of the above discussions, it is clear that the said authority was competent to exercise power of suspension against the petitioner.
27. Likewise in case of Ram Sunder Ram (supra), the same analogy has been laid down by the Supreme Court as has been laid down in case of N. Mani (supra). But here in this case, the core question is 19 Writ Petition No.21029/2019 whether the Commissioner (Revenue) was competent or not to exercise the power of suspension against the petitioner who is considered to be a municipal employee.
28. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the order impugned dated 24.09.2019 (Annexure-P-3) is not sustainable as the same has been issued by the authority, not competent to do so.
29. Resultantly, the petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The order impugned dated 24.09.2019 is, therefore, set-aside.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI) JUDGE ac/-
Digitally signed by ANIL CHOUDHARY Date: 2020.01.10 13:18:55 +05'30'