Himachal Pradesh High Court
_________________________________________________________ vs Pratap Singh Alias Chotu on 7 March, 2025
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Sushil Kukreja
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 276 of 2015 Reserved on: 01.03.2025 Decided on: 07.03.2025 _________________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh .....Appellant Versus Pratap Singh alias Chotu ......Respondent _________________________________________________________ Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes _____________________________________________________ For the appellant: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Senior Additional Advocate General with Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate General.
For the respondent: Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate with Ms. Shwetima Dogra, Advocate.
Sushil Kukreja, Judge The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant- State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) against the judgment of acquittal dated 26.02.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (CBI), Shimla, H.P., in Sessions Trial No.11-T/7 of 2013/12, whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, the 'NDPS Act').
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 2
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, giving rise to instant appeal as per the prosecution story, are that on 07.01.2012, a police party headed by ASI Vijay Kumar was on patrolling duty towards Balag Kainchi-Basadhar road and when the said police party was present 300 metres ahead of Balag Kainchi towards Basadhar at about 6:05 PM, a person was noticed coming from Kashna/Basadhar side, who was carrying a red coloured bag in his right hand. On seeing the police party, the said person got perplexed and turned back and then tried to run way, but he was nabbed by the police on suspicion for having some incriminating substance including narcotic drugs in his possession. Thereafter, on inquiry, he disclosed his name as Pratap Singh (accused herein). Since it was an isolated place and there was no habitation nearby to associate any independent witness, as such, HC Manoj Kumar and Constable Varun Joshi were associated as witnesses in the proceedings by the Investigating Officer ASI Vijay Kumar. Thereafter, the bag being carried by the accused was searched and on opening the same, a transparent polythene envelope was recovered, which was containing a black coloured substance in the shapes of ball, stick and chapati and on the basis of experience, it was found Charas/cannabis. On weighment, the recovered contraband was found to be 3.750 KGs. Thereafter, the police completed all the codal formalities, viz., recovered contraband was repacked in the same manner and then put in a cloth Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 3 parcel, which was sealed with 18 seals of seal impression 'A'. The personal search of the accused was also conducted, but nothing incriminating was found. Sample seal was separately taken on a piece of cloth. NCB form, in triplicate, was filled and seal after use was handed over to Constable Varun Joshi. Thereafter, the Investigating Officer prepared the rukka and sent the same through Constable Rajeev Patial to the police station, on the basis of which, FIR in question was registered against the accused. The Investigating Officer also recorded the statements of the witnesses and prepared the spot map. The accused was arrested and got medically examined. The cloth parcel, containing the recovered contraband, was handed over to SHO, who, after checking the entries, re-sealed the same with 12 seals of seal impression 'M' and deposited the case property in the Malkhana. Special report was also prepared and delivered to the ASP City, Shimla. The case property was sent to FSL, Junga for analysis.
3. On the completion of the investigation and receipt of the SFSL report, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the Trial Court.
4. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 28.05.2013 framed charges against the accused under Section 20 of NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 4
5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined 10 witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313, Cr.PC was recorded, wherein he denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against him, besides pleaded to be innocent and that he was illegally detained at Theog Bazar by the police and thereafter charas was planted against him. He also examined 10 witnesses in his defence.
6. The learned trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 26.02.2015, acquitted the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Section 20 of NDPS Act, hence, the instant appeal preferred by the appellant-State.
7. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General contended that the trial Court has appreciated the evidence on record in a slip-shod and perfunctory manner and discarded the well reasoned and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He further contended that the learned trial Court has observed that the police had not given any option to the accused to be searched before a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer and had also not given their personal search to the accused prior to his search ,however, as per record, the contraband was recovered from the accused during recovery and in the cases of chance recovery, compliance of Section 50 NDPS Act is not mandatory. He also contended that the learned trial Court has wrongly given undue Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 5 weightage to the minor discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, as such, the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside.
8. Conversely, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/ accused contended that the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Trial Court after proper appreciation of both facts and law. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its true perspective and the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court. Therefore, he submitted that the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed.
9. We have heard learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned Senior Counsel for the respondent and also carefully examined the entire records.
10. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 6 his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
11. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730, which reads as under :-
"10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years.
11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed:
"7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons."
12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 7 Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:
(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court,
(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal,
(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and
(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-
appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, observed as under:-
"31.The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows:
31.1.Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 8 facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
[State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2.However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows:
31.2.1.Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse;
(a)Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489]
(b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were "interested" witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980)
(c)Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393]
(d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime.
[Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297]
(e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of "implicit proof" rather than that of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99]
(f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610] Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 9
(g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish "motive". [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice;
(a)Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502]
(b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]."
13. In H.D. Sundara & others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:-
"8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CrPC"). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows:
8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 10 evidence;
8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.
9.Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court's view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-
appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken."
14. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 11 conclusion than that of the Trial Court.
15. In the instant case, the accused has been tried for commission of the offence under Section 20 NDPS Act on the allegation that on 07.01.2012 at 06:05 PM at place Balag Kainchi, Theog, the accused was found in conscious and exclusive possession of 3.750 KGs of charas.
16. To substantiate the charge framed against the respondent- accused and to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses. However, case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-8 HC Manoj Kumar, PW-9 Constable. Rajiv Patial and PW-10 SI Vijay Kumar (investigating Officer), who have been examined primarily to prove the search, recovery and seizure of 3.750 KGs of charas in question from the exclusive and conscious possession of the accused.
17. All the aforesaid witnesses, i.e. PW-8 HC Manoj Kumar, PW-9 Constable Rajiv Patial and PW-10 SI Vijay Kumar have deposed with one voice that on 07.01.2012, they were on patrolling duty towards Balag Kainchi to Basadhar and at about 6:05 PM, when they had moved 300 mtrs ahead on the road from Balag Kainchi towards Basadhar, a person carrying a red carry bag in his right hand came from the opposite side, who on seeing the police party, turned back and tried to run away, but he was apprehended for carrying some stolen articles or Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 12 some contraband. On inquiry, he divulged his name as Pratap Singh. As the place was lonely, no public witness was available, therefore, the Investigating Officer associated PW-8 HC Manoj Kumar and Constable Varun Joshi as witnesses. The bag in possession of the accused, which had written on it "Sai Cloth House, Main Bazar Chopal", was searched and inside it was found ball shaped, stick shaped and chapati shaped black substance. On the basis of experience, it was found to be cannabis. The recovered cannabis was weighed by a weighing measure, which was in the IO kit and found to be 3 KG 750 grams in weight. The recovered cannabis after being put back in the same bag was sealed in a cloth parcel with eighteen seals of seal impression "A". NCB-1 form in triplicated was filled. Separate seal impression was taken on the piece of plain cloth. Seal after use was handed over to Constable Varun Joshi. Both the aforesaid mentioned parcels were seized vide seizure memo Ext.PW-8/A. Thereafter, the rukka was drawn by the Investigating Officer and sent through PW-9 Constable Rajiv Patial to Police Station Theog alongwith the case property.
18. In the instant case, the learned trial Court has given finding that the police had not given any option to the accused to be searched before the Magistrate or Gazetted Officer and neither the police party had given their personal search to the accused prior to the search of his bag and the personal search and the prosecution has miserably Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 13 failed to establish the recovery of alleged contraband from the exclusive and conscious possession of the accused. However, such finding of the trial Court is misconceived as the contraband was recovered from the carry bag, which the accused was carrying with him and not from his personal search. It is no longer res integra that whenever a search is conducted from any of the items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, container etc. and as a result thereof, a contraband under the NDPS Act is recovered, it would not amount to a personal search of the accused and because of this reason, Section 50 of the NDPS Act, would not be attracted. It is applicable only in the case, where contraband is recovered from the personal search of the accused. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on more than one occasions that such search and recovery from a bag, briefcase, container, etc. does not come within the ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
19. In the case of Ajmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746, 500 grams of charas was recovered from the bag carried by an accused on his shoulder and it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:
"15.The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the provision of Section 50 of the Act would also apply, while searching the bag, briefcase, etc. carried by the person and its non- compliance would be fatal to the proceedings initiated under the Act. We find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. It requires to be noticed that the question of compliance or non- compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is relevant only where search of a person is involved and the said section is not applicable nor attracted where no search of a person is involved. Search and recovery from a bag, briefcase, container, etc. does not Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 14 come within the ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, because firstly, Section 50 expressly speaks of search of person only. Secondly, the section speaks of taking of the person to be searched by the gazetted officer or a Magistrate for the purpose of search. Thirdly, this issue in our considered opinion is no more res integra in view of the observations made by this Court in Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [(2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664 : 2003 Cri LJ 3868] The Court has observed: (SCC p. 471, para 16) "16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag or premises (see Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra [(1999) 8 SCC 257 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1422] , State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080] and Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana [(2001) 3 SCC 28 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 426] ).The language of section is implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as contrast to search of premises, vehicles, or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh's case. Above being the position, the contention regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act is also without any substance."
20. In State of H.P. Vs. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court held that a person would mean a human being with appropriate coverings and clothing and also footwear. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can under no circumstances be treated as a body of a human being. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word "person" occurring in Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
21. In State of Punjab vs. Baljinder Singh & another, (2019) 10 SCC 473, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 15 & 17 of the judgment held as under:-
15. As regards applicability of the requirements under Section 50 of the Act are concerned, it is well settled that the mandate of Section 50 of the Act is confined to "personal search" and not to search of a vehicle or a container or premises.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 15
16. xxxx xxxx xxxx
17. In the instant case, the personal search of the accused did not result in recovery of any contraband. Even if there was any such recovery, the same could not be relied upon for want of compliance of the requirements of Section 50 of the Act. But the search of the vehicle and recovery of contraband pursuant thereto having stood proved, merely because there was non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act as far as "personal search" was concerned, no benefit can be extended so as to invalidate the effect of recovery from the search of the vehicle. Any such idea would be directly in the teeth of conclusion (3) as aforesaid."
22. Thus, the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court shows that the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act will come into play only in the case of personal search of the accused and not of some baggage, which he may be carrying. In other words, if merely a bag carried by a person is searched without there being any search of his person, Section 50 of NDPS Act will have no application.
23. In the instant case, the contraband was allegedly recovered from the carry bag, which was being carried by the accused and his personal search did not lead to any recovery, as such Section 50 of NDPS Act is not applicable.
24. It is well settled that the conviction can be based upon the testimony of the police officials, provided that such testimony is reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. The evidence of police witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved, merely on account of their official status. The testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 16 The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. In Pramod Kumar Versus State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 588, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinizing the evidence, the Court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the Court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:-
"13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence."
25. Similarly, in Baldev Singh Versus State of Haryana, (2015) 17 Supreme Court Cases 554, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 17 the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. However, prudence requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:-
"10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness."
26. In Surinder Kumar Versus State of Punjab, (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 563, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:-
"16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil it was held as under: (SCC p.655) "It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature".
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 18
27. In Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that non- association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinize the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed as under:-
"19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case. [Kalpnath Rai vs. State, (1998) AIR SC 201] However, such omissions cast an added duty on Courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which if found reliable can form the basis of a successful conviction."
28. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the testimony of police witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non- corroboration by independent witnesses, however such testimony needs to be carefully scrutinized. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony.
29. In the instant case, the prosecution story is totally based on the statements of police officials, i.e. PW-8, HC Manoj Kumar, PW-9 Constable Rajiv Patial and PW-10 SI Vijay Kumar and admittedly no independent witness has been associated during the investigation. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the testimonies of aforesaid police officials are trustworthy Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 19 and inspire confidence. As per the statements of police officials, i.e. PW-8, HC Manoj Kumar, PW-9 C. Rajiv Patial and PW-10 SI Vijay Kumar, they went from Shimla upto Chailla on 07.01.2012 by HRTC bus and the accused was apprehended at a place, Balag Kainchi towards Basadhar at about 6.05 PM. However, after perusing the entire evidence on record, the statements of aforesaid witnesses have been found to be totally unreliable and untrustworthy and the same do not inspire confidence. PW-10 SI Vijay Kumar (Investigating Officer), who was posted during the relevant period at Special Investigating Unit, Shimla, had stated in cross-examination that after leaving police station, they went to Lakkar Bazar bus stand and thereafter they went towards Chailla in HRTC bus. He further stated that there was normal traffic at Lakkar Bazar and there was no snow on the road and the traffic was not blocked anywhere till Chailla due to snow fall. PW-8 HC Manoj Kumar stated in his cross-examination, that they left Police Station Sadar, Shimla at 9.45 AM and from there, they went to Bus Stand, Lakkar Bazar, from where, they boarded a bus which was going towards Rohru and they went up to Chaila and from Chailla, they took a bus which was going towards Neri Pull. PW-9 C. Rajiv Patial also stated in his cross- examination that they took an HRTC bus from Lakkar Bazar up-till Chailla.
30. The defence of the accused is that he was falsely Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 20 implicated by the police and was illegally detained at Theog Bazar and thereafter charas was planted against him. In his defence, the accused examined ten witnesses. The perusal of the defence evidence shows that on 07.01.2012, no bus of HRTC had plied on the route from Shimla to Rohru via Fagu due to heavy snow fall. As per GD entry No.40, dated 07.01.2012 entered at 11.15 PM, Police Station Dhalli (Ext.D-2), due to the blockage of road, no bus had plied to Rohru on account of heavy snow fall. Similarly, as per GD entry No.27, dated 10.01.2012 entered at 4.15 PM, Police Station Dhalli (Ext. D-5), the road towards Theog was blocked on 07.01.2012 due to heavy snow fall. DW-2 Ravinder Kumar is a witness from Metrological Centre, Shimla, who tendered in evidence chart of January, 2012 Ext. D-6 and according to the same, Shimla and Theog had received heavy snow fall on 6th to 9th January, 2012. DW-3 Constable Kirpal Singh from Police Post Fagu had tendered in evidence copy of daily diary dated 08.01.2012 (Ext.D-7) and as per entry No.3 thereof, no means of transport was available due to heavy snow fall. DW-4 HC Puran Chand, Investigating Officer, Sadar, Shimla, had brought copy of daily diary dated 09.01.2012 (Ext. DW4/A) and as per GD entry No.56, there was heavy snow fall on 07.01.2012. DW-5 HHC Madan Singh, Police Station Theog, had brought copy of daily diary dated 07.01.2012 of Police Station, Theog (Ext. DW5/A), and as per GD entry No.8 entered at 6.05 AM, entry No.26 entered at 6.40 PM and Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 21 entry No.30 entered at 9.40 PM, no means of transport was available from Shimla to Theog on 07.01.2012 due to blockage of road on account of heavy snow fall. DW-6 Bhupinder Kumar Goel had produced on record abstract of log book of snow cutter from 05.01.2012 to 20.01.2012 Ext.DW6/A. DW-7 Pradeep Kumar, Chief Inspector, HRTC, Rohru Unit, Dhalli had produced on record duty roster dated 07.01.2012 (Ext. DW7/A) and as per the entries incorporated in the duty roster, no bus had plied via Fagu on 07.01.2012. DW-8 Mohan Sahil, Reporter, Dainik Bhaskar and DW-9 Uttam Singh, Section Head, Tribune Office, Shimla had brought on record copies of news items, Ext. DW8/A and DW9/A and as per the same, there was heavy snow fall in Shimla and Theog on 07.01.2012. DW-10 Kamlesh Kumar, Bus Stand Incharge, ISBT, Tuti Kandi, Shimla, had produced on record the duty register w.e.f. 01.01.2012 to 31.01.2012 pertaining to duties of drivers, conductors and the buses deputed on various routes pertaining to HRTC Rohru, Rampur and Reckong Peo and as per entries dated 07.01.2012, HRTC buses did not ply on Shimla-Rohru route due to blockage of roads on account of snowfall.
31. The aforesaid documentary evidence clearly shows that no HRTC buses had plied on Shimla-Rohru route via Fagu on 07.01.2012 due to blockage of road as a result of heavy snow fall. Therefore, the statements of aforesaid police officials, i.e. PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 to Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 22 the effect that they went from Police Station Sadar, Shimla to Chailla by HRTC bus does not inspire confidence. The statement of PW-10 SI Vijay Kumar, Investigating Officer, has been completely shattered by the learned defence counsel during cross-examination. His demeanor was also noted by the learned trial Court at the time of cross-examination as he even denied the certified copies of the daily diary register obtained by the defence counsel under RTI Act. The relevant portion of his cross-examination is extracted as under:-
".............I do not remember the route of the bus however the same was proceedings towards Rohru. When we came back to Theog in the night from the spot the snow fall had not started. But it was about to start. It is incorrect that no bus was plied on this route due to heavy snow fall. I can not say anything about any certificate issued by any authority for non plying of buses due to heavy snow fall on that day. I can not say about any rapat lodged in P.P. Phagu that no bus was plied on that day due to heavy snow fall. It is incorrect that the rapat was lodged at P.S. Theog that no bus was plied on that day due to heavy snow fall. It is incorrect that as per the Rojnamcha of P.S. Theog it was heavily snowing much prior to the reaching Rajeev Patial. It is incorrect that it was recorded in Rojnamcha at P.S. Theog that due to heavy snow fall constable Rajeev Patial had not gone to the spot after delivery of rukka due to heavy snow fall...................
.....................It is necessary to note the demeanor of this witness. The witness even denied the certified copy made in the daily diary register obtained by the defence under RTI. I can not say that after being free after 7th January, I came back to Shimla on 9th January, 2012 due to heavy snow fall. I can not say about the entries made in daily diary register mark-X. I can not say anything about the entries made in daily diary mark-Y dated 06.01.2012,07.01.2012 and 08.01.2012. I never remained posted in the area beyond Theog.............."
32. Statement of PW-9 Constable Rajiv Patial was also completely shattered by the defence counsel. He denied the suggestion that on 07.01.2012 there was snow at Theog and stated that the traffic Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 23 was properly plying on the road which is contrary to the record. PW-8 HC Manoj Kumar also stated in his cross-examination that they left Police Station Sadar at 9:45 AM, from there they went to Bus Stand, Lakkar Bazar, where they boarded a bus, which was going towards Rohru and they went upto Chaila. He further stated that they took an HRTC bus from Chailla which was going to Neri Pull, which is again contrary to the record as no HRTC bus had plied on that day due to heavy snow fall.
33. Thus, perusal of the cross-examinations of the aforesaid witnesses clearly demonstrate that their statements are totally based upon falsehoods as it has been established by the defence that no bus had plied on 07.01.2012 due to heavy snow fall on the route from Shimla to Rohru via Fagu. The documentary evidence led by the accused has completely belied the version of the police officials, i.e. PW-8 and PW-9 and also the Investigation Officer i.e.PW-10,hence, their presence on the spot is highly doubtful and no credence can be attached to their evidence which is totally unreliable and untrustworthy.
34. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 26.02.2015, rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum- Special Judge Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5227-DB 24 (CBI), Shimla, HP, in Sessions Trial No.11-T/7 of 2013/12 is required for the reasons recorded hereinabove. The appeal, which is devoid of merit, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ) Judge ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge March 07, 2025 (VH)