Gujarat High Court
Narendrabhai Mukeshbhai Rajgor vs State Of Gujarat on 8 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 9008 of 2020
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NARENDRABHAI MUKESHBHAI RAJGOR
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR ASHISH M DAGLI(2203) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR MAULIN G PANDYA(3999) for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3
MR. SOAHAM JOSHI, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 08/08/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. The present petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs:-
"A. Your Lordship may be pleased to admit and allow this petition.
B. Your lordship may be pleased to stay and further operation of order passed by Ld. Add. Sessions Judge, Court No. 32, City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in criminal appeal no. 389 OF 2017.
C. Your lordship may be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 04/12/2020 passed by the Ld. Add. Sessions Judge, Court No. 32, City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in criminal appeal no. 389 OF 2017."
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE AS UNDER:-
2. The wife of the present petitioner, along with their son Rakshit, voluntarily left her matrimonial home on 3.04.2013. Subsequently, she preferred an application under various provisions Page 1 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short, "the Act") which came to be registered as Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 117 of 2014. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 18, Ahmedabad, was pleased to pass an order in the said application on 15.04.2017. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent-wife preferred Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 2017 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 32, City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad, which came to be decided by order dated 04.12.2020.
2.1. Being dissatisfied with the said appellate order, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present Special Criminal Application.
SUBMISSION OF THE PETITIONER:-
3. In essence, the petitioner-husband assails the judgment and order rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 2017, preferred by the private respondent-wife, whereby the learned Sessions Court directed the petitioner to provide alternative suitable accommodation to the respondent-wife at Ahmedabad within thirty days from the date of the order, or, in the alternative, to pay her a sum of Rs.5,000/- per month towards rent.
3.1. Learned advocate Mr. Ashish M. Dagli, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-husband, contended that the learned Appellate Court, without adverting to the relevant factual matrix and in the absence of any evidence adduced by the respondent-wife in support of her claim under Section 19(f) of the Act, proceeded to grant such relief. It was urged that the premises in question belong to and are owned by the petitioner's father, and thus the respondent-wife cannot assert Page 2 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined a right to reside therein.
3.2. It was further submitted that the petitioner is ready and willing to resume cohabitation with the respondent-wife at Morbi; however, she has, of her own volition, declined to join him there. Learned counsel emphasised that the trial court had categorically recorded that, in the absence of evidence, relief under Section 19(f) of the Act could not be granted. Notwithstanding this, the appellate court, without cogent reasoning, reversed such finding, thereby committing a grave error of jurisdiction.
3.3. Accordingly, it was submitted that the impugned order passed in the appeal preferred by the respondent-wife be quashed and set aside, and the present petition be allowed.
SUBMISSION OF THE RESPONDENTS:-
4. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Maulin Pandya, appearing for the respondent-wife, submitted that the learned trial court, while declining to grant relief under Section 19(f) of the Act, primarily placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.R. Batra and Anr. v. Smt. Taruna Batra [(2007) 3 SCC 169]. It is submitted that a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Satish Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja [(2021) 1 SCC 414], has categorically held that the proposition of law laid down in S.R. Batra (supra) no longer holds the field and is not a correct enunciation of law.
4.1. The learned advocate for the respondent, while supporting the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court, contended that the wife, under Section 19(f) of the Act, is entitled to Page 3 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined reside with her husband under the same roof; and where the husband fails to secure her accommodation in the shared household, he is legally obligated to provide her suitable alternative residence or pay reasonable rent. The learned appellate court, it is urged, has rightly recorded findings in this regard, and therefore, the present petition is nothing but a gross abuse of the process of law, warranting outright dismissal.
5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, concurring with the submissions advanced on behalf of the respondent, urged that an appropriate order be passed in the facts and circumstances of the case.
FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF THE COURT:-
6. I have heard the learned advocates for both sides and have meticulously perused the record. It is pertinent to note that the respondent-wife, along with her minor son, preferred Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 117 of 2014 before the Court of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 18, invoking Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Act, against her husband and in-laws.
6.1. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate partly allowed the application under Section 18 of the Act, declined to pass any order under Section 19 of the Act, granted maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month to the respondent-wife and Rs.2,000/- per month to the minor son from the date of the application under Section 20 of the Act, and further awarded compensation of Rs.5,000/- under Section 22 of the Act.
Page 4 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined 6.2. In paragraph 15 of the judgment in the said Criminal Miscellaneous Application, the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate recorded reasons for declining relief under Section 19 of the Act, primarily observing that the respondent-wife had failed to produce any document to establish that the property in which the parties had cohabited constituted the "shared household"
and was owned by the petitioner. For declining such relief, the learned Magistrate placed reliance upon the decision in S.R. Batra and Another (supra).
6.3. The aforesaid judgment gave rise to two statutory appeals under Section 29 of the Act: firstly, Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 2017 preferred by the respondent-wife seeking relief under Section 19 of the Act, and thereafter, Criminal Appeal No. 428 of 2017 preferred by the petitioner-husband challenging the award of compensation made by the learned trial court. Both appeals were adjudicated by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, who, vide common judgment dated 04.12.2020, dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 428 of 2017 filed by the husband, and partly allowed Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 2017 filed by the wife by directing the petitioner-husband to provide suitable accommodation to the respondent-wife, and in the event of failure to do so, to pay her monthly rent of Rs.5,000/-.
6.4. The reasons assigned by the learned appellate court in this regard are contained in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the impugned judgment, which are as under:
"25. Looking to the record of the Learned Trial Court as well Page 5 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined as the impugned judgment and order, the Learned Trial Court has assigned the reasons regarding not passing any residence order under section 19 of the D.V. Act, by holding that the petitioner has not produced any documentary evidence regarding property owned by the respondent- husband and further relying on the judgment of the Hon'bl Apex Court, in the case of S.R. Batra, whereby Learned Trial Court held that in the form of village Form No.7/12, an agricultural land which is in the name of the father of the respondent-husband, hence the petitioner-wife is not entitled to get any residence order.
But looking to the provisions of section 19(f) of the D.V. Act and furthermore, the respondent-husband in his cross-examination has admitted that he is living luxurious life and well settled. Therefore, I am of the considered view that looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner-wife is entitled for residence order.
26. Therefore, I am of the considered view that order passed by the Learned Trial Court in not passing the residential order, is totally unjustified, since the Learned Trial Court without appreciating the evidence placed by the petitioner, has straight away not passed the residential order, which is per se illegal. Therefore, I am of the considered view that certainly, the respondent is to be directed to provide suitable accommodation to the petitioner-wife at Ahmedabad or to pay a fixed monthly rent towards the payment of rent and thereby it would meet the ends of justice. Hence, I am of the considered view that the Learned Trial Court ought to have granted a prayer sought by the petitioner-wife as to residential order. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to be awarded with the residential order. Therefore, in the light of above discussions, in my view, not awarding reliefs u/Sec.19 to the petitioner-wife by the Learned Trial Court, is uhjustified and illegal"
6.5. At the very outset, it would be apposite to advert to the statutory definition of the term "shared household" as contemplated Page 6 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined under Section 2(s) of the Act, which reads as under:--
"shared household means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;"
7. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Satish Ahuja (supra), had occasion to interpret the expression "means and includes" as employed in Section 2(s) of the Act, in the context of the reliefs envisaged thereunder. The pertinent observations recorded in paragraphs 53, 54, 55, 57, 62, and 64 of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:--
"53. After noticing the ratio of above judgments, Section 2(s), which uses both the expressions "means and includes"
and looking to the context, we are of the view that the definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is an exhaustive definition. The first part of definition begins with expression "means" which is undoubtedly an exhaustive definition and second part of definition, which begins with word "includes" is explanatory of what was meant by the definition. Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that even if it is accepted that the definition of Section 2(s) is exhaustive, his case is fully covered in both the parts of the definition.
54. The use of both the expressions "means and includes" in Section 2(s) of Act, 2005, thus, clearly indicate the Page 7 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined legislative intent that the definition is exhaustive and shall cover only those which fall within the purview of definition and no other.
55. Now, reverting back to the definition of Section 2(s), the definition can be divided in two parts, first, which follows the word "means" and second which follows the word "includes". The second part which follows "includes" can be further sub-divided in two parts. The first part reads "shared household means a household where the person aggrieved has lived or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent". Thus, first condition to be fulfilled for a shared household is that person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship. The second part subdivided in two parts is- (a) includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent and owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and
(b)includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. In the above definition, two expressions, namely, "aggrieved person" and "respondent" have occurred. From the above definition, following is clear:- (i) it is not requirement of law that aggrieved person may either own the premises jointly or singly or by tenanting it jointly or singly; (ii) the household may belong to a joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household; and (ii) the shared household may either be owned or tenanted by the respondent singly or jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
57. The judgment of this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra), which is sheet anchor of the submission of the appellant needs to be noticed in detail. In the above case, the respondent was married with the son of appellant on Page 8 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined 14.04.2000. Respondent started living with her husband in the house of appellant No.2 on the second floor. It was not disputed that house belonged to appellant No.2 and her son, i.e., husband of respondent had no share. Husband had filed a divorce petition against respondent whereas respondent filed a criminal case under Sections 406, 498A, 506 and 34 of Indian Penal Code. Respondent shifted to her parents' residence because of the dispute with her husband. She when later tried to enter the house, she found the main entrance locked hence, she filed suit No. 87 of 2003 to grant mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. The Trial Court granted temporary injunction in favour of the respondent. The appellant filed the appeal, which was allowed by dismissing the temporary injunction. Respondent filed a Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, which was allowed by learned Single Judge holding that the appellant is entitled to reside in the second floor as that was her matrimonial home. The appellant aggrieved against the judgment of the High Court had filed an appeal. This Court in Paragraph 18 observed that since the house belongs to mother-in-law of the respondent and does not belong to the husband, hence, she cannot claim any right to live in the said house. Following was observed in paragraph 18:-
"18. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in- law of Smt Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house."
xxx xxx xxx
62. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) in paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 were made while considering the expression "person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived". This Court observed in paragraph 26 that if the interpretation canvassed by learned counsel for the respondent is accepted that the house of the husband's relative where respondent resided shall become shared household, shall lead to chaos and would be absurd. The expression "at any stage has lived" occurs in Section 2(s) after the words "where the person aggrieved lives". The use Page 9 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined of the expression "at any stage has lived" immediately after words "person aggrieved lives" has been used for object different to what has been apprehended by this Court in paragraph 26. The expression "at any stage has lived" has been used to protect the women from denying the benefit of right to live in a shared household on the ground that on the date when application is filed, she was excluded from possession of the house or temporarily absent. The use of the expression "at any stage has lived" is for the above purpose and not with the object that wherever the aggrieved person has lived with the relatives of husband, all such houses shall become shared household, which is not the legislative intent. The shared household is contemplated to be the household, which is a dwelling place of aggrieved person in present time. When we look into the different kinds of orders or reliefs, which can be granted on an application filed by aggrieved person, all orders contemplate providing protection to the women in reference to the premises in which aggrieved person is or was in possession. Our above conclusion is further fortified by statutory scheme as delineated by Section 19 of the Act, 2005. In event, the definition of shared household as occurring in Section 2(s) is read to mean that all houses where the aggrieved person has lived in a domestic relationship alongwith the relatives of the husband shall become shared household, there will be number of shared household, which was never contemplated by the legislative scheme. The entire Scheme of the Act is to provide immediate relief to the aggrieved person with respect to the shared household where the aggrieved person lives or has lived. As observed above, the use of the expression "at any stage has lived" was only with intent of not denying the protection to aggrieved person merely on the ground that aggrieved person is not living as on the date of the application or as on the date when Magistrate concerned passes an order under Section 19. The apprehension expressed by this Court in paragraph 26 in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra), thus, was not true apprehension and it is correct that in event such interpretation is accepted, it will lead to chaos and that was never the legislative intent. We, thus, are of the considered opinion that shared household referred to in Section 2(s) is the shared household of Page 10 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined aggrieved person where she was living at the time when application was filed or in the recent past had been excluded from the use or she is temporarily absent.
xxx xxx xxx
64. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The definition of shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the definition of "respondent" under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of the husband. In event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the definition of shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of shared household is clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the interpretation of definition of shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Page 11 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined Taruna Batra (supra) is not correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law."
8. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgment, unequivocally held that there is no legal requirement for the house to be owned--either exclusively or jointly--by the husband. While scrutinising the decision in S.R. Batra (supra), the Court expressly declared it to be an erroneous exposition of the law.
9. Section 19(1)(f) of the Act is extracted hereinbelow:--
"19. Residence Orders.--(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may, upon being satisfied that domestic violence has occurred, pass a residence order--
"(f) directing the respondent to secure for the aggrieved person an alternative accommodation of the same standard as that enjoyed by her in the shared household, or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman."
10. The aforesaid provision confers jurisdiction upon the learned Magistrate to issue an order of restraint under Section 19 while adjudicating upon an application under the Act. In exercise of such powers, the Court may direct the respondent-husband to secure for the aggrieved person the same standard of residence as she had been enjoying in her shared household, or, if circumstances so necessitate, to pay rent in lieu thereof.
11. In the present case, it is the categorical assertion of the respondent-wife that she was residing with her husband in the Page 12 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/9008/2020 ORDER DATED: 08/08/2025 undefined matrimonial household at Morbi. Consequently, the petitioner- husband was under a legal obligation to provide her with an alternative accommodation of an equivalent standard, or to compensate her by way of rent for the same. It is further alleged that the respondent-wife was rendered destitute by the conduct of the petitioner and compelled to return to Morbi, where her parental family resides. Even the minor son was constrained to abandon his paternal home and reside with his mother elsewhere.
12. Learned advocate Mr. Ashish M. Dagli has submitted that the petitioner's father instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 32 of 2014 before the Court of the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Morbi, seeking to restrain the respondent-wife from entering premises owned by him, and had obtained such relief. It is, however, noted that a second appeal against the said decree is presently pending before this Court. This submission, however, does not advance the petitioner's cause inasmuch as, notwithstanding the pendency of such civil proceedings, the petitioner remains under a legal obligation to secure suitable accommodation for his destitute wife, with whom he shared a domestic relationship.
13. Where an act of domestic violence has the effect of compelling the wife to reside separately, she is, as a matter of legal entitlement, to be provided with accommodation commensurate with the standard she enjoyed prior to the occurrence of such violence.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, and considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the petition is devoid of merit and is, accordingly, liable to be dismissed.
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15. Consequently, the husband-petitioner is statutorily bound to tender the amount of rent to the respondent-wife, who has been unnecessarily dragged into the present proceedings. The respondent- wife, a destitute lady whose sole sustenance is derived from the maintenance awarded by the learned Trial Court, has been constrained to incur expenses towards litigation.
16. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court, while dismissing the present petition, deems it just, equitable, and in the interests of justice to impose costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) upon the petitioner. Accordingly, the petition stands DISMISSED. Any interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. Notice is discharged.
17. The costs so quantified shall be paid to respondent No. 2 within a period of three weeks from today. In the event of default, the said sum shall be recoverable by the respondent wife in accordance with Section 125(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(J. C. DOSHI,J) MANISH MISHRA Page 14 of 14 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Aug 12 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Aug 12 21:48:41 IST 2025