Telangana High Court
M. Ramakrishna vs State Of Telangana on 19 April, 2024
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITIONS No. 17769, 14651, 16821, 17690, 17746, 17749, 17750,
17753, 17779, 17780, 17786, 17921, 17946, 17978, 17992, 18037,
18094, 18110,18118, 18134, 18214, 18837, 19435, 20057, 20068 of 2020
178, 672, 16786, 18282, 18515, 19806, 19899, 19911, 19961, 20060,
20063, 20129, 20137, 20305, 20814, 20826, 20857, 21108, 21448,
21549, 21615, 22274, 24442, 29227, 30367 of 2021
AND
20058, 32944 of 2022
COMMON ORDER :
All these Writ Petitions are filed questioning the notices issued by the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC) directing petitioners to pay arrears of licence fee / lease amount. Initially, interim orders were passed wherein this Court directed the respondent Corporation not take any coercive steps against petitioners herein.
2. Since the issue involved in the all these cases is one and the same, the facts urged in Writ Petition No. 178 of 2021 are taken for convenience sake.
Conspectus of Petitioners' Case is as follows::
3. Petitioners state that they are the authorized licensees of Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter be referred to as 'Corporation' for brevity) for running catering stalls individually in Mahatma Gandhi Bus Station (MGBS), Hyderabad, Jubilee Bus Station (JBS), Secunderabad and Dilsukhnagar Bus Station, on payment of 2 license fee. It is stated, they are filing this Writ Petition, challenging the most inexcusable abdication of imperative duty on the part of the Corporation to review and revise the license fee of petitioners commensurate with the drastic decline in the volume of commuters in the buses of Corporation, throughout the State of Telangana, particularly MGBS and JBS Bus Stations, due to unprecedented pandemic COVID-19, as a result, their business is totally collapsed, despite the most warranting emergency situation and several representations to the respondents, requesting them to revise their license fee to meet the fall out of Pandemic COVID-19 and challenging the most atrocious and unwarranted action of the respondents pressurizing them to pay the full amount of their license fee and threatening to terminate their licenses in a most irresponsible manner without fulfilling its mandatory obligation to revise the license fee to tide over the present financial crisis.
Petitioners further state that the question of law to be decided in Writ Petitions is 'as to whether respondent - Corporation is entitled to claim the previous license fee from petitioners for the period affected by Force Magesure/Vis Major i.e.,. unprecedented dangerous Pandemic COVID-19, due to which the volume of commuters in all the bus stations of the 3 Corporation across the State of Telangana, particularly in MGBS and JBS, has fallen down drastically to 10-20% of the normal times, resulting in collapse of business of petitioners'. Petitioners state that due to imposition of abrupt National Lock Down on 22.03.2020, their stalls were shut down and remain closed till the last week of October, 2020 and they could not even remove their stocks from their stalls. Consequently, their stocks were totally damaged and they suffered huge loss. As the pandemic was prevalent even after lifting of lock down, the Corporation did not start operation of its buses for few weeks. Since the pandemic had been very much virulent in alarming proportions in the country and physical distance from person to person is very much inevitable, as a minimum caution to stop transmission of disease, people became panic and confined to their houses and totally avoided commute in buses to protect themselves from the pandemic.
Petitioners further state that because of the very poor turnout of passengers to MGBS and JBS, which is less than 10% of the normal times, due to virulent Pandemic COVID- 19, Corporation has operated only 10% of its buses for a period of 4 months till the end of September, 2020. The volume of commuters started increasing slowly from the 2nd week of 4 October and the volume of commuters was 20% in October and November, 2020 and was 30% in December, 2020. The Corporation did not start operation of its inter-State Buses till 04.11.2020 and city buses till the beginning of October, 2020. The Corporation started operation of city buses only in October, 2020 with 25% of the buses. As the transmission of pandemic is taking place multi-fold with the contact of outside objects, even the negligible number of commuters are very much scared / reluctant to purchase anything from their stalls. The Corporation had also restricted the foot-fall in MGBS in such a manner that the commuters coming to MGBS shall wait in the places earmarked for them and go straight away to board the buses. Because of the abnormal situation, petitioners could not open their stalls till the last week of October, 2020. When there was a slight improvement just before Dassera, they opened their stalls one by one on different dates and intimated the same to the authorities concerned. Thereafter also, they are having only 20% of the business, when compared to their business of previous years and they are unable to pay wages to their workers and are suffering huge losses. Petitioners further state that due to drastic fall in commuters, as stated above, revenue of the Corporation had come down to less than 20% and the 5 Corporation had to get financial aid from the State Government to tide over the crisis. When that being the position, how miserable is the condition of petitioners as petty traders can be imagined. Petitioners' financial position is much more worse than the Corporation and they suffered huge loss and could not afford to pay the previous license fee.
It is also stated that in view of the unforeseen and unprecedented financial crisis, all the stall owners of MGBS including petitioners made the representation dated 21.05.2020 to the respondent-Corporation bringing to their notice the abnormal situation that they are not in a position to run the stalls for the existing license fee, due to lack of commuters and requesting them to revise their license fee reducing it to 20% of the existing fee and that they cannot open their stalls till the respondents revise their license fee reasonably to tide over the present financial crisis. Petitioners had been making representations dated 28.05.2020, 03.06.2020, 11.06.2020 and 24.06.2020 to the respondents one after the other in that regard, but they did not bother to take any decision revising the license fee.
The grievance of petitioners is that the Corporation is threatening to take coercive steps to terminate their license in 6 a most irresponsible manner and in a colourable excise of power, totally ignoring the hard reality and unprecedented financial crisis created by the dangerous pandemic, as to whether the licensees of stalls have any business or not and as to whether they can afford to pay the existing license fee or not, for corona crisis period. The 2nd respondent did not bother to take into consideration the crucial fact that Corporation is totally paralyzed due to very poor turnout of the commuters because of the crisis. The respondent Corporation had collected license fee from petitioners for the months of October, November and December, 2020, high-handedly threatening them that they would disconnect power supply to stalls and would terminate their licenses and claimed whatever license fee paid by them is subject to the orders of this Court in these Writ Petitions. Petitioners also state that when transport activity of Corporation had been fallen down drastically beyond anybody's imagination, for a long period, due to natural calamity, Corporation is bound to revise their license fee to meet the contingency proportionate to the volume of its transport activity, in terms of its revenue. The volume of commuters in MGBS and JBS in the normal period is only the basis for the license fee offered by them by way of filing tenders, for obtaining licenses of their stalls. When 7 the very basis is gone, petitioners are not liable to pay the previous license fee and they are entitled to claim revision of license fee, commensurate with the prevailing situation.
According to petitioners, licensees of TSRTC in all the Bus Stations have offered the license fee with a legitimate expectation that the number of buses being operated in the Bus Stations, where their stalls are located and its occupancy ratio and the magnitude of travelling public coming to Bus Station as on date of tender notification of their stalls, would remain same, during their license period, without there being any force majeure, causing most extraordinary situation for a long period like COVID-19, which drastically reduced travelling public. When unforeseen and unprecedented extraordinary situation arises for a long period, totally reversing the normal situation, license fee, as agreed upon in the normal circumstances, cannot be enforced against them in view of unprecedented extraordinary situation. Petitioners urged that it would be more appropriate to revise their license fee, proportionate to the present revenue of the Corporation. The principle of quid pro quo applies here for collecting the license fee from them. The Corporation has granted license to them to do particular business in the particular Bus Station, keeping in mind the 8 annual average of travelling public in that particular Bus Station and the expected business of their stalls with the expected magnitude of the travelling public, in that particular Bus Station and the Corporation is not at all justified in demanding them to pay the previous license fee till corona crisis is over and normalcy is restored. Petitioners further state that Corporation being the instrumentality of the State shall act in a fair and reasonable manner without there being any element of arbitrariness and shall rise to the occasion and act appropriately to meet the emergency situation, without any apathy. It is duty bound to take into consideration the existing hard reality and act appropriately to revise the license fee to suit the present financial crisis. The Corporation shall not act like a private teacher and it is petitioners' fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution to demand the Corporation to take into consideration the extraordinary financial crisis. It is well-established principle of law that the contracts entered into between the parties in the normal circumstances shall not be enforced, during the period of Force Majeure and Vis Major.
Finally, petitioners state that A.P. State Road Transport Corporation took a decision and issued Circular No. 2 9 of 2020, dated 09.10.2020 waiving the license fee of the stalls for the lock down period from 22.03.2020 to 07.06.2020 and reducing the fee proportionate to the percentage of operation of buses, subject to payment of minimum 20% of license fee and to collect full amount of license fee only after attaining 80% level of operations in terms of KMs. of the region concerned. The Railway Department has also waived the license fee of the stalls in all the Railway Stations for the lock down period and the subsequent period up to October, 2020 and collecting only 10% of the license fee from the stall owners' w.e.f. November, 2020. On the same lines, TSRTC is expected to take a decision to revise the license fee of petitioners proportionate to the existing volume of commuters and the revenue of the Corporation, after lock down and petitioners are willing to pay 20% of the license fee tentatively till the Corporation revise their license fee. Petitioners also state that the Corporation is not justified to invoke the clause relating to termination of license for non- payment of license fee for 3 months, in the context of force majeure i.e., Pandemic COVID-19, as the said clause cannot be applied to such situation. In support of their submissions, the following judgments are relied:
i) MP Power Management Company Limited, Jabalpur vs. M/s.
Sky Power Southeast Soloar India Private Limited reported in 2022 Live Law (SC) 966;
10
ii) M/s. Koushik Group vs. The State of Telangana [W.A.No.571 of 2022 Dated 5.9.2022];
iii) Md. Nazeeb Pasha vs Telangana State Road Transport [W.P.No.42128 of 2018 Dated 26.4.2019];
iv) Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, South Central Railways & Ors vs. SCR Caterers, Dry Fruits, Fruit Juice Stalls Welfare Association & Anr reported in (2016) 3 SCC 582;
v) ABL International Ltd & Anr vs. Export Credit Guarantee reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553;
vi) Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd & Anr vs. CG Power & Industrial Solutions Limited & Anr reported in (2021) 6 SCC 15;
Counter-affidavit filed by the respondent - Corporation :
4. Respondents state that Writ Petition is not maintainable as it is arising out of contractual obligations and if petitioners are aggrieved by any clause or any damages suffered, remedy available to them is to approach the competent Civil Court. It is stated that Corporation started operating its District buses from 19.05.2020; in June 2020, it started 71% of its original operations, thus the contention of petitioners that the Corporation operated only 10% of buses till September, 2020, 20% in October and November and 30% in December, 2020 is not correct. The occupancy ratio was around 51% in October, 55% and 58% in November and December. It is stated that considering the representations made by the Licensees of the Stalls in the Bus Stations, the Corporation sought approval of the Government for giving exemption from payment of monthly licence fee for April and May, 2020 i.e., lockdown period and to 11 allow the licensees to pay licence fee for June, July, August and September 2020 in instalments without any penal interest and the decision of Government of Telangana is awaited. Therefore, the Corporate Office issued instructions vide letter No.C3/437(108)/2019-OPD(M&C) dated 31.10.2020 advising officers not to insist the licensees for payment of license fee for the period April - September 2020 and to collect the regular license fee from October, 2020 onwards. The Licensees have been informed accordingly by the Unit Officers concerned, therefore, the contention of petitioners that their representations have not been considered is not correct.
According to the Corporation, there is no legal right for the petitioners to seek / claim any remission / reduction on payment of license fee / compensation / reimbursement of losses in view of Clause 44 of the Deed of License which clearly spells the obligation of payment on petitioners as extracted hereunder:
"44. In case business is not carried out by the licensee due to riots/ agitations/ bundhs/ fire/ floods/ natural calamities/ strikes/ either by internal or external factors or for any other reasons, for a particular period, or periods, the Licensee shall have no right to claim any remission on license fee payment or compensation or reimbursement of loss, etc,.12
Therefore, there is no obligation on the Corporation as per the terms and conditions of the Agreement to grant any remission or reduction of license fee for any reason.
Respondents stated that petitioners' obligations under Agreement are within the realm of private law and there is no element of public law involved and they have to invoke the remedy of approaching the civil court rather than filing the present Writ Petition. Petitioners are not challenging the terms or clauses of the Agreement and hey cannot compare and impose the decision taken by other Corporations. The Corporation has its own limitation and decisions taken by other Corporations are not binding upon them. It was further stated that the Corporation considered the representations of petitioners and other license holders who were seeking relief of reduction of license fee and the decision of the Corporation to collect regular fee from October 2020 onwards has been communicated to all the licensees, but some of the licensees went on making representations. Therefore, the Managing Director vide proceedings No.C3/437(23)/ 2020-OPD(M&C) dated 10.02.2021 rejected the request for reduction of license fee.13
It is stated further that petitioners under the guise of the interim order dated 08.01.2021 are not paying monthly licence fee for their respective stalls, which is causing great financial inconvenience to the Corporation. It is stated that except the 1st petitioner, all others have to pay license fee for the period prior to lock down. It is stated that since the decision of the Government on collection of License fee for the period April to September 2020 is awaited, the Corporation is not insisting petitioners for payment of license fee for that period. Even if that period is excluded, all the petitioners except the 1st petitioner, are not paying licence fee regularly. Some petitioners have to pay licence fee for three to six months. Though petitioners are not paying license fee, the Corporation is restrained from taking any steps for realization of license fee, in view of the interim orders of this Court. Unless, this Court vacates the interim order dated 08.01.2021, the Corporation will suffer grave and irreparable loss and ultimately, sought for dismissal of the Writ Petition.
5. Respondents have relied upon the following decisions:
i) Joshi Technologies International Inc. Vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728;14
ii) B. Prabhakar Rao & Ors vs. The V.C & M.D.A.P.S.R.T.C [W.P.No.31454 of 2011 & Batch dated 9.4.2018]
iii) M/s. Koushik Group vs. State of Telangana [W.P.No.27097 of 2021 dated 19.5.2022]
iv) M/s. Koushik Group vs. The State of Telangana [W.A.No.571 of 2022 Dated 5.9.2022];
6. Reply/Rejoinder submitted by the petitioners:
Petitioners submits that respondents have deliberately ignored the most crucial factual and legal aspect of the case that their licenses have lost their efficacy by 80%, due to unprecedented dangerous pandemic anybody's imagination in the volume of commuters throughout the State of Telangana, particularly in MGBS and JBS Bus Stations in Hyderabad and consequently, their business is totally collapsed, defeating the very object of their licenses, warranting review of their license fee to meet the most un-precedented crisis arisen out of Pandemic COVID-19 for a long period more than one year. Corporation being instrumentality of the State come under the definition of State and it is expected to act in a fair and reasonable manner, unlike a private trader, in discharge of its public duties. When the mighty Corporation itself is struggling with its poor revenue, how miserable petitioners are being the licensees of the Corporation, doing petty business for their livelihood. Petitioners stated further that in the wake of un- precented pandemic, a constitutional duty is cast on the 15 Corporation, being the State, to act in a fair and reasonable manner, in dealing with them being its licensees, regarding the payment of our license fee and shall review our license fee, in tune with the current financial crisis, but unfortunately, the Corporation is acting in a most arbitrary manner pressurizing them to pay the stipulated license fee. The attitude of the Corporation is like that of a private money lender and totally acting in a most irresponsible manner as if the relationship between them is like the one between private individuals. When the scenario as regards volume of travelling public is at the lowest ebb and far lesser than the volume of commuters, as on the date of our tenders, fallen to less than 20% of the normal size of commuters creating an un-precedented decline in the volume of commuters, there is no justification whatsoever on part of the Corporation in not reviewing their license fee and in demanding them to pay the fee stipulated in the agreement. It is also stated that if there is a drastic decrease in the volume of commuters due to any other natural calamity for few days unlike the present crisis, the Corporation is not responsible and petitioners are also not entitled to claim any remission in the license fee. But the present situation is totally different and petitioners are deprived of even minimum business for long time 16 more than one year. The Corporation cannot escape from its accountability to rise to the occasion and review the license fee, keeping in view the pandemic and its resultant decline in the volume of commuters.
It is further stated that the revenue of the Corporation reflects actual volume of commuters, travelling in its buses. In view of the drastic decline in the volume of commuters, as reflected in the revenue of the Corporation, it is mandatory on the part of the Corporation, under Article 14 of the Constitution, to reduce their license fee proportionate to the decrease in its revenue when compared with normal times. Therefore, petitioners are claiming reduction of their license fee as a matter of right. Petitioners stated that in fact, the revenue of the Corporation had fallen down to 20% of its revenue of normal times, before the Pandemic up to middle of October. The Revenue has risen to 30% of its normal revenue from the middle of October, 2020 and the same continued till the end of December, 2020. Again the revenue had fallen down to 30% in January, 2021 and the same continued till the end of March, 2021. From April, 2021 onwards, size of travelling public has fallen down drastically to 20% and the corresponding revenue of the Corporation has fallen down accordingly due to abrupt 17 surge of COVID-19 across the country and petitioners did not have any business in April, 2021 and petitioners cannot afford to pay license fee for April 2021. It is stated that in all fairness, the Corporation is expected to collect license fee from the date of opening of their stalls in October, 2020, by reducing license fee proportionate to the decrease of its revenue, when compared with the normal times before the Pandemic. All of them paid license fee from the date of opening of the stalls in October, 2020, ranging from 40 to 50% of their respective licence fee, voluntarily. But, unfortunately, the Corporation is pressurizing them to pay the full amount and threatening to terminate their license, in a most irresponsible manner, ignoring the realistic situation. The Corporation may produce its records to show its actual revenue, during the pandemic period, to avoid any controversy. If the Corporation does not produce its record on its own, this Court may be pleased to direct the Corporation to produce its record. Petitioners submit that the allegation of the Corporation that Writ Petition is not maintainable, as it is arising out of contractual obligation, is untenable and unsustainable as petitioners are only questioning the arbitrariness of the respondents in not acting upon their representations for reduction of license fee in view of the 18 unprecedented pandemic, which is continued for more than a year. The allegation of the Corporation that it operated 71% of buses and the occupancy ratio was around 51% in October, 2020 and 55% in November, 2020 is not true.
Petitioners also state that the Managing Director considered their representation and rejected the same and communicated vide proceedings dated 10.02.2021 is not true, self-contradictory untenable and unsustainable. In fact, the Board of Directors of the Corporation is competent authority to take a policy decision regarding reduction of petitioners' license fee. The Managing Director is not the competent authority to take a decision in that regard. The administration of the Corporation vests in the Board of Directors and any policy decision shall be taken only by the Board but not the Managing Director, who is only Executive Authority to carry out the decisions of the Board. Therefore, the communication of the Managing Director dated 10.02.2021 rejecting their representations and directing them to pay full amount of license fee from October, 2020, is not valid and unsustainable. In fact, the said proceedings is totally bereft of any consideration of petitioners representations, as such it cannot be considered. The mere observation of the Managing Director in his 19 proceedings that the Corporation suffered huge financial loss due to lock down, because of which petitioners license fee cannot be reduced, cannot be considered. When the Managing Director is conscious of the fact that the Corporation suffered huge financial loss due to lock down, Corporation shall also be conscious of the fact that petitioners also suffered huge financial loss. When the mighty Corporation has suffered huge financial loss, what would be petitioners' plight. The very observation of the Managing Director that Corporation suffered huge financial loss due to lock down itself proves beyond any doubt that petitioners too suffered huge financial loss. Therefore, the communication of the Managing Director rejecting their representations and directing them to pay full amount of license fee from October, 2020, totally suffers from non-application of mind and it cannot be considered as a decision.
Petitioners also stated that Clause 44 of the License Deed does not apply to an un-precedent natural disaster like Pandemic COVID-19, which occurred for a long time for more than one year totally affecting the normal situation to a large extent. The said Clause applies only to common natural calamities like floods, earthquake, etcetera, which would be only 20 for few days, not more than 10 days. But COVID-19 is very abnormal in nature and unimaginable and unprecedented, beyond anybody's imagination and continuing for more than one year, creating an unprecedented economic crisis for the entire country effecting financially the Governments and all the citizens badly, without any chance of recovery in near future. Even assuming that Clause 44 is applicable, it shall be declared as highly inconsiderable, arbitrary, discriminatory, unilateral, totally unwarranted and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and opposed to principles of fair play and natural justice.
7. Heard learned counsel for petitioners Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, Sri Ramesh Chilla, Ms. Vladameer Khatoon, Sri Hari Kishan Kudikala, Sri D. Durga Prasad, Sri K. Tarun Chowdary, Sri M. Anil Kumar, Sri K. Ravinder Reddy, Sri P. Venkateswara Rao, Sri M. Maddileti and Sri M. Srinivas and learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation Sri Gaddam Srinivas, Sri Thoom Srinivas, Sri B. Mayur Reddy, in all the Writ Petitions and perused the entire record.
8. The point for consideration in these Writ Petitions is whether the Corporation is entitled to claim license fee from 21 petitioners for the period effected by Force Majeure/Vis Major i.e. unprecedented dangerous Pandemic COVID-19, due to which volume of commuters in all the bus stations of the Corporation across the State of Telangana, particularly MGBS and JBS, has fallen down drastically to 10 to 20% of the normal times, resulting in collapse of the business of the stalls of the petitioners.
9. According to petitioners, this batch of Writ Petitions is filed against the Corporation and its authorities challenging the most arbitrary, highly unjust, highly irrational action of the Corporation and its authorities in demanding petitioners, who are the license holders of the Corporation for running various stalls in the bus stations of TSRTC throughout the State of Telangana, to pay the full amount of license fee without any sense of responsibility, equity and justice, ignoring the hard reality that due to the unprecedented Pandemic Covid-19, the Corporation had operated less than 10% of the actual number of buses being operated before the Pandemic and ignoring the hard reality that even the occupancy ratio of negligible number of buses is very poor being less than 10% of its occupancy for a period of more than one year commencing from imposition of National Lock Down on 22.03.2020 because of the very poor 22 turnout of passengers to all the bus stations throughout the State of Telangana and due to alarming spreading of the Pandemic -19. As a consequence of which the petitioners and all the other stall owners in all the bus stations had no option except to close their stalls up to October, 2020 for a period of 6 months, ever since the date of National Lock Down. Even the negligible number of passengers are very much reluctant to purchase anything from the stalls of petitioners and other stalls because of fear that transmission of Pandemic was taking place very fast, with the contact of outside objects. The action of the Corporation and its authorities in demanding petitioners and other stalls licence holders in all the bus stations throughout the State to pay the full amount of licence fee in the back ground as stated in the above para, is nothing but flagrant violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 14 of the Constitution "Equality before Law" which has wide connotation that there shall not be any element of arbitrariness in the action of the State and its instrumentalities.
10. It was contended that this Writ Petition and the connected batch of Writ Petitions do not fall in the realm of contract. Petitioners are neither seeking enforcement of any contractual obligation nor annulment of any clause of the 23 licence deed. They are only questioning the arbitrariness of the corporation in demanding them to pay the full amount of licence fee in an unprecedented highly abnormal situation, which cannot be visualized because of which licenses granted by the Corporation to petitioners for running stalls in the bus stations of TSRTC became non-operational and they did not have any business during the period of pandemic. In view of the point for consideration, it was contended that the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in. Joshi Technologies International Inc. case (supra) relied on by the Corporation has no relevance at all. In the said case, petitioner therein sought to incorporate a new clause in its agreement, which alleged to have been missed to be included in the agreement by oversight. The Supreme Court held that it is a contractual matter and the High Court cannot grant such a relief under Article 226. The relief sought in the present case is totally different and distinct and has nothing to do with enforcement of the contractual obligations, being totally outside the scope of contract, as the issue involved is a legal issue pertaining to a situation which arose beyond anybody's imagination and which is not governed by the licence deeds of petitioners. Further, it was contended that pandemic was very much prevalent for more than 1 ½ years ever since imposition of 24 National Lock Down in March, 2020. Merely because 1st Lock Down was lifted after two months, it does not mean pandemic ceased to exist. It continued for more than one and half year even after lifting of Lock Down. The Government of Telangana imposed 2nd Lock Down for April, May and June, 2021, with slight relaxations. During the said period also, stalls of petitioners remain closed.
11. It was specifically argued that Central Government issued guidelines vide Memorandum dated 13.05.2020 as to how to deal with the contracts during pandemic for granting necessary relief to the parties of the contract, by treating the contract period as Dies-Non during the period of pandemic. The said Memorandum was also filed as one of the material papers. In view of the said guidelines, licence period of petitioners during the pandemic shall be treated as Dies-Non and no licence fee shall be collected from them.
12. Further, it was contended that petitioners did not open their stalls till the 1st week of October, 2020 ever since the lock down and the Corporation is aware of the said fact. Petitioners have specifically pleaded in this Writ Petition and the Corporation having admitted that stalls of petitioners remain 25 closed till the 1st week of October, 2020, is not at all justified in demanding licence fee for the closure period. The occupancy ratio is less than 10% of even the skeleton buses operated by the Corporation during the Covid period of 1 ½ years, is not denied by the Corporation in its counter. Therefore, it is proved beyond any doubt that occupancy ratio is less than 10%. The reason given by the Managing Director vide proceedings dated 04.09.2021 for not granting remission of licence fee during Covid period is that Corporation suffered huge financial loss. It is not at all the case of the Corporation that petitioners had sufficient business during the said period enabling them to pay full amount of licence fee. Accordingly, the Corporation admitted the crucial facts that the petitioners had no sufficient business during Covid-19. The Corporation had forwarded the representations of petitioners to government and they are still pending consideration. The said fact is evident from the letter of the Executive Director of the Corporation dated 31.10.2020 which was addressed to all the Regional Managers directing them to collect licence fees from the stall owners only from October, 2020. When the decision of the government is still awaited, Corporation is not justified in demanding petitioners to pay full amount of licence fee from June to October, 2020. 26
13. This Court, during the hearing, directed the Corporation to produce the record relating to occupancy ratio of the buses during Covid period and to consider the claim of petitioners for revising licence fees proportionate to the occupancy revenue of the Corporation during the Pandemic period. But, unfortunately, the Corporation did not comply with the said direction. As the Corporation failed to produce the record relating to occupancy ratio of the buses and the revenue of the corporation during the pandemic, this Court may be pleased to draw adverse inference against the Corporation that occupancy ratio of the buses and revenue of the Corporation is poor and not exceeding even 10% the occupancy ratio and the revenue of the corporation during the normal period.
14. It was also particularly argued that A.P. State Road Transport Corporation took a decision, by issuing Circular No.2/2020, dated 09.10.2020, waiving the license fee of the stalls for the lock down period from 22.03.2020 to 07.06.2020 proportionate to the percentage of operation of its buses, subject to payment of minimum 20% of license fee and to collect full amount of license fee, only after attaining 80% level of operations in terms of KMs. of the region concerned. The Railway Department has also waived the license fee of the Stalls 27 in all the Railway Stations for the lock down period and subsequent period up to October, 2020 and collecting only 10% of the license fee from the stall owners w.e.f. November, 2020. On the same lines, TSRTC is expected to take a decision to revise the license fee of petitioners, proportionate to the existing volume of commuters and the revenue of the Corporation, after lock down, petitioners are willing to pay 20% of the license fee, tentatively, till the Corporation revise the license fee. The Corporation is not justified to invoke the clause of the agreement of the license, relating to termination of license, for non-payment of license fee for 3 months, in the context of present force majeure i.e., Pandemic COVID-19, as the said clause cannot be applied to the present abnormal situation.
15. Conversely, learned counsel for the Corporation contended that it is well-settled legal proposition by the Hon'ble Apex Court that mandamus cannot be issued unless there is a legal right of petitioners and corresponding statutory obligation on the part of Corporation. In the present case, admittedly, there is no public duty or statutory obligation in the working of commercial agreements and no ground on those lines is referred to challenge the proceedings. There is no violation of fundamental right of petitioners by the Corporation by issuing 28 termination proceedings. The 1st lockdown period 22.03.2020 to 18.05.2020 due to COVID-19 contract was not operated .
16. It was contended that the Corporation allotted stalls available at various Bus Stations to the successful bidders through tender process; the Corporation entered into separate agreements with specified terms and conditions. Petitioners and several other license holders for the stalls at various bus stations have filed Writ Petitions seeking a direction to waive the license fee during Covid-19 period. Learned Standing Counsel contended that TSRTC also suffered huge financial losses due to pandemic and several licensees have submitted representations seeking waiver of license fee during lockdown period; Government imposed lock down for 58 days (22.03.2020 to 18.05.2020) in the 1st phase and for 39 days (12.05.2021 to 19.06.2021) with certain relaxations in the 2nd phase. Despite restrictions and partial lockdown in the State, TSRTC arranged to operate RTC and Hire bus services from all bus stations. Considering the representations of licensees, the Vice Chairman and Managing Director, TSRTC through proceedings dated 04.09.2021 allowed licensees to pay license fee for May to August, 2021 in four equal installments in October to December 29 2021 and January 2022 without penal interest, though there was delay in payment of license fee and the following clauses are existing in the terms and conditions of the Contract :
" Clause 11(a) of agreement the license fee is Rs. 45,506/ - (Rupees Forty Five Thousand, Five Hundred and Six Only) per month exclusive of electricity, water charges, maintenance charges and GST and the same shall be paid on or before 10th day of current month."
"Clause 11(d) of agreement, the licensee is liable to pay penalty for each day of delay @ 36% per annum in case of belated payment of monthly license fee, maintenance charges, electricity and water charges, on the amount payable, in addition to payment of license fee."
17. It was contended that the representations of petitioners have been examined and it has been decided to extend license period of the existing contractors by one year in respect of all those licensees who seek such extension vide proceedings dated 4.9.2021. The Vice Chairman and Managing Director issued Circular No. 15/2023-OPD(MNC), communicating that the Corporation Board has approved i) to waive license fee for April and May, 2020 for all the stalls, Toilet Maintenance Contracts and advertisement contractors of the Corporation since there was total lock-down due to Covid pandemic. ii) to allow the licensees who have not paid the license fee for the months of June to September, 2020 to pay license fee in four equal monthly installments i.e. April to July, 2023 without imposing any penal interest; iii) to collect license 30 fee from October-2020 onwards as per the terms and conditions of the agreement. iv) to refund balance Security Deposit after withholding license fee amount equivalent to June to September, 2020 and the other dues, if any as on date in case of those ex-licensees who have not paid license fee for these four months; v) to adjust two months' license fee pertaining to April and May, 2020 towards subsequent rental dues, in case of all those licensees who have paid license fee for two months and to refund two months license fee in case of ex-licensees.
18. Learned counsel also contended that petitioners are bound to follow contractual obligations agreed upon, as such, they cannot claim any rent exemptions, compensation or reimbursement for any loss as per clause 45 of license deed. Clause-45 of the license deed clearly specifies that :
" In case business is not carried out by the licensee due to riots /agitations / bundhs /fire / floods / natural calamities / strike /either by internal or external factors or for any other reasons, for a particular period, or periods, the Licensee shall have no right to claim any remission on license fee payment or compensation or reimbursement of loss etc.,."
19. Clause 27 of license deed specifies that licence is liable for termination with one month advance notice on the following grounds:
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i) If the licensee defaults in payment of license fee for three months consecutively or three times in a calendar year.
ii)If the licensee fails to do the business (for which license is granted) in the stall for a continuous period of Ninety (90) days.
Therefore, as per the clauses of agreement entered by the licensees with the respondent Corporation, there is no provision to waive license fee. Further, the Corporation also sustained huge losses due to lock down, however, keeping in view the difficulties experienced by the license holders, the corporation extended some relaxation of conditions and relief to licensees. Finally, it was argued that though the clauses of agreement do not permit, the Corporation considering the difficulties experienced by the license holders of the stalls in the bus stations, taken all measures to protect their interests and extended the same reliefs to the licensees. Therefore, the Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS:
20. The extraordinary outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic has had staggering effects on the economy, health and commerce of about 110 nations across the globe. The same conditions have continued for a period of one-and-a-half year. In addition to the massive pressure on the health and medical segments, several other unprecedented factors played crucial 32 part in the whole system, economy, commerce, or business. Given the situation of disruption of supply chain, disruption of assured manpower, uncertainty of future planning, inadequacy of security as well as the forced restraints in free commercial activities, numerous commercial contracts have either been interrupted, delayed or cancelled. The situation has thrown light on several important questions with respect to jurisprudence of the force majeure clause in various commercial contracts or frustration of contracts.
21. The term 'force majeure' which seems to have been borrowed from the Code Napoleon had received interpretation in several decisions of the English Courts in earlier years. In Matsoukis v. Priestman and Co.[ (1915) 1 K.B. 681] , Justice Bailhache opined that 'force majeure' would include strikes and break-down of machinery but not bad weather or football matches, or a funeral. In Lebeeaupin v. Crispin[(1920) 2 K.B. 714], Justice Mc Cardie had observed: "A force majeure clause should be construed in each case with a close attention to the words which precede or follow it, and with due regard to the nature and general terms of the contract. The effect of the clause may vary with each instrument."
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22. In the Indian context, the Supreme Court has considered, interpreted and decided the events of 'force majeure' in various judicial precedents, inter- alia from Satyabrata Ghosh v. Mugneeram Bangur[[1954 SCR 310]] to Energy watchdog v. CERC [(2017)14 SCC 18] and maintained a strict yet flexible approach towards the concept of 'force majeure' and frustration of contracts. In Alopi Prashad and Sons v. UOI [1960 (2) SCR 793], the Supreme Court had observed that commercial hardship shall not be a just and reasonable ground to support frustration of contract and excuse performance.
23. There was a difference of opinion and questions were raised over the fact that some contracts though having a 'force majeure' clause, do not stress on the word 'pandemic', 'epidemic', 'disease', etcetera, while majority of the contracting parties rely on the general phrase 'any other unforeseeable event, not under the control of either of the parties.'
24. On par with the private sector, Government contracts and Public Sector transactions also started suffering on account of pandemic and declaration of lockdown throughout the country. To address the situation fairly, Ministry 34 of Home Affairs came out with Notification No. F. 18/4/2020 PPD, dated 19.02.2020 with respect to Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017 declaring that interruptions in supply chain due to Covid 19 from China or any other country shall be covered under the ambit of 'force majeure' and that 'force majeure' shall be invoked whenever considered appropriate following the due process of law. While the power of the Ministry to bring certain events within the ambit of 'force majeure' under Clause 9.7.7 by a simple notification may be a different issue, but, as it appears, by this notification, Corona Pandemic was brought within the meaning of 'force majeure' as defined in the Manual and tacitly, this event certainly becomes applicable in respect of all government and / or public sector contracts irrespective of application of the Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017. It may be noted that this Memorandum of 19th February 2020 was issued prior to Covid-19 affecting operations in India, recognizing the difficulty faced by the contracting parties regarding import of materials from other countries which were impacted by the pandemic.
25. Similarly, on account of various representations and submissions made by various Renewable Energy (RE) Developers and RE Associations, and considering the prevailing 35 situation, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy vide Office Memorandum No. 283/18/2020-GRID SOLAR dated 20.03.2020 declared Covid-19 as a 'force majeure' event. The Ministry vide said order granted time extensions in scheduled commissioning date of RE projects, in light of disruption of supply chain due to the pandemic.
26. The Ministry of Roads Transport and Highways also in its Circular dated 18.05.2020 inter-alia classified the pandemic as a 'force majeure' event. In addition, Ministry of Home Affairs, by its Order No. 40-3/2020(D), dated 24.03.2020 expressed that the country was threatened with the spread of Covid 19 virus and therefore, has considered to take effective measures to prevent its spread across the country and in exercise of powers under section 10(2)(I) of the Disasters Management Act, 2005, issued various guidelines for immediate implementation. Subsequently, by Office Memorandum, dated 13.05.2020, the Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure referred to its earlier memorandum dated 19.02.2020 and also referred to the Manual of Procurement and recognized inter-alia that in view of the prevailing restrictions, it may not be possible for the parties to the contract to fulfill contractual obligations. Therefore, after fulfilling due procedure and wherever 36 applicable, parties to the contract could invoke 'force majeure' clause for all construction / works contracts, goods and services contracts, and PPP contracts with Government Agencies up to a certain period and subject to certain conditions. Therefore, officially, the Government of India recognized Covid-19 Pandemic as an event of 'force majeure' applicable in relation to contracts with Government Agencies, in effect, resulting inclusion of Public Sector Undertakings also.
27. While the specific acceptance of 'force majeure' in relation to Government sector contracts may not have any binding effect on the contracts outside the scope of the explicit instances or in relation to purely private contracts between private parties, they probably offered an explanatory value to bring Covid 19 and the forced restraints imposed on account of lockdowns, within the ambit of 'force majeure'.
28. The scrutiny of the Courts would be to rely on the terms of 'force majeure' clause in the contracts or on principles of frustration under section 56 of the Contract Act. This means, unless there is compelling evidence for non-performance of contract, the Courts do not favor parties resorting to frustration 37 or termination of contract. On account of enormous devastative effects pandemic created on the commercial and economic environment in the country, different Courts had to come forward and grant relief to different contracting parties who were severely affected by the Pandemic. The Delhi High Court considered the matter in June 2020 in the case of MEP Infrastructure Developers Ltd vs. South Delhi Municipal Corporation [W.P.(C) 2241/2020]. The court essentially relied on the Ministry of Roads Transport and Highways (MORTH) circular and observed that:
" 27(i) The respondent Corporation itself referred to Circular dated 19.02.2020 which notified that the COVID-19 pandemic was a force majeure occurrence. In effect, the force majeure clause under the agreement immediately becomes applicable and the notice for the same would not be necessary. That being the position, a strict timeline under the agreement would be put in abeyance as the ground realities had substantially altered and performance of the contract would not be feasible till restoration of the pre-force majeure conditions."
The Court also expounded on the continuous nature of 'force majeure' event and held that the subsequent lockdown relaxations given by the Central
Government and the State Government shall not amount to abatement of the 'force majeure' event, at least in respect to major contracts such as road construction projects. The court also identified the distinct effects of the lockdown, independent of the effects of the pandemic and its implications on various 38 contracts which many be affected by the 'force majeure' conditions.
29. In Halliburton Offshore Services Inc. v. Vedanta Ltd. O.M.P (I) (COMM.) No. 88/2020 & I.As. 3696-3697/2020, decided on 29.05.2020, the Delhi High Court was of an unequivocal opinion that:
" 62. The question as to whether COVID-19 would justify non-performance or breach of a contract has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case. Every breach or non-performance cannot be justified or excused merely on the invocation of COVID-19 as a Force Majeure condition. The Court would have to assess the conduct of the parties prior to the outbreak, the deadlines that were imposed in the contract, the steps that were to be taken, the various compliances that were required to be made and only then assess as to whether, genuinely, a party was prevented or is able to justify its non- performance due to the epidemic/pandemic".
Further, while discussing the scope of the force majeure clause in contracts it was observed by the court that:
" Para 63. It is the settled position in law that a Force Majeure clause is to be interpreted narrowly and not broadly. Parties ought to be compelled to adhere to contractual terms and conditions and excusing non-performance would be only in exceptional situations. As observed in Energy Watchdog it is not in the domain of Courts to absolve parties from performing their part of the contract. It is also not the duty of Courts to provide a shelter for justifying non- performance. There has to be a 'real reason' and a 'real justification' which the Court would consider in order to invoke a Force Majeure clause".
30. The Madras High Court in Tuticorin Stevedores' Association v. The Government of India [WP(MD)No.6818 of 2020 and WMP(MD)No.6217 of 2020], dated 14.09.2020, 39 observed that the question as to whether on account of the pandemic outbreak of Covid-19, the parties can invoke the principle of 'force majeure' need not detain us. The calamitous impact and disruption caused by Covid-19 on the economic front has been recognized by the Government itself. In Confederation for Concessionaire Welfare vs Airports Authority of India [W.P(C). 2204/2021 & CM APPL.6421- 22/202], the Hon'ble Delhi High Court observed on 17.02.2021 inter-alia that the Court has perused the clauses relating to 'Force Majeure'. There can be no doubt that pandemic is a 'force majeure' event. Since petitioners wish to terminate/exit from their respective agreements, while directing completion of pleadings and while the issues are under examination by this Court, there is a need to reduce the risk to both parties as simply postponing the exit by the petitioners would also make it impossible for AAI to re-allot the spaces to willing concessionaires and the outstanding against petitioners would continue to mount. Accordingly, as an interim measure, Hon'ble Court directed certain processes to be followed. In Ramanand vs. Dr. Girish Soni RC.
[REV447/2017], an application came under consideration of the Delhi High Court which raised various issues relating to 40 suspension of payment of rent by tenants owing to COVID-19 lockdown crisis and the legal questions surrounding the same. By order dated 21.05.2020, the Delhi High Court while determining whether lease agreements are covered under the ambit of Sections 32 and 56 of the Act and even though it was held that suspension of rent on the grounds of force majeure is not permissible under the circumstances, the Court allowed relaxation in the schedule of payment of the outstanding rent owing to the lockdown.
31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parvasi Legal Cell. Vs Union of India observed that the pandemic was an 'unusual' situation that had impacted the economy globally. This case revolved around the liability of the airlines to compensate passengers who faced cancellation of flights due to government-imposed lockdowns and restrictions on inter-state and international travels. The court relied on the office memorandum issued by the Ministry of Civil Aviation dated 16th April 2020 to dispose of the petition.
32. In Transcon Iconia Pvt. Ltd v ICICI Bank [2020 SCC OnLine Bom 626], the Bombay High Court while determining whether moratorium period would be excluded for NPA classification observed inter alia as under: 41
" 38... the period of the moratorium during which there is a lockdown will not be reckoned by ICICI Bank for the purposes of computation of the 90-day NPA declaration period. As currently advised, therefore, the period of 1st March 2020 until 31st May 2020 during which there is a lockdown will stand excluded from the 90-day NPA declaration computation until -- and this is the condition -- the lockdown is lifted'.
33. In yet another judgment in R. Narayan v. State of Tamil Nadu. [Case No.19596 of 2020 and W.M.P.(MD)Nos.16318 & 16320 of 2020], the Madras High Court directed the Municipal Corporation to waive the license fee for running a shop at a bus stand, and observed that:
"...this Court would be justified in treating the "lock down" as a force majeure event which will relieve the licensee from performing his obligation to the corresponding extent." The Court also observed that ... "The respondents (The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors.) themselves have chosen to treat the lock down restrictions as a force majeure event. But they have relieved the licensees from the obligation to pay the fees only for two months. The reason for granting waiver for the months of April and May would equally hold good for the entire "total lockdown" period."
34. Therefore, as it appears, most of the High Courts relied on the government orders that classified pandemic as 'force majeure', although the relief granted in each case has been subjected to restraint based on the accompanying facts and circumstances. The common observation, however, remained that Covid-19 pandemic is a 'force majeure' event.
35. To establish pandemic as a 'force majeure' occurrence de hors the contract, the parties must demonstrate how the pandemic has disturbed the fundamental 42 basis on which the obligations and agreements of the parties rested [Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. Vs Khayaliram Jagannath; AIR 1968 SC 552].
36. In the instant case, petitioners have categorically established as to how they sustained losses due to pandemic. As stated supra, they relied on the following judgments:
In MP Power Management Company Limited, Jabalpur vs. M/s. Sky Power Southeast Soloar India Private Limited, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under;
" 31. In Mahabir Auto Stores and others v. Indian Oil Corporation and others , the appellant complained that the respondent, which was a company incorporated under the Companies Act was denying or discontinuing to deal with the appellant, which had been dealing with the respondent for nearly eighteen years. We listen to the following words spoken by this Court: "12. It is well settled that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive power, must be informed by reason. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the observations of this Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar [(1977) 3 SCC 457]. It appears to us, at the outset, that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent company IOC is an organ of the State or an instrumentality of the State as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution. The State acts in its executive power under Article 298 of the Constitution in entering or not entering in contracts with individual parties. Article 14 of the Constitution would be applicable to those exercises of power. Therefore, the action of State organ under Article 14 can be checked. See Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar [(1977) 3 SCC 457] at p. 462, but Article 14 of the Constitution cannot and has not been construed as a charter for judicial review of State action after the contract has been entered into, to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions. In a situation of this nature certain activities of the respondent company which constituted State under Article 12 of the Constitution may be in certain circumstances subject to Article 14 of the Constitution in entering or not entering into contracts and must be reasonable and taken only upon lawful and relevant consideration; it depends upon facts and circumstances of a particular transaction 43 whether hearing is necessary and reasons have to be stated. In case any right conferred on the citizens which is sought to be interfered, such action is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution, and must be reasonable and can be taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. Where there is arbitrariness in State action of this type of entering or not entering into contracts, Article 14 springs up and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the State executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, in such monopoly or semimonopoly dealings, it should meet the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. If a governmental action even in the matters of entering or not entering into contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable. In this connection reference may be made to E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] , Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [(1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] , R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489] and also Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay [(1989) 3 SCC 293] . It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and nondiscrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of the dealing as in the present case.
17. We are of the opinion that in all such cases whether public law or private law rights are involved, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The dichotomy between rights and remedies cannot be obliterated by any strait-jacket formula. It has to be examined in each particular case. Mr Salve sought to urge that there are certain cases under Article 14 of arbitrary exercise of such "power" and not cases of exercise of a "right" arising either under a contract or under a statute. We are of the opinion that that would depend upon the factual matrix.
18. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the contentions and the dealing between the parties and in view of the present state of law, we are of the opinion that decision of the State/public authority under Article 298 of the Constitution, is an administrative decision and can be impeached on the ground that the decision is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on any of the grounds available in public law field. It is true that there is discrimination between power and right but whether the State or the instrumentality of a State has the right to function in public field or private field is a matter which, in our opinion, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the situation, but such exercise of power cannot be dealt with by the State or the instrumentality of the State without informing and taking into confidence, the party whose rights and powers are affected or sought to be affected, into 44 confidence. In such situations most often people feel aggrieved by exclusion of knowledge if not taken into confidence."
54. We may cull out our conclusions in regard to the points, which we have framed:
i. It is, undoubtedly, true that the writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy. A matter, which lies entirely within a private realm of affairs of public body, may not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of the Court.
ii. The principle laid down in Bareilly Development Authority (supra) that in the case of a nonstatutory contract the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract and the decisions, which are purported to be followed, including Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra), may not continue to hold good, in the light of what has been laid down in ABL (supra) and as followed in the recent judgment in Sudhir Kumar Singh (supra).
iii. The mere fact that relief is sought under a contract which is not statutory, will not entitle the respondent-State in a case by itself to ward-off scrutiny of its action or inaction under the contract, if the complaining party is able to establish that the action/ inaction is, per se, arbitrary.
iv. An action will lie, undoubtedly, when the State purports to award any largesse and, undoubtedly, this relates to the stage prior to the contract being entered into [See R.D. Shetty (supra)]. This scrutiny, no doubt, would be undertaken within the nature of the judicial review, which has been declared in the decision in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India.
v. After the contract is entered into, there can be a variety of circumstances, which may provide a cause of action to a party to the contract with the State, to seek relief by filing a Writ Petition.
vi. Without intending to be exhaustive, it may include the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be called upon to honour its obligations of making payment, unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute raised relating to the liability of the State to make the payment. Such dispute, ordinarily, would include the contention that the aggrieved party has not fulfilled its obligations and the Court finds that such a contention by the State is not a mere ruse or a pretence.
vii. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a Writ Petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the Writ Petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the Writ Court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit.
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viii. The existence of a provision for arbitration, which is a forum intended to quicken the pace of dispute resolution, is viewed as a near bar to the entertainment of a Writ Petition (See in this regard, the view of this Court even in ABL (supra) explaining how it distinguished the decision of this Court in State of U.P. and others v. Bridge & Roof Co. , by its observations in paragraph-14 in ABL (supra)].
ix. The need to deal with disputed questions of fact, cannot be made a smokescreen to guillotine a genuine claim raised in a Writ Petition, when actually the resolution of a disputed question of fact is unnecessary to grant relief to a writ applicant.
x. The reach of Article 14 enables a Writ Court to deal with arbitrary State action even after a contract is entered into by the State. A wide variety of circumstances can generate causes of action for invoking Article 14. The Court's approach in dealing with the same, would be guided by, undoubtedly, the overwhelming need to obviate arbitrary State action, in cases where the Writ remedy provides an effective and fair means of preventing miscarriage of justice arising from palpably unreasonable action by the State.
xi. Termination of contract can again arise in a wide variety of situations. If for instance, a contract is terminated, by a person, who is demonstrated, without any need for any argument, to be the person, who is completely unauthorised to cancel the contract, there may not be any necessity to drive the party to the unnecessary ordeal of a prolix and avoidable round of litigation. The intervention by the High Court, in such a case, where there is no dispute to be resolved, would also be conducive in public interest, apart from ensuring the Fundamental Right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When it comes to a challenge to the termination of a contract by the State, which is a non-statutory body, which is acting in purported exercise of the powers/rights under such a contract, it would be over simplifying a complex issue to lay down any inflexible Rule in favour of the Court turning away the petitioner to alternate Fora. Ordinarily, the cases of termination of contract by the State, acting within its contractual domain, may not lend itself for appropriate redress by the Writ Court. This is, undoubtedly, so if the Court is dutybound to arrive at findings, which involve untying knots, which are presented by disputed questions of facts. Undoubtedly, in view of ABL Limited (supra), if resolving the dispute, in a case of repudiation of a contract, involves only appreciating the true scope of documentary material in the light of pleadings, the Court may still grant relief to an applicant. We must enter a caveat. The Courts are today reeling under the weight of a docket explosion, which is truly alarming. If a case involves a large body of documents and the Court is called upon to enter upon findings of facts and involves merely the construction of the document, it may not be an unsound discretion to relegate the party to the alternate remedy. This is not to deprive the Court of its constitutional power as laid down in ABL (supra). It all depends upon the facts of each case as to whether, having regard to the scope of the dispute to be resolved, whether the Court will still entertain the petition.
xii. In a case the State is a party to the contract and a breach of a contract is alleged against the State, a civil action in the 46 appropriate Forum is, undoubtedly, maintainable. But this is not the end of the matter. Having regard to the position of the State and its duty to act fairly and to eschew arbitrariness in all its actions, resort to the constitutional remedy on the cause of action, that the action is arbitrary, is permissible (See in this regard Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P. and others). However, it must be made clear that every case involving breach of contract by the State, cannot be dressed up and disguised as a case of arbitrary State action. While the concept of an arbitrary action or inaction cannot be cribbed or confined to any immutable mantra, and must be laid bare, with reference to the facts of each case, it cannot be a mere allegation of breach of contract that would suffice. What must be involved in the case must be action/inaction, which must be palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle. An action, which is completely malafide, can hardly be described as a fair action and may, depending on the facts, amount to arbitrary action. The question must be posed and answered by the Court and all we intend to lay down is that there is a discretion available to the Court to grant relief in appropriate cases.
xiii. A lodestar, which may illumine the path of the Court, would be the dimension of public interest subserved by the Court interfering in the matter, rather than relegating the matter to the alternate Forum. xiv. Another relevant criteria is, if the Court has entertained the matter, then, while it is not tabooed that the Court should not relegate the party at a later stage, ordinarily, it would be a germane consideration, which may persuade the Court to complete what it had started, provided it is otherwise a sound exercise of jurisdiction to decide the matter on merits in the Writ Petition itself.
xv. Violation of natural justice has been recognised as a ground signifying the presence of a public law element and can found a cause of action premised on breach of Article 14. [See Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others]"
In M/s. Koushik Group vs. The State of Telangana [W.A.No.571 of 2022 Dated 5.9.2022], the Division Bench of this Court though negated the relief claimed by the petitioners therein, had categorically held at Para 3 as under:
"................However, respondent No.2 vide letter dated 23.09.2021 had informed the appellant that its request for waiver of licence fee for the strike period from 05.10.2019 to 25.11.2019 was rejected. Insofar the dues for COVID-19 period, it was mentioned that Government was seized of the matter; once the Government takes a decision regarding licence fee payable during the COVID-19 period, the same would be implemented; if any exemption/concession is given by the Government, the licence fee so paid would be adjusted against future payable amount. Appellant's request to respondent 47 No.2 to await decision of the Government was not considered. Instead, impugned proceedings were issued."
In yet another case of this Hon'ble Court i.e. Md. Nazeeb Pasha vs Telangana State Road Transport [W.P.No.42128 of 2018 Dated 26.4.2019], this Court at Para 8 held as under:
" 8. The scope of judicial review in contractual matters is limited. The precedent decisions guided this court on exercise of judicial review in these matters:
9. In Asia Foundation & Construction Ltd. Vs. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd.2, while referring to guidelines laid down in Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651], Supreme Court held as under:
(1997) 1 SCC 738 PNR,J WP No.42128 of 2018 10 "9. ....... The High Court in construing certain clauses of the bid documents has come to the conclusion that such a correction was permissible and, therefore, the Bank could not have insisted upon granting the contract in favour of the appellant. We are of the considered opinion that it was not within the permissible limits of interference for a court of law, particularly when there has been no allegation of malice or ulterior motive and particularly when the court has not found any mala fides or favouritism in the grant of contract in favour of the appellant. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651] this Court has held that:
"The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers,
2. committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or,
5. abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:
(i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it;
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.48
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time." (emphasis supplied) The wisdom and admissibility of decision is not amenable to judicial review unless the same is declared as arbitrary or irrational or in abuse of power."
In Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, South Central Railways vs. SCR Caterers, Dry Fruits, Fruit Juice Stalls Welfare Association; it has been held as under:
" 26. India is a welfare State. Article 38 of the Constitution of India, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, reads as under:
"38. State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people.-- (1) The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations."
27. It is the duty of every welfare state to generate employment. Presently, millions of youth of the country are unemployed. The right to livelihood is a part of right to life, as has been held in the case of Olga Tellis (supra). A vast majority of the unemployed population of the country then, is susceptible to being exploited by the rich and the capitalists. It is the duty of the state, acting through its instrumentalities to ensure that no person in a vulnerable position is exploited. In the case of People's Union for Democratic Rights & Ors. v. Union of India9, Bhagwati,J. lamenting on the exploitation of the weak and the powerless held as under:
".........The Rule of Law does not mean that the protection of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that the law should be allowed to be prostituted by the vested interests for protecting and upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement of their civil and political rights. The poor too have civil and political rights and the Rule of Law is meant for them also, though today it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and the alcohol kings have the Fundamental Right to carry on their business and to fatten their purses by exploiting the consuming public, have the 'chamars' belonging to the lowest strata of society no Fundamental Right to earn an honest living through their sweat and toil? .........civil and 49 political rights, priceless and invaluable as they are for freedom and democracy, simply do not exist for the vast masses of our people. Large numbers of men, women and children who constitute the bulk of our population are today living a sub-human existence in conditions of abject poverty: utter grinding poverty has broken their back and sapped their moral fibre. They have no faith in the existing social and economic system. What civil and political rights are these poor and deprived sections of humanity going to enforce?"
28. This Court, being entrusted with the task of being the countermajoritarian institution, is duty bound to ensure that the rights of the downtrodden minorities and the members of the weaker sections of the society are not trampled upon.
29. One more important aspect to be taken note of by this Court is the non governance of railway property in the past 67 years since independence. Though, it is a recognized principle of law that the property of the railways is public property, yet in reality, it is the private players and industries that are allowed to carry on their business for transport of raw materials from one place to another. After the enactment of the Railways Act, 1989, the Rail Land Development Authority has been established under Chapter IIA of the Act to manage the railway property by framing policy or rules for allotment of the same in favour of the licensees, including fixing license fee or occupation charges in respect of the vast extent of vacant property from which huge revenue can be collected, which is a laudable object to cater to the need of the public at large. The periodical revision of license fee in respect of such big operators has not been done by the railways. Also, the Policy of not renewing the licenses of those persons who are members of the respondents are completely dependent on self-earning from these small units and making them participate in a public competition is absolutely unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. The chances of such persons being deprived of their right to livelihood is also an important factor which has to be taken into consideration by this Court to interpret the policy framed by the appellants. The callous attitude as far as the inaction on the part of the State in tackling the problem of rising unemployment is appalling. The situation is made worse by the handing over of public functions to private entrepreneurs, which then exploit the policies of the government against the poor and downtrodden people of the country. If the appellants under the guise of the policy are permitted to deny renewal of licenses in favour of the licensees, it would amount to deprivation of their right to freedom of occupation guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as well as the right to livelihood, which action of the appellants would be diametrically opposed to their constitutional duty towards social justice as well as uplifting the weaker sections of the society and the unemployed youth of the country.
30. In the case of Consumer Education & Research Center v. Union of India a three Judge Bench of this Court observed as under: 50
"18....Social justice, equality and dignity of person are cornerstones of social democracy. The concept 'social justice' which the Constitution of India engrafted, consists of diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen.......Social justice is a dynamic device to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, Dalits, Tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single idea of a society but is an essential part of complex social change to relieve the poor etc. from handicaps, penury to ward off distress, and to make their life livable, for greater good of the society at large. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation. Social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure to workman are part of his meaningful right to life and to achieve self- expression of his personality and to enjoy the life with dignity, the State should provide facilities and opportunities to enable them to reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security and civilised living while sharing according to the capacity, social and cultural heritage."
31.Further, in the case of Sadhuram Bansal v. Pulin Sarkar11 this Court held as under:
"29......There is no ritualistic formula or any magical charm in the concept of social justice. All that it means is that as between two parties if a deal is made with one party without serious detriment to the other, then the Court would lean in favour of the weaker section of the society, Social justice is the recognition of greater good to larger number without deprivation of accrued legal rights of anybody. If such a thing can be done then indeed social justice must prevail over any technical rule. It is in response to the felt necessities of time and situation in order to do greater good to a larger number even though it might detract from some technical rule in favour of a party."
32. Keeping in view the evolving concept of social justice, we allow the members of respondents who are the licensees to continue their petty business, especially in the absence of employment potentiality in the country on account of non-governance and non- implementation of the constitutional philosophy of an egalitarian society, which provides the opportunity to all individuals to lead a life of dignity. The right to life with dignity has been interpreted to be a part of right to life by this Court in the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors as under:
"8........We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing one-self in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic 12 (1981) 1 SCC 608 Page 34 34 development of the 51 country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self."
37. Petitioners also relied upon ABL International Ltd vs. Export Credit Guarantee, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where the State behaves arbitrarily, even in the realm of contract, the High Court can interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.
" Recently, judiciary has been of the opinion that even where there is an arbitration clause between a State instrumentality and a private party, such clause does not act as an absolute bar to the remedies under Article 226. Hence, where the State instrumentality violates the constitutional mandate to act fairly and reasonably under Article 14, relief under Article 226 can be sought. Therefore, recourse to jurisdiction under Article 226 is not excluded altogether in contractual matters.
The above rationale was upheld in the recent case of Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v.
CG Power and Industrial Solutions Ltd.8. In this case, Respondents 1 & UPPTCL (Petitioner) entered into a Framework Agreement on 05.03.2010 for construction of 765/400 KV sub-station at Unnao. The agreement was further divided into 4 sub-agreements. First agreement was for supply-delivery of equipment. Second agreement was for handling-erecting-testing of equipment. First & second agreement were non-civil in nature. The Petitioner vide its 52 letter dated 02.09.2016 informed the Respondent No. 1 that Rs. 2,60,68,814 was due on account of labour cess with respect to the First agreement (supply agreement). The Respondent objected imposition of the labour cess on the note that the first agreement on which the labour cess is imposed is a "supply contract", and the respondent's company was not covered under the definition of contractor under the Cess Act. The Petitioner without considering the representation made by the respondent tried to recover the cess amount from pending bills of the Respondent. Pursuant to this action of petitioner, Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench). High Court accepted the petition and by its order set aside the letter dated 02.09.2016 and 29.12.2018 issued by the petitioner directing Respondent No. 1 to discharge the due labour cess. Petitioner challenged the impugned order of the High Court dated 24.02.2020 by way of the present petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. Petitioner challenged the jurisdiction/ power of the High Court to adjudicate a contractual dispute where the contract contains an arbitration clause and when there is an alternative remedy 53 available. The Supreme Court rejected the plea of the Petitioner and upheld the decision of the High Court and decidedly held that the existence of arbitration clause does not debar the High Court from entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
38. Learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation relied upon the decision in Joshi Technologies International Inc, vs. Union of India, wherein it was held at Para 69 as under:
" 69(v)Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. ...
(viii) If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitutional of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction...
(ix)The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract. This Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. Dichotomy between public law and private law, rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between public law remedies and private law, field cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the 54 matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision making process or that the decision is not arbitrary....
(xi) The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes... ...."
39. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Courts to issue any person or authority, including any government, directions, orders or writs "for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose". Though "any other purpose" as provided for in Article 226 alludes that High Courts have a wide discretion in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, judicial precedents hold otherwise. Writs under Article 226 are intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where subordinate tribunals or bodies act wholly without or in excess of jurisdiction, or in violation of principle of natural justice, or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on face of record and that such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifested injustice.
40. In relation to application of writ jurisdiction in private matters, the Apex Court has elucidated that writ petition 55 is a remedy in public law and can be filed against Government or State or their instrumentalities and private individuals cannot be equated with State or its instrumentalities. Even where there is an arbitration clause between a State instrumentality and a private party, such clause does not act as an absolute bar to the remedies under Article 226 [Unitech Ltd. V. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation 2021 SCC OnLine SC 99]. Hence, where the State instrumentality violates the constitutional mandate to act fairly and reasonably under Article 14, relief under Article 226 can be sought. Therefore, recourse to jurisdiction under Article 226 is not excluded altogether in contractual matters.
41. Petitioners are neither seeking enforcement of contractual obligation nor seeking annulment of any clause of their licence deeds. They are only questioning the arbitrariness of the Corporation in demanding them to pay full amount of licence fee in an unprecedented highly abnormal situation i.e., Pandemic Covid-19, which cannot be visualized, because of which the licenses granted by the Corporation to petitioners for running stalls in the bus stations of TSRTC became non- operational and they did not have any business during the said period. In view of the above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme 56 Court in Joshi Technologies International Inc. Vs. Union of India (supra) relied on by the Corporation has no relevance at all to the present case. In the said case, petitioners therein sought to incorporate a new clause in its agreement, which alleged to have been missed to be included in the agreement by oversight. It has been held that it is a contractual matter and that the High Court cannot grant such a relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The relief sought by petitioners from this Court in the present Writ Petitions are totally different and distinct and has nothing to do with the enforcement of contractual obligations, being totally outside the scope of contract, as the issue involved in the present batch of cases is a legal issue pertaining to a situation arose under unprecedented visualized by anyone by any stretch of imagination and which is not governed by the licence deeds. Pandemic was very much prevalent for a period of more than 1 ½ years ever since imposition of National Lock Down in March, 2020. Merely because 1st Lock Down was lifted after two months, it does not mean the pandemic ceased to exist and it continued for more than one and half year even after lifting of Lock Down. The Government of Telangana imposed 2nd lock down for a period of 3 months from April to June, 2021, with slight relaxations. 57 During the second lock down period also, stalls of petitioners remain closed.
42. Central Government issued guidelines by way of Memorandum dated 13.05.2020 as to how to deal with the contracts, during pandemic period, for granting necessary relief to the parties of the contract, by treating the said period as Dies-Non. In view of the said guidelines, licence period of petitioners in pandemic during which licenses of petitioners became non-operational, shall be treated as Dies-Non and no licence fee shall be collected from petitioners for Dies-Non period i.e. non-operational licence period of petitioners, as a result of Covid-19.
43. Admittedly, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation took a decision and issued Circular No.2/2020 dated 09.10.2020, waiving license fee of stalls for the lock down period from 22.03.2020 to 07.06.2020 proportionate to the percentage of operation of its buses, subject to payment of minimum 20% of license fee and to collect full amount of license fee, only after attaining 80% level of operations in terms of KMs. of the region concerned. The Railway Department has also waived the license fee of all the Stalls in all the Railway Stations for the lock down 58 period and the subsequent period upto October, 2020 and collecting only 10% of the license fee from the stall owners w.e.f. November, 2020.
44. In the light of predicament situation, there is every possibility to believe that petitioners did not open their stalls till the 1st week of October, 2020 ever since lock down and the Corporation is aware of the said fact. Petitioners have specifically pleaded in the Writ Petitions the said fact which was not denied by the Corporation in its counter. Hence, it is not at all justified to demand licence fee for the closure period. The occupancy ratio is less than 10% of even the buses operated by the Corporation during Covid period of 1 ½ years, is not denied by the Corporation. Therefore it is proved beyond any doubt that the occupancy ratio is less than 10%. The reason given by the Managing Director of Corporation vide proceedings dated 04.09.2021 for not granting remission of licence fee during Covid period is that the Corporation suffered huge financial loss due to the pandemic. It is not at all the case of the Corporation that petitioners had sufficient business during the said period enabling them to pay full amount of licence fee. Accordingly, the Corporation admitted the crucial facts that petitioners had no sufficient business during Covid-19 and it forwarded the 59 representations of petitioners for reduction of licence fees proportionate to the occupancy ratio of the buses and the revenue of the Corporation during the Pandemic period, for its consideration and they are still pending with the Government. The said fact is evident from the letter of the Executive Director of the Corporation dated 31.10.2020 which was addressed to all the Regional Managers, directing them to collect licence fees from the stall owners only from the month of October, 2020. Representations which were forwarded to Government by the Corporation are still pending and no orders are passed in that regard till date.
45. As held by various Courts in the Country that due to the extraordinary outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic, there was disruption of supply chain, assured manpower, uncertainty of future planning, inadequacy of security as well as the forced restraints in free commercial activities, numerous commercial contracts have either been interrupted, delayed or cancelled. The corporation ought to have considered extraordinary financial crisis and ought to have acted appropriately, revising their license fee for the period affected by the Pandemic COVID-
19. The relevant Covid-19 period under Lease Deeds can be put in abeyance till the normalcy was restored in view of the 60 unprecedented and unforeseen pandemic, which unsettled everything and created an unimaginable and miserable extraordinary situation.
46. Since, admittedly the representations of petitioners are still pending with the Government and no orders are passed in that regard till date , in the light of the above, this Court opines that interest of justice would be met if Government takes a policy decision in the light of the decisions taken by A.P. Government and Railway Department in regard to waiver of license fee. This Court is conscious of the fact that it cannot direct the Government to take particular policy decision, but in the peculiar circumstances, with respect to the unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath affects, this Court can only suggest the Government to take benevolent view on par with that of Andhra Pradesh Government and Railway Department in the peculiar facts of the cases and dispose of the representations of petitioners within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Needless to state that till the disposal of representations, the interim orders granted earlier will continue.
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47. With the above observations these Writ Petitions are disposed of. No order as to costs.
48. Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.
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NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J 19th April 2024 ksld