Karnataka High Court
Sri Mahesh Prabhu vs State Of Karnataka on 14 December, 2022
Author: M. Nagaprasanna
Bench: M. Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.8820 OF 2021
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION No.8875 OF 2021
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8820 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
1 . SRI MAHESH PRABHU
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
S/O SUDARSHAN PRABHU,
NO.10/1, GROUND FLOOR
LAKSHMINARAYNA COMPLEX
PALACE ROAD
BENGALURU - 52.
2 . SMT.KAVITA PAI
W/O VIVEK PAI,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
NO.9, 8TH MAIN, RAJMAHAL VILAS,
BENGALURU - 80.
3 . SMT. SABITHA PAI
W/O SRI P.SATISH PAI
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
NO 9, 8TH MAIN
RAJMAHAL VILAS
BENGALURU - 80.
2
4 . SRI YESHWANTH SHENOY
S/O H.V.SHENOY,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
NO 10/1, LAKSHMINARAYANA
COMPLEX, GROUND FLOOR
PALACE ROAD
VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052.
5 . SRI SATEN PATEL
S/O HIMALAL P. PATEL,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
NO.30, RAILWAY PARALLEL ROAD
KUMARAKRUPA WEST
BENGALURU - 20.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI CHANDAN K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
AMRUTHALLI POLICE STATION
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY SPP,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . SRI N.SUBRAMANI
S/O V.NAGARAJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
RESIDING AT VENKATESHPURA
JAKKUR POST, YELAHANKA HOBLI
BENGALURU - 560 065.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1;
3
SRI S.SUBRAMANYA, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO a) QUASH THE FIR BEARING
CR.NO.233/2021 PENDING ON THE FILE OF VII ADDL.C.M.M.,
BENGALURU REGISTERED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 ON 24.09.2021
ALLEGING OFFENCES U/S 465, 468, 471, 420, 447, 506 R/W 120B
OF IPC AGAINST THE PETITIONERS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE - Q
AND ETC.,
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8875 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
1 . SRI P.SATISH PAI
S/O LATE P.NARASIMHA PAI
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS
NO.85/1, K.H.ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . SRI RAGHUNATH S.,
S/O H.SHANKAR
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.306
7TH C MAIN, 3RD BLOCK
RAJAJI NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 001.
3 . SRI MAHADEVAIAH M.S.,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
S/O M.SHIVANNA
NO.59, KMC
VASANTH NAGAR MAIN ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 052.
4 . SRI P. ASHWIN PAI
S/O SATISH PAI
4
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
M/S CENTURY SHELTERS
NO.10/1, LAKSHMINARAYANA
COMPLEX, GROUND FLOOR
PALACE ROAD, VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052.
5 . SRI P.RAVINDRA PAI
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
NO.25, MADHUVAN
BELLARY ROAD
BYATARAYANAPURA
BENGALURU - 560 052
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI CHANDAN K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
AMRUTHALLI POLICE STATION
BENGALURU - 560 001.
REPRESENTED BY SPP,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . SRI N.SUBRAMANI
S/O V.NAGARAJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
RESIDING AT VENKATESHPURA
JAKKUR POST
YELAHANKA HOBLI
BENGALURU - 560 065.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI S.SUBRAMANYA, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
5
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO A. QUASH THE FIR BEARING CR.NO.233/2021
PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE VII ACMM, BANGALORE
REGISTERED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 ON 24.09.2021 ALLEGING
OFFENCE U/S 465, 468, 471, 420, 447, 506 R/W 120B OF IPC
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-T AND ETC.,
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 29.10.2022, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER
Both these calls in question registration of a crime in Crime No.233 of 2021 for offences punishable under Sections 465, 468, 471, 420, 447, 506 and 120B of the IPC pending before the VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru and are therefore taken up together and considered by this common order.
2. Heard Sri.Sandesh.J.Chouta, learned counsel appearing for petitioners, Smt.K.P.Yashodha, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri.S.Subramanya, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
6Criminal Petition No.8820 of 2021:
3. Brief facts that lead the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition, as borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:-
The petitioners are accused 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 in the aforesaid crime. Accused No.1 enters into a registered agreement of sale with five members who were the legal heirs of one Sanjeevappa in respect of subject properties. In furtherance of the same, after about 13 years, the power of attorney holder of the legal heirs executed a sale deed in favour of accused No.1 of the subject properties. On 16-07-2022 close to 19 persons who were the legal heirs of late Sanjeevappa also executed a sale deed in favour of one Yogeshwar Varma in respect of 36½ guntas of land in Sy.No.107/3, 28 guntas in Sy.No.116/3 and 2 acres and 28 guntas in Sy.No.108/1 totally measuring 4 acres and 12½ guntas situated at Amruthahalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk.
Accused No.3 later files a suit in O.S.No.15998 of 2003 seeking a declaration at the hands of the competent civil Court to declare that the sale deed dated 16-07-2002 executed in favour of Yogeshwar Varma was void, illegal and not binding on him. Accused No.3 was 7 one M.S.Mahadevaiah. In the said suit all 19 members who were signatories to the sale deed dated 16-07-2002 were made defendants. During those proceedings, it appears that a settlement was initiated and accused No.4 as vendor and accused No.3 as consenting party executed sale deed in favour of M/s Century Shelters. Accused No.3 who was a consenting party to the aforesaid sale deed files a compromise petition before the civil Court before whom O.S.No.15998 of 2003 was pending for recording the said compromise and closure of the suit. The said case was decreed in terms of the compromise on 07-04-2007.
Later, M/s Century Shelters took up development of property and come up with a huge structure. After about 14 years of the aforesaid development, a notice comes to be issued to the petitioners herein under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. by the Police on 10-11-2021. It is then the petitioners come to know that the 2nd respondent has registered a complaint in Crime No.233 of 2021 for the afore-quoted offences and the notice is issued in furtherance of the said registration of crime. It is then the petitioners have knocked the doors of this Court in the subject petition.8
4. This Court noticing the fact that the matter was, on the face of it, purely civil in nature granted an interim order of stay of all further proceedings in the aforesaid crime. The interim order so granted subsists even as on date.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the issue is purely civil in nature and the complainant and his wife have now registered the crime on the ground that they had purchased a small piece of land in the aforesaid survey number and have documents to that effect which are bogus. He would contend that if the complainant had purchased some piece of land in the said survey number, he could not have kept quiet for 14 long years and when the construction is nearing completion could not have registered the crime. The complainant has to first file a suit to get an order of such ownership over the land.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the 2nd respondent would vehemently refute the submissions to contend that way back on 28-09-2002 the land was converted and the 2nd respondent along with his wife had purchased the property through an absolute sale deed dated 21-11-2013 from the erstwhile owners 9 of the property Smt. Mala S.Kulkarni and the property so purchased by the complainant is precisely located in Sy.No.107/3 and after the purchase of the said property the revenue records are also changed in the name of the 2nd respondent. Sy.No.107/3 measures 1 acres 04 guntas out of which, the complainant has purchased a small portion. He would admit that construction has come up to an advanced stage but would submit that his rights are to be protected.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and perused the material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute as they are all a matter of record. The lands in Sy.No.107/3 totally measuring 1 acres 04 guntas was a part of larger extent which belonged to Dodda Muniyappa and his family members. Dodda Muniyappa and his family members executed two agreements of sale both dated 17-08-1989 in favour of accused No.1. In furtherance of agreements Dodda Muniyappa and his family members executed two registered power of attorneys in favour of accused No.2 10 empowering him to sell the larger extent of property. Accused No.1 thereafter nominated accused No.3 to purchase the property and accordingly Dodda Muniyappa and his family members represented by their power of attorney executed a sale deed on 15-07-2002.
Dodda Muniyappa along with other family members later executed another sale deed in favour of accused No.4. The dispute arose between accused No.3 and accused No.4 with regard to the property that was sold which became a subject matter in O.S.No.15998 of 2003 which was instituted by accused No.3 against Dodda Muniyappa and others. It appears that in the said suit the parties enter into a compromise which was for the purpose of reconveyance of land that was converted to residential purpose which was a part of larger extent sold in favour M/s Century Shelters. The compromise petition was accepted by the Court and the suit was decreed based on the said compromise. In terms of the compromise, accused No.4 executes a sale deed in favour of M/s Century Shelters and accused No.3 joins said deed as a consenting party. Therefore, M/s Century Shelters becomes a bona fide purchaser of the property in Sy.No.107/3 in terms of the sale deed. It appears that there were several sale deeds concerning 11 Sy.No.107/3 through which accused Nos. 3 and 4 had purchased lands.
9. M/s Century Shelters which became the absolute owner of the property enters into a Joint Development Agreement with M/s Century Real Estate Holdings Private Limited on 18-01-2011 and got constructed residential apartment complex and sold them in favour of several independent individuals. After the building comes up and sale takes place, the subject complaint is registered by the 2nd respondent on the ground that he has purchased from the erstwhile land owner a small portion of land in Sy.No.107/3 upon which the building has come up. The allegation is that documents were created, concocted and forged and on the basis of the said forged documents the building has been put up by M/s Century Shelters. Based upon the said complaint, the crime comes to be registered.
10. A perusal at the complaint itself would indicate that the complainant is seeking to set the criminal law in motion on the ground that he is the purchaser of land in Sy.No.107/3 on 21-11- 12 2013 from the hands of one Mala S.Kulkarni and the narration is made up to 2021 and has enclosed several documents to the said complaint. The 2nd respondent/complainant has chosen to initiate civil proceedings for determination of his rights in terms of the alleged sale of the year 2013. If the complainant has a sale deed in his favour nothing stopped him from initiating any proceedings in a manner known to law immediately thereafter. After the building has come up, the complainant seeks to register the crime for getting the property which he claims to be belonging to him in terms of the sale deed. Therefore, the registration of crime is only with an intention of getting the property to his possession which even according to him was in terms of a sale deed of the year 2013.
11. If the facts narrated hereinabove are noticed, everything on the face of it, would clearly indicate that the issue is purely civil in nature. The 2nd respondent/complainant is now seeking to give the said civil proceedings, a colour of crime, by registering the crime contending that he is the owner of certain piece of land on which certain building has come up. This is made eight years after the claim of sale from the erstwhile land owners of Sy.No.107/3.
13Therefore, it is for the complainant to agitate the same before the competent civil Court. There can be no criminality attached in the entire episode of facts that are narrated hereinabove.
12. Permitting further proceedings to continue against the petitioners would, on the face of it, become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. Setting the criminal law in motion in a matter which is purely civil in nature is not what the criminal justice system is meant for is the law laid down by the Apex Court. Reference being made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of RANDHEER SINGH V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH1would be apposite. The Apex Court holds as follows:
"18. The only question is whether there is any criminal offence disclosed in the FIR so far as the Appellant is concerned. When the High Court passed its order dated 5th October, 2017, Rajan Kumar (since deceased), the executant of the sale deed and the Power of Attorney holder was also an applicant before the Court. Today, there has been a change in situation, in that, criminal proceedings against Rajan Kumar have abated since Rajan Kumar is no longer alive. It is the case of the private respondent that the private respondent purchased property. In the meantime, Rajan Kumar, who is no longer alive, on the basis of a false Power of Attorney of Bela Rani, executed a sale deed in favour of Randheer Singh, i.e., the Appellant herein. There is only a vague averment "by 1 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942 14 connivance". The next part of the sentence reads "Bela Rani had no right to sell the aforesaid plot."
19. As recorded in the judgment and order, the property in question has even been mutated in the name of the Appellant. Of course, mutation records are not a document of title. Whether Bela Rani had title, whether she validly executed a power of attorney, whether any right has accrued to the Appellant, are matters for the civil court to adjudicate.
20. There is a further allegation that on the basis of the false sale deed, the Appellant and Rajan Kumar (since deceased) in association with the witnesses of the sale deed who are "criminal natured persons" were attempting to trespass the house by breaking open the lock and had got written their name in the absence of the complainant.
21. It is interesting that a charge sheet was filed, the relevant part whereof is extracted hereinbelow for convenience:--
"16. Brief fact of the case:
The case was successful on the basis of the plaintiff. Further, the investigation was transferred from police station Shahpur to the Crime Branch.
The above investigation was done by me. So for during the investigation the statements of the witness and sec. 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC has been registered against the accused.
The accused is send to the court, punished the accused by summing."
22. The charge sheet is totally vague. There is not even a whisper in the charge-sheet of what transpired from the investigation against the Appellant herein.
23. Even though an FIR need not contain every detail, an offence has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the case of the Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no title. Bela Rani 15 executed a false Power of Attorney in favour of Rajan Kumar (since deceased). Alternatively, the Power of Attorney, in itself, was a forged document.
24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could mean a deed which was not actually executed, but a deed which had fraudulently been manufactured by forging the signature of the ostensible executants. It is one thing to say that Bela Rani fraudulently executed a Power of Attorney authorising the sale of property knowing that she had no title to convey the property. It is another thing to say that the Power of Attorney itself was a forged, fraudulent, fabricated or manufactured one, meaning thereby that it had never been executed by Bela Rani. Her signature had been forged. It is impossible to fathom how the investigating authorities could even have been prima facie satisfied that the deed had been forged or fabricated or was fraudulent without even examining the apparent executant Bela Rani, who has not even been cited as a witness.
25. Ms. Deepika Kalia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, competently argued the matter and vehemently tried to persuade this Court not to intervene. She even sought time to produce further documents. However, the charge- sheet speaks for itself and there could be no question of improvement of the charge-sheet read with the FIR, either by adducing documents or by filing affidavit or by making oral submissions.
26. Mr. Chandra Prakash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant cited certain judgments of this Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [(2009) 8 SCC 751]; Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand [(2013) 11 SCC 673]; Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar [(2005) 10 SCC 336]; Vesa Holdings Private Limited v. State of Kerala [(2015) 8 SCC 293]; Robert John D'Souza v. Stephen V. Gomes [((2015) 9 SCC 96]; and Kapil Agarwal v. Sanjay Sharma [(2021) 5 SCC 524].
27. In Mohd. Ibrahim (supra), this Court held as under:--
16"19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security).
20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused.
21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner.
22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code.
17A clarification
23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint.
24. The term "fraud" is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of "fraud" is "deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage". Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines "fraud" with reference to a party to a contract.
27. The term "fraudulently" is mostly used with the term "dishonestly" which is defined in Section 24 as follows:
"24. 'Dishonestly'.--Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person is said to do that thing 'dishonestly'."
28 [Ed. : Para 28 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-2009.]. To "defraud" or do something fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include:
(i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (Sections 206, 421 and 424).
(ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (Section
207).18
(iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections 208 and 210).
(iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243).
(v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (Sections 246 to 253).
(vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to
261).
(vii ) Fraudulent use of false instrument/weight/measure (Sections 264 to 266).
(viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420).
(ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (Section 422).
(x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration (Section 423).
(xi) Forgery making or executing a false document (Sections 463 to 471 and 474).
(xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security, etc. (Section 477).
(xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony (Section 496).
It follows therefore that by merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other law, unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under the Code or other law.
Section 504 of the Penal Code
29. The allegations in the complaint do not also make out the ingredients of an offence under Section 504 of the Penal 19 Code. Section 504 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace.
The allegation of the complainant is that when he enquired with Accused 1 and 2 about the sale deeds, they asserted that they will obtain possession of land under the sale deeds and he can do whatever he wants. The statement attributed to Appellants 1 and 2, it cannot be said to amount to an "insult with intent to provoke breach of peace". The statement attributed to the accused, even if it was true, was merely a statement referring to the consequence of execution of the sale deeds by the first appellant in favour of the second appellant.
Conclusion
30. The averments in the complaint if assumed to be true, do not make out any offence under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 504 of the Code, but may technically show the ingredients of offences of wrongful restraint under Section 341 and causing hurt under Section 323 IPC."
28. In Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court held that:--
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal 20 proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court."
29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika (supra), this Court found that the complaint, in that case, did not disclose any criminal offence at all, much less any offence under Section 420 or Section 120B IPC. The case was purely a civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lay before the civil Court.
30. In Vesa Holdings Private Limited (supra), this Court held:--
"13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. In our view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings."
31. In Robert John D'Souza (supra), this Court held:
"12. As far as the offence of cheating is concerned, the same is defined in Section 415 IPC, for which the punishment is provided under Section 420 IPC. Section 415 reads as under:21
"415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'.
Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.
Illustrations ***"
From the above language of the section, one of the essential ingredients for the offence of cheating is deception, but in the present case, from the contents of the complaint it nowhere reflects that the complainant was deceived or he or anyone else was induced to deliver the property by deception. What was done, was so reflected in the resolutions, and sale deeds.
13. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 695, para 7) "7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the 22 basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
15. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [(2007) 12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259], this Court in paras 25 and 46 has observed as under : (SCC pp. 10-11 & 16) "25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [[1964] A.C. 1254 : [1964] 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)] Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [[1977] A.C. 1 : [1976] 2 WLR 857 : (1976) 2 All ER 497 (HL)] stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved.
******
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of 23 harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained."
16. In view of the above discussion and the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that none of the offences for which the appellants are summoned, is made out from the complaint and material on record. We further find that it is nothing but abuse of process of law on the part of the complainant to implicate the appellants in a criminal case after a period of twelve years of execution of registered sale deeds in question, who is neither party to the sale deeds nor a member of the Society. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High Court and that of the courts below. Accordingly, the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the appellants in the criminal complaint filed by Respondent 1, in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC, also stands quashed."
32. In Kapil Agarwal (supra), this Court observed that Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of harassment.
33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far as the Appellant is concerned.
24There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this Appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above."
(Emphasis supplied) Later, the Apex Court in the case of JASWANT SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB2 has held as follows:
"18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur v. State Gujarat6 laid down the broad principles for exercising the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., speaking for the bench, enumerated the principles in paragraph 16 and in sub paragraphs. The same are reproduced below:
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:2
2021 SCC OnLine SC 1007 25 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (0) to secure the ends of justice, or) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue 26 with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8, and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
(Emphasis supplied) In the light of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the case of RANDHEER SINGH and JASWANT SINGH (supra), permitting further proceedings to continue would become an abuse 27 of the process of the law and result in miscarriage of justice.
Therefore, the proceedings against the petitioners are to be obliterated.
Criminal Petition No.8875 of 2021:
13. The challenge in this writ petition is to the very same registration of the crime as is in Crl.P.No.8820 of 2021. It is therefore an offshoot of the very same allegations. For the very reasons rendered obliterate the proceedings in Crl.P.No.8820 of 2021, the subject criminal petition also deserves to succeed. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petitions are allowed.
(ii) Crime registered in Crime No.233 of 2021 of Amruthahalli Police Station and proceedings pending before the VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stand quashed qua the petitioners.
(iii) It is made clear the observations made in the course of this order will not influence, bind or come in the way of any civil proceeding pending against the parties to the lis.28
Consequently, I.A.No.1/2022 pending in Crl.P.No.8875/2021 stands disposed.
Sd/-
JUDGE bkp CT:MJ