Bombay High Court
Marwadi Shares & Finance Ltd vs Miral Kanaksinh Thakore on 7 January, 2014
Author: R.D.Dhanuka
Bench: R.D.Dhanuka
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
O.O.C.J.
ARBITRATION PETITION NO.485 OF 2013
Marwadi Shares & Finance Ltd
Marwadi Arwaadi Financial Plaza,
Nanamaya Main Road, Off 150Ring Road
and having branch office at 306,
Gresham House, 132, Mint Road
Mumbai-400 001. .. Petitioner
vs
1. Miral Kanaksinh Thakore
305, Muktanand Apts,
Nr Nutan Society,
M.Arvind Marg,
Navsari-396 445
2. Manish Girdharilal Shah
303,Crystal Chambers
Sattapir Main Bazar,
Navsari-396 445. .. Respondents
with
ARBITRATION PETITION NO.486 OF 2013
Marwadi Shares & Finance Ltd
Marwadi Arwaadi Financial Plaza,
Nanamaya Main Road, Off 150Ring Road
and having branch office at 306,
Gresham House, 132, Mint Road
Mumbai-400 001. .. Petitioner
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ap485.486.13c.o.
vs
1. Miral Kanaksinh Thakore
305, Muktanand Apts,
Nr Nutan Society,
M.Arvind Marg,
Navsari-396 445
2. Manish Girdharilal Shah
303,Crystal Chambers
Sattapir Main Bazar,
Navsari-396 445. .. Respondents
Appearances:
Mr.G.R.Joshi a/w Mr.Jayant Gaikwad i/b M/s Ajay Khandhar & Co for
Petitioner
Mr.Neville Debon for Respondent no.1
CORAM : R.D.DHANUKA, J
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 23.12.2013
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 07/1/2014
COMMON JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT :
1. By these two petitions, filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the petitioner seeks to impugn the awards dated 1.11.2011 in both the matters dismissing the appeals filed by the petitioner on the ground of limitation. By consent of the parties, both the matters ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 3 ap485.486.13c.o.
were heard together and are disposed of by a common Judgment.
2. Since facts of both the matters are identical, I am summarizing the facts of Arbitration Petition No.485 of 2013.
3. The Petitioner is a member of National Stock Exchange of India and Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd. The respondent No.1 was the constituent of the petitioner. Disputes arose between the parties in respect of some of the transactions. Since the impugned award is challenged only on the ground of limitation, this Court need not summarize all the facts considering the merits of the claim.
4. On 1.11.2011 the learned Arbitrator appointed under the rules, bye laws and regulations of the Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd rendered an award in the claims filed by the petitioner herein against the respondent no.1 thereby rejecting the claims. The petitioner received copy of the said award on 4.11.2011. On 12.11.2011 the petitioner made an application under section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the learned Arbitrator inter alia praying for corrections in the said award. The ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 4 ap485.486.13c.o.
said application was received by the Stock Exchange on 14.11.2011. On 5.3.3012 the learned Arbitrator found that there were some inadvertent errors crept in the said award which were capable of correction under section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and passed an order on 5.3.2012 allowing the said application partly and also by exercising the jurisdiction under bye-law No.258 (1) (a) of the Bombay Stock Exchange bye laws and directed the office to correct the award to the extent mentioned therein and granted the prayers of the petitioner. A copy of the said correct award was received by the petitioner on 10.3.2012. On 12.4.2012, the petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate bench under the rules and bye laws and regulations of Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd.
The petitioner also prayed for condonation of delay of 3 days in filing the appeal. By an order dated 15.11.2012 the appellate bench of Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd rejected the said appeal on the ground that there was a delay of 3 days in filing the said appeal and on the ground that SEBI circular and subsequent amendments by Bombay Stock Exchange to the bye-laws and regulations stating clearly that the Appeal bench of the concerned Regional Arbitration centre cannot take cognisance of any appeal unless the same had been received by the concerned Regional centre within a period of ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 5 ap485.486.13c.o.
thirty days and therefore application for condonation of delay was not maintainable and the appeal therefore stood rejected.
5. The petitioner filed this petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 impugning the said decision of the appellate bench and filed this petition on 27.2.2013 that is within three months from the date of receipt of the award of the appellate bench.
6. For the purpose of appreciating the arguments advanced by both the sides, it will be necessary to refer to some of the bye laws and regulations of the Bombay Stock Exchange unamended and amended which provides for arbitration and limitations.
7. Prior to the amendment, Bye law 252 (1) (b) provided for time to make a claim against a member who was declared a defaulter. Bye law No.252 (2) provided that the Arbitrator shall not take cognisance of any claim/complaint/difference or dispute unless the same had been received by the Exchange within six months from the date of transaction or from the date on which the client claimed to have given instructions/order to buy or ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 6 ap485.486.13c.o.
sell or recovery or from the date of which the client claimed to have paid or given a security whichever was earlier. Bye law 252 (3) provided that subject to clauses 1 (a) to (c) and clause 2 the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 relating to limitation as may be in force in India from the date and time and shall apply to arbitration under those bye laws as they apply to the proceedings of the Court.
8. Bye law No.258 (1) (a) empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any computable error, any arithmetical error, any clerical or typographical error or any other error of a similar nature occurring in the award if an application is made within 15 days of the receipt of the Arbitral award. Bye law 258 (2) provides that if the Arbitral tribunal considers the request made under bye-law 258 (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction or give interpretation and such interpretation shall form part of the award. Bye-law No.258 (3) empowers the Arbitral tribunal to correct its own errors or typographical indicated in sub clause (a) of clause (a) of bye law 258 within 10 days of making the award. Bye law No.274 (A) provided that a party dissatisfied with an award may appeal to the appeal bench against such an award within 15 days of the receipt of such an award. Bye-law ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 7 ap485.486.13c.o.
No.274 (A) (1) provided for other bye-laws of that chapter as may be applicable shall apply mutatis mutandis to the proceedings before the appeal bench and award by the appeal bench.
9. Regulation No.15.23 (iii) provided that the appeal memo shall be submitted by a party appealing or his authorised representative to the Arbitration Secretary within 15 days of receipt of the award of the Arbitral tribunal. Regulation 15.23 (iv) provided that where an appeal is presented after the expiry of limitation specified therefore, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit stating the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the appeal bench and he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. The appeal bench after giving notice and opportunity to reply and on hearing both the sides, if satisfied that there was sufficient cause for delay may condone the delay. Regulation No. 15.23 (iv) (3) provided that an application for condonation of delay shall be disposed of as far as possible within 15 days and in case it was allowed on such terms as the appeal may deem proper, the appeal may be admitted for hearing, otherwise the appeal shall be rejected.
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10. On 11.8.2010 the Securities and Exchange Board of India issued a circular to all the Stock exchanges with a view to streamline the arbitration mechanism for arbitration of disputes arising between the client and a member across various market segments. It was provided in the said circular that the limitation period of filing arbitration reference shall be governed by the law of limitation i.e. Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The party aggrieved by the Arbitral award may appeal to the Appellate panel of arbitration of Stock Exchange against such an award which appeal may be filed within one month from the date of receipt of the arbitral award. It was further provided that a party aggrieved may file an application to the court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 . The said circular was issued in exercise of the powers conferred under section 11 (1) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India at 1992 read with section 10 of the said circular in Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956.
RELEVANT AMENDMENTS MADE TO THE BYE LAWS AND REGULATION PURSUANT TO THE CIRCULAR DATED 11.8.2010 ISSUED BY SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 9 ap485.486.13c.o.
11. By a Board Resolution dated 17.2.2010 and approved by the Securities and Exchange Board of India dated 15.2.2012 Bye law No.252(1) stood deleted. Bye law No.252 (2) also came to be amended and substituted by approval of SEBI on 15.2.2012 which reads thus:
"(2) The Arbitrators shall not take cognizance of any claim, complaint, difference or dispute unless the same has been received by the concerned Regional Arbitration Centre of the Exchange within the period prescribed therefor under the Limitation act, 1963. Any dispute as to whether a claim, complaint, difference or dispute falls within the ambit of this clause shall be decided by the Arbitrators.
Provided that the claim, complaint, difference or dispute which were rejected solely on the ground that they were not filed within the six month period provided under the Rules,Bye-laws and Regulations in force prior to1st September, 2010 shall be entertained by the Arbitrators provided such claim, complaint, difference or dispute are,as on the date of their filing before them are within the limitation period as prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963.
The Board of Directors or the Managing Director and Chief Executive officer may,from time to time appoint Committees separately for each Regional Arbitration Centre to amicably settle all claims, complaints, differences and disputes that are referred to it. "
12. Bye law 252 (3) which provided that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable is deleted by the Board resolution dated 17.12.2010 and approved by Securities and Exchange Board of India dated 15.2.2012. Bye law No.274 (A) (3) is amended by Board Resolution dated 18.5.2011 and approved by SEBI on 15.2.2012 which reads as under :
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3. " Any party to the reference aggrieved by an Award may prefer appeal to the Appeal Bench of the concerned Regional Arbitration Centre against such award within 30 days from the date on which a copy of the arbitral award is received by him. The Appeal Bench of the concerned Regional Arbitration Centre shall not take cognizance of any appeal unless the same has been received by the concerned Regional Arbitration Centre within the said period of 30 days. "
13. Regulation No.15.23 (iii) which provided for 15 days time to file an appeal is amended vide Board Resolution dated 17.12.2010 which reads thus:
15.23 (iii) III. Time for prefering Appeal:
" The appeal memo shall be submitted by the party apealing or his authorised representative to the Arbitration Secretary within 30 (thirty) days of the receipt of the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. The appellant shall not be entitled to prefer an appeal from the arbitral award after the expiry of the aforesaid period of 30 days and the appeal if any, filed after the expiry of the said period of 30 (thirty) days shall not be taken cognizance of by the Appeal Bench. "
14. Regulation No.15.23 (iv) which had empowered the appeal bench to condone the delay on the party showing sufficient cause is deleted vide ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 11 ap485.486.13c.o.
Board Resolution dated 17.12.2010.
15. Mr.G.R.Joshi learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was clerical or typographic error in the impugned award rendered by the learned sole Arbitrator. The petitioner had made an application under section 33 read with bye law no.258 (1) (a) before the learned Arbitrator for correction of the impugned award dated 1.11.2011 which application was received by the SEBI on 14.11.2011. It is submitted that without filing such an application for correction, the petitioner could not have filed an appeal before the appeal bench of the exchange under by law 274 (A) (3).
The learned counsel submits that though the said application was made as far back as on 12.11.2011 and was received by the BSE on 15.11.2011, the learned Arbitrator made the corrected award on 5.3.2012, copy of the said award was served on the petitioner only on 10.3.2012. It is submitted that the time to file an appeal and seek condonation of delay on showing sufficient cause had accrued to the petitioner when the petitioner had filed his claim before the Bombay Stock Exchange. When such a claim was filed before the Bombay Stock Exchange in case of any delay on sufficient cause being shown, the petitioner could seek condonation of delay in filing the ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 12 ap485.486.13c.o.
appeal before the appeal bench under Regulation No.15.23 (iii) and 15.23
(iv). At the relevant time under Bye law No. 252 (3), the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act 1963 were applicable to the arbitration as they applied to the proceedings in Court. The learned counsel submitted that under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act,1963 read with regulation No.15.23, the petitioner could not have made application for condonation of delay if sufficient cause was shown by the petitioner. It is submitted that since the right to file an appeal is a substantive right, right of seeking condonation of delay on showing sufficient cause also is a substantive right and such rights having accrued on the date when arbitration claim was filed by the petitioner, such rights accrued could not be taken away by amending those bye laws and regulations. The learned counsel submits that such rights of the parties having accrued prior to the date of amendment thus could not have been taken away by amending the provisions. The learned counsel submits that the amendments carried out to Bye-law No.252 and regulation No.15.23 would not apply with retrospective effect and cannot be extended to the proceedings already initiated or rights already having accrued prior to the date of such an amendment.
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16. Mr.Joshi learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner invited my attention to the Judgment of the Supreme court in case of GARIKAPATI VEERAYA VS N.SUBIAH CHOUDHRY reported in AIR 1957 SUPREME COURT 540 and in particular paras 23 and 72 of the said judgment in support of his submission that the right of appeal and to seek condonation of delay is not a mere matter of procedure but, is a substantive right and right of appeal is vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date of lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution. Paras 23 and 72 of the said judgment reads as under :
23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy suit appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 14
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(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant an exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.
72. But it is said that there were before the decision in Sadar Ali vs Dalimuddin (supra) authorities of Indian courts which had held that a suit appeal and second appeal were to be regarded as constituting one proceeding that Sadar vs Dalimuddin (K) merely and grafted this principle on the decision Colonial Sugar Refining Co vs Irving (A) supra and that the decision come to therein was therefore well placed on principle. These decision however when examined contain little that really supports the conclusion reached in Sadar Ali vs Dalimuddin (K). In fact they are merely referred to in the judgment at pages 516 and 517 without any discussion as authorities relied on by the counsel for appellant in support of his contention that the principle of S.6 of the General Clauses Act was applicable in the construction of the Letters Patent. The first of these decisions is Ratanchand Shrichand vs Hammantray Shivbakas 6 Bom HCR 166 (Z) 23). There the facts were that a suit for Rs.23,319/- was instituted in the court of the Principal Sadar Amin of Dhulia and that was substantially decreed on January 29,1959. On March 19, 1869 the Bombay Civil Courts Act came into force and under that Act, appeals in suits exceeding Rs.5000/- lay to the High court of Bombay. But under the law as is stood prior to that date the appeal against the judgment of the Principal Sadar Amin would have lain to the District Court. The point for decision was whether an appeal against the decree dated January 29, 1869 lay to the District Court or to the High Court. The learned Judges held that the proper forum to which the appeal was the District Court. The decision was based on S.6 of the General Clauses Act which enacted that " the repeal of any statute shall not affect any proceedings commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation". It was observed by Couch C.J that " A suit is a judicial proceeding and the word 'proceedings' must be take not include all the proceedings in the suit from the date of its institution to its final disposal and therefore to include proceedings in appeal". The meaning of this passage is clearly this: The word "proceeding" is not limited to suits it is wide enough to include appeals. Just as a right of suit which had accrued before repeal is saved by S.6 so also is a right of appeal. This is all that the above observation means. It does not mean that when under this section a right of suit is saved, a right of appeal against the decree passed therein is in ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 15 ap485.486.13c.o.
addition saved. This is clear from the following observations :
" It is clear that it was the intention of the legislature to take away the right to appeal in any case in which it existed at the date of passing of the Bombay Court's Act.
" When therefore, a suit or could not maintain a proceeding by way of appeal at the date of the repealing Act, Ratanchand Shrichand vs Hammantrav Shivbakas (Z23) (supra) is no authority for holding that such a right is preserved to him as comprised in a right of suit which he had that date. "
17. Mr.Joshi learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of R.C.GOENKA VS CHASE TRADING CO 2002 (1) MH.LJ 774.
Reliance is placed on paras 1,2,3,6 and 7 of the said judgment in support of his submissions that the dispute having arisen prior to the date of amendment of the bye laws and regulation, rights of the parties would be governed by the Bye-laws and regulation applicable and existing on the date of accrual of original cause of action.
Paras, 1,2,3,6 and 7 reads thus :
1) Petitioner by the present petition impugns the Award passed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 17th January, 2001. By the said Award, the Arbitral Tribunal upheld the objections of the respondents herein that the claim was barred by limitation and accordingly rejected the reference. That Award has been impugned on the ground that the transactions were ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 16 ap485.486.13c.o.
transactions before the bye-laws of Stock Exchange came to be amended and consequently they would not apply to transactions or in respect of a cause of action which had arisen before the bye-laws were amended. The transactions between the parties were of the year 1991-1992. The amendment to the bye-laws was brought into force on 29-8-1998. Earlier, petition had filed an arbitration reference on 6-11-1997 in respect of the same subject matter. It was numbered as Reference No. 278 of 1997 and was withdrawn on 5-8-1998. It is subsequent to this that the fresh reference was made to the Arbitral Tribunal. As noted earlier, the material on record shows that the transactions between the parties were of the year 1991-1992. The last entry in the books of accounts was on 22-3-1993.
1. The case of the petitioner is that there was a fire in the office of the petitioner on 1-8-1994. After reconstructing the records, it was seen that large amounts of moneys were due and payable by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner. Petitioner after reconstructing the records on 6-11-1998 filed arbitration reference before the Bombay Stock Exchange under the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Stock Exchange. The reference made was numbered as Reference No. 278 of 1997 and filed against one Sajjan Kumar Jagodia and his Associates. At the time the first reference was made, there was no period of limitation in respect of claims between a Member and Constituent and or vice versa. Before the Arbitral Tribunal various objections were raised in view of which, Applicant was allowed to withdraw the reference on 5-8-1998 with liberty to file new reference.
Petitioners pursuant to the liberty granted, filed application for reference on 11-10- 1999. The same was referred and was numbered as Arbitration Reference No. 234 of 1999. As already set out, the bye-laws of the Stock Exchange were amended from 29-8- 1998. By the amendment, limitation has now been provided in respect of transactions between Members and Constituents. The Respondents herein before the Arbitrators raised a preliminary objection that the claim preferred was barred by limitation and consequently the reference ought to be dismissed. The Arbitral Tribunal considered the above contention arrived at the conclusion that the bye-laws as amended would apply to the present reference as it was filed on 11-10-1999 and the bye-laws has come into force on 5-8-1998. The Arbitral Tribunal noted that the last entry in the books of accounts had been made on 22-3-1993. After excluding the period between 21-5-1998 to 5-8-1998 the Arbitral Tribunal found that the dispute was barred by limitation and therefore, rejected the reference.
2. At the hearing of the petition, on behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that considering the findings by the Arbitral Tribunal itself that the last entry in the Books of ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 17 ap485.486.13c.o.
Account being 22-3-1993, these would be transactions before the bye-laws were amended on 29-8-1998. The amended bye-laws would only apply to transactions after the amendment and not cover transactions in respect of which cause of action had arisen before the amendment. Considering the issue involved and as it would affect other references, notice was issued to the Bombay Stock Exchange as to their stand on the issue. It was the Bombay Stock Exchange that had framed the Bye-law. On behalf of the Bombay Stock Exchange, their learned counsel after taking instructions has made a statement to this court that it is the stand of the Bombay Stock Exchange that only transaction which have been entered into after 29-8-1998 would be covered by the amended bye-laws. Transaction previous to that period, and completed before that period would be covered by the bye-laws as earlier existing. In other words if the cause of action had arisen before the bye-laws as amended had come into force, the bye-laws as amended would not apply.
3. Let me therefore, consider as to whether the bye-laws as amended would apply to transactions in respect of which cause of action had arisen before the amendment. Section 43 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, provides that the Limitation Act, 1993 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in the court. However, Section 2(4) of the Act of 1996 provides that Part I, except Sub-section (1) of Section 40, sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement except insofar as the provisions of Part I are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder. In other words, by virtue of Section 2(4), of the Arbitration Act, bye-laws of the Bombay Stock Exchange being Arbitration under an enactment would not be covered by Section 43 of the Act of 1996. This was noticed by this court in Smt. Ashalata S. Lahoti v. Hiralal Liladhar, MANU/MH/0033/1999 : (1999)1BOMLR241 . A similar view had been taken in Hemendra V. Shah v. Stock Exchange, Bombay MANU/MH/0087/1995 : (1995)97BOMLR737 under the Act of 1940. It is therefore, clear considering the Act of 1996, that provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply to arbitration under the bye-laws of the Bombay Stock Exchange. Limitation, if any, if provided by the bye-laws would apply.
18.. The only question is whether the bye-law as amended will cover references already pending and would also apply to those references where the cause of action arose before 29-8- 1998. There is no dispute that insofar as procedure is concerned, it will apply from 29-8-1998.
The question is whether the bye-laws involving limitation will apply to references pending at the time when the new Bye-laws came into force; to references made pursuant to an award being set aside under the Act of 1940 or an award set aside under the Act of 1996, if the cause of action had arisen before the bye-laws came into force or will only apply in respect of contracts entered into after the new bye-laws came into force. Insofar as pending proceedings are ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 18 ap485.486.13c.o.
considered, Section 31(s) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. That would only leave cases of those who had not applied or cases like the petitioner who had withdrawn the reference to file a fresh reference or awards made on a reference before the bye-laws were amended which is set aside and a fresh reference is sought.
The new Act does not provide for remitting the award as in the case of the Act of 1940. The limited power is as contained in Section 33 or Section 34(4) of the Act of 1996. Therefore, even if time is saved between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the Court under Section 43(4), a fresh reference will be barred if after excluding such time the reference is barred by limitation. It cannot be contemplated that this was the intention of Parliament when it enacted Section 43(4) or of the Bombay Stock Exchange when it framed the bye-law providing for limitation.
The real issue to be considered is whether the Bombay Stock Exchange had the power to make a bye-law having retrospective effect and if it was its intention to make bye-law 252, retrospective?
It may be important to note that though a Legislature can make law with retrospective effect as its power is plenary the same is not the position insofar as delegated legislation is concerned. The scope of that power is not coextensive with that of the legislature. This was noted by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Modi Food Products v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, MANU/UP/0017/1956 :
AIR1956All35 . The learned Division Bench observed that the body exercising subordinate and delegated legislative powers cannot make legislation retrospective in effect, unless that power is expressly conferred. Support for that proposition was found in the Judgment of the Apex Court in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gutta Mill, MANU/SC/0056/1952 : (1953)ILLJ186SC namely that unless the statute confers express power on the authority to make an order with retrospective effect. Such a power cannot be exercised. Similar view has been taken by Kerala High Court in C. W. Motor Service (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala MANU/KE/0115/1959 : AIR1959Ker347 where the court observed as under :
"The Rule is well settled that even in a case where the executive Government acts as a delegate of a legislative authority, it has no plenary power to provide for retrospective operation unless and until that power is expressly conferred by the parent enactment." The House of Lords in Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. expressed the same opinion. Their Lordships observed : "It would be dangerous power to place in the hands of Ministers and their subordinate officials to allow them whenever they had power to license, to grant the licence export facto and a statutory power to license should not be construed as a power to ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 19 ap485.486.13c.o.
authorise or ratify what has been done unless the special terms of the statutory provisions clearly warrant the construction."
A Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Government of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh, MANU/RH/0009/1962, was considering the effect of repeal of old law of limitation and its replacement by a new law. The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court noted that it is not always true to say that law of limitation is only a law of procedure and does not bar the remedy altogether so as to destroy the right. It is a well settled proposition of law that the new law of limitation would not revive a barred right. Similarly, it may be taken to be equally well settled that the new law of limitation cannot be construed retrospectively so as to destroy altogether the remedy of litigant to enforce his right in a court of law. In case the remedy to enforce a vested right is altogether barred on the date when the new law comes into force without providing any breathing time to a litigant, that remedy must continue to be governed by the old law of limitation. It is true that the legislature has full powers to make law retrospectively. It is also accepted position that the law of limitation does not extinguish the right but only bars the remedy. The proposition of law may be set out as observed by Asutosh Mookerjee, J. in Manju Bibi v. Akkel Mahmud as under ;
'"No doubt, we find it frequently asserted in judicial decisions that a Statute of Limitation embodies merely a rule of procedure; but this statement is only generally and not universally true. The essence of the matter is that when a new Statute of limitation which shortens the period for institution of suits and comes into force the moment it becomes law is sought to be made retrospectively applicable to causes of action which have accrued earlier than the length of time prescribed, it ceases to be a statute of mere procedure and serves to destroy pre-
existing and enforceable rights. Under circumstances, like these, the Court, when invited to hold that the new statute has retrospective operation, will struggle against the acceptance of such interpretation, unless there is the clearest indication that the Legislature intended to destroy existing rights without notice and thus to penalise innocent litigants."
The position of law from Corpus Juris as quoted in interpretation of Statutes by Bindra, 1961, Third Edition, Page 586 is as under;
"While it has been said that statutes relating to remedies or procedure may be given a retroactive operation, a more accurate statement of the principle intended is that, unless expressly prohibited by Statute, and in the absence of directions to the contrary, or unless in doing so some contract obligation is violated or some vested right divested, statutes merely affecting the remedy or law of right of action accrued before or after the change in the law. The Legislature has full control over the mode, time and manner of prosecuting suits, and whenever upon consideration of an entire statute relating to those matters, it appears to have been the legislative intent to make it retroactive, it will be given this effect...."::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 20
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7. The issue therefore, would be whether the bye-law as framed, the body conferred with the power to make the bye-law was conferred the right to make it retrospectively and if so, whether the bye-laws have been made with retrospective effect. Bye-law 248(b) sets out, that an acceptance whether express or implied of a contract subject to arbitration as provided in Sub-clause
(a) and with the provision for arbitration incorporated therein shall constitute and shall be deemed to constitute an agreement between the member and the non-member or non-members concerned. All claims (whether admitted or not), differences and disputes of the nature referred to in Sub-clause (a) in respect of all dealings, transactions and contracts of a date prior or subsequent to the date of contract shall be submitted to and decided by arbitration as provided in the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange and that in respect thereof any question whether such dealings, transactions and contracts have been entered into or not, shall also be submitted to and decided by arbitration as provided in the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange; In other words, disputes prior to or subsequent to the contract. There was no provision for limitation in the contract as a term, until 29th August, 1998 except for disputes arising from Contracts between Members and Members. All that bye- law 252(2) states is that the provision of the Limitation Act, 1963, or any other law relating to limitation shall apply to arbitration under these bye-laws as they apply to the proceedings in the Court. There is nothing in the said bye-laws to hold that the said provisions will also apply to contracts which were entered into and to which contracts, bye-law 252(2) was not incorporated as a term of the contract. In other words, only those contracts which have been entered into after bye-law 252(2) came into force will the provisions of limitation become applicable as a term of the contract. They therefore, become applicable to those contracts entered into after the amendment was gazetted. This was notified by the notice dated 20th October, 1998. Bye-laws were gazetted on 29-8-1998. They would come into force from 29-8-1998. There is nothing to indicate that they would be retrospective in character. There is nothing also which indicates that they were made with purpose of being retrospective. On the contrary, on behalf of the Stock Exchange, statement is made that they will apply to transactions entered into as on 29-8-1998, when they came into force.
Bye-laws framed are now made applicable to transactions between the Member and constituent and vice versa. This form part of the contract which contain terms of limitation unlike contracts entered into earlier. Respondent No. 2 has been conferred powers under Security and Exchange Act to make bye-laws. These bye-laws before they came into force however have to be approved by the Government of India. They are statutory in character. As already noted, bye-laws may be statutory in character, but they cannot be placed on the same footing as rules which are also subordinate legislation. The distinction is that insofar as Rules are concerned, the Act itself provides that they may be placed on the floor of the House of the Legislature or rules which passed the Act, unlike bye-laws. The limitation now applicable to transactions between the Members and Constituent and vice versa is not by an Act of ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 21 ap485.486.13c.o.
Legislature but by the bye-laws. The view which is being taken will avoid uncertainty and not defeat the claim of persons whose references were made and award set aside or cause of action had arisen before bye-laws were amended.
In view of the above discussion and the stand of the second respondent, bye- laws as to limitation as framed would apply only to those transactions which have been entered into as and on 29th August, 1998 and after. Whether the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act confers power on the Stock Exchange to make bye-laws with retrospective effect need not be considered in detail in view of the view taken.
19. Mr.Joshi learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if there would not have been errors which can be corrected in the impugned award passed by the sole Arbitrator, the petitioner need not have applied for correction under section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Bye-law 258 (1)(A). The Arbitrator took more than2 ½ months to decide the said application filed by the petitioner under section 33. The petitioner received a copy of the corrected award on 10.3.2012. On 12.4.2012 the petitioner filed the appeal before the appeal bench along with the application for condonation of delay. The appeal bench took more than 7 months to decide the application for condonation of delay and dismissed the said application and the appeal on 15.11.2012. Within three months from the date of receipt of copy of the award of the appeal bench, the petitioner filed this petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 22 ap485.486.13c.o.
Conciliation Act, 1996. It is submitted that since the bye laws provided for a remedy of appeal against an order passed by the learned sole arbitrator the petitioner exercised such option to file an appeal. During the pendency of such application under section 33 read with Rule 258 (1) A) Bye-law 252, 274 A and Regulation 15.23 came to be amended and applicability of provisions of the Limitation Act,1963 came to be deleted. It is submitted that in view of the gross delay on the part of the learned sole arbitrator who at the first instance took time to dispose of the application under section 33 read with Bye law 258 (1) (A) and thereafter by the appeal bench in disposing of the application for condonation of delay, limitation to challenge the original award rendered by the sole Arbitrator under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 expired. The petitioner cannot be made to suffer because of the delay on the part of the sole learned Arbitrator and the appeal bench in disposing of the proceedings filed by the petitioner. The learned counsel submits that there is no dispute raised by the respondents that the petitioner has not shown any sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 2/3 days in filing appeal before the appeal bench. The impugned order passed by the appeal bench is thus contrary to law laid down by the Supreme Court and by this Court and ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 23 ap485.486.13c.o.
contrary to section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
20. Mr.Joshi also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Messrs HOOSEIN KASAM DADA (INDIA) LTD VS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH reported in AIR 1953 Supreme Court 221 and in particular pars 8,9 and 10 in support of his submissions that since the provisions of Bye-laws and regulations not having been amended with retrospective effect the vested rights could not be taken away except by special enactment or necessary intentment. Para 8 to 10 of the said judgment read thus :
8. The above decisions quite firmly establish and our decisions in Janardan Reddy v. The State and in Ganpat Rai v. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. , uphold the principle that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in, and before a decision is given by, the inferior court. In the language of Jenkins C.J. in Nana bin Aba v. Shaikh bin Andu (supra) to disturb an existing right of appeal is not a mere alteration in procedure. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication.
9. Sri Ganapathy Aiyar urges that the language of section 22(1) as amended clearly makes the section retrospective. The new proviso, it is pointed out, peremptorily requires the authority not to admit the appeal unless it be accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax in respect of ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 24 ap485.486.13c.o.
which the appeal is preferred and this duty the authority must discharge at the time the appeal is actually preferred before him. The argument is that after the amendment the authority has no option in the matter and he has no jurisdiction to admit any appeal unless the assessed tax be deposited. It follows, therefore, by necessary implication, according to the learned Advocate, that the amended provision applies to an appeal from an assessment order made before the date of amendment as well as to an appeal from an order made after that date. A similar argument was urged before the Calcutta Special Bench in Sardar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra), namely, that after the amendment the court had no authority to entertain an appeal without a certificate from the Single Judge. Rankin C.J. repelled this argument with the remark at page 520 :-
"Unless the contrary can be shown, the provision which takes away jurisdiction is itself subject to the implied saving of the litigants' right."
In our view the above observation is apposite and applies to the case before us. The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre- existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right. The argument that the authority has no option or jurisdiction to admit the appeal unless it be accompanied by the deposit of the assessed tax as required by the amended proviso to section 22(1) of the Act overlooks the fact of existence of the old law for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right and really amounts to begging the question.
The new proviso is wholly inapplicable in such a situation and the jurisdiction of the authority has to be exercised under the old law which so continues to exist. The argument of Sri Ganapathy Iyer on this point, therefore, cannot be accepted.
10. The learned Advocate urges that the requirement as to the deposit of the amount of assessed costs does not affect the right of appeal itself which still remains. intact, but only introduces a new matter of procedure. He contends that this case is quite different from the case of Sardar Ali v. Dalmuddin (supra), for in this case it is entirely in the power of the appellant to deposit the tax if he chooses to do so whereas it was not within the power of the appellant in that case to secure a certificate from the learned Single Judge who disposed of the second appeal. In the first place the onerous condition may in a given case ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 25 ap485.486.13c.o.
prevent the exercise of the right of appeal, for the assessee may not be in a position to find the necessary money in time. Further this argument cannot prevail in view of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Man Mohan Singha (supra). No cogent argument has been adduced before us to show that that decision is not correct. There can be no doubt that the new requirement "touches" the substantive right of appeal vested in the appellant. Nor can it be overlooked that such a requirement is calculated to interfere with or fetter, if not to impair or imperil, the substantive right. The right that the amended section gives is certainly less than the right which was available before. A provision which is calculated to deprive the appellant of the unfettered right of appeal cannot be regarded as a mere alteration in procedure. Indeed the new requirement cannot be said merely to regulate the exercise of the appellant's pre-existing right but in truth whittles down the right itself and cannot be regarded as a mere rule of procedure.
21. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand submits that by virtue of amendment to Bye-law 252 and 274 A right to file an appeal is not taken away. Time to file appeal which was 15 days was substituted by a period of 30 days and power of appeal bench to condone the delay are taken away. It is submitted that right to make an application for condonation of delay is not a substantive right but is procedural law and thus provisions for condonation of delay having been deleted, the appeal bench was right in rejecting the application for condonation of delay and the order thus passed was in compliance with amended Bye laws and regulations and cannot be interfered with.
22. The learned counsel made an attempt to distinguish the Judgment of ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 26 ap485.486.13c.o.
the Supreme Court in case of GARIKAPATI VEERAYA (supra) on the ground that the said judgment did not deal with application for condonation of delay but was dealing with right to file an appeal which was a substantive right.
23. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in ASSAM URBAN WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD vs SUBHASH PROJECTS MARKETING LTD 2012-LAWS 9SC)-1-48 Civil Appeal No.(s) 2014 of 2006 dated 19.1.2012 para 8 which read thus :
8. In Popular Construction Co.(supra) this court has held that an application for setting aside an award filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34 (3) would not be an application in accordance with sub section (3) as required under section 34 (1) of the 1996 Act and Section 5 of the 1963 Act has no application to such application. In para 12 of the report, it was held in Popular construction Co (supra) thus:
12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are but, not thereafter used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of section 29 (2) of the limitation Act and would therefore bar the application of section 5 of the Act.
Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase but not thereafter wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. "
REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 27 ap485.486.13c.o.
24. It is not in dispute that prior to amendment on 15.2.2012, bye law 252 (3) provided that all the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 or other laws relating to limitation as may be in force in India from time to time shall were applicable to arbitration as those to proceedings in court. A perusal of the unamended Regulation 15.23 clearly indicates that the appellant could present an appeal after expiry of the period of limitation accompanied by application supported by an affidavit stating forth the facts on which the appellant relies and sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal within the stipulated time. The appeal bench was empowered to condone the delay if sufficient cause was shown after an opportunity to file a reply and after hearing both the parties.
25. Unamended bye-law 274 A (3) provided that party dissatisfied may appeal to the appeal bench against an award within 15 days of the date of the receipt of such an award. By virtue of amendment the period of 15 days for filing the appeal came to be substituted by 30 days. Bye-laws provided an option to a party dissatisfied with the award to file an appeal before the appeal bench constituted by Bombay Stock Exchange before filing an ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 28 ap485.486.13c.o.
Arbitration Petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 directly in the appropriate Court.
26. It is not in dispute that on the date when the petitioner had invoked arbitration agreement and had filed a claim before the learned sole Arbitrator the petitioner had a vested right to file an appeal before the appeal bench and after showing sufficient cause to seek condonation of delay. The appeal bench had power to condone delay by exercising such powers under section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 read with Regulation 15.23 (iv).
27. The Supreme court in the case of GARIKAPATI VS SUBBIAH CHOUDHARY supra has held that the right of appeal is not mere matter of procedure but, is a substantive right which is vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when adverse judgment is pronounced, such a right has to be governed by law prevailing on the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 29 ap485.486.13c.o.
the appeal. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.
28. The Supreme Court in the case of M/S HOOSEIN KASAM (INDIA) LTD VS STATE OF M.P. supra has held that the provision which is calculated to deprive the appellant of the unfettered right of appeal cannot be regarded as a mere alteration in the procedure. The Supreme court held that new requirement cannot be said merely to regulate the exercise of the appellant's pre-existing right but in truth whittles down the right itself and cannot be regarded as a mere rule of procedure.
29. The Bye-laws and regulation framed by the Bombay Stock Exchange are statutory in nature. This Court in the case of R.P. GOENKA VS. M/s CHASE TRADING CO supra had considered the amendments to the bye-law 252 (2) and has interpreted the said provisions and has held that there was nothing in the said Bye-laws to hold that the said provisions will also apply to contracts which were entered into and to which contracts, bye-law 252 (2) was not incorporated as a term of the contract. It has been ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:15 ::: RNG 30 ap485.486.13c.o.
held that only those contracts which had been entered after Bye-law 252 (2) came into force will the provisions of limitation become applicable as a term of the contract. The Bye-law did not indicate that they were made with the purpose of being retrospective.
30. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 read thus :
" Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not--
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. "::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:16 ::: RNG 31
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31. In my view, the rights and remedies accrued to the petitioner and subsequent rights and/or remedy for filing proceedings before the superior Courts or appellate forum would continue and cannot be divested by amendment unless it is shown clearly intended by amendment to make it applicable with retrospective effect. The petitioner has already having filed proceedings before the learned Arbitrator, the right of filing an appeal against the impugned award if any and a right to file an application for condonation of delay on showing sufficient cause on the date of filing the original proceedings would be continued. A perusal of the amendment to Bye law 252,274 A and regulation 15.23 does not indicate that the said amendment was to be made applicable with retrospective effect and the rights and remedies which were already vested on the date of filing the claim before the learned Arbitrator were taken away with retrospective effect.
32. In my view, since the option to file an appeal before the appeal bench which was the mechanism conferred under the Bye-laws before filing a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the petitioner had a vested right to impugn the arbitral award ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:16 ::: RNG 32 ap485.486.13c.o.
rendered by the sole Arbitrator along with an application for condonation of delay in the event of delay by showing sufficient cause. The day on which the impugned award was rendered by the learned sole arbitrator, there was no amendment to Bye-law 252 (3) 274 A and Regulation 15.23
(iv) described aforesaid.
33. In view of the obvious error which could be corrected under section 33 read with bye law 258(1)(A), the petitioner was justified in making an application for correction. The learned Arbitrator however took more than 2 ½ months to make a corrected award. During the pendency of the said application, bye law 252(3), 274 A and Regulation 15.23 (iv) came to be amended by which the provisions of Limitation Act including section 5 which was applicable to all such Arbitral proceedings were deleted, and right to seek condonation of delay was taken away. The appeal bench took more than 7 months to decide the application for condonation of delay. If the petitioner would have challenged the impugned award rendered by the sole Arbitrator directly under section 34 within 3 months from the date of receipt of the impugned award rendered by the sole arbitrator the said petition would have been within time and the petitioner would not have ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:16 ::: RNG 33 ap485.486.13c.o.
been deprived of the remedy of filing arbitration petition. The petitioner however having been vested with right of filing an appeal before the appeal bench under the mechanism provided under bye-laws, the petitioner having exercised that option, the petitioner also had right to apply for condonation of delay after sufficient cause being shown. In view of the gross delay on the part of the learned Arbitrator and thereafter by the appeal bench, time to challenge the impugned award passed by the sole Arbitrator directly under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 also became time barred. The petitioner cannot be made to suffer because of the gross delay on the part of the sole Arbitrator and by the appeal bench.
34. In my view, the right to file an appeal includes right to file application for condonation of delay and which right is parallel to right of appeal and is also a substantive right provided sufficient cause is shown by the petitioner. In my view, sufficient cause having been shown the appeal bench had power to condone such a delay in view of section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In view of such existing right vested in the petitioner on the date of filing original proceedings by the petitioner before ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:16 ::: RNG 34 ap485.486.13c.o.
the learned sole Arbitrator such amendment cannot affect the legal proceedings or remedy in respect of which any such right or privilege which the petitioner had existing when the original proceedings filed by the petitioner were filed. Amended Bye-law and regulation does not provide that the same were applicable with retrospective effect. The intent of such an amendments can be seen from the circular issued by the SEBI which also does not indicate that the amendment proposed to bye law and regulations were to be made applicable with retrospective effect.
35. In so far as the judgment in case of ASSAM WATER SUPPLY (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents is concerned, it is held by the Supreme Court that under section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 time to file arbitration application having been specifically provided, under section 5 of the limitation Act is not applicable. In my view, the ratio of the Supreme court on the said issue does not apply to the facts of this case. The question which arises for consideration in this case is whether the amendment to the Bye-laws and regulations would apply with retrospective effect or not. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondents on the said judgment in case of ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:16 ::: RNG 35 ap485.486.13c.o.
ASSAM WATER SUPPLY (supra) thus is misplaced.
36. In my view, the appellate bench was not right in taking the view that there was no power vested in the appellate bench to condone the delay under bye law 274 (A). In my view, the appellate bench has failed to exercise its power to condone the delay once the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal by 3 days. The impugned award rendered by the appeal bench thus deserves to be set aside. I therefore pass the following order :
ORDER
(i) The impugned awards passed by the appeal bench (Exhibit C to the petition) are set aside. The appeals filed by the petitioner along with the application for condonation of delay are restored to file.
The appeal bench is directed to hear the application for condonation of delay by exercising powers of condonation of delay on its own merits expeditiously
(ii) Arbitration petitions are allowed in aforesaid terms.
(iii) No order as to costs.
R.D.DHANUKA, J ::: Downloaded on - 27/01/2014 23:07:16 :::