Karnataka High Court
Sri T R Shivaramu vs Anti Corruption Bureau on 22 February, 2017
Author: John Michael Cunha
Bench: John Michael Cunha
R
JMCJ WP.No.4309/2017 (GM-Res)
22.02.2017 AND CONNECTED MATTERS
WRIT PETITION NO.4309 OF 2017(GM-RES)
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 6886 OF 2016
WRIT PETITION NO.8578 OF 2016
WRIT PETITION NO.57178 OF 2016
WRIT PETITION NO.6 OF 2017
WRIT PETITION NO.3146 OF 2017
WRIT PETITION NO.3147 OF 2017
WRIT PETITION NO.3148 OF 2017
WRIT PETITION NO.3176 OF 2017
2
ORDER
Whether the Inspector of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, has no lawful authority to register the F.I.Rs., and undertake investigation for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a preliminary question raised in this batch of writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India r/w. section 482 of Cr.P.C., 1973?
2. Petitioners in all the above petitions are the public servants as defined under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Separate F.I.Rs. came to be registered against the petitioners under different sections of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (the details of the crime numbers and the provisions under which the F.I.Rs. are registered are detailed in the respective petitions).
3. The common case of the petitioners is that earlier the State Government had declared the office of the Inspector of Police, Lokayuktha Police as the Police Station and the Inspector of Police was authorized to investigate any offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 vide orders dated 6.2.1991, 8.5.2002 and 5.2.2002. But, by a subsequent order dated 3 14.3.2016, the Government abolished the Lokayuktha Police and in its place, Anti-Corruption Bureau has been constituted to monitor acts of corruption. It is stated in the petitions that clause 3 of the aforesaid order dated 14.3.2016 provides that notifications would be issued declaring the Anti-Corruption Bureau as the Police Station under section 2(s) of Cr.P.C., 1973. Pursuant to the said order, Government has issued four notifications on 19.3.2016 superseding the earlier notifications dated 6.2.1991, 8.5.2002 and 5.12.2002 thereby withdrawing the declaration to the effect that the Office of the Inspector of Police, Lokayuktha is a Police Station. Furthermore, the above notification authorizes the Deputy Superintendent to investigate an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and also declares the Office of ADGP, Anti-Corruption Bureau as a Police Station.
4. The further case of the petitioners is that the Government of Karnataka has conferred powers on all Inspectors of Police, Office of Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate offences arising under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 vide 4 notification dated 21.4.2016 (Annexure-H in W.P.No.4309/2017). According to the petitioners, it is evident from the above facts that the Office of the respondent has not been declared as a Police Station under section 2(s) of Cr.P.C., 1973 and only Deputy Superintendent of Police is authorized to investigate offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as per the notifications dated 19.03.2016, therefore in the absence of similar notification declaring the Inspector of Police, as a Police Station, the respondent cannot register the case and proceed with its investigation.
5. Further it is contended that as per clause 5 of the Executive Order dated 14.3.2016, no complaint against a public servant can be registered and investigated by the Anti- Corruption Bureau without prior permission of the appointing authority. In cases in hand, no such permission has been sought before registering the F.I.Rs., and for conducting investigation against the petitioners. Therefore, registration of F.I.Rs., and the consequent investigation undertaken by the respondent being illegal and contrary to section 17 of the Prevention of 5 Corruption Act, 1988, the petitioners have sought for issue of a writ or order quashing the impugned F.I.Rs., and all further proceedings pending before of the respondent Police.
6. In all the above writ petitions, an interim prayer was sought for seeking stay of the impugned F.I.Rs., and all further investigation arising there from. By order dated 9.1.2017 ad-interim stay was granted as prayed for till the next date of hearing and the same is being extended till date.
7. On service of notice, the respondent has filed statement of objections inter alia contending that the writ petitions are not maintainable as the petitioners have failed to avail alternative remedies available in law. It is further contended that the petitioners have not approached the court with clean hands and they have suppressed the material facts affecting their rights. In the objection statements it is stated that after collecting the source report, the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bengaluru city found it necessary to investigate the offence and hence passed necessary orders under sections 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 6 1988. One such order is produced at Annexure-R in W.P.No.4309/2017. Thereafter, the respondent i.e., the Police Inspector registered the cases against the petitioners. It is further stated that the respondent has obtained necessary warrants under section 93 Cr.P.C., from the competent jurisdictional court and conducted raid and prepared the mahazars.
8. With regard to the power of the respondent to register the F.I.Rs., it is stated that there is no rule that the respondent can only register a case on the basis of a complaint being filed. The respondent is empowered and is duty-bound to take suo motu notice of an offence such as the one for which the petitioners are under investigation there being a cognizable offence. It is submitted that Anti-Corruption Bureau in the State of Karnataka comprises of the Office of the ADGP, IGP, 10 Superintendents of Police, 35 Deputy Superintendents of Police, 75 Police Inspectors and 200 Head Constables/Police Constables. The Office of ADGP and specified offices of Deputy Superintendent of Police have been made Police Stations in 7 terms of section 2(s) of Cr.P.C. vide notification dated 19.3.2016 (Annexure-G3 of W.P.No.4309/2017) and notification dated 30.3.2016 (Annexure-R1 of W.P.No.4309/2017). It is specifically pleaded in the statement of objections that the office of the respondent does not enjoy an independent and separate physical existence. The Inspector of Police i.e., the respondent discharges his official duties from the Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bengaluru city. The Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police has been classified as a Police Station and the respondent discharging his official duties from the said Police Station was thus authorized to register a criminal complaint under section 154 of Cr.P.C.
9. It is further stated that the Government of Karnataka by virtue of power vested in it under section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, issued an order dated 21.4.2016 (Annexure-H of W.P.No.4309/2017) and has empowered all the Inspectors of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau as competent officers to investigate offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and therefore, the respondent was not 8 only competent but duty-bound to accept the request to investigate the complaint registered against the petitioners.
10. With regard to clause 5 of the Executive Order dated 14.3.2016, it is stated in the objection statement that the said clause requires prior sanction only when investigation is directed against any decision or recommendation made by a public servant. In the instant case, the offences alleged against the petitioners are either under Section 7 or Section 13 and in some cases under Section 13(1)(e) r/w. 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The said offences do not relate to a decision or recommendation taken by the petitioners in their official capacity. Therefore, the investigations in the instant cases do not fall under clause 5 of the Executive Order. It is further contended that Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides for a statutory bar under section 19(3)(c) against staying of proceedings on any ground. Therefore, the prayer made by the petitioners to stay the investigation in the teeth of section 19(3)(c) cannot be granted. On those grounds, the 9 respondent has sought for vacating the stay order granted by this Court.
11. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the Jagadesha B.N., learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent.
12. Sri.M.S.Bhagwat, the learned counsel leading the argument on behalf of the petitioners would submit that the registration of the F.I.Rs., in the instant cases and the consequent investigation undertaken by the respondent Police Inspector is illegal and cannot be sustained for the following reasons:
(i) Office of the Police Inspector has not been not declared as Police Station as required under section 2(s) of Cr.P.C., 1973;
(ii) As per the notification issued by the Government dated 14.3.2016, prior sanction of the competent authority namely the ADGP was not obtained before initiating any investigation against the petitioner as per clause 5 of the aforesaid notification.10
Therefore, registration of the F.I.Rs., by the respondent being without authority of law, this Court has rightly stayed the operation of the impugned F.I.Rs., and the consequent investigation and hence, there is no reason or justification to vacate the said interim order as sought for by the respondent.
13. In support of his argument, learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of this court in the case of MUSHTAQ AHMED vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (1983) 1 KLJ 276 and would submit that in the instant case, the Government having issued notification declaring the Office of Deputy Superintendent of Police as the Police Station, the registration of the F.I.Rs., and the consequent investigation by the respondent is wholly illegal. In other words, it is the argument of the learned counsel that "office" of the Deputy Commissioner means the post or the designation of the Dy.S.P and therefore except the Dy.S.P. no other person could register the FIR.
14. Learned counsel has also referred to the case in C.M.PRASAD vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (1984) 11 1 KLJ 219 to bring home the point that the respondent could not be regarded as officer-in-charge of the Police Station for the reason that by virtue of notification dated 30.3.2016, only the "Office of Deputy Superintendent of Police" has been declared as the Police Station and not the Inspectors of Police.
15. Further, relying on the case of SHARANAPPA vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA in Crl.P.No.200315/2015, learned counsel would submit that the respondent having not been declared as a Police Station under section 2(s) of Cr.P.C., the entire proceedings initiated by the respondent are liable to be quashed and therefore, the interim order granted by the Court is required to be extended till the final disposal of the petition. The learned counsel appearing for the other petitioners have also advanced their arguments in line with the above submissions.
16. Meeting the above argument, learned Spl. Public Prosecutor Sri.Jagadeesh B.N. at the outset submitted that the interim order of stay was obtained by the petitioners by suppressing the notification issued by the State Government dated 30.3.2016 where under the Office of Deputy 12 Superintendent of Police in each district of Karnataka is declared as Police Station under section 2(s) of Cr.P.C. It is submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that if this notification was brought to the notice of the court at the time of hearing, the court would not have granted the interim order. Since the petitioners have suppressed this material fact and have taken the interim order by concealing the Government order dated 30.03.2016 which has a material bearing on the controversy raised in the petition, Jagadesha B. N. the learned Spl. Public Prosecutor would submit that solely on this ground, interim order is liable to be vacated. Secondly, Jagadesha B.N. learned Spl. Public Prosecutor would submit that the grant of interim stay in the matter is contrary to the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Learned counsel has referred to section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and placing reliance in the case of State by Police Inspector vs. T.Venkatesh Murthy reported in (2004) 7 SCC 763 has emphatically submitted that in view of the statutory bar contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the Act, the interim orders granted by this Court are liable to be vacated. On this point, 13 the learned Spl. Public Prosecutor Sri.Jagadesha B.N. has placed reliance on the principles enunciated in the case of SHAHID BALWA vs. UNION OF INDIA reported in (2014) 2 SCC 687, GOVINDARAJU vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2008) 6 KLJ 718 and in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANOTHER vs. PASTOR P. RAJU, wherein it is held that power under section 482 of Cr.P.C., can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings pending in any court, but the court cannot interfere with the statutory power of the police to conduct investigation in cognizable offences.
17. With regard to the contention of the petitioners that only the Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police is declared as a Police Station and therefore the respondent has no authority to register the F.I.R., learned counsel would submit that as per section 2(s) of Cr.P.C., Police Station means any post or place declared generally or specially by the State Government to be a Police Station and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf. Placing reliance in the decision rendered by this Court in Dr.S.M.KALLIGUDD vs. 14 STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (1988) 1 KLJ 252, learned Spl. Public Prosecutor would submit that the word "post" used in the definition of "Police Station" could only mean a "place where police officers are stationed." It is the argument of the learned Spl.Public Prosecutor that in the present case, the Government of Karnataka having validly created a set of Police Stations for the Anti-Corruption Bureau to register cases and to carry on investigation work by virtue of section 2(o) of the Code, in the absence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Police Officers present in the Police Station next in seniority namely the Inspectors of Police assume charge as the "Officers in charge" of the Police Station. Therefore, as Officers in Charge of the respective Police Station the respondents are entitled to register the FIRs. Further the Officers in Charge of the Police Stations being empowered to investigate cognizable offences as per section 156 of the Code, the challenge laid by the petitioners questioning the authority of the Inspectors of Police to register and investigate the offences cannot be accepted. 15
18. I have taken into consideration the rival submissions made at the Bar and have carefully scrutinized the material on record.
19. Petitioners have questioned the authority of the Inspector of Police to register the F.I.Rs., and to undertake the investigation mainly on the ground that the Inspectors of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau are not declared as Police Station within the meaning of section 2(s) of Cr.P.C. The petitioners do not dispute the fact that the Inspectors of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau have been duly authorized to investigate the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the petitions, categorical assertions are made that by virtue of notification dated 21.4.2016, the Inspector of Police are empowered to investigate the offences. The said notification reads as under:
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA No.HD71 PosiPa 2016 Karnataka Government Secretariat Vidhana Soudha, Bengaluru, dated 21.04.2016.16
NOTIFICATION In continuation of Notification No. HD 71 PoSiPa(iii) 2016, dated 19.03.2016 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub clause (c) of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988) the Government of Karnataka hereby authorizes all the Inspectors of Police, Office of the Anti Corruption Bureau for the purpose of the said Section.
BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF KARNATAKA Sd/-
(B.Venkateshamurthy) Under Secretary to Government Home Department (Police Services-A)
20. Undisputedly, this notification is issued in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Government under sub-clause
(c) of section 17 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Section 17 of the Act specifies three types of officers who can investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of competent court. According to the first proviso, if a Police Officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorized 17 by the Government in this behalf by a general or special order, he can investigate into the offences without the orders of the Magistrate. The second proviso provides that where an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section 1 of section 13 is sought to be investigated, such investigation shall not be conducted without the order of the Police Officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police.
21. In the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the notification dated 21.4.2016 is a general order issued under sub-section (c) of section 17 of the Act authorizing all the Inspectors of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau for the purpose of section 17 of the Act. This notification is not under challenge. Hence, the power of Police Inspectors, Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate into the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 stands established.
22. In respect of the investigation into the offences under section 13(1)(e) of the Act are concerned, it is specifically stated in the objection statement filed by the respondent that prior to the commencement of investigation thereon, specific 18 orders have been obtained from the Superintendent of Police. This fact has not been disputed by the petitioners. One of such order passed by the Superintendent of Police under Section 17 is at Annexure-R1. As a result, the contention of the petitioners that the Inspectors of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau are not duly authorized to investigate the offence under Section 13 (1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 either for lack of general order or for lack of specific order by the Superintendent of Police under Section 17 of the Act, cannot be sustained.
23. Now coming to the question of the authority of the Inspectors of Police, to register the F.I.R's is concerned, it is not in dispute that in all these cases, F.I.Rs., are registered by the Inspectors of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau. The contention of the petitioners is that Police Inspector is not declared as Police Station within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Code and therefore, the registration of the F.I.Rs., by the respondent - Inspectors is illegal and without authority of law. 19
24. In order to appreciate this controversy, it is necessary to note that registration of F.I.R. is not the same thing as investigation. Registration of a F.I.R. is a starting point of any investigation. As explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of LALITA KUMARI vs. GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH & Others reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1:
The FIR is a pertinent document in the criminal law procedure of our country and its main object from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and from the point of view of the investigating authorities is to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps to trace and to bring to book the guilty.
25. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not prescribe any procedure for registration of the F.I.Rs. On the other hand, by force of section 22 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are made applicable to trials for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, subject to certain modification as provided in section 22, unless the application of 20 any provisions of the Code is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. As per provisions of Cr.P.C., the manner and method of registering the case and conducting the investigations are left entirely to the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station or the Officer deputed by him.
26. Here itself reference could be made to section 154 of Cr.P.C. It reads as under:
154. Information in cognizable cases.-(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every, such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf:21
(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.
(3) Any person, aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence;
27. Section 154 of Cr.P.C., mandates compulsory registration of F.I.R. in a case of cognizable offence. The legislative intent of section 154 is expounded in Bhajan Lal's case wherein it is stated as under:
22
"30. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1) is that every information relating to the commission of a 'cognizable offence' (as defined under Section 2(c) of the Code) if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into writing) or in writing to 'an officer in charge of a police station' (within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Code) and signed by the informant should be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe which form is commonly called 'First Information Report' and which act of entering the information in the said form is known as registration of a crime or a case."
Thus, a reading of the above provision makes it clear that the responsibility of registering the First Information Report is entrusted essentially to the "Officer in Charge" of the concerned Police Station.
28. Section 2(o) of the Code defines the term "Officer-in- Charge". It reads as under:
"Section 2(o). 'Officer in charge of a police station' includes, when the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station is absent from the station-house or unable 23 from illness or other cause to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station-house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or, when the State Government so directs, any other police officer so present;"
29. As per the above definition, when the Officer-in- Charge of the Police Station is absent from the station-house or unable from illness or other cause to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station-house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or, when the State Government so directs, any other police officer so present, may register the F.I.R.
30. In the instant case, though the petitioners did not disclose the notification issued by the Government declaring the Office of Deputy Superintendent of Police as Police Station, yet after service of notice, learned Spl. Public Prosecutor has put forth the notification dated 30.3.2016 issued by the Government declaring the office of Deputy Superintendent of Police as Police Station. It reads as under:-
24
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA No.HD 71 PoSiPa 2016 Karnataka Government Secretariat Vidhana Soudha, Bengaluru, dated 30.03.2016 NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (s) of Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) the Government of Karnataka hereby declare the places mentioned in column (2) of the Table below as police stations and specifies the local are mentioned in the corresponding entries in column (3) thereof, as local areas included within those Police Stations:-
Sl. No. Name of the Police Stations Local Areas Included Within the Police Stations specified in column (2) 1 Office of the Deputy Bengaluru City Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Bengaluru City, Bengaluru 2 ---------- ----------
3 ---------- ----------
4 ---------- ----------
5 ---------- ----------
6 ---------- ----------
7 ---------- ----------
8 ---------- ----------
9 ---------- ----------
10 ---------- ----------
11 ---------- ----------
12 ---------- ----------
13 ---------- ----------25
14 ---------- ----------
15 ---------- ----------
16 ---------- ----------
17 ---------- ----------
18 ---------- ----------
19 ---------- ----------
20 ---------- ----------
21 ---------- ----------
22 ---------- ----------
23 ---------- ----------
24 ---------- ----------
25 ---------- ----------
26 ---------- ----------
27 ---------- ----------
28 ---------- ----------
29 ---------- ----------
30 ---------- ----------
BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF KARNATAKA Sd/-
(J.D. Madhuchandra Tejaswi) Deputy Secretary to Government Home Department (Police Services)
31. The learned counsel for the petitioners however contend that since under the above notification only the "office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police" is declared as Police Station no person other than the Deputy Superintendent of Police could be regarded as Police Station authorized to receive 26 and register the FIR. In support of this argument, learned counsel for the petitioners have heavily relied on the proposition laid down in the case of MUSHTAQ AHMED vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (1983) 1 KLJ 276. The learned counsel has laid emphasis on para 11 of the said judgment wherein it is observed as under:
"11. It may be that if the office of a Police Officer so appointed on deputation was not declared to be a Police Station and consequently he did not become an officer in charge of a Police Station, it might be open to the objection, that he could not exercise the powers of investigation under the Code. But, as pointed out earlier, the State Government has made a specific declaration to the effect that the office of each of the two officers was a Police Station. By the force of this declaration itself, each of the two officers also became the officer in charge of the Police Station and, therefore, there can be no doubt that each of them could exercise all the powers available to an officer in charge of a Police Station for investigation under the provisions of the Code."
(underlining supplied.) 27
32. The above proposition, in my view, does not advance the contention of the petitioners, rather it supports the argument of the Sri.Jagadeesha B.N. learned Special Public Prosecutor that as "Officers in charge" of the Police Station, the Inspectors attached to Anti-Corruption Bureau are entitled to exercise all the powers available to an Officer in charge of the Police Station. In the said decision, the point that arose for consideration of the court was whether a Superintendent of Police or a Deputy Superintendent of Police who is appointed on deputation to the State Vigilance Commission, as Deputy Commissioner Investigation or as Asst. Commissioner Investigation whose office is declared to be a Police Station by the State Government under section 2(s) of Cr.P.C., has no lawful authority to undertake investigation of an offence under section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against civil servant of a State. The Court observed that under the notification issued by the Government in the said case, the Offices of D.C., S.P., A.C., and Dy.S.P., have been declared to be "Police Station" within the meaning of that expression as defined under section 2(s) of the Code and on such declaration, the Office of each of the two 28 officers became "Police Station" and each of the officers became "Officers in Charge" of that "Police Station". Applying the same analogy to the facts of the instant case, the Government having declared the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police as "Police Station" within the meaning of 2(s) of the Code, the Police Inspectors attached to the Anti-Corruption Bureau as "Officers in Charge" of the Police Station could always exercise the powers available to an officer in charge of a Police Station.
33. Viewed from another angle, the term "Police Station"
is defined in section 2(s) of the Code, which reads as under:
"2(s) 'police station' means any post or place declared generally or specially by the State Government, to be a police station, and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf."
As per this definition, Police Station means "post" or "place" declared by the Government as "Police Station". The learned counsel for the petitioners have built up the argument equating the word "post" to "Office" and have put forth the plea that since the "office" of the Deputy Superintendent of Police 29 has been declared as "Police Station", without there being a similar notification declaring the office of the Police Inspectors as Police Station, the respondents have no authority to register the FIRs for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This argument, in my view, is lopsided and fallacious. A plain reading of the notification dated 30.3.2016 makes it evident that the State Government has declared the places mentioned in column No.2 as Police Stations and has specified the local areas for each of the said Police Stations.
34. In an identical case, a similar notification issued by the Government of Karnataka declaring the Office of the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Bengaluru Metropolitan Task Force to be a Police Station with a territorial jurisdiction over metropolitan area in respect of the offences committed under Special Act like Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act 1976, the Bengaluru Development Act 1976, was challenged in a writ petition and this Court had an occasion to consider the meaning of the word "post" as spelt out in the definition. On examining the meaning assigned to the said word in Webster's New 30 Collegiate Dictionary, in para 9 of the judgment in the case of Dr.S.M.Kalligudd and others vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1998 (1) KLJ 252, this court held as under:
9. In the case of P.R.Nayak v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had an occasion of constructing the word 'post' in the context of Civil Service Regulations. There the word has been used with the word 'office'. Keeping this aspect in view, the Supreme Court has held that "the word 'post' with its previous counterpart the 'office' means the position in service". Applying the same reasoning, since, the word 'post' in the definition of 'police station' has been with words/expressions like 'place, a local area", therefore, by applying the rule noscitur a sociis (the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps), it has to be held that the word 'post' used in the definition of 'police station' could only mean 'a place where police officers are stationed'. Assignment of any other meaning to the 31 word 'post' in the context it has been used in the definition of police station would lead only to an absurd meaning. I say so because, if the post of DIG is treated as police station, then there cannot be any Officer-in-charge thereof for the purpose of Sections 154 and 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
35. The above reasoning fully answers the contentions raised by the petitioners in these writ petitions. I am in complete agreement with the view held in the above decision. Even otherwise, a perusal of the notification dated 30.3.2016 amplifies the view that the State Government intended to declare the Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police where the Police Officers are stationed as the Police Station for the purpose of registering the cases and investigation of the offences under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the face of this factual and legal position, I do not find any substance in the contentions of the petitioners that for want of separate notification, the Inspectors of Police stationed in the 32 office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police are not authorized to register the FIRs. As already stated above, in all these cases, FIRs are registered by the respondents/Inspectors of Police. A bare look at the FIRs indicate that the Police Stations where the FIRs are registered are described as "Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bengaluru city." Column 14 of the FIR contains the signature of the person who registered the FIR. It is important to note that these FIRs are signed by the Police Inspectors, Anti- Corruption Bureau, Bengaluru city Police Stations as Officers in Charge of the Police Stations, thereby making it evident that these FIRs are registered by the respondents in their capacity as the Officers in Charge of the Police Stations which is in accordance with section 154 of Cr.P.C. As Officers in Charge of the Police Stations, the respondents have lawful authority to register the FIRs and further by virtue of the general notification issued by the State Government under section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as already discussed above, the respondents are also legally entitled to investigate into the offences under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Accordingly, it is held that the Inspectors of Police, Anti- 33 Corruption Bureau have lawful authority to register the FIRs and undertake investigation for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
36. Sri.Jagadeesha.B.N., learned Special Public Prosecutor has sought for vacating the stay order issued on 20.1.2017 and 23.1.2017 on the additional ground that the petitioners have not approached this court with clean hands and have deliberately suppressed the notification dated 30.3.2016 declaring the office of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti- Corruption Bureau Bangalore city as Police Stations. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has referred to the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH vs. VIRENDRA KUMAR TRIPATHI reported in (2009) 15 SCC 533 and also the decision of this Court in the case of Sri.GOVINDARAJU vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in 2008 6 KLJ 718. But as I have already come to the conclusion that the registration of the FIRs by the respondents is in accordance with the section 154 of CR.P.C., and that the investigation undertaken by the 34 respondents is with the lawful authority by virtue of the notification dated 21.4.2016 issued under section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, there is no justifiable reason to extend the interim orders in all these cases. More over, the embargo contained in section 19(3) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. also warrants vacating of the order as the power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to interfere with the statutory power of the police to conduct investigation in cognizable offences. The preliminary point raised in these petitions is answered accordingly.
Sd/-
JUDGE Bss.