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Jharkhand High Court

Pawan Kumar Yadav @ Pawan Yadav vs The State Of Jharkhand & Ors on 11 May, 2026

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Anubha Rawat Choudhary

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
          Cr. Revision No.1456 of 2023
                                ------

Pawan Kumar Yadav @ Pawan Yadav .... .... Petitioner Versus The State of Jharkhand & Ors. ..... .... Respondents With Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.152 of 2023

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Manoj Yadav                   .... ....          Appellant
                         Versus
The State of Jharkhand         ..... ....    Respondent
                           With
                 Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.249 of 2023
                                  ------
1. Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar
2. Sanjay Yadav @ Bachchu Yadav
3. Abhay Yadav                .... ....        Appellants
                         Versus
The State of Jharkhand         ..... ....   Respondent
                            With
              Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.518 of 2025
                                ------
Bhikhari Yadav                   ....            ....          Appellant
                              Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Pawan Yadav
                                       .....        ....   Respondents

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

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For the Appellant : Mrs. Jasvinder Mazumdar, Advocate [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.249/2023] Mr. Nilesh Kumar, Advocate Mr. Ayush Kr. Verma, Advocate [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.1456/2023] For the State : Mr. Pankaj Kumar, P.P. Mr. Anup Pawan Topno, A.P.P. [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.249/2023] Mr. Rajesh Kumar, A.P.P. Mr. P.D. Agrawal, Spl. P.P. [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.1456/2023] For the Res. No.2 Mr. Nilesh Kumar, Advocate Mr. Ayush Kr. Verma, Advocate [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.518/2025]

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16/Dated: 11.05.2026 1 Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.249 of 2023

1. Reference may be made to the order dated 07th May, 2026, in pursuant thereto, the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj, is present.

2. He has stated that one of the co-accused persons, namely, Manish Yadav has been apprehended from the place of State of Gujarat. The other co-accused person, namely, Rajneesh Yadav is still to be apprehended.

3. It has further been stated that the location has been found out in the Andaman and the Police of District of Sahibganj is taking endeavour for apprehending him.

4. The Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj has undertaken before this Court that since sincere endeavour will be taken and as such, according the aforesaid undertaking, the matter is being deferred to be listed on 22.06.2026, so far the issue for which concern was shown by this Court in the order dated 7th May, 2026.

5. List on 22.06.2026.

6. On that date, the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj shall appear physically.

I.A.(Cr.) No.15368 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.249 of 2023

7. The instant interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of appellant no.1, namely, Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar under Section 430(1) of the B.N.S.S., 2023 for suspension of sentence dated 21.02.2023 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-I, 2 Sahibganj, in connection with Borio (J) P.S. Case No.365 of 2021 corresponding to G.R. Case No.108 of 2022 for the offence under Section 147, 148, 149, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant:

8. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant no.1, namely, Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar that no material has come establishing the complicity said to be committed by the present appellant, since, on the basis of general and omnibus allegation, the present appellant has been implicated in the present case, which has not properly been appreciated by the learned trial Court.
9. It has further been contended by referring to the testimony of the witnesses in order to establish that there is wide contradiction in their testimony.
10. It has been submitted that although the prayer for suspension of sentence had already been dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court while passing the order in interlocutory application being I.A. No.1960 of 2025, which was rejected vide order dated 21.03.2025, the prayer is now being renewed for suspension of sentence against the maximum sentence of eight years. It is urged that the appellant has already undergone a period of four years and four months in custody. The present application, therefore, rests solely on the ground of the quantum of sentence already 3 undergone by the appellant.
11. It has been contended that other co-accused persons, namely, Sanjay Yadav @ Bachchu Yadav and Abhay Yadav, have also been directed to be released on bail by this Court, vide order dated 07.02.2025 passed in I.A. No.12952 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.249 of 2023]. One of the other co-

accused persons, namely, Manoj Yadav, has also been directed to be released on bail by the learned Single Judge of this Court, vide order dated 27.11.2024 passed in I.A. No.9230 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.152 of 2023], therefore, the issue of parity has also been raised.

12. Further, it has been submitted that there is no criminal antecedent against the present appellant. Submission of the learned Public Prosecutor for the State and learned counsel for the Informant:

13. Mr. Pankaj Kumar, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, as also, Mr. Nilesh Kumar, learned counsel for the Informant, have jointly submitted that the nature of the allegation is of a very serious character. It is urged that the prosecution case stands substantiated on the strength of the testimony of the injured witness, P.W.-6, duly supported by the independent witness, P.W.-10. Their depositions have further found corroboration from the testimonies of P.W.-1, P.W.-2, and P.W.-3, thereby lending cumulative assurance to the prosecution version.

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14. It has been submitted that this Court has passed an order while considering the prayer for suspension of sentence by taking into consideration the testimony of P.W.6, the injured witness (the victim) as also the P.W.10, the independent witness corroborated by other witnesses including the Doctor, who has been examined as P.W.8.

15. It has further been contended that merely because the half of the sentence has been completed, the prayer for suspension of sentence cannot be allowed.

16. It has also been contended on behalf of the State by referring to the objection, wherein, the issue of societal impact has been referred and more particularly the murder of eye witness, who has been examined as P.W.10, has also been brought on record.

17. Learned counsel appearing for the State and the Informant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, have submitted that it is not case of suspension of sentence merely on the ground of completion of half of the sentence. Analysis

18. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the content has been averred in the instant interlocutory application as also the objection filed on behalf of the State as also the Informant.

19. The matter was heard by this Court on 16th April, 2026 and this Court has passed an order inviting objections on 5 behalf of the State and the Informant.

20. The objections have been filed on behalf of the State as also the Informant.

21. The objection filed on behalf of the State is premised not only on the merits of the case but also upon the larger societal impact of granting suspension of sentence particularly by taking reference of the murder of the eyewitness, i.e., P.W.10.

22. The case of the present appellant has also been dealt with by the learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering the issue of suspension of sentence in I.A. No.1960 of 2025, which was rejected, vide order dated 21.03.2025, for better appreciation, the said order is being referred hereinbelow: -

"I.A. No.1960 of 2025

I.A. No. 1960 of 2025 has been filed on behalf of the appellant no.1 under Section 430(1) of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for grant of bail.
2. Heard Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant no.1 and Mr. Anup Pawan Topno, learned APP as well as Mr. Nilesh Kumar, learned counsel for the Informant.
3. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant no.1 submitted that the appellant no.1 has been falsely implicated in this case by the Informant. It is submitted that the allegation of firing against the appellant is not correct. It is submitted that even as per the FIR, the PW-6 Informant stated that he had sustained two fired arm injuries in his abdomen.

However, the Doctor, who was examined as PW-8, has submitted that he found one entry wound and one exit wound injury i. The Injury No.1 is Entry wound oval in shape with inverted margin measuring about ½"X½" X skin deep on right flank. 5.5" from mid line. ii. The Injury No.2 is Exit wound with everted 6 margin measuring about 1''X1'' in diameter on right upper quadrant. CECT abdomen advised and patient referred to Higher Centre for better management and treatment. Thus, the Informant had sustained one bullet injury not two, as alleged in the FIR, and the evidence by the PW-6.

4. It is submitted that the PW-10 is other alleged eye-witness while stated who has not name of the appellant for firing at him rather he has alleged against the Diga Choudhary @ Vijay Choudhary, Manoj Yadav and Sunil Yadav for firing at him.

Thus, there is contradiction in the evidence of Informant and other eye-witness i.e. PW-10. It is submitted that the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3 namely Monu Kumar Yadav, Mantu Yadav and Sant Gope @ Sant Yadav respectively are not reliable as they are interested witnesses and they have stated all the persons named in the FIR had made indiscriminate firing upon the Informant. It is submitted that the appellant has been convicted for the offences under Section 307/149 of IPC and not specific under 307 of IPC. It is submitted that the appellant is in custody since 28.12.2021 and hence the appellant may be enlarged on bail.

5. On the other hand, learned APP has opposed the prayer for bail. It is submitted that the informant has named the appellant for firing at him in the FIR and also during evidence while examining as PW-6. It is submitted that several eye-witnesses have supported the allegation against the appellant no.1 and hence the prayer for bail may be rejected.

6. Learned counsel for the Informant after adopting the submission of the learned APP, has further submitted that apart from the Informant examined as PW-6, there are several witnesses namely Monu Yadav, Mantu Yadav and Sant Yadav and who have been examined as PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3 respectively and who have supported the allegation against the appellant for firing at the informant. It is submitted that in view of the specific allegation against the appellant no.1 and hence the prayer for bail may be rejected.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case of the learned Trial Courts and considered the submissions of both the 7 parties.

8. It appears from the FIR that the appellant had firstly fired upon the informant.

9. It also reveals from the evidence of informant namely Pawan Kumar Yadav examined as PW-6 that the appellant had firstly fired upon the Informant in his abdomen then thereafter one co-accused Bhikhari Yadav had fired in his abdomen.

10. From evidence of PW-8 Dr. Ranvijay Kumar, it appears that there are two injuries on his abdomen which are as follow:-

iii. Entry wound- oval in shape with inverted margin measuring about ½"X½" X skin deep on right flank. 5.5" from mid line.
iv. Exit wound with everted margin measuring about 1''X1'' in diameter on right upper quadrant. CECT abdomen advised and patient referred to Higher Centre for better management and treatment.
Both injuries are caused by fire arms.

11. It appears from the cross examination of Doctor at para 5 that he had found one entry wound and one exit wound in the body of the injured person. He further stated that he had not found injuries cause by the two bullets and also not found any type of injury in his heel.

12. As there is direct allegation of firing by the appellant not upon the Informant at first instance, I am not inclined to enlarge the appellant on the bail at this stage.

13. The prayer for bail of the appellant no.1 namely Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar is hereby rejected at this stage.

14. Thus, I.A. No.1960 of 2025 is also rejected."

23. From the aforesaid order, it appears that P.W.-6, being an injured witness, has supported the prosecution version. In his testimony, he has clearly disclosed the name of the present appellant, thereby directly implicating him in the occurrence.

24. From the testimony of P.W.-6, it clearly emerges that he sustained bullet injury in the course of the assault perpetrated by Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar (the appellant), as also Bhikhari 8 Yadav.

25. Thus, from the testimony of P.W.-6, it is evident that the name of the present appellant has been specifically disclosed as the person who inflicted the bullet injury, as a result of which P.W.-6 sustained injury in his abdomen. This version has remained consistent and has further stood corroborated even during the course of cross-examination.

26. The P.W.10, who has been examined as eye witness, has also supported the prosecution version having remain consistent in the cross-examination.

27. The testimony of P.W.6 and P.W.10 has been corroborated by P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3. More particularly, their testimony has also been supported by the medical evidence, as would be evident from the testimony of doctor, who has been examined as P.W.8.

28. The learned single judge of this Court, while considering the testimony of the witnesses, has declined to pass the order of suspension of sentence, as would be evident from the order as referred hereinabove.

29. Now, renewing the prayer for suspension of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant has raised two grounds: (i) parity with similarly placed co-accused, and (ii) the period of custody already undergone by the appellant, which is stated to be more than half of the maximum sentence of eight years.

30. This Court, therefore, is to consider the issue of parity 9 and the period having been undergone and as to whether, these two grounds, can be said to be the sufficient ground for suspension of sentence ignoring the nature of allegation which has been substantiated in course of trial.

31. The 1st ground, i.e., the issue of parity has been taken that the other co-convicts have been directed to be released on bail after suspension of sentence.

32. There is no denial of the fact that the parity is one of the grounds for the purpose of consideration of bail as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein, it has held as under:

"18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co accused who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration."

33. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed in the aforesaid judgment, i.e., Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement (supra) that it is axiomatic that the principle of parity is based on the guarantee of positive equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for 10 repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing similar wrong order. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate the illegality or irregularity. If there has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of people by any authority or by the court, without legal basis or justification, other persons could not claim as a matter of right the benefit on the basis of such wrong decision.

34. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its power in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230, wherein, it has been held as under:

"25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17) "17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second respondent was a history sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute 11 certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non- application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside."

26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12-2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law."

36. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sagar Vs. State of UP & Anr., 2025 INSC 1370 has categorically observed that while utilizing parity as a ground for bail, the same must focus on the role of the accused and cannot be utilized solely because another accused person was granted bail in connection with the same offence, and neither can this ground be claimed as a matter of right, the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:

"12. The High Court appears, plainly, to have 12 erroneously granted bail to the accused-respondent on the sole ground of parity which it has misunderstood as a tool of direct application as opposed to parity being focused on the role played by the accused and not the thread of the same offence being the only common factor between the accused persons. On this count alone we can set aside the impugned judgment and order. However, we propose not to do so and proceed to delve further.
14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct position in law. The word 'parity' is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as "equality, especially of pay or position."

When weighing an application on parity, it is 'position' that is the clincher. The requirement of 'position' is not met only by involvement in the same offence. Position means what the person whose application is being weighed, his position in crime, i.e., his role etc. There can be different roles played - someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who fired a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by the sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to hack away at the opposer's limbs with a weapon."

35. It appears from the aforesaid judgements while considering the issue of parity, the surrounding facts are to be taken into consideration in entirety and if it is found that the case of one or the other co-accused persons is identically placed on the basis of material brought by the witnesses in course of the trial.

36. This Court has examined the aforesaid contention while considering the orders passed by the learned single Judge of this Court with respect to other co-accused, namely, Sanjay Yadav @ Bachchu Yadav, Abhay Yadav and Manoj Yadav.

37. It appears from the order dated 07.02.2025 passed in 13 I.A. No.12952 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.249 of 2023] that the specific attributability has not been casted upon Sanjay Yadav @ Bachchu Yadav and Abhay Yadav, rather, they are shown to be along with Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar (the present appellant) and Bhikhari Yadav.

38. Taking into consideration the aforesaid fact the prayer for suspension of the said co-convict has been allowed by this Court.

39. In the present case, this Court has examined the testimony of P.W.-6, the injured witness, as well as that of P.W.-10, from which it is evident that the present appellant has been shown to be the principal assailant who inflicted bullet injuries. In contrast, the co-convicts who have been directed to be released on bail after suspension of sentence stand on a different footing, inasmuch as no specific allegation has been attributed to them in respect of the commission of the crime of causing bullet injuries.

40. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the nature of allegation which has been substantiated by the prosecution against the present appellant, namely, Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar is quite different to that of other co-convicts, who have been directed to be released on bail after suspension of sentence.

41. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the case of the present appellant stands on a footing quite distinct from that of the other co-accused persons. In view of the 14 specific and direct attribution made against him, the benefit of parity cannot be extended to the appellant.

42. So far as the completion of half of the sentence is concerned, this Court is conscious that half of the sentence can be one of the grounds for suspension of sentence but it cannot be the sole ground, rather, the completion of half of the sentence is to be tested on the basis of surrounding facts.

43. It requires to refer herein the settled position of law that the period of custody cannot be the sole ground for suspension of sentence, rather, the nature of crime as has been found to be proved against one or the other, the appellant herein, is to be taken into consideration and even if the convict has completed substantive sentence or half of the sentence, that cannot be a sole ground for suspension of sentence if the nature of offence having been proved in course of trial is serious.

44. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr. 2024 INSC 343 has derived the principle that the factors like nature of the offence held to have committed, the manner of their commission, the gravity of the offence, and also the desirability of releasing the convict on bail are to be considered objectively and such consideration should reflect in the consequential order passed in relation of suspension of sentence.

45. Further, it needs to refer herein that recently, the Hon'ble 15 Apex Court in the case of Chhotelal Yadav versus State of Jharkhand &Anr. (Criminal Appeal no.4804/2025) has specifically observed that while considering the plea for suspension of sentence, even in cases where the sentence is for a fixed term, there is a caveat that if there are exceptional circumstances, then the Court may decline to suspend the sentence.

46. Further, the objection, which is to be furnished in view of the rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Somesh Chaurasia Vs. State of M.P. & Anr. (supra), the affidavit-in-objection has been filed wherein specific averment has been made regarding the societal impact and it appears from the said objection that the district police have specifically stated that release of the present appellant will be detrimental to the society.

47. Such averment has been made in the facts of the case that immediately after the testimony having been recorded of P.W.10, he was murdered, as would be evident from paragraph-22 of the affidavit-in-objection filed on behalf of the State, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: -

"22. That it is humbly stated and submitted that the Officer-in-Charge, Jirwabari P.S., prepared a report about the impact on society. Although the report states that, apart from the present case, the Appellant no.1 (Sonu Yadav Alias Ajgar) has no criminal history, releasing the appellant on bail would nonetheless give rise to an apprehension of a recurrence of a similar 16 untoward incident.
The report also reveals that life-threatening attacks have been carried out against the victim in the past as well.
The report also reveals that one of the witnesses of the instant case, namely Ravindra Yadav, was murdered, in which Sunil Yadav alias Nunuva, who is the close relative of this Appellant, is the prime accused in that case. This incident was registered vide Mufassil P.S. Case No. 49 of 2023 dated 27.05.2023 under section 147/148/149/302 of I.P.C. and 27 of the Arms Act.
The report also reveals that the other co-accused persons have antecedents. Co-accused, namely Bhikhari Yadav, who is also the father of Appellant No. 1 (Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar) has 12 criminal antecedents. Co-accused, namely Sunil Yadav, who is also a close relative of Appellant No. 1 (Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar) has 10 criminal antecedents and is also an accused in the murder of one of the witnesses of the instant case, namely Ravindra Yadav. Co-accused, namely Abhay Yadav, who is also a close relative of Appellant No. 1 (Sonu Yadav @Ajgar) has 4 criminal antecedents. Co-accused, namely Sanjay Yadav, who is also a close relative of Appellant No. 1 (Sonu Yadav @ Ajgar) has 3 criminal antecedents."

48. The issue of the appellant having undergone more than half of the sentence is, no doubt, a relevant consideration. However, such factor is required to be weighed by maintaining a delicate balance between the mandate of the Rule of Law and the constitutional guarantee enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court must, therefore, ensure that while the right to life and personal liberty is safeguarded, the sanctity of judicial system and societal confidence in the justice delivery system are not undermined.

49. Herein, the involvement of the present appellant directly has been surfaced by giving bullet injury and thereafter, 17 murder of the independent eyewitness, i.e., P.W.10.

50. Further, two of the accused persons are still to face the trial. One of them, has been said to be apprehended and as such, in these circumstances also, taking into consideration the murder of one witness, i.e., P.W.10, this Court is of the view that merely on completion of half of the sentence, it would not be just and proper to allow the instant interlocutory application.

51. Insofar as the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that there are no criminal antecedents against him is concerned, this Court is of the view that the issue of antecedents has no determinative bearing in the present matter.

52. Therefore, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that it is not a fit case for suspension of sentence of the present appellant.

53. Accordingly, I.A.(Cr.) No.15368 of 2025 stands dismissed.

54. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not prejudice the issue on merit as the appeal is lying pending for its consideration.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) 11.05.2026 Rohit/-

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