Karnataka High Court
Murarilal Agarwal S/O. A.P. Agarwal vs The State Of Karnataka on 27 April, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 10.03.2026
Pronounced on : 27.04.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.71665 OF 2012 (LA - KIADB)
BETWEEN:
MURARILAL AGARWAL
S/O A.P.AGARWAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
M/S. AGARWAL SPONGE AND
ENERGY PVT. LTD.
NO. 899A, 899B AND 900,
HARAGINADONI ROAD
VENIVEERAPURA CROSS,
KUDITHINI VILLAGE,
BALLARI - 585 104.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI GURUDAS S.KANNUR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SRINAND A.PACHHAPURE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRIES,
M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU.
2
2 . SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
DHARWAD.
3 . THE SPL. DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU.
4 . ARCELOR MITTAL LTD.,
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT
HAVING ITS
REGISTERED OFFICE AT:
UPPAL PLAZA, M6, 6TH FLOOR,
JASOLA DISTRICT CENTRE,
NEW DELHI - 110 025.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI KESHAVA REDDY, AAG FOR R-1;
SMT.SHARMILA PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 AND R-3;
SRI NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO (a) ISSUE A WRIT IN THE
NATURE OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT OF APPROPRIATE
NATURE TO QUASH NOTIFICATION NO.CI/86/SPQ/2010
DATED:04.05.2010, IN SO FAR IT RELATES TO SY.NO.902B
MEASURING 6 ACRES 86 CENTS (SL.NO.233), SY.NO.907A
MEASURING 6 ACRES 10 CENTS (SL.NO.239) AND SY.NO.907B
MEASURING 6 ACRES 38 CENTS (SL.NO.240) OF KUDITHINI
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VILLAGE; (b) PASS SUCH OTHER ORDERS AS MAY BE DEEMED
APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, IN THE
ENDS OF JUSTICE; (c) ISSUE THE WRIT IN THE NATURE OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT OF APPROPRIATE NATURE TO
QUASH THE NOTIFICATION DATED 05.02.2010 GAZETTED ON
06.02.2010 BEARING NO.CI/86/SPQ/2010 ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.3 WHICH IS PRODUCED AND MARKED AS
ANNEXURE-G TO THE WRIT PETITION; (d) THIS HON'BLE COURT
BE PLEASED TO DECLARE THAT THE ENTIRE ACQUISITION
PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 HAVE BEEN
ABANDONED IN SO FAR AS THE PETITION SCHEDULE PROPERTIES
ARE CONCERNED.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 10.03.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court seeking the following
reliefs:
(a) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ of
appropriate nature to quash Notification
No.CI/86/SPQ/2010 dated 04-05-2010, insofar as it
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relates to Sy.No.902B measuring 6 acres 86 cents
(Sl.No.233) Sy.No.907A measuring 6 acres 10 cents
(Sl.No.239) and Sy.No.907B measuring 6 acres 38 cents
(Sl.No.240) of Kudithini Village and
(b) Pass such other orders as may be deemed appropriate
under the circumstances of the case, in the ends of
justice.
(c) Issue the writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ
of appropriate nature to quash the Notification dated
05-02-2010 gazetted on 06-02-2010 bearing
No.CI/86/SPQ/2010 issued by the respondent No.3 which
is produced and marked as Annexure-G to the writ
petition.
(d) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to declare that the entire
acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondent No.1
have been abandoned insofar as the petition schedule
properties are concerned."
2. Heard Sri Gurudas S. Kannur, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner; Sri Keshava Reddy, learned Additional
Advocate General appearing for respondent No.1; Smt. Sharmila
Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 and
Sri Nitin Prasad, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
3.1. The petitioner is the Executive Director of one M/s
Agarwal Sponge & Energy Private Limited ('the Company' for short).
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The Company is operating a sponge iron unit and a power plant unit
in an area of 24.75 acres in Kuditini Village, Bellary District. The
Company also holds a sanction of 12 Mega Watt captive power
plant by the State High Level Clearance Committee constituted
under the Karnataka Industries (Facilitation) Act, 2002. When
things stood thus, the State issues a Preliminary Notification under
Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act,
1966 ('the Act' for short) seeking to acquire land to an extent of
4865.64 acres for industrial purpose, i.e., to set up a steel plant for
respondent No.4/Arcelor Mittal. A notice under sub-section (2) of
Section 28 of the Act was issued to the petitioner. But, the
averment in the petition is that it was never served on him. Enquiry
then is sought to be conducted under sub-section (3) of Section 28
of the Act for considering the objections of persons who had
appeared for hearing on the said date, on receipt of notice or those
who had received the notice. On 04-05-2010, the State issued a
Final Notification under Section 28(4) of the Act. The land of the
petitioner was also included in the Final Notification as Sy.No.902B,
907A and 907B to a total extent of 19.34 acres. The petitioner
became aware of the acquisition proceedings only when the name
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of the petitioner was replaced with the name of the Board in the
revenue records. The petitioner then submits a representation
which goes unheeded. Therefore, the present petition is preferred
seeking the aforesaid prayer.
3.2. After the Notification, on 18-12-2012 the Assistant
Commissioner passes an order declaring that the lands of the
petitioner are forfeited on violation of Section 79A and 79B of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The coordinate Bench of this
Court disposes the subject petition on 11-01-2013, in view of the
order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 18-12-2012. A Writ
Appeal is preferred challenging the said order in Writ Appeal
No.30275 of 2013. The said Writ Appeal is disposed as withdrawn,
reserving liberty to seek review. Accordingly, Review Petition
No.100087 of 2014 is preferred. On 22-11-2017 the beneficiary of
the acquisition i.e., the 4th respondent issues a communication to
the Board that possession of the property belonging to the
petitioner has not been handed over to it and requests allotment of
alternative land.
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3.3. During the pendency of the subject petition, the Apex
Court in B. RAVIPRAKASH v. KIADB disposes Civil Appeal
Nos.621-700 of 2023 observing that acquisition for the 4th
respondent/Arcelor Mittal was not for public purpose. In W.P.(C)
No.776 of 2023, Arcelor Mittal submitted that it would not require
the land to an extent of 2643 acres. During all these proceedings
review petition was pending. The review petition comes to be
allowed on 06-06-2024 by the coordinate Bench, recalling the order
dated 11-01-2013 and restoring the subject petition to file. It is
then heard.
4. Learned senior counsel Sri Gurudas S.Kannur appearing for
the petitioner would vehemently contend that no notice as
obtaining under sub-Section (2) of Section 28 of the Act is issued to
the petitioner and no enquiry in terms of sub-section (3) of Section
28 of the Act is held qua the lands of the petitioner. He would
submit that service of notice is not a mere formality, it is a
statutory right of every land owner. The acquisition is not for a
public purpose. The lands were acquired in violation of sub-section
(1) of Section 28 of the Act. The State has not taken possession of
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the lands of the petitioner. They still remain with the petitioner. No
award is passed in respect of the acquired land. The object of the
Act is to prioritize industrialization and development. In the lands of
the petitioner currently an industry is being run. Therefore, on all
these grounds, he would seek quashment of the proceedings.
5. Per contra, Sri Keshava Reddy, Additional Advocate
General appearing for the 1st respondent/State would vehemently
refute the submissions in contending that once a notification under
sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Act is issued, the land vests in
the State in terms of Section 28(5) and cannot be transferred back
to the land owner. Once possession is taken, the land cannot be de-
notified from the process of acquisition. All the lands are acquired
for public purpose in order to achieve the goal of industrialization.
The possession of lands vest with the Board after completion of
acquisition process.
6. Learned counsel Smt. Sharmila Patil, appearing for 2nd and
3rd respondents would toe the lines of the learned Additional
Advocate General.
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7. The learned counsel Sri Nitin Prasad appearing for the 4th
respondent would vehemently contend that non-service of notice
cannot be accepted, as the notice under Section 28(2) was issued
to the petitioner. The petitioner has not placed on record any
document to demonstrate that he has received clearance in terms
of law to set up a 12 MW captive power plant. The lands purchased
by the petitioner were agricultural lands. Therefore, it was hit by
Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The land
allotted to the 4th respondent was after due deliberation by the
Board under the Act. Therefore, there is no ground to grant the
prayer that is sought for by the petitioner.
8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
9. The afore-narrated facts, dates and link in the chain of
events are all a matter of record. The preliminary notification is
issued on 05-02-2010 seeking to acquire vast area of land for
industrial purpose. A notice under sub-section (2) of Section 28 of
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the Act is said to have been issued to the petitioner. There is no
record produced to demonstrate that it was ever served upon the
petitioner. Without service of notice under sub-section (2) of
Section 28, it cannot be said that an enquiry under sub-Section (3)
of Section 28 gets complete. Nonetheless, a Final Notification
comes to be issued on 04-05-2010. What happened in the subject
petition and how it comes to be restored are all narrated
hereinabove, which would not require reiteration. A communication
dated 22-11-2017 from the 4th respondent to the Board assumes
significance and it reads as follows:
"Arcelor Mittal
Ref.No.AMIPL/KIADB/2017-18 22-11-2017
The Chief Executive Officer & Executive Member,
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board,
4th Floor, No.49, Khanija Bhavan,
Race Course Road, Bangalore-560 001.
Dear Sir,
Subject: Request for allocation of 37.87 acres of
alternate land in Villages Kudithini and
Veeniveerapura, Ballari District.
We would like to bring to your notice some of the issues we are
facing which need your kind attention.
As you are kindly aware, Arcelor Mittal has received the
Allotment Letter and Possession Certificate for 2659.75
acres of private land from KIADB. Out of this area,
physical possession of Survey Number 661/B(P) to the
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extent of 2.00 acres was not taken by the company due to
existing ancestral samadhi of land owner Mr.
Revanasiddappa and also survey number 902 and 907(P)
to the extent of 19.34 acres belonging to Agarwal Sponge
Iron Plant in respect of which a court case is pending
before Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka. Further, some
portion of our land at Village Kudithini is located adjacent
to NH-63 from which the National Highway Authority of
India (NHAI) has acquired 16.53 acres of land for
diversion of bypass road for connecting the same to NH-
63 outside the Kudithini village.
We therefore request KIADB to allot equal area i.e., 37.87
acres of alternate land in KIADB industrial area located
adjacent to our south western part of project layout. We
have also identified such alternate land to the extent of
37.87 acres in KIADB industrial area and prepared a
sketch and list of survey numbers, which is annexed
herewith for your kind perusal.
We request you to look into the matter and do the needful
please.
Yours faithfully,
For Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited,
Sd/-
Authorised Signatory."
(Emphasis added)
The 4th respondent communicates to the Board that in three survey
numbers to an extent of 19.34 acres belonging to the petitioner
possession is not handed over. In the interregnum, an analogous
matter concerning the same acquisition came up for consideration
12
before the Apex Court. The Apex Court on 31-01-2023 in Civil
Appeal Nos. 621-700 of 2023 has passed the following order:
"Leave granted.
Delay in filing substitution is condoned.
Application for brining the legal representatives on record
is allowed.
These appeals arise out of the legal acquisition
proceedings under the Karnataka Industrial Area Development
Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1966 Act"]. The first
respondent-Board was constituted under the 1966 Act. On
05.02.2010, a Notification under sub-Section (1) of Section 28
of the 1966 Act notifying lands totally admeasuring 4993.65
acres specifically for acquisition for the purposes of development
of respondent No.3 Company [Arcelor Mittal India Pvt.
Ltd.]/beneficiary Company. The Final Notification under sub-
Section (4) of Section 28 of the 1966 Act was issued on
04.05.2010 which again specifically mentions that the lands
subject matter of the Notification are being acquired for the
benefit of the beneficiary Company. As a result of the
Notification under sub-Section (4) of Section 28, the total land
admeasuring 4864.64 acres vested in the State Government by
virtue of sub-Section (5) of Section 28.
The second respondent-Special Land Acquisition Officer
made an Award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1894 Act") determining
market value at Rs.1,50,000/- per acre. Even the Award
specifically mentions that the acquisition was for the project of
the beneficiary Company.
The owners invoked Section 18 of the 1894 Act and
accordingly, a Reference was made to the Civil Court. On the
application made by the owners, the beneficiary Company was
impleaded in the Reference proceedings under Section 18 of the
1894 Act. The Land Acquisition Officer was already a party to
the Reference.
13
In exercise of the powers under Section 31 of the 1966
Act, the State Government appointed an Officer of the Board to
exercise the powers of a Deputy Commissioner for
determination of the compensation payable. The Officer was
designated as the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Evidence was
adduced before the Reference Court by the owners as well as by
the Special Land Acquisition Officer. After completion of the
recording of evidence, an application was made by the
beneficiary Company contending that the Board was a necessary
party. The Reference Court rejected the said application and
proceeded to pass an Award granting enhancement in
compensation.
Separate appeals were preferred by the Board
before the High Court. The main contention raised by the
Board in the appeals was that by virtue of Clause [c] of
Section 20 of the 1894 Act as amended for the State of
Karnataka, it was entitled to receive a notice of the
Reference under Section 18. By accepting the said
contention, the Division Bench of the High Court
proceeded to set aside the Award made under Section 18
of the 1894 Act and remanded the References back to the
Reference Court for deciding afresh after notifying the
Board in accordance Clause [c] of Section 20(2) of the
1894 Act.
The submission of the appellants is that the Board was
neither a necessary nor a proper party to the Reference
proceedings as the beneficiary Company was the person for
whose benefit the acquisition was made. Secondly, it is pointed
out that on behalf of the Board, the Special Land Acquisition
Officer stepped into the witness box and adduced evidence.
Thirdly, it is pointed out that though the beneficiary Company
was a party to the Reference under Section 18, the Award of the
Reference Court was never challenged by the beneficiary
Company.
The contention of the first respondent-Board before us is
that it being a authority within the meaning of Clause [c] of
Section 20 of the 1894 Act, it was entitled to a notice of the
Reference proceedings along with the beneficiary Company.
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On a query made by us, the learned counsel appearing
for the Board did not dispute that the entire compensation in
this case will be payable by the beneficiary Company. The
learned counsel also pointed out that after the acquisition was
completed, certain portion of the acquired land has come back
to the Board. We have also heard learned counsel appearing for
the beneficiary Company.
Before we deal with Clause [c] of Section 20 of the
1894 Act, we may note here that going by the
Notifications issued under sub-Sections (1) and (4) of
Section 28 of the 1966 Act, the acquisition was
specifically for the benefit of the beneficiary Company.
Under sub-Section (1) of Section 28, the State
Government has a power to notify a land for acquisition,
both for the purposes of development by the Board or for
any other purpose in furtherance of the object of the Act.
Both the Notifications clearly lay down that the land was
not sought to be acquired for the purposes of the
development by the Board but for the activities of the
beneficiary Company.
Apart from that, there is an agreement dated
02.06.2012 executed by and between the beneficiary
Company and the Board which contains Clause 5. The
said Clause incorporates obligation of the beneficiary
Company to pay the enhancement of land compensation
as per the decree of the competent Court. The agreement
also records that initial compensation amount has already
been deposited by the beneficiary Company with the
Board.
Therefore, in the facts of the case, there is no
manner of doubt that the acquisition was only for the
benefit of the beneficiary Company and that the liability
to pay compensation as well as the enhanced
compensation was only of the beneficiary Company. On
facts, it must be noted that the Special Land Acquisition Officer
who is admittedly an Officer of the Board stepped into the
witness box before the Reference Court. In the cross
examination, he accepted that he was deposing on behalf of the
Officers of the Board as well as on behalf of CEO of the Board.
Documentary evidence was also adduced by him.
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We have perused the impugned judgment. A finding has
been recorded that the Board and the beneficiary Company are
jointly and severally liable to pay compensation. This finding is
based on interpretation of Clause [c] of Section 20 of the 1894
Act, as amended for the State of Karnataka. There is a finding
recorded that notice was required to be issued on the
References under Section 18 both to the beneficiary Company
and the Board. For the sake of convenience, we may reproduce
Section 20 as amended for State of Karnataka which reads thus:
"20. Service of Notice.- The Court shall
thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which
the Court will proceed to determine the reference, and
directing their appearance before the Court on that day,
to be served on the following persona namely:
(a) the Deputy Commissioner;
(b) all persons interested in the reference; and
(c) If the acquisition is not made for the
Government, the person or authority for whom it
is made."
In this case, acquisition is admittedly not for the benefit
of the State Government. Clause [c] requires notice to be issued
in such a case either to the person for whom acquisition is made
or for the authority for whom the acquisition is made. Clause [c]
incorporates the word "or" between "the person" and "authority"
and not the word "and".
In the facts of the case, the beneficiary Company is
the person for whom the land was notified for acquisition
and it is beneficiary Company which was liable to pay
compensation and enhanced compensation to the
owners. Therefore, there was no occasion for the High
Court to come to the conclusion that the notice under
Clause [c] of Section 20 was required to be issued to the
Board as well as to the Company. There was no
requirement of issuing notice to the Board in the facts of
the case.
In the impugned judgment, the High Court has noted that
not only that the Award of the Reference Court was not
challenged by the beneficiary Company, but during the course of
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hearing of the appeals, no submissions were canvassed by the
learned counsel representing the beneficiary Company.
Therefore, the finding of the High Court that the Award of
the Reference Court is bad on account of failure to issue notice
to the Board is completely erroneous and is required to be set
aside. Hence, there was no warrant for passing an order of
remand.
Hence, the appeals succeed and the impugned judgment
of the High Court is set aside and the Awards made under
Section 18 of the 1894 Act by the Reference Court are restored.
We direct the beneficiary Company to pay the entire
amount payable as per the Award of the Reference Court to the
owners within a period of three months from today.
No orders as to costs."
The question before the Apex Court was, whether notice had to be
issued to the Board under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, since the land owner had sought reference under Section 18
of the Land Acquisition Act. The Apex Court holds that since
acquisition of land is for the purpose of 4th respondent and not
public purpose, the compensation was payable by the 4th
respondent and not the Board.
10. After the said order, in a particular writ petition before the
Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.776 of 2023, the 4th
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respondent submits that it would return the entire land of 2643
acres. The order dated 06-10-2023 passed by the Apex Court in the
writ petition filed by the 4th respondent reads as follows:
"Application for exemption from filing O.T. is allowed.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions,
states that in view of the changed scenario the petitioner
is not desirous of keeping the land and will return the
entire land of 2643 acres. The amount paid of Rs. 267
crores can also be forfeited by the Development Board.
Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 seeks time to
obtain instructions.
Issue notice.
In view of the aforesaid changed situation, learned
counsel for respondent No. 1 accepts notice in the aforesaid
context.
We may note the concern of the learned counsel
representing the farmers that they have to receive
compensation and whether the petitioner or any third party with
whom the Board has to deal with.
List on 30.10.2023."
Therefore, two things would emerge from the aforesaid orders, that
acquisition was not for public purpose and the land to an extent of
certain acres would be returned back to the Board.
11. During all these processes, the possession of the land
remained with the petitioner, as could be gathered from the
18
communication quoted supra. It is also an admitted fact that no
award is passed qua the lands of the petitioner. In the light of the
possession not being taken on manifold reasons and no award
being passed, what would become applicable is the law declared by
the Division Bench of this Court in THE SPECIAL LAND
ACQUISITION OFFFICER v. K.B.LINGARAJU1 wherein the
Division Bench has held as follows:
".... .... ....
7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that no period
of limitation has been prescribed for conclusion of the
proceeding initiated under the KIAD Act and, therefore, the
proceeding could not have been declared to have lapsed on
account of efflux of time. It is also urged that the learned Single
Judge ought to have appreciated that the provisions of Section
11-A of the Act of 1894 does not apply to the proceeding
initiated under the KIAD Act.
8. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents has supported the order passed by the learned
Single Judge.
9. We have considered the submissions made on both the
sides and have perused the record. The Supreme Court in
M.NAGABHUSHANA vs STATE OF KARNATAKA (2011) 3
SCC 408 has held that the KIAD Act is a self-contained code
and is a law relating to acquisition of land for public purpose and
for payment of compensation. It was further held that once the
proceeding for acquisition of land is initiated under the KIAD
Act, the provisions under Section 11A of the Act of 1894 do not
1
Writ Appeal No.6819 of 2017 disposed of on 28-09-2022
19
apply to the acquisition under the KIAD Act. The aforesaid
decision was relied upon in SLAO, KIADB MYSORE vs
ANASUYA BAI DEAD BY LRS (2017) 3 SCC 313. Thus, it is
evident that the Act is a self-contained code and the time limits
prescribed under the Act of 1894 do not apply in respect of the
land acquired under the KIAD Act. The proceeding under the
KIAD Act cannot be held to have been lapsed if the award is not
passed within a period of two years in view of the timeline
prescribed under Section 11A of the Act of 1894.
10. We are aware that the KIAD Act does not
prescribe any time limit for conclusion of the proceeding
and a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
OFFSHORE HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED vs. BANGALORE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS (2011) 3 SCC
139 which has been subsequently adverted to in
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER
vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER (2018) 9 SCC
122 has held that the provisions of Section 11-A of the
Act of 1894 cannot be read into the provisions of the
Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.
11. It is well settled in law that the right to hold the
property is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article
300-A of the Constitution of India. No citizen can be
deprived of his property without following due process of
law. It is well settled legal proposition that where a
statute does not provide for time limit of performance of
an act, such act has to be performed within a reasonable
time and what would be the reasonable time has to be
decided in the facts and circumstances of the cases. (See:
'MEHER RUSI DALAL vs. UNION OF INDIA (2004) 7 SCC
362, P.K.SREEKANTAN vs. P.SREEKUMARAN NAIR (2006)
13 SCC 574 and K.B.NAGUR vs. UNION OF INDIA (2012) 4
SCC 483). Therefore, in the facts of the case, we have to
ascertain whether the acquisition proceeding initiated by
KIADB is vitiated on account of inordinate delay in
conclusion of the same.
12. However, in the instant case, the preliminary
notification was issued on 15.09.2000 whereas, the final
notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act was issued on
13.05.2005. Even after a period of 7 years from the date of
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decision of the Division Bench of this Court, i.e. on
16.12.2010, no action was taken by KIADB to conclude
the proceeding of land acquisition. No explanation has
been offered for the delay of 7 years in concluding the
proceeding which is fatal. Therefore, the learned Single
Judge in the facts of the case and in the absence of the
any explanation on behalf of the appellants for the delay
in concluding the land acquisition proceeding has rightly
held that the land acquisition proceedings insofar as it
pertains to lands of the respondents have lapsed on
account of efflux of time.
For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any
ground to divert with the view taken by the learned
Single Judge."
This is called in question by the Board before the Apex Court. The
Apex Court rejects SLP in S.L.P.(Civil) - Diary No.38087 of 2023 by
a detailed order. The order dated 26-09-2023 reads as follows:
"1. Delay condoned.
2. The State of Karnataka issued a preliminary notification
under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Act, 1966 (in short "KIAD Act") on 15.09.2000
proposing to acquire the land of the respondents. It was
followed by final notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD
Act on 15.06.2005. The said notification was quashed by the
High Court on 15.10.2008 on the ground of unreasonable delay
of five years in issuing the same. However, in appeal, the
acquisition process was upheld vide judgment dated
16.12.2010, and a direction was issued to the State/Board to
determine the market value of the land as on the date of the
final notification, i.e., 13.05.2005.
3. The aggrieved land owners approached this Court, but
their claim has turned down on 18.01.2016. It is an admitted
fact that there was no interim stay granted by this Court.
Regardless thereto, the petitioners chose to issue notices under
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Sections 9 and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on
26.05.2016.
4. The above-stated notices gave rise to the second round
of litigation initiated by the expropriated land owners. The
Single Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition on
17.08.2017 and held that the acquisition qua respondent nos.1
and 2 had lapsed due to the delay on the part of the
petitioner/Board in passing the award. On appeal, vide the
impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has
affirmed the view taken by the learned Single Judge.
5. The Division Bench, while rejecting the writ appeal, has
opined as follows:
"12. However, in the instant case, the
preliminary notification was issued on 15.09.2000
whereas, the final notification under Section 28(4) of the
KIAD Act was issued on 13.05.2005. Even after a period
of 7 years from the date of decision of the Division
Bench of this Court, i.e. on 16.12.2010, no action was
taken by KIADB to conclude the proceeding of land
acquisition. No explanation has been offered for the
delay of 7 years in concluding the proceeding which is
fatal. Therefore, the learned Single Judge in the facts of
the case and in the absence of the any explanation on
behalf of the appellants for the delay in concluding the
land acquisition proceeding has rightly held that the land
acquisition proceedings insofar as it pertains to lands of
the respondents have lapsed on account of efflux of
time."
6. With reference to the reasons assigned by the High
Court, we have heard learned senior counsel on behalf of the
petitioner/Board. It is not in dispute that there was no legal
impediment for passing the award during pendency of the
proceedings before this Court as no interim order was
operative. The plea that the possession had already been
taken in the year 2010 is totally untenable and appears to
be directly in the teeth of Article 300A of the Constitution
of India.
7. It is an admitted fact that there is a delay of 16
years, i.e., from 2000 to 2016 in passing the award.
22
Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, the view taken by the High Court does not warrant
any interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
8. The special leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.
9. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
12. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed and the
prayers to be granted, on the sole score that the 4th respondent/
beneficiary has itself indicated that it wants to return 2643 acres of
land, which undoubtedly consists lands of the petitioner, as
possession was never taken.
13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) Preliminary Notification No. C1/86/SPQ/2010 dated 5-02-2010 and Final Notification No. C1/86/SPQ/2010 dated 04-05-2010 issued by the 1st respondent stand 23 quashed qua the lands bearing Sy.Nos.902B, 907A, 907B of Kudithini Village, Bellary District.
Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2023 also stands disposed.
SD/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ