Delhi District Court
Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Soceity (Regd.) on 21 October, 2021
IN THE COURT OF SHRI GIRISH KATHPALIA,
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE (HQs)
& RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL (CENTRAL)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019
GOVIND RAM
S/o SH. BANWARI LAL
R/o 9271-J, GROUND FLOOR
GAUSHALA KISHAN GANJ
DOUBLE PHATAK, KISHAN GANJ
DELHI-110 006 .....APPELLANT
VERSUS
DELHI PINJRAPOLE SOCEITY (REGD.)
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
372, KHARI BAOLI, DELHI-110 006 .......RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 16.04.2019
First date before this court : 19.07.2019
Arguments concluded on : 11.10.2021
Date of Decision : 21.10.2021
RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019
SUMAN LATA
W/o SH. GOVIND RAM
R/o 9271-JHA, GROUND FLOOR
GAUSHALA KISHAN GANJ
DOUBLE PHATAK, KISHAN GANJ
DELHI-110 006 .....APPELLANT
VERSUS
DELHI PINJRAPOLE SOCEITY (REGD.)
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
372, KHARI BAOLI, DELHI-110 006
.......RESPONDENT
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.)
RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.)
RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 1 of 31 pages
GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA
Date: 2021.10.21 12:02:56 +05'30'
Date of filing : 21.05.2019
First date before this court : 19.07.2019
Arguments concluded on : 11.10.2021
Date of Decision : 21.10.2021
RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019
SUMAN LATA
W/o SH. GOVIND RAM
R/o 9271-A, FIRST FLOOR
GAUSHALA KISHAN GANJ
DOUBLE PHATAK, KISHAN GANJ
DELHI-110 006 .....APPELLANT
VERSUS
DELHI PINJRAPOLE SOCEITY (REGD.)
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
372, KHARI BAOLI, DELHI-110 006 .......RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 01.08.2019
First date before this court : 01.08.2019
Arguments concluded on : 11.10.2021
Date of Decision : 21.10.2021
APPEARANCE : Shri S.P. Aggarwal, counsel for appellants
Shri Pankaj Singhal, counsel for respondent
COMMON JUDGMENT
1. These three appeals, arising out of similar eviction orders are based on similar factual and legal matrix, so taken up together for disposal. The appellants tenants in these appeals under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act have assailed orders dated 03.05.2019 of the learned Additional Rent Controller whereby eviction petitions filed by the present respondent landlord under Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act were allowed. On service of notice, respondent society entered appearance through counsel to oppose these appeals. I heard learned counsel for both sides and examined the trial court record. RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 2 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 12:02:28 +05'30'
2. Briefly stated, circumstances leading to the present appeals are as follows.
2.1 The present respondent being a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and being landlord of Gaushala Kishan Ganj, Double Phatak, Kishan Ganj, Delhi, inducted the appellant Govind Ram as a tenant in respect of premises No. 9271-J, ground floor, Gaushala, Kishan Ganj at a monthly rent of Rs. 40/-, and the appellant Smt. Suman Lata as a tenant in respect of premises No. 9271-A, first floor and 9271- Jha, ground floor of Gaushala Kishan Ganj at a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- and Rs. 40/- respectively. Tenancy of the appellants in respect of premises no. 9271-A and 9271-J was for residential purposes while tenancy of the appellant in respect of premises no. 9271-Jha was for commercial purpose. As regards premises no. 9271-A, no rent agreement was executed, and it was an old tenancy, whereas regarding the remaining two premises, the tenancy was created vide rent agreements dated 07.08.2001.
2.2 The present respondent landlord, being a registered society is running a Gaushala under the name and style Gaushala Kishan Ganj where about 1300 cows and calves are housed, taken care of by 25 permanent employees and about 25 daily wagers. The employees of the respondent society work daily from 04:00am to 10:00am and thereafter from 05:00pm to 08:00pm for mulching etc. of cows and feeding the cows and calves. During the intervening period from 10:00am to 05:00pm, the employees and daily wagers of the respondent society require place to stay. Although the 25 permanent employees of the RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 3 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 12:02:05 +05'30' respondent society are being provided accommodation, but the same is not sufficient. Even the covered space with the respondent society to house those 1300 cows and calves is insufficient, due to which winter season is fatal to them. Therefore, the respondent society requires the tenanted premises for accommodation of cows and calves sheltered by it and for use of its employees for furtherance of its activities. Pleading these circumstances, the respondent society filed eviction petitions under Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act against the present appellants and other tenants.
2.3 The appellants, on being issued notice of the eviction proceedings, appeared before the Additional Rent Controller and filed their respective written statements, mainly pleading that the respondent society cannot be treated as "public institution" within the meaning of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act; that each of the appellants had been inducted as tenant in the tenanted premises about 40 years ago by Shri Ram Bhagat after taking Rs. 2,50,000/- from each of them; and that the respondent society is not authorized to run Gaushala as they do not hold any license issued by municipal authorities. Therefore, according to the appellants, the eviction petitions were liable to be dismissed.
2.4 The present respondent society filed replications before the learned Additional Rent Controller, denying the pleadings of the appellants and reaffirmed the petition contents. The present respondent society specifically denied payment of any money to Shri Ram Bhagat by any of the appellants and pleaded that this is just a concocted story of the appellants.
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 4 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 12:01:42 +05'30' 2.5 Subsequent to the completion of pleadings, the appellants filed applications under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking permission to amend their written statements in order to specifically plead that in view of judgment dated 27.07.2012 of the court of Ms. Sujata Kohli, ADJ, Delhi the respondent society is an industry and a private trust, not authorized to run Gaushala. But those amendment applications were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 30.05.2017, which order was upheld by my learned predecessor in appeal by way of order dated 27.04.2018.
2.6 On the basis of above rival pleadings, trial was conducted before the learned Additional Rent Controller, in which three witnesses were examined on behalf of the respondent society and two witnesses were examined on behalf of each of the appellants. After hearing both sides, the learned Additional Rent Controller delivered the findings that the respondent society is a public institution and requires the tenanted premises bonafide for accommodation of their employees as well as of their cows and calves. Accordingly, the eviction petitions were allowed by way of the impugned judgments. Hence, the present appeals.
3. Both sides addressed arguments in these appeals on two questions: whether the present respondent society is a "public institution", and if so, whether requirement of the tenanted premises for accommodation of employees and of cows and calves can be held to be "for furtherance of activities" of the respondent society within the meaning of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 5 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 12:01:19 +05'30'
4. Learned counsel for appellants argued that the present respondent society does not fall within the definition of "public institution" as stipulated in the Explanation to Section 22 of the Act. It was argued that the expression "public institution" within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act would cover only the educational institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary, provided the same have not been set up by any private trust. Since the present respondent society is admittedly running a Gaushala, according to the appellants, the present respondent society cannot be taken to be a "public institution". It was also argued that since the present respondent society is engaged in selling milk, cow urine and cow dung, it is not even a charitable institution. Further, learned counsel for appellants argued that in order to make out a case under Section 22 of the Act, the landlord has to establish that the premises are required for furtherance of their activities, which means expansion of activities, whereas in the present case, the need established by the present respondent society is only as regards the existing activities insofar as the present respondent society needs the tenanted premises for residence of its existing employees and for a shed for its cows. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for appellants placed reliance on the judgments in the cases of Siya Ram Gupta vs Shrimati Ganga Devi Jain Bharmarth Trust, Delhi, 1960 SCC Online Punjab 87; Gulab Rai Kishori Lal vs Banarsidas Chandiwala Sewa SmarakTrast, LAWS (P&H) - 1964-3-24; Sri Prachin Durga Mandir & Gaushala vs East Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr, WP(C) 4858/2013 decided on 02.08.2013 by a Single Judge Bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court; Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust vs Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal, ILR 1973 Delhi 144; and Bombay Pinjrapole, RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 6 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 12:00:54 +05'30' Bhuleshwar vs The Workmen & Another, 1971 SCC (3) 349. In addition, learned counsel for appellants also placed reliance on order dated 24.07.2012 of the court of Ms. Sujata Kohli, learned ADJ-04 (West) Tis Hazari Courts Delhi passed in the suits titled: Govind Ram Sharma vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society and Smt. Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society, MCA No. 12/11 and 13/11.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the present respondent society argued that the order passed by Ms. Sujata Kohli, learned ADJ is not binding on this court and is also distinguishable on facts. Learned counsel for the present respondent society took me through the pleadings and evidence on record of the learned trial court in support of his argument that keeping in mind the aims and objects of the respondent society, it is clearly a "public institution" and requires bonafide the tenanted premises for furtherance of its activities. Learned counsel for the present respondent society also argued that definition of the expression "public institution" is very vast and clearly covers the respondent society as well. It was further argued by learned counsel that there is no evidence at all to show that the respondent society is engaged in sale of cow urine or cow dung. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for respondent society placed reliance on the judgments in the cases of M/s Sarvedshak Arya Pratinidhi Sabha vs Ranjit Singh & Sons, ILR (1974) II Delhi 63; Chuni Lal vs University Of Delhi & Ors, 1970 RCR(Rent) 742; MCD vs Badri, 1966(2) DLT 294; Shanti Swaroop vs Badri Bhagat Jhandewala Temple Society, MANU/DE/1986/2017; Sh. Jagdish Chandra Lekha vs All India Blind Relief Society, MANU/DE 4041/2014; The Electric and Motor Works RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 7 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 12:00:28 +05'30' (P) Ltd. vs YWCA, Trivandrum, MANU/KE/0186/1970; Bombay Panjrapole, Bhuleshwar vs The Workmen And Another, AIR 1971 SC 2422; Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs A. Rajappa & Others, AIR 1978 SC 969; ITO (E) vs M/s Bombay Pinjrapole Trust, order dated 24.05.2013 of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai; Shiv Lal vs Shree Gaushala, CR No. 6726 of 2014 decided by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court on 11.02.2015; and Sir Jamshetjee Jeejeebhoy vs The State Of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2005 Bombay
32.
6. In rebuttal arguments, learned counsel for appellants argued that in view of order dated 24.07.2012 of Ms. Sujata Kohli, ADJ, Delhi, the present respondent society is completely prohibited from running a Gaushala and that being so, they cannot come under Section 22 of the Act.
7. At the very outset, I consider it appropriate to deal with order dated 24.07.2012 of my coordinate judicial officer Ms. Sujata Kohli, the then ADJ-04, West, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi. No doubt, an order passed by a judicial officer of the district judiciary cannot operate as a binding judicial precedent, as submitted by learned counsel for the respondent society. But at the same time, in order to ensure uniformity and consistency of views, once an order passed by a judicial officer is cited by either side, the court must examine the same. Having perused the said order passed by Ms. Sujata Kohli, ADJ, Delhi, in my considered view the said order is not relevant for the present purposes. The said order was passed by the learned ADJ in an appeal challenging the grant RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 8 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:59:53 +05'30' of interim injunction whereby the present appellants had been restrained from running a dairy inside the tenanted premises. The learned ADJ after examining the entire material on record arrived at a view that parties were yet to lead evidence as to whether the present appellants were running a dairy from the tenanted premises or not, because report of the local commissioner was to the contrary. Besides that, the learned ADJ also took a view that the rent agreement dated 07.08.2001 referred to above had been challenged by the present appellants and was required to be proved by way of evidence, so interim injunction ought not to have been granted. It is under these circumstances that Ms. Sujata Kohli, learned ADJ allowed the appeals vide order dated 24.07.2012 and set aside the impugned interim injunction order.
8. In the case of Siya Ram Gupta (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for appellants, the circumstances were that under a Will executed by one Smt. Ganga Devi Jain in 1935, the respondent trust was created and parts of the premises forming the trust property, occupied by tenants, were directed to be used as a dharamshala for sadhus and mahants. The issue was whether the respondent trust, which had filed suits against tenants under Section 17 of the Act of 1952, claiming itself to be a public institution, requiring the tenanted premises for furtherance of its activities, could succeed. The trial court and the appellate court held that the respondent was a public trust and it was a public institution within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act and that it required bonafide the tenanted premises for furtherance of its activities. The Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court examined as to whether a charitable trust is necessarily a public institution within the meaning of Section 17 of the RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 9 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:59:27 +05'30' Act, in which while the term is not defined, but it is illustrated by the Explanation (which definition is same as the definition in Explanation to Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act) and held that a charitable institution of the nature of plaintiff's trust, is not necessarily public institution within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act. The Hon'ble High Court placed reliance on an earlier judgment of the same High Court and held that if every charitable trust was intended to be within the ambit of Section 17, the legislature would have used that expression instead of using the expression "public institution".
9. Learned counsel for appellants referred to the judgment of Gulab Rai Kishori Lal (supra) but without giving a recognized citation, so the same could not be located. However, learned counsel for appellants had filed two pages of the said judgment from which it appears that in that case also the tenants had contended that not by any means every charitable trust is a "public institution" within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, I could not draw benefit from the said judgment. In any case, the judgment of the Gulab Rai Kishori Lal (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for appellants was discarded by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of M/s Sarvedshak Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (supra).
10. In the case of Sri Prachin Durga Mandir & Gaushala (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for appellants, the writ petitioners before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court had challenged a notice issued by the municipality calling upon the writ petitioners to remove the cows in excess/maximum permissible number from their premises. After RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 10 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:59:02 +05'30' traversing through the relevant provision of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that the Municipal Corporation had permitted maximum four cows for the religious purposes and there was no reason why for religious purpose, the petitioners could demand to keep more cows, because there is nuisance and hazard from existence of such animals in the congested city.
11. In the case of Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for appellants, the eviction petition under Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was dismissed by the Rent Controller and the dismissal was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal on the ground that the appellant is not a public institution and that the premises were not needed in furtherance of the activities of the public institution bonafide and that one of the co-trustees could not bring the eviction petition in the name of the trust. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court examined the nature and scope of the expressions "trust" and "an institution". It was held that a "trust" is primarily a legal concept, a mode of transfer of property and of holding property, whereas "an institution" is primarily a social concept. Although founders of the trust had transferred their property to a charitable purpose by creating public trust, but the body to translate the trust into a living and active principle had not yet come in existence and the Hon'ble High Court held that it is that body which will be entitled to be called "an institution". It is in this context that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court observed that if intention of the legislature in Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was to enable the trustees of every charitable trust to avail themselves of Section 22, then nothing was easier for the legislature than to use the word RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 11 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:58:29 +05'30' "charitable trust" in the place of the words "public institution". Thus, the Hon'ble High Court upheld the view of the learned Rent Controller as well as Rent Control Tribunal to the effect that the trustees and the trust were not the public institution. The Hon'ble High Court held thus :
"The expression "public institution" which originally means an established society or a foundation of a public character has also been at times applied to the building or buildings occupied by such an organization. Neither the organization carrying on the activity nor the building housing the organization carrying on such activities has been shown to exist in the present case. It is only the former owner of the building who are trying to get their purpose served through the facade of a public trust. It cannot be said, therefore, that their need for the premises is bonafide".
12. In the case of Bombay Pinjrapole, Bhuleshwar (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for both sides, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held on the facts and circumstances of the case that the Bombay Pinjrapole is an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act; that the activities of the Pinjrapole, though charitable at the beginning, was not exclusively so in the later years, and that the later activities show that it was carried on as a business concern insofar as the value of the milk supplied for the last 3 or 4 years itself was well in excess of Rs. 2,00,000/- per annum, which could only be possible if the cows and buffaloes had been kept and maintained not merely to keep them alive but with the idea of getting as much production out of them as possible and the Pinjrapole was run like a dairy farm. That was in context of an industrial dispute raised by RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 12 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:58:05 +05'30' workers employed with Bombay Pinjrapole. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the basis of material on record observed that the Bombay Pinjrapole started in 1834 was originally a charitable institution for the care and protection of animals but gradually it expanded its activities to such an extent it became a dairy farm. In the present case there is no such material on record to reflect that the respondent society is primarily a business entity engaged in dairy farming for earning purposes.
13. In the case of M/s Sarvedshak Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (supra), the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that setting up of center for preparing competent preachers of Vedic dharma would be an activity which would bring the society within the ambit of a "public institution". The Hon'ble High Court held thus:
"47. ...... Now the question for determination is whether the society is "public institution" within the meaning of section 22 of the Act. Explanation to this section without doubt shows that the definition is illustrative and not exhaustive. It therefore, cannot be said that only an educational institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary can be said to be a "public institution". The term "public institution"
used in section 22 of the Act is in a generic sense.
48. The society claimed the possession of the premises in question for the furtherance of its activities as a "public institution" and for opening an educational institution for girls. The respondents in their written statement controverted this allegation by saying that "the petitioner - sabha can hardly be called a public institution. They have no activity which can be called beneficial for the public in general. Their aims are religious and political".
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 13 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:57:41 +05'30' ......
50. ....... It was further submitted that the meaning of the word "institution" according to Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Vol. 1), 1961 Edition, is, "An establishment, organisation, or association, instituted for the promotion of some object, esp. one of public utility, religious, charitable, educational etc." The word "Institution", it was contended, according to its definition in the aforesaid dictionary embraces "religious institutions" being a purpose one of public utility.
51. There appears to be force in the contention of the learned counsel for the society. It would be instructive here to note the decision in Royal Choral Society vs Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (1943) 2 All.E.R.
101. In that case the income of the society was sought to be taxed on the plea that it was not a society "established for charitable purposes only" and that its income was not "exclusively applied for such purposes". It may be noted that the object of the society was "encouragement and advancement of choral singing". The contention of the Inland Revenue Commissioner was that the real purpose of the society must be taken to be not one which was educational or otherwise charitable, but one which was of pure entertainment; the singers sing in order to have pleasure of singing. Lord Greene, M.R., dealing with the contention observed at page 104 that there was no flavour of commercial profit, or anything of that kind, about the society. So far as the choir was concerned, the object was held to be "encouragement and advancement of choral singing". Bearing in mind the nature of works and the medium through which they RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 14 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:57:19 +05'30' were performed it was observed that the object so far as the public was concerned, were educational.
Accordingly it was observed at page 105 that, "a body of persons established for the purpose of raising the artistic taste of the country and established by an appropriate document which confines them to that purpose is established for educational purposes, because the education of artistic taste is one of the most important things in the development of a civilized human being". Further, it was observed that, "the fact that the performances are given to the public is not of such great importance, because the circumstances that the choir is being trained, that the training and practice of the choir is one of the principal objects, and in fact may be the primary object of this society leads to the result that the public performance may be regarded as something which is a consequential and necessary part of the training; because you cannot train people satisfactorily if they do nothing but rehearse - they must perform". The society was accordingly held to be engaged in rendering services of musical art and thus promoting the cause of aesthetic education.
52. Reference may also be made to Trilochan Singh vs The Director, Small Industries Service Institute. That was a case of footwear training centre wherein technical training was imparted to the students in the manufacture of footwear. Dealing with the contention whether the imparting of technical training in the manufacture of footwear was an educational activity or not, a Division Bench of the Court observed at page 71, "Education means a systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young boys or even to adults in preparation for the work in life. It need not necessarily be confined to science and arts. Vocational training will RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 15 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:56:59 +05'30' be an educational training." In that view of the matter the Central Footwear Training Centre which provided instructions for learning the craft or trade was held to be an educational institution.
53. If the imparting of instruction for learning a craft or trade and activities of a society set up for rendering services to musical art were held to be educational activities, there is merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-society that in establishing a school for imparting training to the students for preparing a competent cadre of preachers of Vedic religion would be an educational activity. It need hardly be emphasized that one of the objects of the appellant-society is to make arrangements for dissemination of Vedic Dharma and by suitable means to prepare competent preachers of Vedic religion apart from establishing a missionary college of Vedic theology, if need be. It is no doubt true that in the petition the possession of the premises in question was specifically sought on the ground that the society wanted to set up a girls school but one cannot lose sight of the fact that at the same time the society claimed possession of the premises for furtherance of its activities. Shri Ram Gopal Shalwala secretary of the appellant-society has categorically stated in his statement that the society wants to set up a training centre for training students for dissemination of Vedic Dharma".
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the case of Chuni Lal (supra), one of the grounds on which the respondent university had applied for eviction of the appellant tenant under Section 22 of the Act was that the premises were required RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 16 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:56:35 +05'30' bonafide by it for the furtherance of its activities. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that the provision of residential accommodation to the staff may not itself be the object for which the university was established but it is a necessary activity which the university has to undertake if the staff is to perform its duties efficiently, therefore, eviction of the appellant tenant by the respondent university must be regarded as being for furtherance of its activities within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act. The Hon'ble High Court held that use of the word "for" before the expression "furtherance of its activities" makes the expression wider than it would be if the word "in" had been used in place of the word "for", so if it is assumed that the provision of quarters is not an essential step in furtherance of the activities of the university, still it may be necessary for furtherance of its activities.
15. In the case of Badri (supra) while dealing with Section 17 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952, which is pari materia to Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held thus:
"6. .... The explanation which uses the word "includes" does not give exhaustively the connotation of "public institution". As observed by the full bench of the Allahabad High Court in Darbari Lal & Ors. vs Smt. Dharanwati, the word "include" is very liberally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and when it is so used these words or phrases must be considered as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. It seems that RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 17 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:56:03 +05'30' the term "public institution" as first occurring in Section 17 of the Act refers to a public institution as organized activity created or established by law or public or authority while when it is used for the second time as well as in the explanation it may be taken to include also the properties like a college or library etc belonging to an institution."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the case of Shanti Swaroop (supra), the Hon'ble High Court distinguished between public trust and private trust, reiterating that in a public trust the beneficiaries of the trust are people in general or some section of the people, while in the case of a private trust, the beneficiaries are an ascertained body of persons, so the beneficiaries of a math, though members of a fraternity and of the faith of which the spiritual head of the math belongs, were held to constitute at least a section of the public and the maths in general were consequently held to be public in character and an institution.
17. In the case of YWCA, Trivandrum (supra), the Hon'ble Kerala High Court while examining the issue pertaining to Section 11(7) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 held that the word "public" used in the expression "public institution" is wide enough to include within its connotation a section of the public and one of the meanings given to the word "public" is "devoted or directed to the promotion of the general welfare". The Hon'ble Court further held that if a thing is not private then it is public and in that sense YWCA Trivandrum can hardly be called a private body because it is an organization for the promotion of some public object.
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 18 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:55:32 +05'30'
18. In the case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus :
"135. It now remains to make a brief survey of the precedents on the point. One case which is germane to the issue is Bombay Pinjrapole. A Bench of this Court considered the earlier caselaw, including the decisions of the High Courts bearing on humane activities for the benefit of sick animals. Let there be no doubt that kindness to out dumb brethren, especially invalids, springs from the highest motives of fellow feeling. In the land of the Buddha and Gandhi no one dare argue to the contrary. So let there be no mistaking our compassionate attitude to suffering creatures. It is laudable and situations dedicated to amelioration of conditions of animals deserve encouragement from the State and affluent philanthropists. But these considerations have no bearing on the crucial factors which invoke the application of the definition in the Act as already set out elaborately by us. "The manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the condition of the cooperation between the employer and the employee necessary for its success and its object to reader material service to the community" is a pivotal factor in the activity-oriented test of an 'industry'. The compassionate motive and the charitable inspiration are noble but extraneous. Indeed, medical relief for human beings made available free by regular hospitals, run by government or philanthropists, employing doctors and supportive staff and business-like terms, may not qualify for exemption from industry. Service to animals cannot be on a higher footing than service to humans. Nor is it possible to contend that love of animals is religious or spiritual any more than love of human beings is. A pinjrapole is no church, mosque or RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 19 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:55:09 +05'30' temple. Therefore, without going into the dairying aspects, income and expenditure and other features of Bombay Pinjrapole, one may hold that the institution is an industry. After all, the employees are engaged, on ordinary economic terms and with conditions of service as in other business institutions and the activities also have organisational comparability to other profit-making dairies or Pinjrapoles. What is different is the charitable object. What is common is the nature of the employer employees relations. The conclusion, notwithstanding the humanitarian overtones, is that such organisations are also industries. Of course, in Bombay Pinjrapole the same conclusion was reached but on different and, to some extent faulty reasoning. For, the assumption in the judgment of Mitter J. is that if the income were mostly from donations and the treatment of animals were free, perhaps such charity, be it a hospital for humans or animals, may not be an industry. We agree with the holding, not because Pinjrapoles have commercial motives but because, despite compassionate objectives, they share business-like orientation and operation. In this view, section 2(j) applies".
19. In the case of Sir Jamshetjee Jeejeebhoy (supra), the Hon'ble Bombay High Court held thus :
"6. In the present case the petitioner trust is a charitable trust and carrying on activity of a Goshala (Pinjrapole). There can be no doubt that running a Goshala is a charitable activity. We may quote the words of Chagla C.J. in D.R. Pradhan Charity Commissioner, Bombay vs The Bombay State Federation of Goshalas and Pinjrapoles, 1957 ILR 140, "....that any society which seeks to advance the object of saving cows from destruction and improving the standard of cattle would RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 20 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:54:46 +05'30' be working for an object of general public utility." We are satisfied that the petitioner trust whose sole object is running and maintaining Goshala is entitled to exemption from levy of house tax under Rule 7(2)(c). The main object of the petitioner Trust is to run Goshala and even if the petitioner is earning some profit by selling cattle or milk for meeting the expenses of Goshala it cannot be said that the petitioner trust ceased to be a charitable trust. In this connection, it is relevant to note, that the authorities have not recorded a finding that any surplus arising from the operation of the petitioner is not utilised for the trust or distributed to any individuals. Merely because the trust is also conducting incidental activity of selling milk and cattle to needy farmers does not mean that it is not a charitable trust within the meaning of Rule 7(2)(c)". (emphasis supplied)
20. In the case of Shiv Lal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus :
"9. In the case in hand, the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority have looked into the genuineness of the claim and reached the conclusion that the need for the demised premises projected by the respondent is bonafide. This argument of learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the shop in possession of the revision petitioner is a small one, keeping in view the area of Gaushala, has no relevance while reaching the conclusion about the genuineness of the bonafide need projected for the space where the demised premises exists. A Gaushala caters to the need of hundreds of cows. The area is not used only for the cows but also for storing the feed, cutting and preparing of feed, growing of green fodder, residence of the employees etc. A particular place may have relevance for use for a particular purpose which RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 21 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:54:19 +05'30' the other location in the entire property owned by the landlord may not have".
21. Falling back to the present case, it would be apposite to briefly traverse through the rival pleadings and the evidence adduced.
22. In para 18(a) of the eviction petitions, the present respondent society pleaded that it is a public institution registered under the Societies Registration Act and engaged in running a Gaushala under the name and style Gaushala Kishan Ganj, taking care of about 1300 cows and calves through 25 permanent employees and 25 daily wagers, who have to work from 04:00am to 10:00am, followed by 05:00pm to 08:00pm daily; that for the period between 10:00am and 05:00pm, the employees and daily wagers require place to stay; that the accommodation in which cows and calves are being kept is not sufficient and is in open, due to which during winter season, survival of cows and calves are at risk; and that the space available with the respondent society is not sufficient to accommodate its employees and even its cows and calves, so the tenanted premises are bonafide required by the respondent society for furtherance of its activities. In the corresponding paragraphs of the written statements, the appellants denied that the respondent society is a public institution and pleaded that the respondent society has no right to run Gaushala as they do not have the requisite municipal license; that as regards number of cows or employees, the appellants have no concern with the same; and that the respondent society does not have any sanctioned plan to raise construction, so the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed.
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 22 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Date:
Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA2021.10.21 11:53:45 +05'30'
23. Coming to the evidence adduced by both sides, on behalf of the present respondent society, its Secretary stepped into the box as PW1 to depose on oath the above mentioned contents of its pleadings. Although, PW1 was cross examined at length, his testimony as regards the issues involved in the present appeal remains unshaken to the extent that the present respondent society is engaged in maintenance of cows and calves through 25-26 employees and same number of daily wagers and that the tenanted premises are required for accommodation of those employees and daily wagers as well as the cows and calves. In his cross examination, PW1 deposed that they do not require any license under Section 417 of the DMC Act; that out of 25-26 permanent employees, only 20 employees could be provided accommodation by the respondent society; that they have approximately 16 sheds in their premises and each shed can accommodate only 15-20 cows depending upon size of the shed and cow, and presently the respondent society has about 1300-1400 cows; and that besides keeping the cows, they sell milk also but not the dairy products.
24. An official from the Provident Fund Department appeared as PW2 and placed on record the details of 35 employees of the respondent society as Ex. PW2/1 (colly). Despite opportunity, counsel for the appellants opted not to cross examine PW2 in the eviction proceedings filed against the appellant Shri Govind Ram. In the eviction proceedings filed against the appellant Suman Lata, PW2 was cross examined by learned counsel for the appellant and PW2 stated that he RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 23 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:53:17 +05'30' could not tell as how many employees have died or left the job or have got retired or have their own houses available.
25. An official from the SDM office appeared as PW3 and proved the Registration Certificate of the respondent society as Ex. PW3/1. Despite opportunity, counsel for the appellants opted not to cross examine PW3 in the eviction proceedings against the appellant Govind Ram. In the eviction proceedings against the appellant Smt. Suman Lata, the witness was cross examined and he stated that the present respondent society is registered under the Societies Registration Act as per certificate, photocopy whereof is on record.
26. Appellant Shri Govind Ram appeared in the witness box as RW1 and deposed in his chief examination affidavit that he is a tenant in the tenanted premises since the year 1967; that in the year 1999, one Ram Bhagat, alleged to be Secretary of the respondent society took a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- from him against receipt but thereafter Shri Ram Bhagat passed away; and that the respondent society does not hold license, so the Gaushala is being run illegally. In his cross examination, RW1 disclosed about various other litigations pending between him and the respondent society, and stated that he does not know the meaning of "public institution", but admitted that the respondent society is a public institution.
27. Appellant Smt. Suman Lata appeared as RW1 in the proceedings against her and deposed on oath the abovementioned contents of her pleadings. But her cross examination reflects that she RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 24 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:52:44 +05'30' knew nothing at all about the present dispute and neither was she conversant with contents of her chief affidavit nor apparently the same was even read over to her. In response to a number of significant questions, RW1 Smt. Suman Lata simply stated : "I have already told my counsel".
28. Shri Darvesh Bhardwaj, son of appellants Govind Ram and Suman Lata appeared as RW2 in the proceedings against both appellants and deposed in his chief examination affidavit that the present respondent society is not a public institution and has no right to run Gaushala and has no sanction to carryout construction. In his cross examination, RW2 denied the suggestions to the contrary, but admitted that Smt. Suman Lata is his mother and the present respondent society had filed two separate petitions regarding separate tenancy of Govind Ram.
29. It is against the above backdrop of factual and legal matrix that the present appeals have to be examined.
30. To begin with, the provision under Article 48 enshrined in part IV of the Constitution of India, as one of the directive principles of State policy, holds that the State shall take steps for prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle. Significance of Gaushalas (cow-shelters) can be drawn from Article 48 also insofar as the cattle, not provided shelter and found stray, is more prone to being captured and slaughtered. Of course, the provisions of part IV of the Constitution of India are not enforceable by courts, but RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 25 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:52:21 +05'30' according to Article 37, the principles laid therein are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. For present purposes, while interpreting the term "public institution" in the context of a Gaushala, this court cannot ignore the weight of Article 48 of the Constitution in the sense that Gaushalas work with the object of saving cows from destruction and improving the standard of cattle, and thereby operate as means for the State to implement the directive principles.
31. There can hardly be any debate over the general public utility of Gaushalas, especially in highly congested cities like Delhi. Stray cattle on roads, on account of lack of space in Gaushalas and lack of number of Gaushalas, cause not just public hygiene concerns, but also serious traffic hazard. Stray cattle on roads leading to fatal vehicular accidents is not unprecedented. So, role of Gaushalas in amelioration of conditions of cows, calves and buffalos are deeds of not just piety, but of significant public good also. As held in the case of Sir Jamshetjee Jeejeebhoy (supra), there can be no doubt that running a Gaushala is a charitable activity and that any society which seeks to advance the object of saving cows from destruction and improving the standard of cattle would be working for an object of general public utility.
32. The judicial precedents relied upon by the learned counsel for appellants, as discussed above, mainly deal with the question as to whether a charitable trust is necessarily a public institution within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and the undisputed legal position is that not every charitable trust is a public institution. But that is not the RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 26 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:51:52 +05'30' dispute in the present case. In the present case, the respondent society does not claim itself to be public institution merely because of its being a registered society. As reflected from pleadings and evidence on record, the respondent society is not merely a society or a trust as the mode of transfer of property or of holding property. The respondent society, for past several decades, is running a cow shelter, in which about 1300 cows and calves are being taken care of and are being looked after by the respondent society through its approximately 50 employees, including the permanent employees and daily wagers. In the case of Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust (supra), relied upon by the appellants what was before the Hon'ble High Court was only a trust, founders whereof had transferred their properties for charitable purposes but the body to translate the trust into living and active principle had not yet come in existence and it is that body which could have been entitled to be called as an institution, according to the High Court. In contrast, in the present case, it is nobody's argument that the respondent society is merely a trust or a collection of individuals engaged in no activity at all. The present respondent society is admittedly engaged in running a Gaushala, taking care of about 1300 cows and calves through manpower of about 50 employees.
33. Merely because of a solitary sentence in the cross examination of PW1 that the respondent society sells milk, it cannot be said that the respondent society is completely or even predominantly engaged in commercial activity, like in the Bombay Pinjrapole, Bhuleshwar case (supra). There was no cross examination of PW1 or any other witness in order to establish that the respondent society is RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 27 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:51:28 +05'30' engaged in sale of cow milk and/or cow urine and/or cow dung in order to earn money more than the money required to maintain and upkeep those cows and calves. Rather, in cross examination PW1 specifically stated that the respondent society is not selling any dairy product. Nor even pleadings of the present appellants are to the effect that the respondent society is engaged in a commercial venture, so does not deserve to be called "public institution". Going by the legal position laid down in the case of Sir Jamshetjee Jeejeebhoy (supra), the main object of the present respondent society being to run Gaushala, even if the respondent society is assumably earning some profit by selling milk for meeting the expenses of Gaushala, it cannot be said that the respondent society ceased to be a charitable trust.
34. So far as the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra) and Bombay Pinjrapole, Bhuleshwar (supra), both judgments were industry centric, and have to be read from the point of view of rights of the workmen and the definition of 'industry', whereas the present proceedings are tenancy centric and that difference has to be kept in mind while interpreting the statute. Moreover, merely because, as regards the employees, an institution is an industry, the institution does not cease to be a public institution in view of its objects and the ultimate beneficiaries of the public good. The "industry" and the "public institution" cannot be read as mutually exclusive.
35. As regards the alleged lack of municipal license to run Gaushala, that is for the concerned authorities to deal with. Admittedly, RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 28 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Date:
Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA2021.10.21 11:51:00 +05'30' the respondent society has been running Gaushala for past many decades. Running a Gaushala without the requisite licenses can at the most make the activity tainted, which taint can be cured by the society obtaining licenses, but lack of license cannot be a ground to hold that the respondent society is not a public institution. Most significantly, claim of the appellants is that the respondent society "cannot" run Gaushala, and not that the respondent society "is not running" Gaushala.
36. Therefore, I am of the considered view that respondent society is certainly covered by the definition of the expression "public institution" within the meaning of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
37. Next question which arises for consideration is as to whether requirement of the tenanted premises for the purposes of accommodating the employees as well as the cows and calves of the Gaushala can be held to be for furtherance of activities of the respondent society.
38. In view of the judicial precedents cited above, I am unable to find any force in the contention of learned counsel for appellants that in order to be covered by the expression "for furtherance of its activities"
there has to be some expansion in the existing activities of the public institution. No new activity is required, in my view, to make out a case under Section 22 of the Act. As held in the above cited precedents, the word preceding the expression "furtherance of activities" is the word RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 29 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:50:27 +05'30' "for" and not "in", thereby widening the scope of the expression "furtherance of activities".
39. The pleadings and evidence recapitulated above, clearly establish that the respondent society does not have sufficient residential accommodation for its 50 employees and sufficient covered sheds for about 1300 cows and calves, which puts the cows and calves to risk of mortality during winters.
40. Going by the legal position elaborated by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Chuni Lal (supra), provision of accommodation to the 50 employees of the present respondent society may not itself be the object for which the respondent society was established, but it is a necessary activity which the respondent society has to undertake if its employees have to perform their duties efficiently. Therefore, endeavour of the respondent society to provide residential accommodation to its staff, who has to take care of 1300 cows and calves, within the Gaushala does not fall beyond the scope of Section 22 of the Act. As mentioned above the respondent society has brought eviction proceedings against not just the present appellants but against other tenants as well, whose appeals are pending in this court but are not being clubbed with these appeals for the multiple reasons reflected in those judicial records.
41. Therefore, on second count also, the present case does not fall beyond the scope of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act insofar RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 30 of 31 pages GIRISH KATHPALIA Date:
Digitally signed by GIRISH KATHPALIA2021.10.21 11:50:03 +05'30' as the requirement of the tenanted premises by the respondent society is bonafide for furtherance of its activities as public institution.
42. In view of above discussion, I am unable to find any infirmity in the impugned orders, so the same are upheld. The present appeals are devoid of merit, so the same are dismissed.
43. Trial Court Records be sent back with a copy of this judgment and appeal files be consigned to records, leaving the parties bear their own costs.
Announced in the open court on
this 21st day of October, 2021 GIRISH Digitally signed by GIRISH
KATHPALIA
KATHPALIA Date: 2021.10.21 11:49:11 +05'30'
(GIRISH KATHPALIA)
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE (HQs)
RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL, CENTRAL
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
RCT/ARCT No. 55/2019 Govind Ram vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.)
RCT/ARCT No. 87/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.)
RCT/ARCT No. 88/2019 Suman Lata vs Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Regd.) Page 31 of 31 pages