Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Shyam Sundar Das And Others vs Union Of India And Others on 30 June, 2015
Author: Sanjib Banerjee
Bench: Sanjib Banerjee
1
Serial No.210.
June 30, 2015.
SG
WP 10923 (W) of 2008
Shyam Sundar Das and others
-versus-
Union of India and others
Mr Debayan Bera
Mr G. Patra
... for the petitioners.
Mr Sakti Prasad Chakraborty
... for the respondent nos.5 to 24.
Mr Dipankar Das ... for NHAI.
It must be said with some diffidence that this petition should not have been received in this extraordinary jurisdiction in view of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The petitioners and the added respondents are some of the 189 applicants referred to in the impugned award of May 25, 2006 passed by the District Magistrate, Paschim Medinipur, who was, ex- officio, the arbitrator under Section 3-G of the National Highways Act, 1956.
The question here is not one of alternative remedy but that of propriety since notwithstanding the character of the arbitrator as a public servant or an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it is the character of the award which is relevant in ascertaining the forum and the procedure for its challenge.
2By the time that the petition was received in this court, the time to challenge the award under Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 had expired. The provision allows a person intending to challenge an award three months from the date of receipt thereof to launch the challenge. The court is empowered to condone the delay for a period of thirty days after the expiry of three months from the date of receipt of the award, "but not thereafter."
Since these petitioners had not questioned the propriety of the award in the appropriate proceedings, the petition ought not to have been received. No prejudice has been occasioned, however, to the petitioners by this petition having been received, particularly since the award is of May, 2006 and this petition was filed in the year 2008.
It is contended by the petitioners that the award is without reasons and, as such, is liable to be set aside without any other consideration.
Apart from the fact that a challenge to an arbitral award cannot be made by some other method after the expiry of the time permitted therefor; so that the matter may be laid to rest, it is necessary to address the ground urged on merits. At first blush, the fifteen-line award appears to be too short and apparently without reasons; but if the basis for the conclusion is reflected therein, the award should be deemed to have communicated reasons in support thereof.
These petitioners' land in Pasuliachak Mouza had been acquired by the NHAI and upon these petitioners complaining of the inadequacy of the compensation paid, the dispute was referred to 3 arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the said Act of 1956. Before the arbitrator, the petitioners produced deeds of sale of the year 2006 of nearby plots. The arbitrator held that since the acquisition in this case was of the year 2002, the 2006 figures were of no relevance.
It is not as if the arbitrator did not give reasons for finding that the 2006 deeds were irrelevant; at the highest the petitioners can complain of inadequacy of reasons, not the absence thereof.
The arbitrator next went on to refer to "Koushalya Devi's case"
without indicating any reference. Ideally, the parties to the reference should have been made aware of the said case or furnished better particulars thereof. But it has to be kept in mind that a district magistrate has other administrative business and is also burdened as the arbitrator to decide on the quantum of compensation. In his avatar as the arbitrator, the district magistrate may be dealing with a number of cases where the same judgments of a court are referred to and, though the practice cannot be condoned, there is sufficient excuse for a repetitive reference to be referred to by name without any particulars in support thereof.
The arbitrator has referred to the judgment for the purpose of assertion of the principle that when a large tract of land is acquired, the value thereof cannot be assessed on the basis of the purchase deeds pertaining to small plots of land in the comparable area. The logic is unimpeachable.
Reasons are the life-blood of any judicial or quasi-judicial order and the link between the facts and the conclusion. They are the grounds which impel the maker of such order to the substantive 4 directions contained therein. Experience shows that several pages of efforted inanities may not disclose a strand of logic, but a few pithy words may demonstrate how the mind was applied to the matters in issue.
The award in this case was one of the latter kind.
Since the petitioners had waited in this court for nearly a decade, the court is now obliged to inform the petitioners why their plea cannot be accepted. The substantive challenge to the award need not have been addressed; but it was felt necessary to do so, so that the petitioners are not left wondering as to what might have been had they challenged the award in accordance with the regular procedure established by law.
WP 10923 (W) of 2008 is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be urgently made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.
(Sanjib Banerjee, J.) 5