Karnataka High Court
The Assistant Commissioner Of ... vs Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd on 5 December, 2025
Author: S.G.Pandit
Bench: S.G.Pandit
-1-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
Reserved on : 26.09.2025
Pronounced on : 05.12.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 116 OF 2025
C/W
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 114 OF 2025
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 122 OF 2025
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 148 OF 2025
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 165 OF 2025
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 175 OF 2025
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 186 OF 2025
REVIEW PETITION No. 447 OF 2024
IN CRP No. 116/2025
Digitally signed BETWEEN:
by VALLI
MARIMUTHU
Location: HIGH 1. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF
COURT OF
KARNATAKA COMMERCIAL TAXES (AUDIT-1.4),
DVO-1, 5TH FLOOR, TTMC BUILDING,
BMTC BUS STAND, YESHWANTHPUR
BENGALURU - 560022.
2. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS) - 3
BMTC COMPLEX, SHANTINAGAR
BENGALURU - 560027.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
-2-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
AND:
1. BHARATH PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.,
DUPARC TRINITY,
7TH FLOOR, No.17, M.G.ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SMT. TANMAYEE RAJKUMAR, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SECTION 15A OF KARNATAKA
TAX ON ENTRY OF GOODS ACT 1979 AGAINST THE ORDER
DATED 30.09.2022 PASSED IN STA No.502/2015 ON THE FILE
OF THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU,
ALLOWING THE PETITION.
IN CRP No. 114/2025
BETWEEN:
1. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (AUDIT-1.4),
DVO-1, 5TH FLOOR, TTMC BUILDING,
BMTC BUS STAND, YESHWANTHPUR
BENGALURU - 560022.
2. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS) - 3
BMTC COMPLEX, SHANTINAGAR
BENGALURU - 560027.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
AND:
1. BHARATH PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.,
DUPARC TRINITY,
7TH FLOOR, No.17, M.G.ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SMT. TANMAYEE RAJKUMAR, ADVOCATE)
-3-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SECTION 15 OF KARNATAKA TAX
ON ENTRY OF GOODS ACT 1979 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED
30.09.2022 PASSED IN STA No.501/2015 ON THE FILE OF THE
KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU, ALLOWING
THE APPEAL AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
30.07.2025 PASSED BY THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS)- BANGALORE.
IN CRP No. 122/2025
BETWEEN:
1. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (AUDIT-5.2),
VTK-2, 4TH FLOOR,'B' BLOCK,
KORAMANGALA,
BENGALURU - 560047.
2. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS) - 5,
2ND FLOOR, TTMC BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560027.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
AND:
1. M/S HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.,
No.77, OLD MADRAS ROAD,
DOORAVANINAGAR, K.R. PURAM,
BENGALURU-560001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI M. THIRUMALESH, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SECTION 15A OF KARNATAKA
TAX ON ENTRY OF GOODS ACT 1979 AGAINST THE ORDER
DATED 30.09.2022 PASSED IN STA No.117/2017 ON THE FILE
OF THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU,
ALLOWING THE APPEAL.
-4-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
IN CRP No. 148/2025
BETWEEN:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (AUDIT-5.2),
VTK-2, 5TH FLOOR,'B' BLOCK,
KORAMANGALA,
BENGALURU - 560047.
2. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS) - 5,
2ND FLOOR, TTMC BUILDING,
SHANTHINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560027.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
AND:
1. M/S HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.,
No.77, OLD MADRAS ROAD,
DOORAVANINAGAR, K.R. PURAM,
BENGALURU-560016.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI M. THIRUMALESH, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SECTION 15A OF KARNATAKA
TAX ON ENTRY OF GOODS ACT 1979 AGAINST THE ORDER
DATED 30.08.2023 PASSED IN STA No.118/2017 ON THE FILE
OF THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU,
ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND ETC.
IN CRP No. 165/2025
BETWEEN:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (AUDIT-1.2),
DVO-1, 5TH FLOOR, TTMC BUILDING,
-5-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
BMTC BUS STAND, YESHWANTHPUR
BENGALURU - 560022.
2. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS) - 1,
BMTC COMPLEX, SHANTINAGAR
BENGALURU - 560027.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
AND:
1. BHARATH PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.,
DUPARC TRINITY,
7TH FLOOR, No.17, M.G.ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SMT. TANMAYEE RAJKUMAR, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SECTION 15A OF KARNATAKA
TAX ON ENTRY OF GOODS ACT 1979 AGAINST THE ORDER
DATED 30.09.2022 PASSED IN STA No.2395/2014 TO STA
No.2398/2014 ON THE FILE OF THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE
TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU, ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND ETC.
IN CRP No. 175/2025
BETWEEN:
1. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS)-3,
BMTC COMPLEX, SHANTINAGAR,
BENGALURU 560027
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (AUDIT) - 3,4
DVO-3, 2ND FLOOR,
TTMC 'B' BLOCK,
BMTC BUILDING,
-6-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
SHANTINAGAR,
BENGALURU 560027.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
AND:
1. M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED,
MARKETING DIVISION,
'INDIAN OIL BHAVAN',
No.29, P. KALINGA RAO ROAD,
(MISSION ROAD), BENGALURU 560027.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI G. SHIVADASS, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI PRASHANTH S. SHIVADASS, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SECTION 15 OF KARNATAKA TAX
ON ENTRY OF GOODS ACT 1979 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED
30.09.2022 PASSED IN STA No.207/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE
KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU, ALLOWING
THE APPEAL AND ETC.
IN CRP No. 186/2025
BETWEEN:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (AUDIT- 3.4),
DVO-3, 2ND FLOOR, TTMC B BLOCK,
BMTC BUILDING, SHANTHINAGARA,
BENGALURU -560 027.
2. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS)-3,
BMTC COMPLEX, SHANTHINAGARA,
BENGALURU -560 027.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
-7-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
AND:
1. M/S. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.,
No.29, DR. P. KALINGA RAO ROAD,
BENGALURU 560027.
REPRESENTED BY AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
RAJASHEKAR NAIK M.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI G. SHIVADASS, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI PRASHANTH S. SHIVADASS, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SECTION 15A OF KARNTAKA TAX
ON ENTRY OF GOODS ACT 1979 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED
30.08.2023 PASSED IN STA No.622 TO 624/2014 AND STA
No.794-795/2016 ON THE FILE OF THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE
TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU, ALLOWING THE APPEALS.
IN RP No. 447/2024
BETWEEN:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT,
FINANCE DEPARTMENT,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU - 560001.
2. COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES,
KARNATAKA VANIJYA THERIGE KARYALAYA,
GANDHINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560009.
3. JOINT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (APPEALS - 11),
BMTC BUS STOP, SHANTHINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560027.
4. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF
COMMECIAL TAXES (AUDIT- 3.4),
DVO- 3, BMTC BUS STOP,
-8-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
SHANTHINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560027.
5. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF
COMMERCIAL TAXES (ENF-7),
SOUTH ZONE,
VANIJYA THERIGE KARYALA-11,
KORAMANGALA,
BENGALURU - 560047.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ADITYA VIKRAM BHAT, AGA)
AND:
1. M/S. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.,
REP. BY ITS SIGNATURE AUTHORITY,
MARKETING DIVISION,
INDIAN OIL BHAVAN,
No.29, P. KALINGA ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560027.
2. BHARATH PETROLEUM CORPORATON LTD.,
REP. BY ITS SIGNATURE AUTHORITY,
DUPARC TRINITY, No.17, M. G. ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI G. SHIVADASS, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI PRASHANTH S. SHIVADASS, ADVOCATE FOR R1)
THIS REVIEW PETITION FILED UNDER ORDER XLVII RULE
1 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 PRAYING TO
REVIEW THE JUDGMENT OF THIS HON'BLE COURT IN CIVIL
REVISION PETITION No.88 OF 2014 CLUBBED WITH CIVIL
REVISION PETITION 196 OF 2014 (THE CRP'S), DATED
19.06.2023, (ANNEXURE-A).
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,
K.V. ARAVIND, J., MADE THE FOLLOWING
-9-
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND)
Heard Sri. Aditya Vikram Bhat, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for the petitioners, Sri. G.
Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Prashanth S.
Shivadass, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in RP
No.447/2024, Smt. Tanmaye Rajkumar, learned counsel for the
respondent in CRP Nos.116/2025, 114/2025 and 165/2025, Sri.
Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Prashanth S.
Shivadass, learned counsel for the respondent in CRP
Nos.175/2025 and 186/2025, and Sri. M. Thirumalesh, learned
counsel for the respondent in CRP Nos.122/2025 and
148/2025.
2. Revision Petition No.447/2024 has been filed by the
State seeking review of the order passed in Civil Revision
Petition Nos.88/2014 and 196/2014 by the Division Bench of
this Court on 19.06.2023.
- 10 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
2.1 Civil Revision Petition Nos. 116/2025 and 114/2025
have been filed by the State challenging the order dated
30.09.2022 passed in STA No.502/2015 by the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru. Civil Revision Petition
No.122/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order
dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA No.117/2017 by the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition
No.148/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order
dated 30.08.2023 passed in STA Nos.118-122/2017 by the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition
No.165/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order
dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA Nos.2395-2398/2014 by the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition
No.175/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order
dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA No.207/2019 by the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition
No.186/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order
dated 30.08.2023 passed in STA Nos.794-795/2016 by the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal.
3. The Review Petition and the Civil Revision Petitions
involve common questions. Therefore, the learned counsel for
- 11 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
the parties have advanced common and identical submissions.
Accordingly, the Review Petition and the Civil Revision Petitions
are being disposed of by this common order.
4. Civil Revision Petitions have raised following
common questions of law for consideration of this Court:
"a) Whether the Hon'ble Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that
'Denatured Anhydrous Ethyl Alcohol' is different
from 'ethyl alcohol' and is not covered in
Notification No.FD 11 CET 2002 (I) dated 30-03-
2002?
(b) Whether the Hon'ble Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal has failed to consider the
legislative intent behind the broad classification
of 'spirits and alcohol' under the KTEG Act, which
includes 'ethyl alcohol' in all its forms?
(c) Whether the levy of interest under
Section 7(2) of the KTEG Act is justified as a
compensatory measure for delayed payment of
the entry tax on 'denatured anhydrous ethyl
alcohol'?"
Submissions on both Review and Civil Revision Petitions:
5. Sri Aditya Vikram Bhat, learned Additional
Government Advocate, in support of the application for
condonation of delay, submitted that the order under review
dated 19.06.2023 was contrary to the statutory provisions.
Steps were initially taken to file a Special Leave Petition, and
- 12 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
for that purpose the file was processed through the
administrative hierarchy, culminating in approval on
22.11.2023. Learned AGA submits that, thereafter, it was
considered appropriate to file a review petition instead of an
appeal, and the said recommendation again had to pass
through the hierarchical process, which received approval on
13.12.2023. Subsequently, the matter was processed, and
approval was granted by Government Order dated 31.01.2024.
Learned AGA further submits that thereafter necessary
correspondence ensued, and the review petition ultimately
came to be filed on 07.08.2024. It is submitted that the delay
of 374 days has been satisfactorily explained.
5.1 Learned AGA submits that the Tribunal has recorded
concurrent findings of the fact and that no question of law
arose for consideration. Hence, the appeal filed by the
respondent-Oil Corporations was not maintainable. Learned
AGA further submits that the findings recorded in the order
under review are purely factual and are without any basis.
Referring to the Indian Standard 'Anhydrous Ethanol for Use in
Automotive Fuel - Specification,' learned AGA contends that
ethyl alcohol and ethanol (denatured spirit) are classified as
- 13 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
anhydrous ethanol and, therefore, are one and the same. In
this regard, he also relies upon the tender document issued by
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Learned AGA further submits
that the order under review is contrary to the provisions of
Section 15A(4)(a) of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act,
1979.
5.2 In support of the prayer for condonation of delay,
the learned Additional Government Advocate has relied upon
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and Others1, to
contend that 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice, and that
general delays in preferring appeals ought to be condoned in
the interest of justice where no gross negligence, deliberate
inaction, or lack of bona fide is attributable to the party seeking
condonation. He further submits that the Government must be
afforded a certain degree of latitude in such matters. Reliance
is also placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through legal representatives
1 (1996) 3 SCC 132
- 14 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
and Others Vs. Union of India and Others2, to contend that
when the State seeks condonation of delay, a limited leeway
may be provided.
6. Sri G. Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for respondent No.1 in R.P.No.447/2024 and for the
respondents in CRP.Nos.175/2025 and 186/2025, submits that
the delay in filing the review petition has not been explained.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that although a list of events
has been set out in the application, no satisfactory explanation
is forthcoming for the delay. He further submits that when the
proposal for filing a Special Leave Petition had already been
made, and the decision was subsequently altered from filing an
SLP to filing a review petition, the authorities nevertheless took
more than ten months to file the review petition. Learned
Senior Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Karnataka
Housing Board and Ors.3 to contend that when the State is a
litigant, the same yardstick for condonation of delay applicable
to any other litigant must be applied.
2 (2023) 10 SCC 531
3
[(2025) SCC OnLine SC 1969
- 15 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
6.1 Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the
revision petition was decided after framing the questions of law
with the consent of both parties, and the admitted questions
have been duly answered in the order under review. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that the grounds and substantial
questions of law were permitted by way of amendment and on
additional grounds.
6.2 Learned Senior Counsel submits that Entry Tax is
paid when blended petrol is sold and, therefore, levying Entry
Tax at the point of entry would amount to double taxation,
which is impermissible. He further submits that the tax on sale
already includes Entry Tax, and this position has not been
disputed by the Revenue. Learned Senior Counsel contends
that in earlier years the Department had accepted and
approved the procedure of paying Entry Tax at the point of sale
of blended petrol, and the present change in stand is without
any basis. In support of the limited scope of review, learned
Senior Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through Legal
- 16 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
representatives and Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and
Others4.
7. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Section 3
imposes a levy of tax on the entry of goods specified in the
First Schedule into a local area for the purpose of consumption.
8. The First Schedule, at Entry 86 under the heading
'Spirits and Alcohols,' includes (i) denatured spirit, (ii) rectified
spirit, and (iii) ethyl alcohol. The rate of tax was notified by the
State Government vide Notification dated 30.04.1992 at 2%,
treating denatured spirit, rectified spirit, and ethyl alcohol as
distinct products. The Notification dated 30.04.1992 was
thereafter cancelled by Notification dated 31.03.1994.
Subsequently, another Notification dated 30.03.2002 was
issued in exercise of powers under Section 3(1) of the KTEG
Act, prescribing a rate of 4% on rectified spirit, neutral spirit,
and ethyl alcohol.
8.1 It is submitted that no rate of tax has been
prescribed for denatured spirit. Therefore, when denatured
spirit and ethyl alcohol are treated as distinct items under Entry
4
(2021) 13 SCC 1
- 17 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
86 of the First Schedule, and the earlier Notification dated
30.04.1992 had separately provided the rate of tax for each,
the Notification dated 30.03.2002 cannot be interpreted as
including denatured spirit within the expression 'ethyl alcohol.'
8.2 Learned Senior Counsel submits that when the First
Schedule distinguishes denatured spirit and ethyl alcohol as
separate products, and when no rate of tax has been notified
for denatured spirit, the expression 'ethyl alcohol' cannot be
read to include denatured spirit for the purpose of determining
the applicable rate of tax. Learned Senior Counsel further
submits that, as relied upon by the learned Additional
Government Advocate, the Indian Standard 'Anhydrous Ethanol
for Use in Automotive Fuel - Specification' issued by the Bureau
of Indian Standards itself classifies ethyl alcohol and denatured
spirit as two distinct products, both in terms of their chemical
composition and their usage. It is therefore submitted that, in
the absence of a prescribed rate of tax for denatured spirit, the
charging provision fails, and no tax under the KTEG Act can be
levied on denatured spirit.
- 18 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
9. Smt. Tanmaye Rajkumar, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.2, concurs with the submissions
made by the learned Senior Counsel on both the aspects, delay
as well as merits.
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
10. Having considered the submissions advanced by the
learned counsel for the parties, the following points arise for
consideration of this Court in addition to substantial questions
of law framed hereinabove:
(i) Whether the delay in filing the review petition is
reasonably explained?
(ii) Whether the review petition merits consideration?
(iii) Whether delay in filing civil revision petitions are
explained?
11. The above points are independent of the questions
of law that have been raised and admitted in the Civil Revision
Petitions.
ANALYSIS
Reg. Point No. 1:
12. The order under review is dated 19.06.2023.
According to the list of dates forming part of the affidavit
- 19 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
accompanying the application for condonation of delay, the
petitioner initially considered filing a Special Leave Petition
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The list of dates indicates
the movement of the file within the hierarchy of the petitioner
from 20.07.2023, when the order was downloaded, until
22.11.2023, when the recommendation to file a review petition
before this Court was considered. Thereafter, a series of
procedural steps culminating in the filing of the review petition
on 07.08.2024 have been set out.
12.1 However, there is no explanation for the period
between 31.01.2024 and 17.05.2024, and between 21.05.2024
and 09.07.2024, which together constitute a delay of more
than six months. When a grievance is raised against the order
under review, and the process of considering an SLP has
consumed four months, the subsequent decision to file a review
petition which involves only a change in forum has taken nearly
eleven months. This delay is sought to be explained as
reasonable.
12.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra)
has held as under:
- 20 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
"88. It follows, that such appeals or
applications, are generally preferred as
continuation of proceedings already
instituted or within proceedings already
ongoing before a forum. In such instances,
the degree of vigilance that is expected is
much higher, a party is required be prompt
in making all possible endeavours to take
the next step by filing the appeal or
application. The inaction or laxity of the
party in making such endeavours is all the
more significant for deciding if delay should
be condoned or not, as, by the time the
stage of preferring the appeal or application,
arises, it already has the necessary
knowledge to act upon quickly, by virtue of
the prior or ongoing proceedings. If despite
it, a party chooses to wait till the very last
date, it may in all probability be the result of
a deliberate action to dilate the proceedings
or the lack of any modicum of respect for
the prescribed period of limitation.
89. Thus, the notion that a party who failed
to timely avail its remedies, by way of
appeal or application, despite having
sufficient awareness of the original
proceedings should be shown due deference
in condonation of delay, and is entitled to
wait, without being questioned, till the last
day of limitation, is preposterous.
142. Another practical reason why merits
must not be considered at the stage of delay
condonation is that it risks prejudicing the
mind of the court against one party even
before the matter is substantively heard. By
glancing into merits prematurely, the court
may inadvertently form a view that colours
the fairness of the subsequent adjudication.
- 21 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
The judicial discipline required at this stage
demands that only the cause for delay be
scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures
that the ultimate adjudication of rights
occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.
171. The next submission that was
advanced on behalf of the respondents
herein is that, in matters pertaining to
condonation of delay, a certain degree of
leeway ought to be accorded to the
Government and Public Authorities owing to
the innate complexities in the way the State
apparatus functions. The argument is that
due to the inherent bureaucracy and
involvement of various departments of
different hierarchy which are endemic to the
functioning of the State and its
instrumentalities, unavoidable delays tend to
crop up even without any deliberate
intention, and thus, the courts ought to be
pragmatic and liberal where the State or any
of its instrumentalities is seeking
condonation of delay in the filing of the
appeal or application, as the case may be. In
this regard, reliance was placed on the
decision of this Court in G. Ramegowda,
Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142.
177. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra), this
Court observed that public interest suffers if
appeals brought by the Government are
thrown out due to the lapse of the limitation
period. Accordingly, it held that a certain
amount of latitude towards the Government
is, therefore, not impermissible, for the
purpose of condonation of delay. The
relevant observations made therein read as
under:--
- 22 -
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
"15. In litigations to which Government
is a party there is yet another aspect
which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If
appeals brought by Government are
lost for such defaults, no person is
individually affected; but what, in the
ultimate analysis, suffers is public
interest. The decisions of Government
are collective and institutional decisions
and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt,
the same for a private citizen as for
governmental authorities. Government,
like any other litigant must take
responsibility for the acts or omissions
of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter
where Government makes out a case
where public interest was shown to
have suffeed owing to acts of fraud or
bad faith on the part of its officers or
agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes "sufficient
cause" for purposes of Section 5, it
might, perhaps, be somewhat
unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial
verdict, these factors which are
peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the government.
Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they
are, by a considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process of
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CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not
impermissible. It is rightly said that
those who bear responsibility of
Government must have "a little play at
the joints". Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning
-- of course, within reasonable limits --
is necessary if the judicial approach is
not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put government and
private parties on the same footing in
all respects in such matters. [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)
182. The ultimate test that was evolved
whether substantial justice would suffer if
condonation were denied. Thus, the balance
was tilted in favour of condonation when the
litigant was the State, as denial could
prejudice public interest, frustrate legitimate
claims, or impact the public exchequer. The
jurisprudence therefore evolved to give
primacy to public interest over procedural
rigidity.
191. Even in the decisions of Chandra Mani
(supra) and Lipok AO (supra) where this
Court recognized the necessity for drawing a
demarcation between a State or any of its
instrumentalities, on the one hand and a
private individual, on the other, for the
purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
this Court simultaneously observed that
such differential treatment cannot continue
for all times to come. We say so, because
this Court, in the latter parts of the aforesaid
decisions, conveyed an emphatic message to
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
all the States and its instrumentalities to
constitute legal cells for the timely scrutiny
of its cases, to explore the possibility of
settlement instead of pursuing belated
claims, wherever possible and to ensure that
filing of appeals or application as the case
may be, is undertaken expeditiously, and
the officer responsible for pursuing such
action is made personally liable for lapses, if
any.
249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it
must shoulder the same responsibilities and
abide by the same limitations that bind
every litigant. To permit the State to evade
the consequences of delay on the ostensible
plea that the fault lay with individual officers
would amount to diluting the rigour of
limitation statutes and undermining their
very object. Such an approach would not
only privilege the State unjustly over private
parties but would also perpetuate a culture
of indifference and irresponsibility within the
administration."
12.3 If the principle laid down in the above judgment is
applied to the present case, it is evident that the petitioner,
having had a grievance against the order under review, initially
processed the proposal for filing an SLP, which was actively
considered for nearly five months. Thereafter, a decision was
taken to file a review petition. However, the finalisation of the
review petition has consumed almost eleven months, which,
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
though projected as a continuous process, reflects substantial
delay.
12.4 From the list of dates, it is apparent that there were
periods of inaction and laxity on the part of the petitioner in
taking timely decisions. The conduct of the petitioner does not
indicate prompt or bona fide action. The time taken in first
considering the filing of an SLP, and thereafter in filing the
review petition, cannot be regarded as fair or reasonable. This
Court is unable to appreciate the time consumed between
22.11.2023 and 07.08.2024 for filing the review petition,
particularly when five months had already been taken for
considering the filing of an SLP against the very same order.
12.5 It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner has
failed to demonstrate 'sufficient cause' for condonation of
delay. No doubt, it is not the length of delay but the
explanation for the delay that is material. However, in the
present case, no cause, much less a reasonable or satisfactory
cause has been shown. An attempt was made to persuade this
Court to condone the delay having regard to the alleged merits
of the matter. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
aforesaid judgment, the merits cannot be a basis for
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
condonation; only the cause for delay is to be considered and
nothing more.
13. The learned Additional Government Advocate has
also urged this Court to take a lenient view on the ground that
the petitioner is the State. This aspect, however, has already
been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment
referred to above. It has been held that no differential
treatment can be afforded in the matter of condonation of delay
merely because the State is a party. The Supreme Court has
further held that once the State chooses to litigate, it must
shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same
limitations that govern any ordinary litigant. To permit the
State to escape the consequences of delay on the ostensible
plea that the fault lies with individual officers would amount to
diluting the rigor of limitation statutes and defeating their very
object. Such an approach would not only unjustly privilege the
State over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture
of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration.
14. We are constrained to observe, upon examining the
list of dates annexed to the application, that the authorities
concerned have not acted responsibly in the discharge of their
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
duties. It appears that the petitioner has proceeded in a
leisurely manner, seemingly under the expectation that
differential treatment would be extended merely because the
petitioner is the State. The reasons assigned, presented only in
the form of a list of dates, do not explain the delay, they
merely chronicle events. The recurring nature of the issue
involved cannot serve as a ground to overlook the
unreasonable delay.
15. In light of the above discussion, the delay of 374
days in filing the review petition cannot be condoned.
Accordingly, I.A. No. 1/2024 is rejected.
Reg. Point No. 3:
16. The order in the STA is dated 30.09.2022, whereas
the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed on
13.02.2025. As per the affidavit accompanying the application
for condonation of delay, the CRP has been filed with a delay of
680 days. The affidavit merely states that a copy of the
impugned order was received on 06.12.2022, and that
administrative procedures consumed time, culminating in the
Government Order authorising the filing of the revision petition
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CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
on 17.10.2023, which was communicated to the Government
Advocate on 26.10.2023. Thereafter, the Government Advocate
addressed a letter dated 13.12.2023 to the Litigation
Conducting Officer seeking relevant documents, which were
furnished only on 16.01.2025. The CRP was thereafter
presented on 13.02.2025. These reasons are projected as
sufficient cause for condonation of 680 days' delay.
16.1 Having regard to the manner in which the litigation
has been conducted by the State and its authorities, we are
constrained to make certain observations. The issue involved in
the impugned order is identical to the one decided in
CRP.No.88/2014 on 19.06.2023. Although the identical issue
had been pending before this Court since 2014, no substantial
decision-making was required for filing an appeal. Even
assuming the petitioner awaited the outcome in
CRP.No.88/2014, the same was decided on 19.06.2023. The
said order was processed for filing an SLP from 20.07.2023,
indicating that the impugned order dated 30.09.2022 was not
acceptable to the petitioner. There was thus no impediment in
simultaneously processing the filing of a CRP against the order
dated 30.09.2022.
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
16.2 The subsequent decision to pursue a review
petition, in place of an SLP, was taken during the period
between 22.11.2023 and 07.08.2024. Even during this period,
no action is forthcoming from the petitioner to initiate the filing
of a CRP against the order dated 30.09.2022. The review
petition itself was belatedly filed on 07.08.2024. The petitioner
was fully aware that the issue was recurring in nature.
16.3 Coming to the affidavit explaining the delay, the
Government Order authorising the filing of the CRP was issued
after a period of ten months. Although the Government
Advocate sought relevant documents on 13.12.2023, the same
were provided only on 16.01.2025, after a delay of thirteen
months. The affidavit is conspicuously silent about the delay
between 13.12.2023 and 16.01.2025.
16.4 The overall conduct of the petitioner leaves the
unmistakable impression that neither the State nor its
authorities exercised due diligence. On the contrary, the record
reveals clear administrative lethargy and laxity. Administrative
lethargy can never constitute sufficient cause for condonation
of delay. When the bona fides expected in litigation involving
public interest are absent, the State cannot claim any
- 30 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
differential treatment. The conduct demonstrated amounts to a
failure in the discharge of public duties.
16.5 It is also surprising that after the impugned order,
this Court rendered a decision in another matter involving the
same issue, against which a review petition-albeit belated was
filed. Despite this, the present petitions were filed nearly six
months after the filing of the review petition. Acceptance of the
petitioner's plea for a lenient approach would amount to
granting differential treatment to the State, which the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra) has categorically held to
be impermissible.
16.6 In the present case, the conduct of the authorities
is undeniably lethargic. Condonation of such delay would only
encourage irresponsibility on the part of officers entrusted with
litigation involving public money, which deserves to be
deprecated. The petitioner has not acted as a model litigant.
The application for condonation of delay is not only liable to be
rejected, but also warrants the imposition of heavy costs. The
question of costs shall be considered at a later stage of this
judgment while dealing with the remaining issues.
- 31 -
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
17. The questions of law have been admitted. The issue
involved is straightforward. Section 3 of the KTEG Act imposes
tax on the entry of any goods specified in the First Schedule
into a local area for consumption, use, or sale at such rates not
exceeding 5% of the value of the goods as may be specified by
the State Government by notification, with the power to
prescribe different rates for different goods, classes of goods,
or local areas.
18. Section 3(1) reads as under:
3. Levy of Tax.-(1) There shall be levied and
collected a tax on [entry of any goods
specified in the First Schedule] into a local
area per cent of the value of the goods as may
be specified [retrospectively or prospectively
by the State Government by Notification, and
different dates] and different rates may be
specified in respect of different goods or
different classes of goods or different local
areas.
Note. Sub-section (1) as it stood prior to
the first day of May, 1992, after the proviso,
the following proviso shall be and shall be
deemed to have been inserted with effect
from the Twenty-seventh day of November,
1984, namely: -
Provided further that no tax shall be
payable on cast iron castings when used as
raw material, component part or any other
- 32 -
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
input which may be used in the manufacture
of an intermediate or finished goods.
Note. After sub-section (1), the following
proviso shall be deemed to have inserted with
effect from the first day of May, 1992 and
shall be deemed to have been omitted with
effect from the First day of September, 1993,
namely:-
Provided that no tax shall be payable on
cast iron castings when used as raw material,
component part or any other input which may
be used in the manufacture of an intermediate
finished goods."
19. Entry 86 of First Schedule reads as under:
"86. Spirits and alcohol, that is to say.-
(i) denatured spirit;
(ii) rectified spirit;
(iii) ethyl alcohol."
20. Sl.No.66 of Notification dated 30.04.1992 reads as
under:
______________________________________________________
Sl. No. Description of Scheduled goods 1st Schedule Rate of Tax
Item No.
______________________________________________________
.......
66. Spirits and alcohol, that is to say:- [86] 2%
(i) Denatured spirit; [86(i)] 2%
(ii) Rectified spirit; [86(ii)] 2%
(ii) Ethyl alcohol; [86(iii)] 2%
______________________________________________________
- 33 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
21. The notification dated 30.04.1992 came to be
cancelled by Notification dated 31.03.1994. Fresh notification
came to be issued on 30.03.2002 in exercise of powers under
subsection (1) of Section 3 of KTEG Act. Entry 1 (vii) of
Notification dated 30.03.2002 reads as under:
______________________________________________________
Sl. No. Commodity Rate of Tax
______________________________________________________
......
(viii) Rectified Spirit, Neutral Spirit, Ethyl Alcohol 4%
______________________________________________________
22. From the above, it is evident that denatured spirit
and ethyl alcohol are treated as distinct products in the First
Schedule. A similar distinction is maintained in the Notification
dated 30.04.1992, which prescribes a rate of tax at 2%. In
view of the cancellation of the said Notification by the
subsequent Notification dated 30.03.1994, there was no levy
until the Notification dated 30.03.2002 came into force. The
Notification dated 30.03.2002 includes rectified spirit, neutral
spirit, and ethyl alcohol; however, denatured spirit is notably
absent.
23. The State seeks to contend that ethyl alcohol and
denatured spirit are one and the same, and therefore, the levy
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
of 4% on ethyl alcohol should equally apply to denatured spirit.
This contention is untenable. As of today, Entry 86 of the First
Schedule to the KTEG Act distinctly identifies denatured spirit
and ethyl alcohol as separate commodities. A similar distinction
is evident in Item No.6 of the Notification dated 30.04.1992
prescribing the rate of tax.
24. When denatured spirit is not included in the
Notification dated 30.03.2002, it is impermissible to contend
that ethyl alcohol includes denatured spirit. When both
products are treated differently in the First Schedule, it is
difficult to accept that they are to be regarded as the same for
the purposes of the Notification dated 30.03.2002, particularly
when the earlier Notification dated 30.04.1992 expressly
treated them separately.
25. Even the Indian Standard: Anhydrous Ethanol for
Use in Automobile Fuel - Specification issued by the Bureau of
Indian Standards distinguishes ethyl alcohol from denatured
spirit based on their function and usage. This aspect has been
rightly considered by the Appellate Tribunal in the impugned
order. The view taken by this Court in the order under review
also proceeds on the same reasoning.
- 35 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
26. This Court, in the order under review, has
undertaken a detailed analysis of Section 3 (Levy of Tax), the
entries in the First Schedule, and the effect of the Notifications
dated 30.04.1992, 31.03.1994, and 30.03.2002, and has
arrived at the conclusion that the Notification dated 30.03.2002
does not apply to impose entry tax on denatured spirit. The
order under review has considered all submissions and
contentions sought to be urged in the present review petition.
27. We find no justifiable or demonstrable grounds to
take a view different from that taken by this Court in
CRP.No.88/2014 dated 19.06.2023.
28. The above questions of law stand fully answered
and are squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in
CRP.No.88/2014. Accordingly, the questions are answered in
the same terms.
Reg. Point No.2:
29. The review petitioner seeks to re-agitate issues
already considered and decided by the Co-ordinate Bench in
the order under review. The scope of review jurisdiction is
exceedingly narrow. A review may be entertained only when a
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CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record is clearly
demonstrated. An error that requires a process of reasoning to
be discerned cannot be regarded as an "error apparent on the
face of the record" so as to attract the provisions of Order
XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Under the guise of review, the Court may
correct an apparent mistake, but it cannot revisit or substitute
the view earlier taken.
29.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Inderchand Jain v. Motilal,5 has laid down the scope of
review petition. Relevant paras extracted are as under:
"8. An application for review would lie
inter alia when the order suffers from an error
apparent on the face of the record and
permitting the same to continue would lead to
failure of justice. In Rajender Kumar v.
Rambhai18 this Court held: (SCC p. 514, para
6)
'6. The limitations on exercise of the
power of review are well settled. The
first and foremost requirement of
entertaining a review petition is that the
order, review of which is sought, suffers
from any error apparent on the face of
the order and permitting the order to
stand will lead to failure of justice. In
the absence of any such error, finality
attached to the judgment/order cannot
be disturbed.'
5
(2009) 14 SCC 663
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
9. The power of review can also be
exercised by the court in the event discovery of
new and important matter or evidence takes
place which despite exercise of due diligence
was not within the knowledge of the applicant
or could not be produced by him at the time
when the order was made. An application for
review would also lie if the order has been
passed on account of some mistake.
Furthermore, an application for review shall also
lie for any other sufficient reason.
10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute
that the review court does not sit in appeal over
its own order. A rehearing of the matter is
impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception
to the general rule that once a judgment is
signed or pronounced, it should not be altered.
It is also trite that exercise of inherent
jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any
order."
29.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
West Bengal Vs. Kamal Sengupta and another6 has held as
under:
"22. The term "mistake or error
apparent" by its very connotation signifies an
error which is evident per se from the record of
the case and does not require detailed
examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of
the facts or the legal position. If an error is not
self-evident and detection thereof requires long
debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be
treated as an error apparent on the face of the
record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC
or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it
differently an order or decision or judgment
cannot be corrected merely because it is
erroneous in law or on the ground that a
different view could have been taken by the
court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any
6
(2008) 8 SCC 612
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
case, while exercising the power of review, the
court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal
over its judgment/decision."
29.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari
Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmed Ishaque7 has held as
under:
"23.... It is essential that it should be
something more than a mere error; it must be
one which must be manifest on the face of the
record. The real difficulty with reference to this
matter, however, is not so much in the
statement of the principle as in its application to
the facts of a particular case. When does an
error cease to be mere error, and become an
error apparent on the face of the record? The
learned counsel on either side were unable to
suggest any clear-cut rule by which the
boundary between the two classes of errors
could be demarcated."
29.4 In Shri Ram Sahu (supra), the following
conclusions were noted:
"35. The principles which can be culled
out from the abovenoted judgments are:
(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its
order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act
is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court
under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1
CPC.
(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision
on either of the grounds enumerated in Order
47 Rule 1 and not otherwise.
(iii) The expression "any other sufficient
reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be
7
AIR 1955 SC 233
- 39 -
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
interpreted in the light of other specified
grounds.
(iv) An error which is not self-evident and
which can be discovered by a long process of
reasoning, cannot be treated as an error
apparent on the face of record justifying
exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).
(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot
be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of
review.
(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed
under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of
subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate
or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior
court.
(vii) While considering an application for
review, the tribunal must confine its
adjudication with reference to material which
was available at the time of initial decision. The
happening of some subsequent event or
development cannot be taken note of for
declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by
an error apparent.
(viii) Mere discovery of new or important
matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for
review. The party seeking review has also to
show that such matter or evidence was not
within its knowledge and even after the exercise
of due diligence, the same could not be
produced before the court/tribunal earlier."
29.5 In the case of S. Madhusudhan Reddy Vs. V.
Narayana Reddy and Others8, referring to the principles laid
down in Shri Ram Sahu (supra), it is held as under:
"26. As can be seen from the above
exposition of law, it has been consistently held
by this Court in several judicial pronouncements
8
(2022) 17 SCC 255
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
that the Court's jurisdiction of review, is not the
same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be
open to review if there is a mistake or an error
apparent on the face of the record, but an error
that has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, cannot be described as an error
apparent on the face of the record for the Court
to exercise its powers of review under Order
XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising
powers of review, the Court can correct a
mistake but not substitute the view taken
earlier merely because there is a possibility of
taking two views in a matter. A judgment may
also be open to review when any new or
important matter of evidence has emerged after
passing of the judgment, subject to the
condition that such evidence was not within the
knowledge of the party seeking review or could
not be produced by it when the order was made
despite undertaking an exercise of due
diligence. There is a clear distinction between
an erroneous decision as against an error
apparent on the face of the record. An
erroneous decision can be corrected by the
Superior Court, however an error apparent on
the face of the record can only be corrected by
exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another
circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1
for reviewing a judgment has been described as
"for any other sufficient reason". The said
phrase has been explained to mean "a reason
sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to
those specified in the rule"
29.6 Similarly, in the case of M/s. Siddamsetty Infra
Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.9, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court examining the grounds mentioned in
Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC reiterated the following conclusions:
9
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214
- 41 -
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
"19. This Court has laid down the
following principles on the exercise of review
jurisdiction:
a. Review proceedings are not by way of
appeal and have to be strictly confined to the
scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC;
b. Error on the face of record must be an
error which must strike one on a mere perusal
and must not on a long drawn process;
C. The power of review must not be
exercised on the ground that the decision was
erroneous on merits;
d. The phrase "any other sufficient
reason" means a reason that is analogous to
the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC;
and
e. The mere possibility of two views on
the subject cannot be a ground for review."
30. In light of the settled legal position, the contentions
urged in support of the review petitions amount to nothing
more than a re-argument of points already advanced and
considered by this Court. No error apparent on the face of the
record is demonstrated; what is sought is merely a rehearing of
the matter. We are, therefore, not inclined to entertain the
review petition. In light of our finding on questions of law
framed in Crp's, the review petition is not entertainable even on
its merits.
31. Before we close this judgment, we deem it
appropriate to make certain observations. The entire exercise
undertaken in the present case is futile and amounts to an
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C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
abuse of the process of law. This exercise has not only
consumed the precious time of this Court but has also resulted
in unnecessary wastage of the time and resources of the State
machinery. The conduct and manner in which the litigation has
been handled by the concerned authorities do not reflect
responsible behaviour. The officer who approved the filing of
the review petition and the belated civil revision petitions has
failed to act in the manner expected of a public servant.
Fairness in action is conspicuously absent.
32. This case warrants stricter action against all officials
involved in initiating and processing these litigations, which
could either have been avoided or timely acted upon. The
belated filing with unreasonable delay appears to be an attempt
to create an impression that necessary steps were taken,
though devoid of bona fides. Such conduct cannot be
countenanced.
33. Although the circumstances merit the imposition of
heavy costs on the concerned officials and initiation of
disciplinary proceedings; as a measure of caution, and in the
hope that matters involving public interest will hereafter be
dealt with seriousness, we refrain from issuing further
- 43 -
CRP No. 116 of 2025
C/W CRP No. 114 of 2025
CRP No. 122 of 2025
AND 5 OTHERS
directions in this regard. However, we direct the Registry to
forward a copy of this order to the Finance Secretary, State of
Karnataka with the expectation that appropriate steps will be
taken to set the administrative machinery in order, thereby
ensuring the protection of public money and public interest.
34. In the light of the above, the following:
ORDER
(i) I.A. No.1/2024 in R.P. No.447/2024 is rejected. Consequently, R.P. No.447/2024 stands dismissed both on the ground of delay and on merits.
(ii) I.A. No.1/2025 in CRP Nos.116/2025, 114/2025, 122/2025, 175/2025 and 186/2025 is rejected.
(iii) Consequently, the civil revision petitions are dismissed by answering the questions in favour of the assessee and against the petitioner.
Sd/-
(S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/-
(K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE DDU/VBS