National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Kamla Kumari vs Branch Manager, United India Insurance ... on 15 March, 2024
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 557 OF 2018 (Against the Order dated 11/10/2017 in Appeal No. 299/2008 of the State Commission Bihar) 1. KAMLA KUMARI W/O. SH. UDAY SHANKAR SINGH, VILLAGE & POST MOHANPUR DISTRICT-BEGUSARAI BIHAR ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. BRANCH MANAGER, UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. BRANCH OFFICE NEAR KAPASIYA CHOWK P.O. & DISTRICT-BEGUSARAI BIHAR 2. BRANCH MANAGER UNITED BANK OF INDIA MAIN ROAD, NAURANGA P.O. AND DISTRICT-BEGUSARAI BIAHR ...........Respondent(s)
BEFORE: HON'BLE AVM J. RAJENDRA, AVSM VSM (Retd.),PRESIDING MEMBER
FOR THE PETITIONER : FOR THE PETITIONER : MR. SANJEEV KUMAR VERMA, ADVOCATE FOR THE RESPONDENT : FOR THE RESPONDENT NO.1 : MR.RAJESH K. GUPTA, ADVOCATE
FOR THE RESPONDENT NO.2 : NOT APPEARED
Dated : 15 March 2024 ORDER
1. The present Revision Petition has been filed by the Petitioner under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (the "Act") against impugned order dated 11.10.2017, passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bihar at Patna ('State Commission') in First Appeal Nos. 299 & 318 of 2008 wherein the State Commission dismissed both the Appeals and affirmed the order dated 24.06.2008, passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Begusarai ("District Forum") in Consumer Complaint No.99 of 2004, wherein the Complaint filed by the Complainant was allowed in part.
2. As per office report, there is a delay of 34 days in filing the present Revision Petition. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay is condoned.
3. Brief facts of the case, as per the Complainant, are that the Complainant obtained a loan of Rs.9,50,000/- from the Respondent No.2/OP2 - Bank for carrying business of Brick Chimni namely "Bandana Bricks". It was to be insured by deducting Rs.2,888/- as premium from the account of the complainant. Pucca Chimni of the Complainant was badly damaged due to floods in August 2002. The Complainant informed Respondent No.1/OP1 - Insurance Company and Respondent No.2/OP2-Bank. On 28.11.2012, the Complainant lodged the claim of Rs.2,91,500/-. However, the same was repudiated on 05.08.2003 by OP-1. Being aggrieved, the Complainant filed a Consumer Complaint before the District Forum.
4. In reply, OP-1 Insurance Company contended that neither it received any premium from the Complainant nor any insurance policy was ever issued in favour of the Complainant. Therefore, there is no question of any liability of OP-1 with respect to loss occurred in the flood. OP-2 - Bank, in reply admitted that the loan was advanced to the Complainant as stated and contended that the OP-1 had submitted a bill for insurance of several parties, including M/s. Bandana Bricks dated 03.05.2002. Against the said bill, OP-2 deposited pay order No.429719 for Rs.19,471/- and another pay order No.429718 for Rs.34,980/- dated 06.05.2002 totaling Rs.54,451/-. It was also contended that as soon as the premium is received by the Insurance Company its liability begins. A surveyor was also appointed by the Insurance Company to assess the damages caused to Chimni of the Complainant and the surveyor filed his report. OP-2 Bank has also written several letters and remainders for settlement of the claim but nothing was done by the OP-1 Insurance Company. It sought dismissal of the Complaint.
5. The learned District Forum, vide order dated 24.06.2008 allowed the complaint in part and directed the OP-2 - Bank as under:
"Now from the documents referred above it is crystal clear that there was no Insurance Policy issued in favour of Bandana Bricks either to Bank or Complainant nor any money receipt of premium was given to the Bank or the complainant regarding payment of premium of Rs. 2888/-. It is settled principle no policy no claim. Since there is no Insurance cover to the complainant's Chimni during the relevant period issued by the Insurance Company therefore, the Insurance Company cannot be held liable to compensate the damage to the Chimni due to flood. On the other hand the OP Bank has admitted deducting the premium amount from the account of the complainant at Rs. 2888/-. It was the duty of the OP Bank to get the receipt of payment of premium as well as policy bond in favour of Bandana Bricks but the bank negligently did not pursue the matter in right earnest with the OP Insurance Com. as a result policy bond was neither given to Bank nor to complainant and of course complainant has suffered but the complainant also did not try to get his policy from the Bank or the Insurance Com. Therefore, the OP Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation to complainant. However, in the circumstances of the case we hold the United Bank of India is guilty of negligence and deficiency in service in as much as it deducted the premium amount from the account of the complainant but failed to get the money receipt as well as policy bond with regard to complainant's Chimni and before the damage caused by flood. No information was lodged with the Insurance Company regarding non-receipt of insurance bond it was informed by the Bank to complainant to take his own initiative to get the policy bond or fresh policy from the OP Insurance Company. As assessed the damage caused to the complainant's Chimni by destruction and spoiling of bricks Chimni and for it the OP United Bank of India is responsible to pay the compensation to the tune of Rs. 50,000/-. A litigation cost of Rs. 2,000/- is also allowed, which shall be paid by the OP Bank. Accordingly the case is allowed against the OP United Bank of India as indicated above and dismissed against the OP Insurance Company. Accordingly the case is allowed in part."
6. Being aggrieved by the order dated 24.06.2008 of the District Forum, the Complainant and OP-2 Bank filed First Appeals before the State Commission. The learned State Commission vide order dated 11.10.2017 dismissed both Appeals with the following observations:
"7. Having considered the submissions of parties, grounds of appeal, material available on record and on perusal of the order passed by the District Forum, it appears that the complainant obtained Rs.9,50,000/- (Rupees nine lacs and fifty thousand only) K.V.I.C. loan to run a Chimni of Bricks. The Bank deducted Rs.2,888/- from the loan account of the complainant which was deposited to the Insurance Company on 06-05-2002 and this amount was cleared by the Insurance Company on 13-06-2002. But the flood came in August 2002, Pucca Chimni of the complainant nor by the O.P.-Bank. Hence, the Insurance Company could not settle the claim of the complainant, though the complainant had suffered a loss of Rs. 9,71,500/-(Rupees nine lacs, seventy one thousand and five hundred only). District Forum held responsible the O.P.-Bank for not deducting the premium amount for next year in which the flood damaged the Chimni of the complainant and awarded compensation of Rs.50,000/-, litigation cost Rs.2000/- to the O.P.-Bank. It was the responsibility of the complainant as also the O.P.-Bank to get insured the Chimni for next year by deducting premium amount from the loan account of the complainant. But, the Bank neither informed the complainant for that nor got, it insured. It is deficiency on the part of the Bank as held by the Hon'ble National Commission in the case of Bank of India vs. Annu Vastrayala and anothers reported in 2008 (2) CPR 321 (NC) in the case of Allahabad Bank vs. JDS Electronics reported in I (2007) CPJ 270 (NC) in the case of Pradeep Kumar Sain vs. City Bank reported in II (1999) CPJ 7 (SC). We do not find any reason to take a different view in this case. Hence, the District Forum order is affirmed and the Appeal No. 299 of 2008 for enhancement of compensation is dismissed as the complainant did not take action to get the Chimni insured for that period. The Appeal No. 318 of 2008 to set aside the District Forum order is also dismissed in view of the Hon'ble National Commission above referred orders.
Thus both Appeals 299 of 2008 and Appeal 318 of 2008 are dismissed."
7. Being dissatisfied by the order dated 11.10.2017 passed by the State Commission, the Complainant filed the present Revision Petition for enhancement of the compensation.
8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Complainant had suffered a loss to the tune of Rs.9,71,500/- and had paid premium for insurance policy of Rs.9.00 lacs whereas the Fora below compensated the Complainant to the tune of Rs.50,000/- only. He sought to allow the Revision Petition and enhance the compensation. He has relied upon the following judgments:
i. I (2007) CPJ 270 (NC) Allahabad Bank versus J.D.S. Electronic Company;
ii. Union Bank of India versus Annu Vastralaya & Anr., IV (2007) CPJ 187 (NC);
iii. Canara Bank versus Leatheroid Plastic Pvt. Ltd., II (2020) CPJ 55 (SC).
9. The learned Counsel for OP-1 - Insurance Company argued in favour of the impugned orders passed by the Fora below. He sought to dismiss the Revision Petition. OP-2 Bank was placed ex-parte vide order dated 05.01.2024 by this Commission as none was present on its behalf.
10. We have examined the pleadings and associated documents placed on record and rendered thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for both the parties.
11. In this case, it is acknowledged that neither any premium was received by the Insurance Company nor insurance policy was issued to cover the loss incurred by the complainant in the flood. As a result, the Respondent No.1/OP-1, the insurance company, is not deemed liable for the loss.
12. Now, the issues at hand are twofold:
Whether the Complainant qualifies as a "Consumer" under the Consumer Protection Act concerning the Respondent No.2/ OP2 - Bank, from which the Complainant obtained a loan for her business.
If the Complainant is deemed a "Consumer," whether she is entitled to compensation for the losses incurred in the flood from the Respondent No.2/OP2-Bank, and if so, to determine the amount.
13. Adverting to the first issue, the definition of the term 'Consumer' as contained in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act of 1986 and now repealed by Section 2 (7) (i) & (ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 reads:
(7) "consumer" means any person who--
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any service for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such service other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person, but does not include a person who avails of such service for any commercial purpose.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this clause,--
(a) the expression "commercial purpose" does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment;
(b) the expressions "buys any goods" and "hires or avails any services" includes offline or online transactions through electronic means or by teleshopping or direct selling or multi-level marketing; (Emphasis supplied)
14. While elaborately discussing the impact of amendments made to the definition of 'Consumer' in relation to exclusion of categories of activities envisaged under the exception of commercial activity, particularly after the 2002 Amendment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shrikant G. Mantri Vs. Punjab National Bank, Civil Appeal No.11397 of 2016 decided on 22.02.2022, held as under:-
30. It could thus be seen that by the 2002 Amendment Act, the legislature clearly provided that a person, who avails of such services for any commercial purpose would be beyond the ambit of definition of the term 'consumer'. The Explanation, which is an exception to an exception, which earlier excluded a person from the term 'commercial purpose', if goods were purchased by such a person for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, was substituted and the Explanation was made applicable to both clauses (i) and (ii). It can thus clearly be seen that by the 2002 Amendment Act, though the legislature provided that whenever a person avails of services for commercial purposes, he would not be a consumer; it further clarified that the 'commercial purpose' does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment.
31. It is thus clear that by the 2002 Amendment Act, the legislature has done two things. Firstly, it has kept the commercial transactions, insofar as the services are concerned, beyond the ambit of the term 'consumer' and brought it in parity with Section 2(1)(d)(i), wherein a person, who bought such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose, was already out of the ambit of the term 'consumer'. The second thing that the legislature did was that even if a person availed of the commercial services, if the services availed by him were exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment, he would still be a 'consumer' for the purposes of the said Act. Thus, a person who availed of services for commercial purpose exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment was kept out of the term 'commercial purpose' and brought into the ambit of 'consumer', by bringing him on par with similarly circumstanced person, who bought and used goods exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment. It could thus be seen that the legislature's intent is clear. If a person buys goods for commercial purpose or avails services for commercial purpose, though ordinarily, he would have been out of the ambit of the term 'consumer', by virtue of Explanation, which is now common to both Sections 2(1)(d)(i) and 2(1)(d)(ii), he would still come within the ambit of the term 'consumer', if purchase of such goods or availing of such services was exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment. With this legislative history in background, we will have to consider the present case.
32. The purpose of the said Act has been succinctly described by this Court in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute 6 (1995) 3SCC 583, which is as under:
"10. A review of the provisions of the Act discloses that the quasijudicial bodies/authorities/agencies created by the Act known as District Forums, State Commissions and the National Commission are not courts though invested with some of the powers of a civil court. They are quasijudicial tribunals brought into existence to render inexpensive and speedy remedies to consumers. It is equally clear that these forums/commissions were not supposed to supplant but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to provide an additional forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and services. The forum so created is uninhibited by the requirement of court fee or the formal procedures of a court. Any consumer can go and file a complaint. Complaint need not necessarily be filed by the complainant himself; any recognized consumers' association can espouse his cause. Where a large number of consumers have a similar complaint, one or more can file a complaint on behalf of all. Even the Central Government and State Governments can act on his/their behalf. The idea was to help the consumers get justice and fair treatment in the matter of goods and services purchased and availed by them in a market dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies. Indeed, the entire Act revolves round the consumer and is designed to protect his interest. The Act provides for "businessto consumer" disputes and not for "businesstobusiness" disputes. This scheme of the Act, in our opinion, is relevant to and helps in interpreting the words that fall for consideration in this appeal."
33. It could thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that the idea of enacting the said Act was to help the consumers get justice and fair treatment in the matter of goods and services purchased and availed by them in a market dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies. It has been held that the entire Act revolves round the consumer and is designed to protect his interest. It provides for "businesstoconsumer" disputes and not for "businessto business" disputes. It has been held that forums/ commissions provided by the said Act are not supposed to supplant but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to provide an additional forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and services.
34. In the case of Laxmi Engineering Works (supra), this Court, while considering the scope of the definition of the expression 'consumer' with relation to Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act and the Explanation added by 1993 Amendment Act, observed thus:
"11. Now coming back to the definition of the expression 'consumer' in Section 2(d), a consumer means insofar as is relevant for the purpose of this appeal, (i) a person who buys any goods for consideration; it is immaterial whether the consideration is paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or whether the payment of consideration is deferred; (ii) a person who uses such goods with the approval of the person who buys such goods for consideration; (iii) but does not include a person who buys such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. The expression 'resale' is clear enough. Controversy has, however, arisen with respect to meaning of the expression "commercial purpose". It is also not defined in the Act. In the absence of a definition, we have to go by its ordinary meaning. 'Commercial' de-notes "pertaining to commerce" (Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary); it means "connected with, or engaged in commerce; mercantile; having profit as the main aim" (Collins English Dictionary) whereas the word 'commerce' means "financial transactions especially buying and selling of merchandise, on a large scale" (Concise Oxford Dictionary). The National Commission appears to have been taking a consistent view that where a person purchases goods "with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a large scale for the purpose of earning profit" he will not be a 'consumer' within the meaning of Section 2(d)(i) of the Act. Broadly affirming the said view and more particularly with a view to obviate any confusion -- the expression "large scale" is not a very precise expression -- Parliament stepped in and added the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/ Amendment Act, 1993. The explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression "commercial purpose" -- a case of exception to an exception. Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a consumer but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others' work for consideration or for plying the car as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial purpose. The explanation however clarifies that in certain situations, purchase of goods for "commercial purpose" would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression 'consumer'. If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment, such purchaser of goods is yet a 'consumer'. In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to be a consumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by selfemployment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a "commercial purpose" and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a "commercial purpose", to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz., "uses them by himself", "exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood" and "by means of selfemployment" make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasise what we say. A person who purchases an autorickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer.) As against this a person who purchases an autorickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation flowing from the expressions "used by him", and "by means of selfemployment" in the explanation. The ambiguity in the meaning of the words "for the purpose of earning his livelihood" is explained and clarified by the other two sets of words." [Emphasis supplied]
35. It can thus be seen that this Court observed that the National Commission was taking a consistent view that where a person purchases goods "with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a large scale for the purpose of earning profit" he will not be a 'consumer' within the meaning of Section 2(d)(i) of the Act. This Court observed that in order to obviate any confusion that the expression "large scale" was not a very precise expression, the Parliament stepped in and added the explanation to Section 2(d)(i) by Ordinance/ Amendment Act, 1993. It has been held that that the explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression "commercial purpose". Various examples have been given by this Court as to what would come within the term of 'selfemployment'.
36. One instance given is that a person who purchases a typewriter and works on the typewriter himself, the purchase would be for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment and he would not cease to be a 'consumer' for the purposes of the said Act. Another example given is that, if a person who purchases an autorickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood, he would still be a consumer too. This Court held that the question as to whether the transaction is for the 'commercial purpose' or for 'earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment' is a question of fact that has to be decided in the facts of each case. It has been held that it is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods so bought, are put to. It has been held that several words used in the explanation, viz., "uses them by himself", "exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood" and "by means of self-employment" make the intention of the Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, for earning his livelihood.
42. It is thus clear, that this Court has held that the question, as to whether a transaction is for a commercial purpose would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, ordinarily, "commercial purpose" is understood to include manufacturing/industrial activity or business to business transactions between commercial entities; that the purchase of the good or service should have a close and direct nexus with a profit generating activity; that the identity of the person making the purchase or the value of the transaction is not conclusive for determining the question as to whether it is for a commercial purpose or not. What is relevant is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction and as to whether the same was to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary. It has further been held that if the dominant purpose behind purchasing the good or service was for the personal use and the consumption of the purchaser and/or their beneficiary, or is otherwise not linked to any commercial activity, then the question of whether such a purchase was for the purpose of "generating livelihood by means of self-employment" need not be looked into.
45. It could thus be seen, that when a person avails a service for a commercial purpose, to come within the meaning of consumer' as defined in the said Act, he will have to establish that the services were availed exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. There cannot be any straitjacket formula and such a question will have to be decided in the facts of each case, depending upon the evidence placed on record.
46. In the present matter, it is not in dispute that the appellant was already engaged in the profession of stockbroker, much before he availed of service of the overdraft facility from the respondentBank. It is also not in dispute that he was also acting as a stockbroker for the respondent Bank. It is also not in dispute that the appellant took the overdraft facility and also sought enhancement of the same from time to time in furtherance of his business as a stockbroker and for the purpose of enhancing the profits therein. As already held by this Court in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works (supra), the terms "services availed by him", "exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood" and "by means of selfemployment" will have to be given its meaning, as intended by the legislature. The said terms will have to be construed in context with the purpose for which the said Act is enacted. We have elaborately discussed the legislative history as to how Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act has come in its present form from the original form. The amendments incorporated by the 1993 Amendment Act as well as by the 2002 Amendment Act would clearly show that the legislative intent is to keep the commercial transactions out of the purview of the said Act and at the same time, to give benefit of the said Act to a person who enters into such commercial transactions, when he uses such goods or avails such services exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment.
47. In the present case, the Commission has come to a finding that the appellant had opened an account with the respondent Bank, took overdraft facility to expand his business profits, and subsequently from time to time the overdraft facility was enhanced so as to further expand his business and increase his profits. The relations between the appellant and the respondent is purely "business to business" relationship. As such, the transactions would clearly come within the ambit of 'commercial purpose'. It cannot be said that the services were availed "exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood" "by means of self-employment". If the interpretation as sought to be placed by the appellant is to be accepted, then the 'business to business' disputes would also have to be construed as consumer disputes, thereby defeating the very purpose of providing speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes."
15. The first issue in the case is whether the dispute pertaining to the terms of the agreement between the Parties to provide for the facility of loan to the business firm of the Complainant, namely, M/s. Bandana Bricks by the Respondent No.2/ OP2-Bank constitutes a Consumer dispute under the Act? In this regard, as enunciated in the Act and clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Act is mainly for the purpose of securing expeditious legal remedies to Consumers. As per Section 2(1)(d) of the Act, a Consumer is a person who buys goods or hires or avails services for consideration, except for commercial purposes. However, this exception has been expanded to a limited extent that, if such transactions are carried out for the purpose of earning livelihood, the individual undertaking such transaction will be considered as a Consumer.
16. It is the admitted position that the Complainant Kamla Kumari took a loan for a sum of Rs.9 Lakhs under K.V.I.C. scheme from OP-2 Bank. She has Proprietor of M/s Bandana Bricks. After perusing all the pleadings available on record, there is not a single word uttered that the Complainant doing the said business for self-employment or earning her livelihood. It appears that the Complainant is not a Consumer as 'M/s. Bandana Bricks" is essentially a commercial entity and involved entirely in commercial transactions with OP-2. Therefore, the proprietorship firm is not a Consumer for any relief from any Commission constituted under the Act. On the other hand, at no stage the Complainant had contended that she is operating the said Account pertaining to the commercial entity for livelihood by means of self-employment and, therefore, she is a consumer.
17. Based on the above discussion and the fact that the relationship between the Petitioner/Complainant and the Respondent No.2/OP2 - Bank is purely "business to business" in nature, the said transaction would clearly come within the ambit of 'commercial purpose'. Therefore, the Petitioner/Complainant is not a "Consumer" under the Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the impugned orders of the Fora below are not tenable and, therefore, both the order dated 24.06.2008 and 11.10.2017 are set aside. The complaint filed before the learned District Forum is dismissed.
18. The issue whether she is entitled for any compensation for the losses incurred in the flood from the Respondent No.2/OP-2-Bank, and if so, the determination of the amount is not a matter for adjudication by this Commission. Accordingly, the Complainant is granted liberty to avail her legal remedy by approaching appropriate forum, having jurisdiction to decide the matter.
19. Consequently, the Revision Petition No.557 of 2018 is disposed of accordingly.
20. There shall be no order as to costs.
21. All pending Applications, if any stand disposed of accordingly.
................................................................................... AVM J. RAJENDRA, AVSM VSM (Retd.) PRESIDING MEMBER