Karnataka High Court
B.A. Jagadeesh vs Sri. Saurabh Kumar Ifs on 8 July, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 26.06.2025
Pronounced on : 08.07.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 08TH DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.1597 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
B.A.JAGADEESH
S/O LATE B.R.ANNAPPAGOWDA
AGED 46 YEARS
THE THEN ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
HASSAN SUB DIVISION
HASSAN DISTRICT
PRESENTLY WORKING AS A
PROJECT DIRECTOR
DISTRICT URBAN DEVELOPMENT CELL
D.C.OFFICE
HASSAN - 573 201.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SANDEEP PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI. SAURABH KUMAR, IFS
THE DEPUTY CONSERVATOR
OF FOREST HASSAN TERRITORIAL DIVISION
ARANYA BHAVAN
B.M.ROAD, NEAR GOVT. ENGINEERING COLLEGE
2
HASSAN - 573 201.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
PRL.CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C HASSAN IN PCR NO.105/2024 NOW
IN C.C.NO.315/2024 UNDER SEC.200 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND SEC.2, 3 OF THE VAN (SANRAKSHAN EVAN
SAMVARDHAN) ADHINIYAM, 1980 EARLIER FOREST
CONSERVATION ACT AND UNDER RULE 15 OF VAN (SANRAKSHAN
EVAN SAMVARDHAN) RULES, EARLIER FOREST CONSERVATION
RULES AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 25.06.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is at the doors of this Court calling in question
proceedings in C.C.No.315 of 2024 pending before the II Additional
Civil Judge and JMFC, Hassan arising out of complaint filed under
Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., for offences punishable under Sections
2 and 3 of the VAN (Sanrakshan Evan Samvardhan)
Adhiniyam, 1980 and under Rule 15 of the Van (Sanrakshan
3
Evam Samvardhan) Rules, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act' and 'the Rules' for short).
2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
It is the case of the prosecution that one T.D. Dasegowda,
Son of late Dyavegowda submits an application under the Right to
Information Act to the Public Information Officer and the Tahsildar
seeking certain documents including copies of mutation, orders of
higher authorities and other Court orders relating to recording the
land as forest, of a particular property situated in Sy.No.22
measuring 61 acres and 32 guntas located in Tyavalli Village,
Shanthigrama Hobli, Hassan Taluk. The Tahsildar issues an
endorsement on 28-10-2020 conveying that the documents
requested by the applicant with respect to entry of Forest in the
record of rights of the aforesaid property was not available in the
office records. The applicant, under the RTI Act, then takes
recourse to filing an appeal before the petitioner under Sections 24
and 49 of the Right to Information Act and Section 136(2) of the
Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964.
4
3. In the said appeal, it was the case of T.D. Dasegowda that
an inadvertent entry of word 'forest' in the record of rights in
relation to Sy.No.22 had crept in and sought restoration of the RTC
entry as 'Sarkari Gomala'. The said appeal was registered as
R.A.No.296 of 2020-21. The petitioner, in the discharge of his
duties as Assistant Commissioner, hears of the matter from
23-07-2021 to 17-12-2021, affords opportunity to both the
Tahsildar and the applicant and on perusal of relevant documents
observed that Forest Department has failed to provide any
document demonstrating the classification of the land in question as
a forest land, except presenting particular record of rights. On the
said examination of documents and consideration of arguments
presented, the petitioner passes an order on 5-01-2022 directing
restoration of the entry in the record of rights as Sarkari Gomala.
The petitioner further observes that it was open to the Forest
Department to pursue transfer of title in its name by making
appropriate proposal before the Deputy Commissioner as
restoration was only as Sarkari Gomala.
5
4. The Forest Department, claiming to be aggrieved by the
order of the petitioner, passed under Section 136(2) of the
Karnataka Land Revenue Act prefers a revision petition before the
Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner on
26-09-2023 remands the matter back to the Assistant
Commissioner for hearing afresh, on the reasons so rendered in the
said order. The Deputy Commissioner further directed that the
Assistant Commissioner should conclude the hearing of the matter
within six months.
5. When things stood thus, the Forest Department registers a
private complaint against the petitioner for violation of the
provisions of the Act and the Rules. The allegation is that the
petitioner while passing the order in R.A.No.296 of 2020-21 has
favoured individual's interest over public interest and has passed
the order against the respondent/Forest Department. The
concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence against the
petitioner and registers C.C.No.315 of 2024. Registration of criminal
case and issuance of summons has driven the petitioner to this
Court in the subject petition.
6
6. Heard Sri Sandeep Patil, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public
Prosecutor for the respondent.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
vehemently contend that the petitioner passes the order on
05-01-2022 in R.A.No.296 of 2020-21. The Forest Department files
the appeal. The Deputy Commissioner remits the matter back to
the Assistant Commissioner for hearing afresh, at which point in
time the petitioner was not the Assistant Commissioner. The
allegation in the complaint is that the petitioner has passed the
order on 05-01-2022 contrary to several judgments of the Supreme
Court. The crime is registered, as observed hereinabove, by filing a
private complaint on 27-01-2024. The learned counsel would
contend that the punishment imposable for violation of Sections 2
and 3 of the Act r/w Rule 15 of the Rules is 6 months. If
punishment that can be imposable is 6 months, the complaint could
not have been registered after a delay of 2 years. He would submit
that it is hit by Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.
7
7.1. Apart from the aforesaid submissions, the learned
counsel would submit that the petitioner has performed his duties
as Assistant Commissioner under Section 136 of the Karnataka
Land Revenue Act. These are quasi-judicial functions against which
an appeal/revision was available before the Deputy Commissioner.
The Forest Department files a revision before the Deputy
Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner considers it and remits
the matter back. He would submit that this cannot become a
subject matter of crime, as performance of quasi-judicial function
cannot become a crime, unless mens rea pervades the said action.
He would further contend that the concerned Court could not have
taken cognizance of the offence without sanction for prosecution
being placed before it, as the petitioner is a public servant and has
performed his duties as a public servant. On all these grounds, the
learned counsel would seek quashment of the proceedings.
8. Per contra, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor
would put up vehement objections to the quashment of proceedings
by taking this Court through the documents appended to the
statement of objections to contend that once a forest it is always a
8
forest. When the RTC was clearly indicating that it was a forest
land, the petitioner ought not to have held as Sarkari Gomala, since
RTC extracts produced before the petitioner when he decided the
matter, the trees grown were Bamboo, Honne and Tapsi, which is
indicative of the fact that it is a forest land. He would submit that
the petitioner being a public servant could not have acted contrary
to law and observed that the land is a Sarkari Gomala. The learned
Additional State Public Prosecutor would submit that sanction to
prosecute is accorded by the Competent Authority on 13-06-2024.
Therefore, he would submit that the proceedings should be
permitted to be continued.
9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
10. The functioning of the petitioner, as Assistant
Commissioner at the relevant point in time, is a matter of record.
An appeal being preferred before him in R.A.No.296 of 2020-21 is
again a matter of record. The petitioner holds proceedings for about
9
4 months, hears the parties, analyses the documents and holds that
the only access route to the agricultural land in Sy.No.22 was being
used in grazing cattle. Therefore, on those documents, the land was
observed to be a Sarkari Gomala. The Forest Department gets
touchy, contending that once a forest always a forest, prefers an
appeal/revision before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy
Commissioner allows the revision and remands the matter back to
the Assistant Commissioner for hearing afresh, as the contention
was appropriate opportunity was not afforded to the Forest
Department to make its case. The relevant order of the Deputy
Commissioner reads as follows:
".... .... ....
ಾ ಮತು ಪ ಾ ಯವರ ಾದವನು ಆ ಸ ಾ ತು. ಾ ಾಗೂ ಪ ಾ ಗಳ ಪರ
ವ ೕಲರು ಾಜರು ಪ ಸ ಾದ ತ ಾದವನು ಪ ಗ!"#ೊಂಡು ಕಡತದ (ನ ಲಭ* +ಾಖ ೆಗಳನು
ಪ -ೕ ಸ ಾ.ರುತ+ೆ. / ಾ ತ ಜ0ೕನು ಸ#ಾ1 2ೋ3ಾಳ ಾ.ದು4, 3 ಂದ 105ೇ
ಪ ಾ ಯವರುಗಳ ಾಗೂ ಇತ7ೆ 2ಾ ಮಸ8ರುಗಳ ಜ0ೕನುಗ9ದು4, :ೕಲ;ಂಡ 2ೋ3ಾಳದ (<ೕ
ಅವರ ಜ0ೕನುಗ92ೆ ೋಗಲು ರು2ಾಡು ರು>ಾ7ೆ. 2ೋ3ಾಳವನು ?ಟA7ೆ BಾವC+ೇ ರDೆಯ
ವ*ವDೆ8ಯು ಇರುವC ಲ(. ಬಹಳ Gಂ Hಂದಲೂ ಸ.ನಂ 22 ರ ಜ0ೕHನ ಪಹ!ಯ ( 2ೋ3ಾಳ ಎಂದು
ಬರು ದು4, ಅJಸೂಚ5ೆ ೊರ "+ೆ ಇ ೕLೆ2ೆ Mಾ7ೆNA ಎಂದು ನಮೂ+ಾ.ರುತ+ೆ.
ಉಪ/Pಾ2ಾJ#ಾ ಗಳQ, ಾಸನ ಉಪ/Pಾಗ, ರವರು >ಾ*/ಹ9R 2ಾ ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ.22 ರ ( 61-32
ಎಕ7ೆ ಪ +ೇಶವನು ಆT.U." #ಾಲಂ 9 ರ ( 2ೋ3ಾಳ ಎಂದು ನಮೂ ಸಲು ಆ+ೇ-"ರು>ಾ7ೆ.
ಮುಂದುವ7ೆದು ಈ ಪ +ೇಶದ Wೈ Dಾಗುವ9 3ಾ ರುವ ಪ +ೇಶವನು ೊರತುಪ " ಉ9#ೆ
ಪ +ೇಶದ ( ಅರಣ* ಇ ಾ#ೆಯವರು 5ೆಡು>ೋಪನು Zೆ[ೆ"ರುವ ಪ\ದ ( ಅಂತಹ 5ೆಡು>ೋಪC ಇರುವ
ಪ +ೇಶವನು ಅರಣ* ಇ ಾ]ೆ2ೆ #ಾ 4 ಸಲು ಸೂಕ ಪ Dಾವ5ೆಯನು ಸ (ಸಲು ವಲಯ
10
ಅರ^ಾ*J#ಾ ಗಳQ, ಾಸನ ವಲಯ, ಾಸನ ರವ 2ೆ 9"ರುವCದು ಕಂಡುಬರುತ+ೆ. ಆದ4 ಂದ ಈ
#ೆಳಕಂಡಂ>ೆ ಆ+ೇ-"+ೆ.
::ಆ+ೇಶ
:: ಆ+ೇಶ::
ಆ+ೇಶ::
:ೕಲ`ನ/+ಾರರ :ೕಲ`ನ/ಯನು Pಾಗಶಃ ಪCರಸ; "+ೆ.
ಉಪ /Pಾ2ಾJ#ಾ , ಾಸನ ಉಪ/Pಾಗ, ಾಸನ ರವರು ಪCನಃ ಉಭಯತ ಯ ಗೂ
5ೋUೕಸು bಾ 3ಾ :ೕಲ`ನ/+ಾರರ +ಾಖ ೆಗಳನು /ವರ ಾ. ಪ -ೕ ", 6 ಂಗ[ೆc ಳ2ಾ.
ಆ+ೇಶ ೊರ ಸಲು ಆ+ೇ-"+ೆ.
ಈ ಆ+ೇಶವನು ಉಕ ೇಖನ Hೕ ಪ ಷ; "ದ ನಂತರ 5ಾಂಕ:26-09-2023 ರಂದು >ೆ7ೆದ
5ಾ*Bಾಲಯದ ( eೂೕfಸ ಾ ತು."
The Deputy Commissioner further directs the proceedings to be
concluded within 6 months from the date of remand. What is
discernible from the aforesaid proceedings is, that the petitioner in
the capacity of Assistant Commissioner, under the provisions of the
Karnataka Land Revenue Act, has held and ordered in the
proceedings as a quasi-judicial Authority. He has not restored the
entry to any private party, but noticing the fact that the land was
used for cattle grazing for ages passes the following order:
".... .... ....
:ೕಲ;ಂಡ ಎ ಾ( ಅಂಶಗಳನು ಪ ಗ!"+ಾಗ ಾಸನ >ಾಲೂ(ಕು gಾಂ 2ಾ ಮ ೋಬ9
>ಾ*/ಹ9R 2ಾ ಮದ ಸ ೆ1 ನಂಬT 22 ರ ( 61 ಎಕ7ೆ 32 ಗುಂhೆ ಜ0ೕನು ಕಂ+ಾಯ +ಾಖ ೆಗಳ ಪ #ಾರ
2ೋ3ಾಳ ಜ0ೕ5ಾ.ರುತ+ೆ. ಆದ7ೆ ಆT.U." #ಾಲಂ 12 ರ ( ಅರಣ* ಎಂದು ನಮೂ+ಾ. 4ದು4
ಕ :ೕಣ ಾ. ಆT.U.".ಯ #ಾಲಂ 9 ರ DಾiJೕನ+ಾರರ #ಾಲಂನ ( ಅರಣ* ಎಂದು
ನಮೂ+ಾ.ರುವCದ#ೆ; BಾವC+ೇ ಆ+ೇಶ ಮತು +ಾಖ ೆಗಳನು ಪ ಾ ಗಳQ ಾಜರುಪ "ರುವC ಲ(.
11
3ಾನ* ಕ5ಾ1ಟಕ ಉಚj 5ಾ*BಾಲಯವC ೋಕಯ* /ರುದk ಜಯ- ೕ ಮತು ಇತರರು, ಕ5ಾ1ಟಕ ಾ
ಜನರl 1983 (1) 353 ಪ ಕರಣದ ( ಈ #ೆಳಕಂಡಂ>ೆ ಆ+ೇ-"+ೆ.
"Even though the land was under the physical control of the
Forest Department, in the absence of an order by the State
Government under section 3 of the Forest Act and notification under
section 4 of the Act, the legal position is that the land continues to be
under the control of the Revenue Dept governed by the Karnataka
Land Revenue Act"
:ೕಲ;ಂಡ #ಾರಣಗ92ಾ. ಸದ ಜ0ೕನು ಕಂ+ಾಯ ಇ ಾ]ೆಯ ಸi>ಾ.ರುತ+ೆ. ಆದ4 ಂದ
ಈ #ೆಳಕಂಡಂ>ೆ ೕ3ಾ1H"+ೆ.
ಆ+ೇಶ
:ೕಲ`ನ/ಯನು ಪCರಸ; "+ೆ. ಾಸನ >ಾಲೂ(ಕು gಾಂ 2ಾ ಮ ೋಬ9 >ಾ*/ಹ9R
2ಾ ಮದ ಸ ೆ1 ನಂಬT 22 ರ (ರುವ 61 ಎಕ7ೆ 32 ಗುಂhೆ ಜ0ೕನನು ಆT.U."./ಪಹ!ಯ #ಾಲಂ 9
ರ ( 2ೋ3ಾಳ ಎಂದು ನಮೂದು 3ಾಡಲು ಆ+ೇ-"+ೆ.
ಸದ 61 ಎಕ7ೆ 32 ಗುಂhೆ Wೈ Dಾಗುವ9 3ಾ ರುವ ಪ +ೇಶವನು ೊರತುಪ " ಉ9#ೆ
ಪ +ೇಶದ ( ಅರಣ* ಇ ಾ]ೆಯವರು 5ೆಡು>ೋಪನು Zೆ[ೆ"ರುವ ಪ\ದ ( ಅಂತಹ 5ೆಡು>ೋಪC ಇರುವ
ಪ +ೇಶವನು ಅರಣ* ಇ ಾ]ೆ2ೆ #ಾ 4 ಸಲು ಸೂಕ ಪ Dಾವ5ೆಯನು m ಾ(J#ಾ ಯವ 2ೆ
ಸ (ಸಬಹು+ಾ.+ೆ ಎಂದು 25ೇ ಪ ಾ ಯವ 2ೆ 9ಯಪ "+ೆ.
ಈ ಆ+ೇಶವನು 5ಾಂಕ 05-01-2022 ರಂದು eೂೕf"+ೆ."
The order, cannot but be said to be in exercise of quasi-judicial
function. The Deputy Commissioner has now set aside and remitted
the matter back to the hands of the Assistant Commissioner, for
consideration afresh. The said consideration is said to be pending
even as on date.
12
11. What shocks is the action of the Forest Department. The
Forest Department registers a private complaint before the
jurisdictional Magistrate invoking Rule 15 of the Rules for offences
punishable under Sections 3A and 3B of the Act. Sections 3A and
3B of the Act read as follows:
"3-A. Penalty for contravention of the provisions of
the Act.--Whoever contravenes or abets the contravention of
any of the provisions of Section 2, shall be punishable with
simple imprisonment for a period which may extend to fifteen
days.
3-B. Offences by authorities and Government
departments.--(1) Where any offence under this Act has been
committed--
(a) by any department of Government, the head of the
department; or
(b) by any authority, every person who, at the time the
offence was committed, was directly in charge of, and
was responsible to, the authority for the conduct of
the business of the authority as well as the authority,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to
be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
render the head of the department or any person referred to in
clause (b), liable to any punishment if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge or that he
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), where an offence punishable under the Act has been
committed by a department of Government or any authority
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) and it is proved that
13
the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance
of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any officer,
other than the head of the department, or in the case of an
authority, any person other than the persons referred to in
clause (b) of sub-section (1), such officer or persons shall also
be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly."
Section 3A punishes a person who contravenes or abets any of the
provisions of Section 2 with imprisonment which may extend
upto 15 days. Section 3B deals with offence by Authorities and
Government Departments. Any offence committed under the Act by
any Authority, every person who at the time of offence committed
was directly responsible for conduct of the said offence would
become open for punishment for 15 days of imprisonment.
12. Admittedly, the date on which the petitioner has passed
the order is 05-01-2022. The said order forms the fulcrum of the
entire complaint. The complaint is registered on 27-01-2024, two
years after the petitioner passing the order. The bar under Section
468 of the Cr.P.C., would kick in. Section 468 reads as follows:-
"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the
period of limitation.--(1) Except as otherwise provided
elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an
offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the
expiry of the period of limitation.
14
(2) The period of limitation shall be--
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable
with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term not exceeding
one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of
limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together,
shall be determined with reference to the offence which is
punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case
may be, the most severe punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 468 deals with power to take cognizance after the period of
limitation. The period of limitation would be 6 months ,if the
offence is punishable with fine only; would be one year, if
the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year. It is settled principle of law, that it is not
the date on which cognizance is taken by the Court that becomes
important for computation of limitation, under Section 468 of the
Cr.P.C, it is the date on which the complaint is registered. The
offence in the case at hand, is punishable with imprisonment for 15
15
days and fine. The maximum period of limitation thus, would be six
months. The complaint is registered after 2 years of passing the
order. Therefore, the registration of complaint is on the face of it,
beyond limitation.
13. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
SARAH MATHEW v. INSTITUTE OF CARDIO VACULAR
DISEASES1 has elaborately delineated the concept of limitation
under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. as follows:
".... .... ....
47. So far as the "heading" of the chapter is concerned, it
is well settled that "heading" or "title" prefixed to sections or
group of sections have a limited role to play in the construction
of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general
indicators or the nature of the subject-matter dealt with
thereunder but they do not control the meaning of the sections
if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section
in proper perspective along with other provisions. In Frick India
Ltd. v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 400 : 1990 SCC (Tax) 185]
, this Court has observed as under : (SCC p. 405, para 8)
"8. It is well settled that the headings prefixed
to sections or entries cannot control the plain words
of the provision; they cannot also be referred to for
the purpose of construing the provision when the
words used in the provision are clear and
unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down
the plain meaning of the words in the provision.
Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading
1
(2014) 2 SCC 62
16
or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in
construing the provision but even in such a case it
could not be used for cutting down the wide
application of the clear words used in the provision."
48. Therefore, the submission that heading of Chapter
XXXVI is an indicator that the date of taking cognizance is
material, must be rejected.
49. It is true that penal statutes must be strictly
construed. There are, however, cases where this Court has
having regard to the nature of the crimes involved, refused to
adopt any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction
of penal statutes. (See MurlidharMeghrajLoya v. State of
Maharashtra [(1976) 3 SCC 684: 1976 SCC (Cri) 493]
and KisanTrimbakKothula v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 1
SCC 300: 1977 SCC (Cri) 97].) In this case, looking to the
legislative intent, we have harmoniously construed the
provisions of Chapter XXXVI so as to strike a balance between
the right of the complainant and the right of the accused.
Besides, we must bear in mind that Chapter XXXVI is part of the
Criminal Procedure Code, which is a procedural law and it is well
settled that procedural laws must be liberally construed to serve
as handmaid of justice and not as its mistress. (See Sardar
Amarjit Singh Kalra [Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod
Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272], N. Balaji v. Virendra Singh [(2004) 8
SCC 312] and Kailash [Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480].)
Conclusion
50. Having considered the questions which arise in this
reference in the light of legislative intent, authoritative
pronouncements of this Court and established legal principles,
we are of the opinion that Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A.
Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have
to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for
deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468
CrPC, primarily because in that case, this Court was dealing with
Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a
special Act. It specifically stated that no court shall take
cognizance of any offence under the said Act after the expiry of
one year from the date on which offence is alleged to have been
17
committed. There is no reference either to Section 468 or
Section 473 CrPC in that judgment. It does not refer to Sections
4 and 5 CrPC which carve out exceptions for the special Acts.
This Court has not adverted to diverse aspects including the
aspect that inaction on the part of the court in taking cognizance
within limitation, though the complaint is filed within time may
work great injustice on the complainant. Moreover, reliance
placed on Antulay '1984' case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas
Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500: 1984 SCC (Cri) 277], in our opinion,
was not apt. In Antulay '1984' case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas
Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500: 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] this
Court was dealing inter alia with the contention that a private
complaint is not maintainable in the Court of the Special Judge
set up under Section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
1952 ("the 1952 Act"). It was urged that the object underlying
the 1952 Act was to provide for a more speedy trial of offences
of corruption by a public servant. It was argued that if it is
assumed that a private complaint is maintainable then before
taking cognizance, a Special Judge will have to examine the
complainant and all the witnesses as per Section 200 CrPC. He
will have to postpone issue of process against the accused and
either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to
be made by a police officer and in cases under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 by police officers of designated rank for
the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground
for proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the
object of the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial. This
contention was rejected by this Court holding that it is not a
condition precedent to the issue of process that the court of
necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202
CrPC or direct investigation as therein contemplated. That is
matter of discretion of the court. Thus, the questions which
arise in this reference were not involved in Antulay '1984'
case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC
500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] : since there, this Court was not
dealing with the question of bar of limitation reflected in Section
468 CrPC at all, in our opinion, the said judgment could not
have been usefully referred to in Krishna Pillai [Krishna
Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri)
646] while construing provisions of Chapter XXXVI CrPC. For all
these reasons, we are unable to endorse the view taken
in Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC
121: 1990 SCC (Cri) 646].
18
51. In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of
the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and
not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.
We further hold that Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar
Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
39] which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani
Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394 :
(2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 388] lays down the correct
law. Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990
Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be
restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for
deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for
the purpose of computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 CrPC.
52. The reference is answered accordingly. The Registry
may list the matters before the appropriate courts for disposal."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the offence being punishable with 15 days and the
law being unequivocal, the complaint lodged after two years is
hopelessly barred by limitation. Therefore, the complaint ought not
to have been entertained.
14. Over and above the aforesaid finding, what shocks the
conscience of the Court is that the Forest Department registering a
crime for the performance of the petitioner's quasi-judicial
19
functions. As an Assistant Commissioner, looking into the records,
he has passed an order, not bartering away the forest land to
private entity, but observing it as a Sarkari Gomala. Appeal is a
remedy which is exercised by the Forest Department. After having
filed an appeal and secured an order of remand to consider the
issue afresh, it did not lie with the Forest Department to register a
crime against the petitioner for having performed his quasi-judicial
functions, unless it is found the exercise of such function is laced
with criminality and foundationed on mens rea. In the light of the
preceding analysis, if further proceedings are permitted to continue,
it would result in miscarriage of justice and become an abuse of the
process of the law.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceeding in C.C.No.315 of 2024 arising out P.C.R.No.105 of 2024 pending before the II Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Hassan stands quashed.
20(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the remanded proceedings concerning R.A.No.296 of 2020-21.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ