Karnataka High Court
Harshadeep Girish Parlathaya vs The State Of Karnataka on 4 March, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 24.02.2026
R
Pronounced on : 04.03.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 04TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.35036 OF 2024 (GM - RES)
BETWEEN:
HARSHADEEP GIRISH PARLATHAYA
S/O. P. P. GIRISH,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 6-66/2 (A1), CHIRAG,
BEHIND KANTHERI,
DUMAVATHI TEMPLE,
AYYAKERE, IDDYA,
SURATHKAL,
MANGALURU - 575 014.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI VIKRAM HUILGOL, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI MOHAN KUMAR G., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY I.O.,
MANGALURU WOMEN POLICE STATION.
2
2. XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1
SRI PARAMESWARAPPA C., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF
BNSS, 2023 PRAYING TO QUASH THE ZERO FIR DATED 19.10.2024
REGISTERED AS CRIME NO. 106/2024 BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1
I.E., MANGALORE WOMEN POLICE STATION/1ST RESPONDENT
AGAINST THE PETITIONER (ANNEXURE A) UNDER SECTION 69,
115(2) OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA 2023 ON THE FILE OF
THE III JMFC COURT, MANGALORE.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 24.02.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
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CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
registration of a crime in Crime No.106 of 2024 for offences
punishable under Sections 69 and 115(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita ('BNS'), 2023.
2. Heard Sri Vikram Huilgol, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner, Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional State
Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and
Sri C. Parameshwarappa, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.2.
3. THE FACTUAL CANVASS:
3.1. The narrative begins in Ireland. In August, 2021, the
petitioner then pursuing his Masters Degree in International
Management at the National University of Ireland met the 2nd
respondent/complainant. She too was then navigating her
academic journey. Friendship sprouted, affection followed. The
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camaraderie matured into physical relationship. By September,
2022 the petitioner had secured employment with Valeo Vision
System. The complainant, despite earnest efforts had not secured
employment. Proximity brought them closer, convenience matured
into cohabitation. In December, 2022 they began living together,
not as strangers bound by compulsion, but as consenting adults
sharing companionship.
3.2. For two years, the two had several sexual escapades.
The petitioner then comes to know that the 2nd respondent was
already married and had a 7 years old child. The relationship
between the petitioner and the complainant eventually soured. By
mid 2024, communication frayed. Expectations collapsed. On
19-10-2024, upon returning to India, the complainant registered
the subject complaint before the Women Police Station, Mangalore
alleging that the petitioner had established physical relations with
her on a false promise of marriage. The complaint becomes a crime
in Crime No.106 of 2024 for offences punishable under Sections 69
and 115(2) of the BNS. Investigation would ensue. The petitioner
calls in question the said crime in the subject petition.
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3.3. On 16-01-2025, a coordinate Bench of this Court granted
an interim order of stay, which is in subsistence even today. The
matter is heard on an application filed by the State, seeking
vacation of the interim order.
SUBMISSIONS:
PETITIONER'S:
4. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
would vehemently contend that the relationship between the
petitioner and the 2nd respondent for close to two years was purely
on consensus. In the complaint, the complainant narrates that due
to the relationship of the petitioner, the complainant had to apply
and seek divorce from the hands of her husband. But, that is
factually incorrect. The relationship between the complainant's
husband and the complainant had strained long ago. Divorce
petition was pending even before the complainant met the
petitioner and thereafter all the acts between the two were purely
on consensus, but never on promise of marriage. Due to
registration of complaint, the effect is that the petitioner lost his job
in Ireland, as communication is sent by the complainant to the
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Company about registration of crime and today he is not getting
any job for acts that have happened on consensus. Insofar as the
complainant is concerned, the complainant has already moved on
with another man. He would seek to place reliance upon certain
posts on social media to demonstrate that the complainant has
already moved to another relationship. Who has suffered in the
bargain is the petitioner who lost his job and opportunity of getting
a new job.
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd
respondent/complainant would though dispute the fact that the
complainant has moved on with another man, has admitted the fact
that the divorce petition was pending even before the petitioner
met the complainant for the first time. The learned counsel submits
that the petitioner and the complainant lived together in Ireland
and there was sexual relationship between the two only on the
promise of marriage. After about two years, the petitioner is said to
have breached his promise when he talked to his family about the
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marriage between the petitioner and the complainant. It is then,
the complainant returned back to this country and registered the
crime. He would admit that all the escapades between the
complainant and the petitioner have taken place beyond the shores
of the nation.
THE STATE:
6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor representing
the 1st respondent would however refute the submissions in
contending that the matter is still at the stage of investigation. The
offence is clearly met in the complaint, as sexual relationship
between the two appears to have happened on the promise of
marriage. If the petitioner did not have the intention to marry, it
would become a false promise of marriage and would attract the
provisions of Sections 69 of the BNS. Therefore, investigation in
such cases must be permitted. Both the learned counsel for the
complainant and the State would seek dismissal of the petition.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
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material on record. In furtherance whereof, the issue that
crystallizes is:
"Does the breakdown of a consensual live-in
relationship, allegedly accompanied by an unfulfilled
promise of marriage, ipso facto constitute an offence under
Section 69 of the BNS?"
CONSIDERATION:
8. The afore-narrated facts are all a matter of record.
Therefore, they would not require reiteration, except skeletal
reference to few dates. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner
and the 2nd respondent met in Ireland and were in a relationship
from May 2022 till sometime in June 2024. Therefore, it was a
relationship for over two years. Several acts of the petitioner and
the 2nd respondent, their squabbles, skirmishes in the relationship
are all narrated in the petition, which would not become necessary
to be noticed for consideration of the issue in the lis. By the time
the petitioner met the complainant, the complainant was already
married and had a 7 year old child. The marriage was said to be in
9
doldrums and the complainant had already registered a petition for
divorce with her husband. The divorce also is said to have been
granted in the month of August 2023. It is then the relationship
between petitioner and the complainant deepened and the two
began to live-in under the same roof. Thereafter, the relationship
between the petitioner and the complainant is said to have turned
sore and eventually ended. It is then the complainant comes back
to India and tries to contact the petitioner. The petitioner being
evasive leads the complainant to register a complaint on the shores
of this nation.
9. Since the entire issue has now sprung from the complaint
so registered on 19-10-2024 by the 2nd respondent, I deem it
appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows:
THE COMPLAINT:
"To
The Station House Officer
Women P.S. Palasiya, Indore
Sub: Harshdeep Parltaya (R/006/66/2(1) Chirag
Behind Kudwas grandur, Chiranthana
Ashram Idiya Surathkal, Mangalore-575014,
Mobile Nos. 7760863267 & 3538994370271
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has bluffed me to establish Physical
relationship complainant-Reg.
Respected Madam,
That I complainant xxxxxxxxxxxxx and I am Indian
National. I request you the following:-
1. That in February 2022 in Ireland, National University of
Ireland I was the student studying Masters in Clinical Research
Post-Graduation Course also I was doing waiter job as part time
in Galemant Hotel. Here I met Harshdeep Parltaya he himself
was in National University of Ireland doing Masters in
International Management as student. He also was doing part
time job in Galemont Hotel as Waiter.
2 I am married and mother of one child, I am 5 years
elder to Harshdeep. I am living away from my husband,
for this Harshdeep did not have any objection. I was
residing with 3 women at this address 186, Tere lane,
Hightra H91KNN2. After meeting Harshdeep in March
2022 he told that he will marry me and established
physical relations. In December 2022 Harshdeep shifted
in our house. He started living with me in my room. In
June 2023 Harshdeep use to say that anyhow after
marriage we are going to live together. Therefore you
leave your women friends and start to reside with me. He
assured that very soon we will marry, like this I got into
his trap. I agreed with Harshdeep and started to reside in
14 Fairgreen House Fargreen Road 4910x29 Ireland.
There Harshdeep many times established physical
relations with me. He again assured about marrying her.
3. Afterwards Harshdeep pressured me take Divorce from my
husband so that he can talk with his family members. In May
2022 I filed a Divorce case with mutual consent. This fact was
known to Harshdeep.
4. When I continuously asking when you will marry me his reply
was that once I obtain Decree then I will talk to my family
members, I use to tell about marriage Harshdeep use to say
that very soon we will marry. Even after telling many times
Harshdeep did not talk with his family members.
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5. While staying with Harshdeep in Ireland in the month of
March 2024 he used to fight for minor things and started
shouting. He did not allow me to meet friends. He assaulted me.
6. On 02-08-2024 when I asked Harshdeep about marriage
Harshdeep said that on 8-8-2024 he is going to India. After
going there I will talk with my parents.
7. On 8-8-2024 when he was going to India then I asked for his
phone for making a call then saw a message in the message box
a girl by name Isha. He was telling not to worry I will talk in
home about you, you are also coming to India after 4-5 days
you can come to my house there we will talk with my parents.
8. When I arrived in India Harshdeep never responded to
my phone calls. Afterwards I with my mother and 2
friends came to Surathkal to meet Harshdeep. On 18-8-
2024 at address Chirag 06/66-2(1), behind Kudwas,
Grandur Chiranthana Ashram, Surathkal, Mangalore,
Karnataka and we stayed in Durga Hotel. at 12.30PM we
went to his house and told his mother that we are staying
in Durga Lodge, at about 3 p.m I, my mother and two
friends went to Padmja Temple there Harshdeep came
and established physical relations and went away. At
3.30 p.m we went to his house we told his father about
our relationship. He told that Harshdeep is going to marry
Isha Vaishnas named girl. He does not have any intention
to marry you. He misbehaved with us and asked to go out
of house when we were about to go then Harshdeep
came. He told us that he cannot marry me, you can do
whatever want to do.
9. Harshdeep bluffed me and established physical relationship.
He did wrong act.
Therefore sir, it is requested that take to trouble for
proper legal action.
Sd/-
Complainant
xxxxxxxx"
(Emphasis added)
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It is narrated that all the incidents of sexual escapades between the
two have happened in Ireland on the alleged assurance of
marriage. In May 2022 even before the relationship between the
two could blossom, the complainant had filed for divorce on mutual
consent from her husband. Therefore, the allegation in the
complaint that the relationship between the petitioner and the
complainant, led the complainant to file a divorce petition, is
contrary to the facts. Divorce is granted later by the concerned
Court on mutual consent would not mean that the petitioner is the
reason for filing of the divorce petition. The petitioner first comes to
India on 08-08-2024 and the complainant on 18-08-2024. The
complainant is said to have contacted the petitioner only to receive
pale replies or even no reply. The complainant further narrates that
she indicated the relationship to the parents of the petitioner. Even
then, nothing turned around. Therefore, the complaint comes to be
registered. The complaint is lucid and vivid. The relationship
between the two from December 2022, till the month of June, 2024
was on consensus at Ireland and never on the shores of this nation.
Therefore, all that happened in Ireland between the two, which is
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ostensibly on consensus is complained of, before the jurisdictional
Police Station in Mangalore.
10. The complaint read in its entirety does not narrate
coercion, deception at inception or force. It speaks of
companionship, cohabitation, shared domesticity and consensual
intimacy extending over 2 years. The complainant's marriage had
already reached the point of legal dissolution before the live-in
arrangement deepened. The intimacy occurred in Ireland, the
cohabitation occurred in Ireland, the shared life occurred in Ireland.
What has followed is not an allegation of violence, but an allegation
of betrayal. Therefore, it is not a case of having sexual intercourse
on deceit from the inception, it is trite that "the law does not
criminalize heart break".
11. Time and again, the Apex Court has clarified that
consensual relationships between adults cannot be
retroactively criminalized, because one party withdraws
from the relationship. A promise of marriage becomes
"false" in law only when it is shown that the promise was a
mere ruse, deceitful stratagem, never intended to be
14
honoured. A subsequent change of mind, emotional
incompatibility, familial opposition or mere reluctance does
not transmute into criminal intent at inception. Jurisprudence
is replete with the Apex Court consistently holding that consensual
physical intimacy between adults, even if premised on expectation
of marriage, does not become rape or its statutory equivalent
unless, the promise was demonstrably false from the beginning.
JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:
11.1. The Apex Court in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM
MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1 has
held as follows:
".... .... ....
11. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers under
Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as
under : (SCC p. 94, para 6)
"6. ... It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
1
(2019) 18 SCC 191
15
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding
if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto."
... ... ...
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very
carefully examine whether the complainant had actually
wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and
had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his
lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or
deception. There is also a distinction between mere
breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If
the accused has not made the promise with the sole
intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual
acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the misconception
created by accused, or where an accused, on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which
were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite
having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide
intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear
case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical
relationship between the parties would not constitute an
offence under Section 376 IPC.
24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the
appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health
Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse
in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was
alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a
married man and that he has differences with his wife.
Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also
alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get
16
their marriage registered. The complainant further states that
she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a
companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that
"as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I
agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair
and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside
sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home". Thus,
they were living together, sometimes at her house and
sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a
relationship with each other for quite some time and
enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they
had been living as such for quite some time together.
When she came to know that the appellant had married
some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not
her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She
had taken a conscious decision after active application of
mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of
a passive submission in the face of any psychological
pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the
tacit consent given by her was not the result of a
misconception created in her mind. We are of the view
that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
they do not make out a case against the appellant. We
are also of the view that since the complainant has failed
to prima facie show the commission of rape, the
complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be
sustained."
11.2. Later, the Apex Court in the case of SHAMBHU
KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
9. In Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of
Maharashtra [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] a two-Judge Bench
2
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1032
17
of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud,
J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021)
18 SCC 517] observed that: (Pramod SuryabhanPawar
case [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019)
9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC pp. 616-18 & 620,
paras 12, 14, 16 & 18)
"12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent
with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active
understanding of the circumstances, actions and
consequences of the proposed act. An individual who
makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various
alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various
possible consequences flowing from such action or
inaction, consents to such action. ...
***
14. ... Specifically in the context of a
promise to marry, this Court has observed that
there is a distinction between a false promise
given on the understanding by the maker that it
will be broken, and the breach of a promise which
is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled. ...
***
16. Where the promise to marry is false and
the intention of the maker at the time of making
the promise itself was not to abide by it but to
deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact"
that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other
hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a
false promise. To establish a false promise, the
maker of the promise should have had no intention
of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
"consent" of a woman under Section 375 is
vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact"
where such misconception was the basis for her
choosing to engage in the said act. ...
***
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges
from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with
respect to Section 375 must involve an active and
reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To
establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a
18
"misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to
marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise,
given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered
to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must
be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
(emphasis supplied)
... ... ...
11. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in
the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the
FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of an
offence under Section 376IPC. The crucial issue which is
to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that
the appellant had given a promise to the second
respondent to marry which at the inception was false and
on the basis of which the second respondent was induced
into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the
FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 375IPC are
absent. The relationship between the parties was purely
of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above,
was in existence prior to the marriage of the second
respondent and continued to subsist during the term of
the marriage and after the second respondent was
granted a divorce by mutual consent.
12. The High Court, in the course of its judgment, has
merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which
cannot be considered in an application under Section 482CrPC.
As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand,
which are not in dispute, would indicate that the ingredients of
the offence under Section 376IPC were not established. The
High Court has, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application
under Section 482CrPC on a completely misconceived basis."
19
11.3. In XXXX v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH3 the Apex
Court holds as follows:
".... .... ....
9. While getting her statement recorded under Section
164CrPC, she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017.
On account of dispute with her husband, she was living with her
parents. As she got acquainted with the appellant, they fell in
love. In 2018, the appellant went to Maharashtra for job.
However, he used to visit her home and take care of the
complainant as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant
assured the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes
divorce from her husband who used to harass and beat her. For
this reason, she divorced her husband and solemnised marriage
with the appellant in a temple in January 2019. Thereafter, they
started living together with her daughter born from the previous
marriage. Despite assurance, the appellant did not solemnise
court marriage. After marriage was solemnised in temple,
treating the appellant as her husband, they both started leading
a married life having physical relations from January 2019 till
June 2020. The appellant treated the complainant as his wife.
Thereafter, the appellant refused to respond to her calls and
even marry her.
... ... ...
11. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she
got divorce from her earlier husband on 10-12-2018. In the
statement under Section 164CrPC, she stated that marriage
between the appellant and the complainant was solemnised in a
temple in January 2019. However, the date of divorce as
claimed by the complainant is belied from the copy of the
decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where divorce
by mutual consent was granted to the complainant and her
husband vide judgment dated 13-1-2021. The aforesaid fact
could not be disputed. Meaning thereby, the complainant
besides the facts in the FIR and also in the statement under
Section 164CrPC regarding her divorce from the earlier
marriage, sought to claim that she had remarried with the
appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage.
3
(2024) 3 SCC 496
20
12. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis
of which FIR was got registered and the statement got
recorded by the complainant, it is evident that there was
no promise to marry initially when the relations between
the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on
the dates when the complainant alleges that the parties
had physical relations, she was already married. She
falsely claimed that divorce from her earlier marriage
took place on 10-12-2018. However, the fact remains
that decree of divorce was passed only on 13-1-2021. It
is not a case where the complainant was of an immature
age who could not foresee her welfare and take right
decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years elder
to the appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough
to understand the consequences of the moral and
immoral acts for which she consented during subsistence
of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of betraying
her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix
that even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for
his job, he used to come and stay with the family and
they were living as husband and wife. It was also the
stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan
of Rs 1,00,000 to the prosecutrix through banking
channel which was not returned back."
11.4. In JASPAL SINGH KAURAL v. STATE OF NCT OF
DELHI4 the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in Naim
Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] whereby this Hon'ble
Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly,
the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual
relationship with the appellant-accused, upon an
assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a
married woman having three children, had continued to
4
(2025) 5 SCC 756
21
have such relationship with the appellant-accused, at
least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In
the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had
observed as under : (SCC pp. 398-99, paras 21-22)
"21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of
the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her
consent for sexual relationship under the misconception
of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to
marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and
therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the
law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section
375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there
is a difference between giving a false promise and
committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of
false promise, the accused right from the beginning
would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix
and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by
giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to
satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise,
one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might
have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her,
and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his
promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of
promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a
person for the offence under Section 376. As stated
earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts
before the court.
22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who
herself was a married woman having three
children, could not be said to have acted under the
alleged false promise given by the appellant or
under the misconception of fact while giving the
consent to have sexual relationship with the
appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have
such relationship with him at least for about five
years till she gave complaint in the year 2015.
Even if the allegations made by her in her
deposition before the court, are taken on their face
value, then also to construe such allegations as
"rape" by the appellant, would be stretching the
case too far. The prosecutrix being a married
woman and the mother of three children was
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mature and intelligent enough to understand the
significance and the consequences of the moral or
immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even
otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course
of such relationship with the accused, is closely
seen, it appears that she had betrayed her
husband and three children by having relationship
with the accused, for whom she had developed
liking for him. She had gone to stay with him
during the subsistence of her marriage with her
husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till
the time she was impregnated by the accused in
the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child
through the loin of the accused, she did not have
any complaint against the accused of he having
given false promise to marry her or having
cheated her. She also visited the native place of
the accused in the year 2012 and came to know
that he was a married man having children also,
still she continued to live with the accused at
another premises without any grievance. She even
obtained divorce from her husband by mutual
consent in 2014, leaving her three children with
her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when
some disputes must have taken place between
them, that she filed the present complaint. The
accused in his further statement recorded under
Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the
complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay
her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case, it could not be said
by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix
had given her consent for the sexual relationship
with the appellant under the misconception of
fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having
committed rape within the meaning of Section
375IPC."
(emphasis supplied)
14. The decision in Naim Ahamed [Naim
Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] is
squarely applicable to the conspectus of present case. It
has been time and again settled by this Hon'ble Court,
that the mere fact that physical relations were
established pursuant to a promise to marry will not
amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section
23
375IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage
was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain
consent for sexual relations without having any intent of
fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that
such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on
the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.
[Mahesh DamuKhare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11
SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471]
15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet,
the following facts are clearly established:
15.1. The physical relationship between the appellant and
Respondent 2 was consensual from the very beginning and
cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of
the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted,
there is no material on record to show that there was any
dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the appellant."
15.2. There is also no material on record, to establish an
offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506IPC against
the appellant. In fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the
appellant, that he was acting in furtherance of the promise to
marry. It is the own observation of the High Court, that the
appellant had made a promise to marry Respondent 2 and was
acting accordingly. The mangalsutra being prepared with the
initials of the name of Respondent 2 complainant does reflect his
intention and promise to marry. However, in the eventuality of a
fall out or split between the parties, it cannot be said that the
promise to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct
dishonest.
15.3. There is also no element of criminality that
can be accrued to the appellant, insofar as it is the own
case of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship
with the appellant, while being in a subsisting marriage.
It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have
sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged period
of five years [Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 5
SCC 764] , while being in a subsisting marriage, and even
subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the
relationship. The prolonged period of the relationship,
24
during which the sexual relations continued between the
parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an
element of force or deceit in the relationship. [Mahesh
Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471] The prosecutrix was thus,
conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her
actions, and had given her consent after an active and
reasoned deliberation. [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v.
State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC
(Cri) 903]"
11.5. In SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA5 the
Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
28. We find that the present case is not a case
where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for
physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship
continued for a period of three long years, which is a
considerable period of time. They remained close and
emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy
that occurred during the course of a functioning
relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as
instances of offence of rape merely because the
relationship failed to culminate in marriage.
29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken
note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken
relationships are given the colour of criminality. The
offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be
invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual
violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert
every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only
trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts
upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice.
Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal
discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528
25
this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for
condemnation.
30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC
764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.)
observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a
consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal
proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the
parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of
criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a
marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under:
"20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR
and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC
are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's
statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication
that any promise of marriage was extended at the
outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if
the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it
cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a
sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account
of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The
relationship between the parties was cordial and also
consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship
between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation
of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual
relationship between the parties at the initial stages
cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said
relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship.
Further, both parties are now married to someone else
and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our
view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present
case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of
law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by
continuing the prosecution."
(underlining by us)
31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in
which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage
holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not
uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner
and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such
a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially
recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of
26
marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering
it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that
such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the
promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no
genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The
law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust
has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective
scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality
for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of
this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete
facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral
conjecture.
... .... ...
33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during
the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation
was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of
consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the
appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum
of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to
be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to
have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however,
the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three
months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy.
34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific
allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or
compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor
does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or
inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence
there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that
respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the
appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record
that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage,
respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such
circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the
physical relationship between the parties was premised upon
any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit
and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this
Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC
27
197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly
engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully
aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show
that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or
false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception,
the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of
the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as
under:
"33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006
onwards, the complainant and the appellant were
residing in different towns. The complainant is an
educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever
upon her which could have prevented her from filing a
police complaint against the accused if she felt that the
sexual relations were under duress or were being
established under a false assurance of marriage. On
many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the
wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation
that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right
from the inception of the relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it
was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet
the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are
convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and the appellant was consensual without the existence
of any element of deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the
complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022,
makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual
relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged
in the complaint that when she had proposed that they
should marry and live together, the appellant physically
abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of
truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been
registered immediately after this incident. However, it is
only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant
that the appellant was getting married to another
woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed
aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she
also admitted that she was equally guilty as the
appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
xxx
28
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not
liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully
agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also
recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused."
(underlining by us)
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High
Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No.
2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was
made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of
consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed
by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ)
505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated
that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual
relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however,
fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in
question itself reveals that the relationship between the
parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent
No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire
to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a
major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated
with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on
her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the
relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was
subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even
upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is
manifest that the relationship between the parties was
consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as
emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held
against the appellant when the same can be otherwise
clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of
this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations
were made:
29
"29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be
a false promise to amount to misconception of fact
within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been
made from the very beginning with an intention to
deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical
relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such
consent was given under a misconception of fact, the
said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this
regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7
SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held
as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced
or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this,
the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had
mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling
a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There
may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion
for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where
an accused on account of circumstances which he could
not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every intention
to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An
accused can be convicted for rape only if the court
reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused
was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e.
at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
30
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact
must have an immediate relevance'.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
accused had never really intended to marry her."
(underlining by us)"
11.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG
v. STATE OF TELANGANA6 the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
25. In the chats which have been placed on record along
with the additional documents, the de-facto complainant, who is
referred to by the name 'Muffin', has admitted that she was
manipulative and was trying to "get a green card holder". At one
point of time, she also stated that it would not be difficult for
her to trap the next one. In the very same breath, she mentions
that she would not waste time with the accused appellant and
needs to "invest on the next victim". She also mentions that she
would irritate her victims to the extent that they dump her, and
she could happily start with the next one. She also stated that
she was using the accused appellant.
26. These chats depict the stark reality about the
behavioral pattern of the de-facto complainant who
appears to be having manipulative and vindictive
tendency.
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1258
31
27. Thus, in our opinion, the accused appellant was
absolutely justified in panicking and backing out from the
proposed marriage upon coming to know of the
aggressive sexual behaviour and the obsessive nature of
the de-facto complainant.
28. Hence, even assuming that the accused
appellant retracted from his promise to marry the
complainant, it cannot be said that he indulged in sexual
intercourse with the de-facto complainant under a false
promise of marriage or that the offence was committed
by him with the de-facto complainant on the ground that
she belonged to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
community.
29. It is also relevant to mention here that in FIR No. 751
of 2021, the de-facto complainant has not even made a whisper
about the accused appellant dumping her on the ground of her
caste. Thus, apparently this allegation which has been set out in
the subsequent FIR No. 103 of 2022 lodged almost after seven
months is nothing but a sheer exaggeration which must be
discarded.
30. Having considered the entirety of facts and
circumstances as available on record, we are of the firm
opinion that allowing prosecution of the accused
appellant to continue in the impugned FIR No. 103 of
2022 would be nothing short of a travesty of justice in
addition to being a gross abuse of the process of Court.
The impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 is nothing but a
bundle of lies full of fabricated and malicious
unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the complainant.
The facts on record clearly establish the vindictive and
manipulative tendencies of the complainant and these
aspects have a great bearing on the controversy."
32
11.7. Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA7 the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully
considering the material on record, the following attributes
come to the fore:
(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and
correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear
from the record that the consent of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her
will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant
and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted
since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they
interacted frequently and fell in love. The
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical
relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so
without her consent, however she not only sustained her
relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit
him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate
with her conduct.
(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said
to have been obtained under a misconception of
fact. There is no material to substantiate
"inducement or misrepresentation" on the part of
the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations
without having any intention of fulfilling said
promise. Investigation has also revealed that
the Khulanama, was executed on 29.12.2022 which
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained
from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties
were already in a relationship and the alleged
incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable
that the Complainant had engaged in a physical
7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230
33
relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of
marriage, while she was already married to
someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to
begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the
Appellant.
(c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury
to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an
offence under section 506 IPC. It is improbable that
there was any threat caused to the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the Appellant
when all along the relationship was cordial, and it
was only when the Appellant graduated and left for
his hometown to Ahmednagar, the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated.
We also cannot ignore the conduct of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the
native village of the Appellant without any
intimation, which is also unacceptable and reflects
the agitated and unnerved state of mind of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same
reason, the criminal prosecution against the
Appellant herein is probably with an underlying
motive and disgruntled state of mind.
(d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being
married before and having a child of four years,
would continue to be deceived by the Appellant or
maintain a prolonged association or physical
relationship with an individual who has sexually
assaulted and exploited her.
9. In our considered view, this is also not a case
where there was a false promise to marry to begin with.
A consensual relationship turning sour or partners
becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking
criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only
burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual
accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time
and again warned against the misuse of the provisions,
and has termed it a folly3 to treat each breach of promise
34
to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an
offence under section 376 IPC."
12.1. The Apex Court, in the case of Dr. DHRUVARAM
MURLIDHAR SONAR supra, draws with unmistakable clarity, the
doctrinal line that separates rape from consensual intimacy,
where two adults of their own volition, engage in consensual
sexual relation over a sustained period, the subsequent
refusal of the man to marry the woman, howsoever
regrettable, does not, ipso facto, transmute such intimacy
into the offence of rape as punishable under Section 376 of
the IPC.
12.2. The principle is reaffirmed in SHAMBHU KHARWAR
supra where the Apex Court interdicted the criminal process at
the threshold holding that the relationship between the
parties was purely consensual and accordingly quashed the
crime as well as the charge sheet.
12.3. In SAMADHAN supra the Apex Court sounded a note
of stern caution against the disquieting tendency of coloring
35
failed relationships, with the hue of heinous crimes. The
Apex Court holds that mere breakdown of a relationship
between the consenting adults, cannot constitute rape nor
can the criminal law be set into motion as a retaliatory
instrument, merely because the relationship did not
ultimately culminate in marriage.
12.4. Further, in AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL, the Apex Court
observes that where the complainant is already married, the
allegation of physical intimacy induced by promise of
marriage stands on infirm grounds, for a promise which is
ex-facie unenforceable, cannot in those circumstances, be
elevated into a foundation of imputing criminality.
12.5. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG
supra the Apex Court goes even further, on a perusal of
contemporaneous chats, it found that the complainant had
exhibited manipulative and vindictive tendencies and held
that man backing out of marriage, even assuming such
promise existed, cannot automatically attract the offence of
36
rape. Holding the prosecution to be malicious and
fabricated, the Apex Court obliterates the proceedings
against the accused.
12.6. In the light of the overwhelming majority of such
decisions, the Apex Court has exercised its Constitutional and
inherent jurisdiction to arrest the criminal process, even at
the stage of registration of the crime, where the allegation
taken to their highest, disclose nothing beyond a consensual
relationship subsequently turning sore.
13. If the law elucidated by the Apex Court, is considered qua
facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would unmistakably
emerge is that, the investigation even, in such cases, must not be
permitted to commence or continue, as the complaint herein, even
if it is accepted in its entirety, does not prima facie disclose such
fraudulent intention at inception, for it to become a crime under
Section 69 of the BNS. The Apex Court, in all the afore-quoted
judgments, was considering the offence punishable under Section
376(2)(n) - rape, being laid on the breach of promise of marriage.
37
The observations therein would clearly become applicable to the
ingredients of Section 69 of the BNS as well - the offence alleged in
the case at hand.
14. Additional materials placed before this Court indicate that
the complainant has moved forward in life and entered into another
relationship. While such developments are not determinative of
guilt or innocence, they underscore the central reality that the
subject case is a relationship that ran its course and ended. The
criminal law is not designed to be invoked as a salve for
emotional rupture. It is apposite to notice the postulates laid
down by the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v.
BHAJAN LAL8 wherein it is held as follows:
".... .... ....
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
8
1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335
38
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
39
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Apex Court permits quashing at the stage of FIR where the
allegations even if taken at face value, do not constitute an offence;
the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and
the continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process.
The case at hand squarely falls within those categories. If every
broken relationship were to be clothed in the garb of
criminality, the Courts would transform into forum of
personal vendetta, rather than forums of justice.
15. The criminal justice system an instrument of State
power, it cannot be permitted to become a weapon in private
disputes arising out of failed relationships. The facts, even if
accepted in toto, disclose nothing beyond a relationship that
did not culminate into matrimony. To permit investigation in
40
such circumstances would not advance justice, it would
distort it.
16. Therefore, upon anxious consideration of facts, the
complaint and the governing principle of law, this Court is of the
considered view, that continuation of investigation even in Crime
No.106 of 2024 would amount to an abuse of the process of the law
and would occasion miscarriage of justice.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) FIR in Crime No.106 of 2024 registered against the petitioner before Mangalore Women Police Station, Mangalore and pending before the III JMFC Court, Mangalore stands quashed.
41Pending application if any, also stand disposed, as a consequence.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:MJ