Calcutta High Court
Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 9 April, 2009
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice S.P. Talukdar
W.P. No. 1035 of 2005
Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association & Anr.
Vs.
Union of India & Ors.
For the Petitioners: Mr. P. K. Dutta, Sr. Advocate,
Mr. C. K. Saha,
Ms. S. Saha.
For the Respondents: Mr. Ashoke Kumar Das Adhikari, Sr. Advocate.
Mrs. Sima Adhikari.
Judgment on : 09.04.2009.
S.P. Talukdar, J.: The communication dated 21st March, 2005 made on behalf of the Defence Estates Officer, Kolkata Circle, addressed to the Chairman, Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association is under challenge in the present application under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Grievances of the petitioner may briefly be stated as follows:-
Petitioner No. 1, Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association, is a company under the Companies Act, 1956 and petitioner No. 2 is its Lord Bishop. The premises No. 84, Middle Road, is the exclusive property of the petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 1 has its registered office at No. 86, Middle Road, Barrackpur. The said premises No. 84, Middle Road, which is a Bungalow and now in a terribly dilapidated condition, was given on annual lease for the period from August 17, 1972 to August 17, 1973 and August 17, 1974 to August 16, 1975 to the Defence Military Establishment followed by the lease for three years from August 17, 1975 to August 16, 1978 with an option for renewal as per clause 13 of the Deed of Lease dated 22nd June, 1976. The said lease was terminable at the option of the Lessee as provided in the Clause 14 thereof. With the expiry of August 16, 1978, the said lease had not been renewed in favour of Union of India, Defence Estates, but unfortunately possession in respect of the same has not yet been given back. The said Defence Establishment is in wrongful and illegal occupation of the said Bungalow, without any authority of law, tangible or otherwise. On behalf of the petitioner, requests were made time and again but without any result so far. The said Bungalow is not being used for any purpose, far less for military personnel as would be reflected from the letter dated December 24, 1996. The Bungalow under reference is on the verge of collapse as conveyed in the letter of January 14, 1997. This was brought to the notice of the Executive Officer, Barrackpur Cantonment Board by petitioner No. 2 vide letter dated May 20, 2003. There cannot be any right whatsoever of the defence authorities in respect of the said Bungalow in view of the declaration made by the Defence Estates Officer in his letter dated January 20, 2005, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-'P-7' to the writ application. Petitioner No. 1 has been duly recognized as 'the holder of occupancy rights' in respect of the said Bungalow. There had been no renewal of lease after August 16, 1978 and no rent had been accepted since then.
In such circumstances, the communication dated 21st March, 2005 whereby the respondent authorities claimed that such Bungalow is held on hire by the Defence Estates Officer, Kolkata Circle and is under the possession of the local military authority is bad, void and illegal. Petitioner No. 1 being recorded Assessee has paid all taxes due to the Board upto 31st March, 2005 amounting to Rs.7,014.50. It is claimed that the petitioner No. 1 is entitled to undertake reconstruction work and replacement wherever necessary without any interference by the Defence Authorities/Cantonment Board.
The petitioner by filing such application under Article 226 of the Constitution, thus, sought for a declaration in favour of the petitioner No. 1 as holder of occupancy rights and for necessary order by way of directing the respondent authority from handing over possession by way of de-hiring in terms of letter dated 20th January, 2005. The petitioner also sought for an order of injunction thereby restraining the respondent authorities from disturbing or interfering in any manner with the petitioners' entry into the said Bungalow and taking steps for repairs and reconstruction.
Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6 contested the case by filing Affidavit-in-Opposition wherein all the material allegations made by the writ petitioners had been denied.
It was claimed that disputed questions of facts being involved, the writ petition does not deserve to be entertained. The respondents claimed that the lease was terminable at the option of the Lessee i.e., the Hon'ble The President of India as provided in Clause 14 of the Lease Agreement executed by and between the parties on 22nd June, 1976. After expiry of the lease agreement on 16.8.1978, the petitioner No. 1 refused to enter into any further agreement. Respondent No. 3 retained the subject Bungalow on monthly rental basis as per Defence Land Policy laid in Government of India, Ministery of Defence letter No. F- 11013/7/73/D(Lands) Vol.-III dated 18.6.1982. It states that "Bungalows held on hire by the Government where the sites are held by the occupancy holders on resumable tenure will not be de-hired".
The subject Bungalow is held on hire for military use and under consideration for resumption as proposed by the Military Authority. Clause 2(A)1(i) Defence Land Policy, as annexed being Annexure-'R-2' to the Affidavit-in-Opposition, provides that the sites held on resumable tenure would be resumed gradually under circumstances as provided in Sub-clause (c) that sites where the existing structures are in dilapidated condition and the subject Bungalow held on Old Grant Terms and under resumption proposal by Military Authority and in terms of Sub-Clause (a), priority will be given for resumption. It was further claimed that the subject Bungalow cannot be de-hired and question of handing it over to the petitioner No. 1 could hardly arise. The Defence Estates Officer by his letter dated 20th January, 2005 stated that Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association is recorded as holder of occupancy right in respect of Bungalow No. 84, Middle Road. The holder of occupancy enjoyed by the petitioner No. 1 is on Old Grant Basis as per GGO No. 179 dated 12th September, 1836 and hence the Government has the power to resume the Bungalow as and when required for defence purposes. The petitioner No. 1 regularly received rent by accepting Account Payee Cheque and this continued till February, 2005. The petitioner No. 1, however, refused to accept the cheque for an amount of Rs.1,888/- as rental for the months September, 2004 to December, 2004. Rent for the month of January, 2005 was also sent by cheque along with forwarding letter dated 10.2.2005 and the same was also refused with endorsement that 'none live at 84, Middle Road, Barackpur'. The rent for February, 2005 was also sent by cheque but it had not returned till the date of filing of the Affidavit- in-Opposition.
On behalf of the respondents, it was further stated that no major repairing or reconstruction job in respect of the Bungalow can be taken up as this may involve change of shape and design. Repair and renovation of the Bungalow presumably requires erection and re-erection of the structure and as such, this requires to be notified to the competent authority under Section 179 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. It was further claimed that the military authorities had already forwarded proposal to the Ministry of Defence for resumption of the Bungalow and this was duly notified to the petitioner vide letter No. B- 15/30/173 dated 30.8.1974 issued by the Defence Estates Officer, respondent No. 3. It had been further stated that the lands in the cantonment particularly of Old Grant tenure are basically meant to meet the urgent and plan strategic requirement of Defence. Primarily the cantonments are established to meet the urgent strategic requirement of the Defence and, therefore, the priority of acquiring/resuming the land in the cantonment is always the prerogative of the Defence.
Dismissal of the writ application was so prayed for.
In the Affidavit-in-Reply, the petitioner sought to refer to the inherent inconsistencies in the stand of the respondent authority as revealed from the Affidavit-in- Opposition. It was stated that the respondents have not been able to show any payment of rent from 2001. It was also stated that there is no mention of payment of rent for the year 1981 and for the periods from 1983 to 1988 and then 1990-1993, 1995-1996.
Mr. Dutta, as learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the lease as granted expired as far back as in 1978 but Union of India did not take any step for resumption. Referring to the claim that the writ petitioner is a minority religious institution, it was submitted that the property under reference in the writ application is practically on the verge of collapse.
Inviting attention of the Court to page 41 of the writ application, Mr. Dutta expressed wonder as to how a corrigendum could be issued like the one dated 21st March, 2005. It was categorically submitted by Mr. Dutta that there cannot be any inherent power of review and such power is required to be conferred by law - either expressly or by necessary implication. It was submitted that the petitioner would like to utilize the property under reference as the orphanage and the petitioner is ready and willing to file an undertaking to that effect. It was further submitted that the petitioner would like its land to be utilized for a noble cause.
The materials on record reveal that a lease agreement was executed on 7th September, 1974 and it was for the period from 17.8.1974 to 16.8.1975. The premises No. 84, Middle Road, Barrackpur, which was, thus, hired by the Military Estates Officer, continued to be enjoyed by the said authority. By execution of another lease agreement dated 22nd June, 1976, the term of lease was extended from 17.8.1975 to 16.8.1978. By letter dated 3rd March, 1976 addressed to the petitioner association, the respondent authority intimated that the proposal for resumption of the property was under consideration of the Government. It appears from copies of correspondences that the respondent authority by letter dated 23rd August, 1976 directed the petitioner to demolish the unauthorized construction in the property under reference and, thus, issued notice under Section 185(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924. This was followed by another communication whereby the petitioner was directed under Section 256 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 to demolish the unauthorized construction within seven days from the date of receipt of the same.
It appears that by letter dated 9th November, 1979, the Bishop of Barrackpur as Chairman of the Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association, approached the respondent authority and sought for return of the property. It wanted that the house should be returned so that it could be used for its original purpose for church and religious work. The petitioner, in fact, sought for de-hiring of the said property and its return.
By letter dated 24th December, 1996, being Annexure-'P-3' at page 31, the respondent authority informed that Bungalow No. 84, Middle Road, Barrackpur Cantonment was held on hire for the defence purposes and there was a proposal for resumption for the defence use. It was as far back as in 13th November, 1996 that the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner wrote a letter to the Defence Estates Officer, Kolkata Circle, indicating therein that no military personnel was staying in the Bungalow under reference. It was under occupation of trespassers and those persons were creating annoyance, damaging the property and selling out the wooden structure. The respondent authority was, thus, asked to vacate the said property.
By letter dated 14th of January, 1997, the petitioner intimated that it would like to take back possession of the Bungalow. It was clearly mentioned that the same was in a dilapidated condition and the respondent authorities were unnecessarily paying house rent. Apprehension that such structure can fall down any moment was also reflected in the said correspondence. Then again, by letter dated 20th May, 2003, an approach was made on the part of the petitioner association to assert its right in respect of the said Bungalow, which was given to the respondent authority on lease.
The letter from the Defence Estates Officer, Kolkata Circle dated 20th January, 2005 addressed to the Chairman of the petitioner association relates to mutation of Bungalow under reference. It was in response to the petitioner's letter dated 6th of January, 2005 that the respondent authority observed :-
"The Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association has admitted the Government Rights on Defence land vide admission deed dated 07.05.1965. The subject Bungalow is recorded as HOR in favour of the Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association".
Interestingly enough, by a letter dated 21st March, 2005, the following sentence was sought to be added :-
"Bungalow No. 84, Middle Road, Barrackpur Cantt. is held on hiring by the Defence Estates Officer, Calcutta Circle and is under the possession of the Local Military Authority".
Mr. Dutta, as learned Counsel for the petitioner, invited attention of the Court to the photographs which have been annexed to the writ application in support of his contention that the said Bungalow is in a dilapidated condition and the whole structure may fall down at any moment causing loss of life and property. Mr. Dutta in course of his submission expressed wonder as to why the Military Authorities did not take any step for resumption of such property. It was submitted that the Bungalow at 84, Middle Road, Barrackpur, stands mutated and recorded with the writ petitioner as an Assessee in the records of Barrackpur Cantonment Board. He further submitted that the Military Estates Officer in his correspondence dated 20th January, 2005 admitted the fact that the petitioner No. 1 is the holder of the occupancy rights in respect of the same. It was accordingly submitted that the structure on such premises No. 84, in such circumstances, stands vested in writ petitioner No. 1. It was further submitted that the said Bungalow had been deserted by the Military Authorities. It remains unattended and uncared for thereby leaving scope for the antisocial elements taking possession of the same and carrying on illegal activities.
On the other hand, Mr. Das Adhikari, appearing as learned Counsel for the respondent authorities, submitted that after expiry of the lease agreement on 16.8.1978 and since petitioner No. 1 refused to execute any further agreement, respondent No. 3 retained the subject Bungalow on monthly rental basis as per Defence Land Policy laid in Government of India, Ministry of Defence letter No. F-11013/7/73/D (Lands) Volume-III dated 18.6.1982.
Referring to the said communication dated 18th June, 1982, which relates to 'revision of land policy in cantonment areas', it was contended that there was a policy decision that the Bungalows held on hire by the Government where the sites are held by the occupancy holders on resumable tenure will not be de-hired.
Mr. Adhikari on behalf of the respondent authorities claimed on the basis of the copy of the correspondence dated 6th January, 2005, being Annexure-'R-3' at page 23 that a cheque for an amount of Rs. 1,888.00 was issued in favour of the petitioner association on account of rent. It was further submitted that as far back as in 30th August, 1974, the Military Authorities took up the matter with the petitioner association regarding resumption.
In the Affidavit-in-Reply filed on behalf of the writ petitioner, a copy of statement has been annexed indicating that rent was deposited till May, 2001.
Mr. Das Adhikari emphatically submitted that there could be no justification for the petitioner to seek recovery of possession in a writ Court. He submitted that writ petition should not be entertained when alternative statutory remedy is available.
In this context reference was made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.P. Foods Vs. S. Samuel & Ors., as reported in (2006) 5 SCC 469. According to Mr. Dutta, grievance of the petitioner in the present case satisfactorily establishes that the circumstances are so exceptional that the doors of the writ Court do not deserve to be kept shut.
In Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors., as reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1, the Apex Court dealt with the aspect. It was held that existence of alternative statutory remedy is not a constitutional bar to High Court's jurisdiction but is a self-imposed restriction. It was further held that the alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies :
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice; or
(iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
It is the settled principle of law that in case an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the writ Court should not ordinarily exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. But maintainability and entertainability are not synonymous.
Mr. Dutta deriving inspiration from the Apex Court decision in the case of Popcorn Entertainment & Anr. Vs. City Industrial Development Corpn. & Anr., as reported in (2007) 9 SCC 593, submitted that in view of gross violation of the principles of natural justice on the part of the respondent authority, as reflected from the impugned action, the petitioner association was left with no choice but to knock the door of this Court.
Relying upon the decision in the case of M/s. Murray & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Board of Wakfs, as reported in AIR 1990 Cal 86, it was submitted by Mr. Dutta there may be occasions for a writ Court to even decide the question of title. It was the consistent and categorical stand of the respondent authority that in view of availability of alternative statutory remedy, the present application does not deserve to be entertained.
It was submitted that the Bungalow was admittedly taken by the respondent authority on hire. It continues to be in possession of the Defence Authorities even assuming that the petitioner association has occupancy right. The writ Court ordinarily is not supposed to deal with disputed points of facts nor the issue relating to ownership and title can be expected to be resolved by a writ Court.
While exploring the justifiability of entertaining such an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, it may be worth mentioning that Section 250 of the Cantonments Act, 2006 lays down that 'Courts not to entertain proceedings in certain cases'. The said Section reads as follows:-
"(1) After the commencement of this Act, no Court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceedings in respect of any order or notice unless an appeal under Section 340 is preferred and the same is disposed of by the appellate authority under sub-
section (3) of Section 343 of this Act.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), every suit, application or other proceedings pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to be dealt with and disposed of by that Court as if the said Section has not been brought into force."
Section 339 refers to notice to be given of suits. Sections 340 and 343 of the said Act deal with appeals and revision respectively.
So far the present case is concerned, the grievance relates to impugned communication dated 21st March, 2005. The petitioner sought for a direction upon the respondent authority to act in terms of the earlier letter dated 20th January, 2005. It is not in dispute that the said Bungalow continues to be in possession of the local military authority. It was essentially taken on lease, which was renewed till 1978. The petitioner took rent in respect of the same till middle of 2001. All such aspects are not essentially in dispute. It was seriously claimed on behalf of the writ petitioner that the defence authorities deserted the Bungalow in question long time back. To keep such a Bungalow unoccupied and uncared for may not serve anyone's interest. There was a proposal for resumption as far back as in 1974. But long time has since passed without any further step in that direction.
In the case between State of Orissa Vs. Ram Chandra Dev, as reported in AIR 1964 SC 685, it was held :-
"Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be issued by the High Court under the said Article even for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone.
Though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the Article clearly indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226."
In the present case, inviting attention of the Court to the communication dated 20th January, 2005, being Annexure-'P-7', it was submitted by Mr. Dutta that the defence authorities accepted that the subject Bungalow is recorded as HOR in favour of the Barrackpur Diocesan Trust Association. Deriving support and strength from the same, it was submitted that in such circumstances, there is no reason as to why the Court shall not declare that the Bungalow stands de-hired from defence authorities. The petitioner also sought for issuance of an order of injunction thereby restraining the defence authorities from disturbing and interfering with the petitioners' entry into the said Bungalow and exist therefrom and otherwise from carrying out and effecting repairs and replacement as required. Though the subsequent corrigendum dated 21st March, 2005 attempts to change the legal complexion to a significant extent, I find no reason as to why the concerned defence authorities should not deal with the grievances ventilated on behalf of the petitioner in their proper perspective.
Mr. Dutta, as learned Counsel for the petitioner, referred to the meaning of the word 'occupancy' as given in Black's Legal Dictionary (6th Edn.) 1078. The same is:
"Taking possession of property and use of the same; said e.g. of a tenant's use of leased premises. Period during which person owns, rents, or otherwise occupies real property or premises. Occupancy is a mode of acquiring property by which a thing which belongs to nobody becomes the property of the person who took possession of it with the intention of acquiring a right of ownership in it. The taking possession of things which before belonged to nobody, with an intention of appropriating them to one's own use. To constitute occupancy, there must be a taking of a thing corporeal, belonging to nobody, with an intention to becoming the owner of it."
While laying emphasis on the words 'for any other purpose' in sub-Article (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution, it was submitted by Mr. Dutta that the claim of the writ petitioner is akin to Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. According to him, since lease term is over long time back, the petitioner, as lessor, wants its property back. It was contended that by no stretch of imagination it can be said that Section 339 of the Cantonments Act stands in the way.
Mr. Dutta further submitted that the impugned action on the part of the respondent authority reflects clear breach of the principles of natural justice. Since Sub-section (3) of Section 339 of the Cantonments Act refers to 'suit', there could be no statutory bar for entertaining such an application under Article 226. Mr. Dutta, in fact, went a step further while submitting that right to property is not only a constitutional right but is an essential human right, which certainly deserves to be appreciated by all statutory authorities and more so, by the defence authorities. It was further contended on behalf of the writ petitioner such association is agreeable to swear affidavit to the effect that such property would not be transferred and it would only be utilized for a noble cause.
What emerges from the materials available on record is that the respondent authority by communication dated 20th January, 2005 accepted the status of the petitioner association and indicated that the subject Bungalow has been recorded as HOR in favour of the Barrackpur Dioceasan Trust Association. This was in relation to the mutation of the premises under reference. Question arises as to whether by a subsequent communication, the respondent authority could be permitted to take a different stand. The communication being Annexure-'P-9' at page 41 dated 21st March, 2005 was issued by way of corrigendum to the earlier letter dated 20th January, 2005 on mutation of the Bungalow No. 84, Middle Road, Barrackpur Cantonment. The Defence Estates Officer claimed that it is held on hiring by the said authority and is under the possession of the Local Military Authority.
Such a stand is required to be analyzed in the context of the facts and materials on record and the grievances of the writ petitioner. It was categorically claimed on behalf of the writ petitioner that the subject Bungalow has been virtually left unattended and uncared for. It has not been utilized by the said authority since long. Taking advantage of this situation, local antisocial elements are allegedly misutilising the same. The fate of the said Bungalow has, thus, been virtually thrown into an ocean of uncertainty. Naturally, question arises as to whether the respondent authority can be permitted to enjoy the benefit arising out of such inertia of inaction. Hands of law are long enough to reach injustice wherever it is. The writ Court being essentially court of equity cannot afford to ignore such legitimate grievances of the writ petitioner. In such circumstances, there is no reason as to why the writ Court cannot intervene when it comes across and where it is found that the respondent authority, that too, defence authorities, attempts to deviate from its original stand.
Mr. Das Adhikari, appearing as learned Counsel for the respondent authority, submitted that the High Court in response to an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is certainly not expected to decide the question of title. In this context, he referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Action Group Res. in Envrn. & Education Development Society & Ors. Vs. Sakky Bai & Ors., as reported in JT 1998 (7) SC 233. He quite rightly submitted that the writ Court is not ordinarily expected to decide any disputed question of fact.
Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bijoy Kumar Dugar Vs. Bidya Dhar Dutta & Ors., as reported in (2006) 3 SCC 242, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent authority that there should not be any enlargement of statutorily restricted grounds of appeal by filing writ petition.
In the case between Sanjana M. Wig (Ms) Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., as reported in (2005) 8 SCC 242, the Supreme Court observed that "Access to justice by way of public law remedy would not be denied when a lis involves public law character or involves a question arising out of public law functions on the part of the respondent, and when the forum chosen by the parties would not be in a position to grant appropriate relief............"
The Apex Court in the said case further observed that "however, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the question as to when such a discretionary jurisdiction is to be exercised or refused to be exercised by the High Court has to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case wherefor no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down."
In this context, it may be mentioned that two competing philosophies of administrative law are prevalent in the Courts. The one, which is commonly known as 'activist model' has thrown a challenge to the second 'restraint model'. There are some who believe that administration is to be left free to get on with policy jobs, without judicial interference or judicialised fetters. It is felt that Courts must know their place, but reasons of function dictate that Courts should not deal with matters of policy; modern public administration requires wide-ranging discretion unfettered by inappropriate legal controls. Such restraint model allows judicial intervention in substantive decisions. The Court's function is here one of containment, review being directed towards keeping administration within the directives that parliament has issued. The activists model being inspired by the doctrine of the rule of law perhaps gives a degree of primacy to the judiciary as it imposes a duty, especially on the Executive, of fidelity to legal principles, which are enunciated by the Courts. The restraint model tends to rely on 'literal' interpretation of statutes, e.g. those giving seemingly unlimited discretion to the decision-maker, or those excluding judicial review. The activist model in practice tends to abandon 'strict constructionism' and relies instead on 'purposive' interpretation.
Administrative law thus becomes a device of participation, adopting what has been called a 'consumer perspective' to the law, insisting not only that powers are properly contained but that they are exercised in a way that allows sufficient consideration of the variety of both rights and interests affected by official decisions.
Reproducing Thomas Fuller's words over 300 years ago it may be said: 'Be you ever so high, the law is above you'.
It can be said that mere fact that the respondents are defence authorities, does not give them a different status. Like every other organization, such respondents are also not above law.
It cannot be disputed that the petitioner organization has grievances, which cannot be measured in pounds, shillings and pence, not only for the inconsistent stand of the defence authorities but for the attitude of indifference as reflected from its inaction over a protracted period of time regarding resumption of the property.
Considering all such facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that interest of justice demands that the respondent authority appreciates the grievance of the petitioner afresh in its proper perspective and take appropriate action or pass necessary order in pursuant to the communication dated 20th January, 2005 being Annexure-P-7'.
The instant writ application, thus, succeeds and be allowed.
The writ application being W.P. No. 1035 of 2005 is disposed of with direction upon the respondent authorities, and particularly respondent No. 3, to consider the grievances as ventilated in the writ application as well as its Annexures afresh and take appropriate action and pass necessary order - of course, after giving the writ petitioner or its representative an opportunity of hearing and this must be done within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. The writ petitioner is directed to submit a copy of the writ application along with its Annexures to the said authority while communicating this order.
There is no order as to costs.
Xerox certified copy of the judgment be supplied to the parties, if applied for, as expeditiously as possible.
(S.P. Talukdar, J.)