Telangana High Court
Dayyala Prabhakar, vs Aggeti Kamalamma, on 24 September, 2025
Author: K. Lakshman
Bench: K. Lakshman
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT: HYDERABAD
CORAM:
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2185 OF 2025
% Delivered on: 24-09-2025
Between:
# Mr. Dayyala Prabhakar .. Petitioner
Vs.
$ Mrs. Aggeti Kamalamma & Others .. Respondents
! For Petitioner : Mr. C.A.R. Sheshagiri Rao
^ For Respondents : ---
< Gist :
> Head Note :
? Cases Referred :
1
. 2024 (2) ALD 840 (TS)
2. 2024 (4) ALD 736 (TS)
3. 2013 (5) ALD 584 (AP)
4. (2008) 10 SCC 97
5. 2007 (5) ALT 215
6. 2006 (1) ALD 607
7. 2005 (4) ALT 119
8. (2005) 4 SCC 315
9. AIR 2022 SC 3848
10. (2018) 14 SCC 1
11. (2021) 4 CTC 539 = SCC OnLine Mad 2514
12. 2020 SCC OnLine SC 562
13. AIR 1941 Cal. 670
14. 2006 SCC 3 100
15. (1974) 2 SCC 393
16. (1977) 4 SCC 467
17. AIR 1986 SC 1912
18. 2003 (5) ALT 403
19. (1990) 4 SCC 147
20. 1989 (2) ALT 653
21. 1998 (6) ALT 399
22. CRP No.2178 of 2025, decided on 04.07.2025.
2
KL,J
CRP No.2185 of 2025
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2185 OF 2025
ORDER:
Heard Mr. C.A.R Sheshagiri Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner.
2. This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article - 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 18.02.2025 passed by the Principal District Judge, Hanumakonda, in O.S.S.R No. 144 of 2025 rejecting the plaint filed by the petitioner.
3. The petitioner herein has filed the above suit for specific performance directing the defendants to execute and register sale deed with delivery of possession in his favour, or in the alternative to pass a decree for the recovery of Rs.75,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Lakhs Only) against the defendants towards refund of amount due and damages for breach of contract.
4. The petitioner has filed the said suit contending as follows:
i. He is doing business in Adthi at agricultural Market, Warangal as "Sai Sudha Traders". One Mogli (dead) close relative of the petitioner used to borrow amounts, for his requirements and that he obtained loans amounting to Rs.4.00 Lakhs, Rs.2.00 Lakhs, Rs.2.00 Lakhs. Rs.4.00 Lakhs, Rs.3.00 Lakhs, Rs.2.00 3 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 Lakhs, and Rs.2.00 Lakhs on 01.10.2015, 12.03.2016, 13.06.2016, 28.06.2016, 27.07.2016, 15.10.2016 and 01.03.2017, late Mogli acknowledged his liability by executing promissory notes and acknowledgements, at an interest of 3% percent month.
ii. Late Mogli promised to pay the total amount on or before 03.09.2019 and further he would pay some amount in cash and cheques and agreed that if he fails to pay the amount, he would execute a G.P.A in favour of the petitioner in respect of 1,000 square yards.
iii. In August 2024, the petitioner, accompanied by his wife, brothers-in-law, and one Mr. A. Satish and Mr. A. Pratap approached Mogli and demanded repayment of the entire sum due, which, inclusive of interest, amounted to Rs.90,44,000/-. Late Mogli, citing financial difficulty, agreed to settle the liability at Rs.75,00,000/-. As he was unable to discharge even the said amount, he consented to execute a sale deed in favour of the petitioner in respect of a plot admeasuring 847.00 square yards (equivalent to 708.177 square metres) in Survey No.568, Shayampet Jagir, Hanamkonda Mandal and District. 4
KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 iv. In confirmation of his agreement to execute the said sale deed, Late Mogli had handed over the original sale deed dated 19.06.2009 registered as document No.3794 of 2009 and had promised to execute and register the sale deed in favour of the petitioner within two or three months from August, 2024. v. On 28.10.2024, Late Mogli died due to heart attack leaving behind the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 as legal heirs. Subsequently, the petitioner has approached the defendants and requested them to execute the sale deed. Initially, they agreed and later they are trying to alienate the property which the petitioner came to know on 30.12.2024. Hence, the Plaintiff has approached the trial Court to seek for the relief of specific performance to execute and register the said sale deed.
5. Initially the Court has returned the Plaint with the following objections on 07.01.2025:
i. Legal notices to the legal heirs of the deceased borrower are not given.
ii. Explain how this suit is maintainable for specific performance when there is no contract between the parties. iii. All the Promissory notes and Ankadas are time barred debts. 5
KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 iv. No written acknowledgement is made for the amounts as mentioned in Para No. 7 of the Plaint.
6. On 22.01.2025, the counsel for the plaintiff resubmitted the plaint with the following explanations:
i. Issuance of legal notice is not mandatory. However, the plaintiff in the presence of the said Pratap and Satish approached the defendants. (Affidavits filed) ii. The promise made by the deceased is oral one. Hence, the suit on oral agreement is maintainable.
iii. Promissory notes are filed to show the passing of consideration and the suit is not for recovery of money. They prove the receipt of consideration.
iv. The acknowledgment is made orally by the deceased, which is proved by the affidavits of A.Prathap and Sri.A Satish.
7. The trial Court has rejected the plaint on the following grounds:
i. Petitioner has filed the documents i.e. Promissory notes of years 2016 and 2017. Therefore, the claims made under those documents are barred by limitation.
ii. The petitioner contended that late Mogli executed an acknowledgment of debt on 01.09.2019 and undertook to 6 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 execute GPA to an extent of 1000 square yards. Even considering that acknowledgement also, the claim made by the Plaintiff is beyond three years.
iii. The petitioner did not mention the date when the Mogli has handed over the registered sale deed and no receipts were obtained to that effect.
iv. Petitioner did not issue a legal notice to the legal heirs of Mogli demanding them to execute the sale deed. v. Oral agreement between two living persons can be adjudicated under the contract Act. But it is an established rule that the offer comes to an end on the death of the offeree, because an offer can be accepted only by the offeree and not by any person. It cannot be accepted by the legal heirs of the offeree.
8. Taking into consideration the total facts and circumstances of the case, documents and plaint, learned trial Court has rejected the Plaint opining that the present plaint is clearly barred by Order - VII Rule - 11 (a) and (d). For the aforesaid reasons, the trial Court has rejected the suit on 18.02.2025 in limini as there is no cause of action and the suit is barred by limitation.
7
KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025
9. Aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court, the petitioner has filed the present Civil Revision Petition on the following grounds:
i. The trial Court failed to properly appreciate the difference between the Plaint not disclosing the cause of action and where there is no cause of action.
ii. The trial Court erred by delving into the merits of the suit which cannot be considered at the threshold. iii. Trial Court has mandated notice before the institution of the suit which is incorrect.
iv. Trial Court has held that Agreement of sale which is oral is not binding on the legal heirs of the Promisor/Offerer to execute a registered sale deed, which is incorrect. v. The trial Court went wrong in deciding that there lies no enforceable right to the petitioner which can be determined only after completion of the trial.
vi. Trial Court failed to consider the settled legal position that a plaint cannot be rejected merely because the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.
vii. Trial Court has committed an error by holding that the unavailability of relief in the suit cannot be a ground for the 8 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 rejection for the Plaint at the threshold which is beyond the scope under Order - VII Rule - 11 C.P.C.
viii. Trial Court ought to have appreciated the fact that an oral agreement of sale is permissible as in the instant case and the documents acknowledging the receipt of various amounts from the petitioner should have been considered. ix. The trial Court also failed to conceive the fact that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the same is to be applied in the present case and the suit cannot be rejected at the stage of registration.
x. The trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit at one's peril regardless, how frivolous the claim may be unless it is barred by a statute.
10. Mr. C.A.R. Sheshagiri Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner made his submissions extensively and also placed reliance on the principle laid down in Chandan Khandewal v. G. Ramakrishna Reddy 1; Mohammed Nadeem Ullah Khan v. Mohammed Akber Ali 2; M/s. Sri Surya Granites v. G. Venkateswarlu 3; Abdul Gafur v. State of 1 . 2024 (2) ALD 840 (TS) 2 . 2024 (4) ALD 736 (TS) 3 . 2013 (5) ALD 584 (AP) 9 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 Uttarakhand 4; Rasumalla Yellaiah v. Chief Commissioner, Land & Administration, Hyderabad5; Sri Laxmi Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. v. G.V. Mohan6 and Thanamki Prasad v. Guntamadugu Puliamma 7.
11. As discussed supra, the petitioner has filed the aforesaid suit for specific performance, directing the defendants to execute register sale deed with delivery of possession in his favour or in the alternative pass a decree for recovery of Rs.75,00,000/- against the defendants towards damages for breach of contract.
12. It is the specific contention of the petitioners that the trial Court had gone into merits of the suit which cannot be considered at the threshold i.e. at S.R. Stage.
13. It is apt to note that Order - VII Rule - 11 of CPC deals with 'rejection of plaint' on the following grounds:
"11. Rejection of plaint.
The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;4
. (2008) 10 SCC 97 5 . 2007 (5) ALT 215 6 . 2006 (1) ALD 607 7 . 2005 (4) ALT 119 10 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature form correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.
14. It is settled law that the trial Court can exercise the power under Order - VII Rule - 11 of CPC at any stage of the suit even before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before conclusion of trial. Power under the said provision can be exercised both at threshold of the proceedings, and in absence of any statutory restriction, at any stage of the subsequent proceedings. However, preliminary objection should be raised at the earliest. The said principle 11 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 was also laid down in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India 8. In paragraph No.18 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"18. In Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath [1987 Supp SCC 663] this Court while dealing with an election petition has held that the power to summarily reject conferred by Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised at the threshold of the proceedings and is also available, in the absence of any restriction statutorily placed, to be exercised at any stage of subsequent proceedings. However, the Court has also emphasised the need of raising a preliminary objection as to maintainability as early as possible though the power of the Court to consider the same at a subsequent stage is not taken away."
15. It is apt to note that trial Court has power to reject the plaint suo motu at any stage. The said power, though legally permissible judicially recognized, is to be exercised with caution and only in the cases where the defect is patent, incurable and discernable from the plaint itself without requiring any enquiry into the disputed facts. The trial Court is not only empowered but is also under a duty to consider the applicability of 8 . (2005) 4 SCC 315 12 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 Order - VII Rule - 11 of CPC at the threshold stage, including prior to registration or numbering of the plaint and even before issuance of summons to the defendant.
16. In M/s. Patil Automation Private Limited v. Rakheja Engineers Private Limited 9, the Apex Court in Paragraph No.68 held as follows:-
"68. On a consideration of the scheme of the Orders IV, V and VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, we arrive at the following conclusions:
(A) A suit is commenced by presentation of a plaint.
The date of the presentation in terms of Section 3(2) of the Limitation Act is the date of presentation for the purpose of the said Act. By virtue of Order IV Rule 1(3), institution of the plaint, however, is complete only when the plaint is in conformity with the requirement of Order VI and Order VII.
(B) When the Court decides the question as to issue of summons Under Order V Rule 1, what the Court must consider is whether a suit has been duly instituted. (C) Order VII Rule 11 does not provide that the Court is to discharge its duty of rejecting the plaint only on an application. Order VII Rule 11 is, in fact, silent about any such requirement. Since summon is to be issued in a duly instituted suit, in a case where the plaint is barred Under Order VII Rule 11(d), the stage begins at that 9 . AIR 2022 SC 3848 13 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 time when the Court can reject the plaint Under Order VII Rule 11. No doubt it would take a clear case where the Court is satisfied. The Court has to hear the Plaintiff before it invokes its power besides giving reasons Under Order VII Rule 12. In a clear case, where on allegations in the suit, it is found that the suit is barred by any law, as would be the case, where the Plaintiff in a suit under the Act does not plead circumstances to take his case out of the requirement of Section 12A, the plaint should be rejected without issuing summons. Undoubtedly, on issuing summons it will be always open to the Defendant to make an application as well Under Order VII Rule 11. In other words, the power Under Order VII Rule 11 is available to the Court to be exercised suo motu. (See in this regard, the judgment of this Court in Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju (supra)."
17. In Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy 10 the Apex Court in paragraph No.24 held as follows:
"24. Ordinarily, an application for rejection of election petition in limini, purportedly under Order 7 Rule 11 for non-disclosure of cause of action, ought to proceed at the threshold. For, it has to be considered only on the basis of institutional defects in the election petition in reference to the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. Indeed, non-disclosure of cause of action is covered by clause (a) therein. Concededly, Order 7 CPC 10 . (2018) 14 SCC 1 14 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 generally deals with the institution of a plaint. It delineates the requirements regarding the particulars to be contained in the plaint, relief to be specifically stated, for relief to be founded on separate grounds, procedure on admitting plaint, and includes return of plaint. The rejection of plaint follows the procedure on admitting plaint or even before admitting the same, if the Court on presentation of the plaint is of the view that the same does not fulfill the statutory and institutional requirements referred to in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. The power bestowed in the Court in terms of Rule 11 may also be exercised by the Court on a formal application moved by the defendant after being served with the summons to appear before the Court. Be that as it may, the application under Order 7 Rule 11 deserves consideration at the threshold. (emphasis supplied)."
18. In Selvaraj v. Koodankulan Nuclear Power Plant India Limited 11 the Apex Court in paragraph No.29 held as follows:-
"29. To sum up, the Court may reject the plaint before numbering and entering it in the Register of Suits, if from a reading of the plaint, it is seen that the suit is barred by any law, or if it suffers from any procedural infirmity, adumbrated supra. The Court, at that stage, cannot and is not expected to conduct a roving enquiry into the merits of the matter by testing the correctness of the plaint-averments even prior to its institution. (emphasis supplied)"
11
. (2021) 4 CTC 539 = SCC OnLine Mad 2514 15 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025
19. In Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali 12, the Apex Court held that the power conferred on the trial Court under Order - VII Rule - 11 of CPC, to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order - VII Rule - 11 of CPC are required to be strictly adhered to. In exercise of power under the said proviso, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or juridical dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
20. Thus, the Apex Court consistently held that the power under Order - VII Rule - 11 of CPC can be exercised suo-motu even before summons are issued or the plaint is registered, provided the defect is evident from the plaint itself. The aim is to prevent misuse of judicial time and protect defendants from frivolous litigation. Therefore, while the power is broad, it must be used with care. Only incurable defects, those that are patent and jurisdictional justify rejection. Procedural lapses like undervaluation or deficient Court fee may be rectified. But where the plaint discloses no cause of action or is barred by statute, the Court is duty bound to reject it.
12
. 2020 SCC OnLine SC 562 16 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025
21. In Bhagar Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany 13, the Calcutta High Court held that Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive and does not expressly provide a remedy for every eventuality. In cases where the circumstances so warrant and necessities of justice so require, the Court is entitled to act upon the assumption of possessing inherent power to act ex debito justitiae so as to do real and substantial justice.
22. In Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express 14, the said principle was upheld by the Apex Court.
23. In Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar15, the Apex Court held that there is an inherent right in every person to bring suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute, one may, at one's peril to bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answers to a suit howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit.
24. In Abdul Gafur4, the Apex Court held that the Apex Court held that rule of pleadings postulate that a plaint must contain material facts. When the plaint read as a whole does not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can be entertained by a Civil Court, it may be rejected in terms of Order - VII, Rule - 11 of the Code. Similarly, a plea of 13 . AIR 1941 Cal. 670 14 . 2006 SCC 3 100 15 . (1974) 2 SCC 393 17 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 bar to jurisdiction of a Civil Court has to be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety and the Court would not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de hors the factual averments made in the plaint.
25. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satypal 16, the Apex Court held that if on a meaningful, not formal reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the Court should exercise its power - under the said provision. And if clever drafting has created an illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order - X of CPC. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the suit has to be disposed of either by the High Court or by the Courts subordinate to it in a meaningful manner as per the procedure prescribed in the Code and not on one's own whims.
26. In R. Ramjibhai Dhyabhai v. Narottamdas Lallubhai 17, the Apex Court held that when the right to sue accrues is again a question of fact, these questions of fact shall have to be decided not by mere glance at 16 . (1977) 4 SCC 467 17 . AIR 1986 SC 1912 18 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 the averments made in the plaint but on evidence adduced on either side. In such cases the plea of limitation becomes a mixed question of law and fact. Unless on an examination of the averments made in the plaint ex facie the suit is barred by limitation, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited at the threshold without conducting an enquiry.
27. In Sri Laxmi Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd.6, erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad on consideration of principle laid down by the Apex Court and High Courts held in paragraph No.15 as under:
"15. The eventual conspectus from a concatenation of the judgments referred to hereinabove shows thus:
Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. In order to decide the question as to whether the plaint shall be rejected under clauses (a) and (d) of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code, the averments made inter alia in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith if any alone shall be taken into consideration. The plea taken in the written statement and the probable defence which the defendant might raise on merits are not germane for consideration. In the process, the plaint in its entirety must be considered to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments in the plaint are taken as correct in entirety, a decree could be passed. So long as the claim as made in the plaint discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is vague and is not 19 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 likely to succeed, is no ground for striking it out. The Court shall not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made inter alia in the plaint. The purported failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. The contentions issues which shall have to be decided on the evidence adduced on either side cannot be decided at the threshold for rejecting the plaint or not, unless on the allegations made in the plaint itself the Court can arrive at a conclusion that the suit is clearly barred by any law, be it a question of a limitation or any other question. A distinction shall be drawn between a case where the plaint itself does not disclose a cause of action and a case where after considering the entire material on record a conclusion can be arrived at that there is no cause of action. If the plaint is asked to be rejected at the threshold, the former case is germane, but not the latter. The Court can exercise the power to reject the plaint at any stage of the suit. The Court should guard itself from any camouflage or trick in the pleading sought to be made so as to create a cause of action. Where the litigation is utterly vexatious and abuse of the process of the Court, can be yet another ground to reject the plaint."
28. In paragraph No.41 of the said judgment, it was held that if the suit on the face of it appears to be frivolous, the plaint can be rejected or not albeit it is not one of the grounds enjoined under Rule - 11 of Order - VII of the Code. Frivolity is again a ground which requires a detailed enquiry unless it is a case where frivolity is writ large on the face of the 20 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 averments made inter alia in the plaint, on that ground the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.
29. The scope of enquiry in an application filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of the Code seeking rejection of the plaint is indeed limited. The Court cannot go beyond the four corners of the plaint and the documents, if any, annexed therewith.
30. In Ragam Yellaiah v. Chinta Shankaraiah18, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held that several other factual aspects are also to be gone into while deciding a question of law involved incidentally, the rejection of the plaint at the threshold cannot be sustained. All these aspects to be gone into, at the time of regular trial.
31. In the light of the aforesaid principle, coming to the facts of the case on hand, as discussed above, the petitioner filed the aforesaid suit seeking specific performance directing the defendants to execute and register sale deeds with delivery of possession in his favour or in the alternative to pass a decree for recovery of Rs.75.00 lakhs against the defendants towards damages for breach of contract. He has specifically pleaded that he has paid money to late Mogli, husband and father of the respondents respectively, he consented to execute and register sale deed in 18 . 2003 (5) ALT 403 21 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 favour of the petitioner in respect of open plot admeasuring 847 square yards in Survey No.568, situated at Shayampet jagir, Hanumakonda Mandal and District and that he has handed over the original registered sale deed bearing document No.3794 of 2009, dated 19.06.2009 to the petitioner with a promise to execute and register a sale deed within two or three months. The petitioner has also specifically pleaded that after the death of Mogli, he approached the defendants, his legal heirs. Initially, they agreed and later they are trying to alienate the said land to third parties.
32. Thus, the agreement is oral. The said Mogli received the aforesaid payments. Ever since the date of handing over the aforesaid registered sale deed of the said Mogli, the petitioner is in possession of the said sale deed as purchaser of the aforesaid plot. There is specific assertion to the said fact in paragraph No.7 of the plaint.
33. The trial Court returned the plaint, mainly on the grounds; (i) the petitioner failed to issue notices to the legal heirs of the deceased demanding execution and registration of sale deed to perform contract; ii) there is no contract between the parties; and iii) all the promissory notes Ankados are time barred debts and iv) no written acknowledgment is made for the amounts received by the said Mogli.
22
KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025
34. In the light of the above, it is apt to note that oral agreement is a valid agreement. Whether there is an oral agreement between the Mogli and the petitioner with regard to sale of the aforesaid plot is a triable issue. According to the petitioner, late Mogli during his life time handed over the original registered sale deed in respect of the subject property to him with a promise to execute sale deed within two or three months from August, 2024. He has filed the said original sale deed along with plaint. The said document is mentioned in the list of documents. He has also filed original promissory note/Ankada and original acknowledgment debt executed by late Mogli.
35. In Brig Mohan v. Sugra Begum19, the Apex Court held as follows:
"There is no requirement of law that an agreement or contract of sale of immovable property should only be in writing. However, in a case where the plaintiffs come forward to seek a decree for specific performance of contract of sale of immovable property on the basis of an oral agreement alone, heavy burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove that there was consensus ad-idem between the parties for a concluded oral agreement for sale of immovable property. Whether there was such a concluded oral contract or not would be a question of fact to be determined in the facts and circumstances of 19 . (1990) 4 SCC 147 23 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 each individual case. It has to be established by the plaintiffs that vital and fundamental terms for sale of immovable property were concluded between the parties orally and a written agreement if any to be executed subsequently would only be a formal agreement incorporating such terms which had already been settled and concluded in the oral agreement."
36. In Y.V. Narasimha Sarma v. S. Appalaraju20,the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as under:
".......Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is not necessary that an agreement for sale should be in writing. There is no prohibition against oral contracts for sale. In every case, where a party comes up with a plea of oral contract of sale, it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the evidence very carefully before accepting that plea. When valuable properties are involved, normally, the parties do not conclude the bargain by oral arrangement but when a party comes to the Court pleading that he is entitled to a specific performance based on an alleged oral contract for sale, the burden lies heavily upon him to establish by acceptable and cogent evidence what he pleaded. This rigorous test is warranted in order to prevent miscarriage of justice. The risk of owners of property being defrauded by resourceful litigants in the absence of the Court adopting a strict and rigorous test in respect of oral contract for sale, is real."
20
. 1989 (2) ALT 653 24 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025
37. In Abdul Rasheed v. Abdul Hakeem 21, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as under:
"...The burden of proof naturally lies on the plaintiff to prove the alleged agreement by realizable, cogent and convincing evidence. The law, no doubt, recognizes an oral agreement of sale and there is no requirement of law that an agreement of contract of sale of immovable property should only be in writing. However, in a case where the plaintiff comes forward to seek a decree for specific performance of contract of sale of immovable property on the basis of an oral agreement alone, heavy burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that there was consensus ad idem between the parties for a concluded oral agreement for sale of immovable property. Whether there was such a concluded oral contract or not would be a question of fact to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each individual case."
38. It is also apt to note that the petitioner has filed third party affidavits of Mr. Amrutha Sathish and Mr. Amrutha Pratap in support of his contention that Mogli promised him to execute and register sale deed along with explanation submitted by the petitioner on the aforesaid objections raised by the trial Court. Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact.
21
. 1998 (6) ALT 399 25 KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025
39. The trial Court rejected the plaint on the aforesaid grounds by going into the merits of the case. As held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, more particularly, Dahiben12 wherein it was held that the trial Court has to consider the pleadings and documents filed by him while dealing with an application under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC.
40. It is settled law that the trial Court has power to reject the plaint at the SR stage. But, at the same time, it cannot go into the merits of the case at the SR stage. The said principle was also held by this Court in Smt. Manjeeth Kaur v. Mr. Sardar Haricharan Singh22.
41. In the present case, the trial Court rejected the plaint by going into the merits of the case including limitation, agreement is oral and there is no acknowledgement of debt by the defendants etc. The trial Court failed to consider specific contention of the petitioner herein that late Mogli has handed over the original registered sale deed bearing document No.3794 of 2009, dated 19.06.2009 under which he acquired the aforesaid plot, to the petitioner herein with a promise to execute and register a sale deed within two or three months from August, 2024. Without considering the aforesaid aspects and the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision, learned trial Court rejected the plaint vide impugned order dated 22 . CRP No.2178 of 2025, decided on 04.07.2025. 26
KL,J CRP No.2185 of 2025 18.02.2025. Therefore, impugned order is not on appreciation of the aforesaid assertions/pleadings of the petitioner in the plaint and impugned order is contrary to the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgments. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
42. The present Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed setting aside the impugned order dated 18.02.2025 passed by learned Principal District Judge, Hanumakonda in OSSR No.144 of 2025. The trial Court is directed to number the said OSSR if the same is otherwise in order and decide it on merits. If any application is filed by the defendants under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of CPC to reject the plaint, the trial Court shall decide the same basing on merits and record available un-influencing of any of the observations made in this order. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the revision shall stand closed.
_________________ K. LAKSHMAN, J 24th September, 2025 Note: L.R. copy be marked.
(B/O.) Mgr