Madras High Court
A.M. Mohan vs The Director General Of Police on 8 December, 2010
Author: G.M. Akbar Ali
Bench: G.M. Akbar Ali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
CORAM
DATED: 8.12.2010
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.M. AKBAR ALI
CRL.O.P.No.19095 of 2010
A.M. Mohan ..... Petitioner
vs
1. The Director General of Police
Govt. Of Tamil Nadu
Chepauk, Chenai
2. The Commissioner of Police
Greater Chennai City
Chennai-600 002 ..... Respondents
Criminal Original Petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for the reliefs as stated therein.
For petitioner : Mr.V. Giri, Senior Counsel for
M/s Nathan and
For respondents 1&2: Mr.Hassan Mohamed Jinnah APP
For 3rd respondent : Mr.PL. Narayanan for
Mr.PR.Dineshkumar
ORDER
Petition is filed seeing a direction to the 2nd respondent to register the case on the strength of the complaint dated 2.7.2010 which is pending with the 2nd respondent and consequently direct the 1st respondent to monitor the case and file periodic reports.
2. The petitioner who claims himself as a public welfare activist has come forward with the petition directing the respondents to register a case on a complaint given by him dated 2.7.2010. The complaint dated 2.7.2010 was addressed to 21 personalities including the Secretary, Department of Finance, Union of India and the Chairman, Indian Bank and the respondents.
3. The petition deals with details about one Mrs.Meerabai Dawson, an Indian by birth, married to an English, Hugh Kennath Dawson, and settled in Middlesex, United Kingdom. According to the petitioner, she owned several property in Tamil Nadu and one of the properties is situated in Town Survey No.11, Block No.21 of Adayar, Chennai of an extent of 2.37 acres, a valuable property was grabbed by the proposed accused. According to the petitioner one A.R. Housing Pvt.Ltd., tried to obtain title in a DRT auction sale and when that was thwarted, a Letters of Administration was obtained by suppressing the facts. According to the petitioner, Mrs. Meera Bai, was issueless and she had executed a Will in respect of her property in England and the executors/ administrators of the Will had obtained probate on 11.3.2002 at London. It seems the same executors had filed an application before the High Court of Madras for an ancillary probate pertaining to the property situated at Chennai and pursuant to which,the property was dealt with by the proposed accused.
4. The allegation of the petitioner is that the the proposed accused have manipulated and had created false and fraudulent documents in order to grab the property of a person who died issueless. According to the petitioner, the Will executed in England was not in respect of the property at Chennai. The petitioner has pointed out many circumstances to show that the property which belong to the State by escheat has been grabbed by unscrupulous persons by creating forged and false documents.
5. The allegation of the petitioner is that the valuable property belonging to a Indian National, after whose death has to escheat to the State, was fraudulently grabbed by the persons who have created forged documents. The petitioner has given a complaint for investigation. Since the authorities have not taken any action, he has filed the present petition seeking for the above relief.
6. Mr.V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner had drawn our attention to the following main points calling for the intervention of this Court to exercise its power under Sec.482 Cr.P.C directing the respondent to register a case and investigate.
i) the property situated T.S. No.Town Survey No.11, Block No.21 of Adayar, Chennai, belong to one Meerabai dawson an Indian born British Citizen who died issueless after executing a Will.
ii) She died on 16.12.2001 in England.
iii) Her Will excludes the property in India. This property was substituted in a DRT auction sale. The auction purchaser tried to obtain title.
vi) Inspite of the fact that the last will of Meera Bai excluded the property in India, in 2003 a power of attorney of the executors of the estate of Meerabai Dawson filed an application for ancillary probate for the property situate in India. This was obtained by suppressing the facts.
(v) An affidavit was filed on 21.8.2002, in OP No.93/1975 as if signed by Meerabai Dawson
(vi) sale deed was executed by another set of power of attorneys of the executors of the estate of Meerabai Dawson in favour of one the Vickon Infrastructure and the confirming party is one A.R. Housing private limited who have tried to gain title by virtue of sale certificate dated 17.4.2003 in the DRT auction sale.
7. The learned senior counsel submitted that under Article 296 of the Constitution of India, the property of Meera Bai shall escheat to the State but has been fraudulently grabbed by creating false documents. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the complaint given by the petitioner was ignored by the respondent police, thereby allowing the offenders to go scot-free . The learned senior counsel further pointed out that the respondent ought to have registered a case as the complaint disclosed cognizable offences. The learned senior counsel relied on a decision reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 (State of Harayana vs Bhajanlal), "32. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.
8. The learned senior counsel also relied on a decision reported in 1993 Supp 4 SCC 260(Union of India vs W.N. Chadha), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"170. It may not be out of place to state, in this context, that there are certain provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code which authorise a police officer to register a case and investigate the mater if there isany reason to suspect the commission of an offence or reasonable suspicion of commission of any offence. Section 157(1) requires an officer in charge of a police station who "from information received or otherwise" has reason to suspect the commission of an offence that is a cognizable offence, he can investigate the matter under Section 156. The expression "reason to suspect" as occurring in Section 157(1) is not qualified as in Section 41 (a) and (g) of the Code, wherein the expression 'reasonable suspicion' is used. Therefore, what Section 157(1) requires is that the police officer should have 'reason to suspect' with regard to the commission of an offence".
9. He also relied on a decision reported in 2006 (1) SCC (Crl) 678, (Ramesh Kumari vs State (NCT of DELHI) and Others wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
"5. The views expressed by this Court in para 31, 32 and 33 as quoted above leave no manner of doubt that the provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the basis of such an information disclosing cognizable offence".
10. He also relied on a decision reported in 2007 1 MLJ (Crl) 315 (Susadima Amarolpam vs Director General of Police, Chennai and another, wherein, this Court has held as follows:
" I. When a complaint discloses a cognizable offence, it is mandatory for the police under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C., to register a FIR and proceed to investigate."
II. There is no discretion vested with the police for refusing to register the FIR on ground of inordinate delay.
11. He also relied on a decision reported in 2008 1 MLJ (Crl) 21(V. Elango vs State), wherein, this Court has held as follows:
"9. The Tamil Nadu police force is known for its excellent skill and good reputation. But, unfortunately certain police officials were not performing their statutory obligation which would amount to dereliction of duty. It is needless to state that a police official is mandatorily required to perform the statutory obligation under Section 154 of Cr.P.C in its letter and spirit by registerinig the First Information Report, in the event of the allegation constituting cognizable offences. Of course, the preference of false and frivolous complaints cannot be ruled out and it is the utmost duty of the police officials to filter such complaints and to take action on a complaint consisting certain definite allegations constituting cognizable offences. Due to the inaction and non registering of the First Information Report in spite of the complaints containing the allegations constituting cognizable offence, this Court is flooded with the petitions under Section 482 of Cr.P.C seeking for the relief of directions to the respondent police to register the First Information Report on the basis of their complaint. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that it is high time that the Director General of Police of this State shall instruct all police officials throughout the State to act in accordance with law by strictly complying with the mandatory requirement under Section 154 of Cr.P.C in its letter and spirit".
12. Mr.PL. Naryanan, who appeared for the 3rd respondent/ intervenor submitted that that the petitioner has no locus-standi to prefer a complaint. The learned counsel pointed out that the executors of the estate of late Meerabai Dawson had appointed power of attorneys for ancillary probate and on merit, this Court had ordered granting of probate. The learned counsel pointed out that the execution of documents are in accordance with law and frivolous allegations are made against the proposed accused with ulterior motives.
13. The learned counsel further submitted that the complaint given by the petitioner does not disclose any cognizable offence. The learned counsel further submitted that the entire exercise of the petitioner is only an abuse of process of law and he has not approached the court with clean hands and with equitable back ground. The learned counsel relied on a decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 117 (Abhinandan Jha and others vs Dinesh Mishra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"19. The question can also be considered from another point of view. Supposing the police send a report viz., a Charge Sheet, under Section 170 of the Code. As we have already pointed out the Magistrate is not bound to accept that report, when he considers the matter judicially. But can he differ from the police and call upon them to submit a final report, under section 169? In our opinion, the Magistrate has no such power. If he has no such power, in law, it also follows that the Magistrate has no power to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, when the police have submitted a final report that no case is made out for sending the accused for trial. The functions of the Magistracy and the police, are entirely different and though, in the circumstances mentioned earlier, the Magistrate may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly infringe (sic. Impinge?) upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view.
20. Therefore, to conclude, there is no power, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a report under section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up an accused for trial."
14. The learned counsel also relied on a decision reported in AIR 1985 CRL L.J 1389 (Aravindakshan and another vs State of Kerala and another) wherein the Kerala High Court has held as follows:
"6..... A person who is seeking such a jurisdiction has undoubtedly to approach the court with clean hands and with equitable backgrounds. He has to come to Court with an open mind for the purpose of making him eligible for such a relief. The High Court may not be justified in invoking the inherent power in favour of a person who is known to have approached the Court with a mala fide and fraudulent background.
15. He also relied on a decision reported in 1999 6 SCC 146 (Arun Shankar Shukla vs State of U.P and Others), wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"2....... It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions "abuse of the process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence. The High Court has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.
16. Mr.Hassan Mohammed Jinnah, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the complaint given by the petitioner is being enquired into by the Central Crime Branch, Team I, Chennai. The petitioner has been asked to appear before the Sub Inspector of Police, CCB on two occasions along with original documents and he has not co-operated and the complaint is pending further enquiry.
17. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied on a decision reported in (2007) 6 SCC 171 (Aleque Padamsee and Others vs Union of India and others ), wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
8. The writ petitions are finally disposed of with the following directions:
(1)If any person is aggrieved by the inaction of the police officials in registering the FIR, the modalities contained in Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code are to be adopted and observed.
(2) It is open to any person aggrieved by the inaction of the police officials to adopt the remedy in terms of the aforesaid provisions.
(3) So far as non-grant of sanction aspect is concerned, it is for the Government concerned to deal with the prayer. The Government concerned would do well to deal with the matter within three months from the date of receipt of this order.
(4) We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.
18. He also relied on a decision reported in (2008) 2 SCC 409(Sakiri Vasu vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Others) wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
"26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C or other police officer referred to in Section 36 Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Morever, he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Why then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies?
19. Heard both sides and perused the materials available on record. It is well settled that once a complaint discloses a cognizable offence, the police officer, to whom such information is given, has no option except to register the same and proceed with investigation. In Bhajan lal's case (1992 SC 604) (State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal) (cited supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"31. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression "information" without qualifying the same as in Section 41 (1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word "information" in Section 154 (1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse in recor an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with this reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, reasonableness' or 'credibility' of, the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purpously thought it fit to employ only the 'word' 'information' without qualifying the said word Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that every complaint or information preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced into writing. The word 'complaint' which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was decided in that place and word "information" was ysed ub the Codes of 1882 and 1955 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present code of 1973 (Act 11 of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makers it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a First Information Report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.
"32. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.
20. This principle has been followed in many leading cases, which the learned senior counsel for the petitioner relied on. It is also indisputable that the High Court can only sparingly exercise its inherent power under Sec.482 Cr.P.C to give effect to any of the provisions under the Code or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
21. The present case relates to a property of one Meera Bai Dawson, an Indian born, who settled in England after marrying an English. The subject matter of the property is a piece and parcel of land bearing Old S.No.63, New Block No.21, and T.S.No.9/1, and T.S.No.11 measuring 2 acres 67 cents in Urur Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chennai. It bears door nos.15,16 and 19 Lattice Bridge Road, Adayar, Chennai. The said Meerabai Dawson had executed a Will dated 30.11.1993. The Will relates to her property in England. There is a specific declaration in paragraph 4 of the Will which reads "I make no provision in my Will for my relatives in India as I proposed to make a separate Will to dispose of my property in India to my relatives".
22. She seemed to have entered into an agreement of sale with one L.S.Abinesh Babu, a Director of Tirven Garments Private Limited on 22.6.1999. The vendor had offered to sell the property for Rs.45 lakhs per acre. Interestingly, the agreement stipulates that the purchaser shall take all necessary action to evict the tenants; shall find prospective buyers to purchase the property; can either retain the property or enter into agreement for sale with any other prospective buyers and the purchaser can fix up the sale consideration which he thinks to be fair but shall pay Rs.45 lakhs per acre to the vendor. In effect, the proposed purchaser can sell the property beyond the said sum of Rs.45 lakhs per acre and retain the excess amount. But the sale was not effected.
23. Prior to this the said Triven Garments Private Limited had obtained financial facilities from Global Trust Bank Limited, Chennai. An affidavit cum declaration seemed to have been filed by Meerabai Dawson for a creation of mortgage by deposit of title deeds in favour of Global Trust Bank on 18.10.1999. This was created as a guarantee to the loan facilities granted to M/s Triven Garments Private Limited. A power of attorney was also executed in favour of L.S. Abinesh Babu on 18.8.2000. As power of attorney, he deposited the title deeds with the Bank. A third party affidavit by the said L.S. Abinesh Babu was filed and a document of confirmation was also executed by Meerabai Dawson on 17.8.2001. Smt Meerabai Dawson died on 16.12.2001.
24. The Global Trust Bank initiated recovery proceedings before DRT Chennai. The property originally mortgaged by the Triven Garments Private Limited was brought for sale. One A.R. Housing Private Limited rep by its Director Govindarajulu purchased the property which was situated at Villivakkam, Chennai. However, the said auction purchaser filed a petition before Recovery Officer, DRT, Chennai in M.A No.176/2002 for exchange of property at Oorur village (property of Meera bai) in lieu of the property at Villivakkam, purchased by them. It was so ordered by the recovery officer.
25. In pursuant to the exchange of property in the auction sale, the subject matter of the property was sold to A.R. Housing Private Limited and the sale certificate dated 9.8.2002 said it was for the recovery of debts due from Triven Garments Private Limited, Abinesh Babu as Director and Smt. Meerabai Dawson as guarantor. 2.27 acres was sold in auction. In 2003, Original Petition No.192 of 2003 was filed before this Court to grant Letters of Administration as regard to the estate of late Meerabai Dawson. This petition was filed by the Executors of the Will of Meerabai Dawson, represented by the power of attorney one Sivanandha Raj. This petition was allowed and this Court ordered on 6.12.2004 for issuance of Letters of Administration. A civil suit was also filed by the executors to cancel the sale certificate. In 2004, a batch of writ petitions were filed to quash the sale certificate and for other relief. This Court by order dated 21.3.2005 quashed the sale certificate dated 9.8.2002. A.R. Housing Private limited filed an application in A.No.481 of 2005 in OP No.192 of 2003 (Letters of Administration) to revoke the Letters of Administration granted in favour of the Administrators represented by power of attorney on the ground of suppression of fact. By order dated 10.8.2006, this Court dismissed the application. A.R. Housing Private limited filed writ appeals before this court challenging the order quashing the sale certificate. A compromise memo was filed and ordered accordingly. On 22.2.2007, one Rahul Suresh Narvekar and Subhas Dagadoo Jadav power of attorney agents of the executors of the estate of Meera Bai Dawson sold the property to one Vicons Infrastructure and Environment Engineering Pvt Ltd represented by its Director Francis Raja for a sum of Rs.20 crores. Interestingly, A.R. Housing Private Limited rep by its Director Govindarajulu was also made as a party to the document as "confirming party". The said purchaser viz., Vicons Infrastructure and Environment engineering Ltd is now dealing with the property in various manner along with A.R. Housing Private Limited and at this juncture, the petitioner who was an earlier associate of the the above stated persons, has come forward with the allegation that the property which belonged to Meerabai Dawson who died issueless and intestate is the property of the State by escheat , but the unscrupulous land grabbers have been dealing with the property by creating false and forged documents.
26. There are two sets of transactions involving the property of Mrs.Meera Bai. The earlier transactions starts with the alleged sale agreement dated 27.4.1999 executed by her in favour of M/S. Triven Garments represented by one L.S. Abinesh Babu. This follows by executing guarantee agreement, mortgage by deposit of title deeds, confirmation letters, power of attorney to deal with the property. This culminates into auction sale of the property. A.R. Housing Pvt. Ltd., obtains title by virtue of sale certificate. This was set aside by this court in a writ proceedings. The writ appeal ends up with a compromise.
27. The second round starts with the initiation of proceedings by the executors of the last will and testament of Mrs. Meera Bai. Though the will specifically excluded the property in India, the Letters of Administration was granted by this court. The above said A.R. Housing Pvt. Ltd., challenges this order, but in vain.
28. The British Executors, who acted through two different power of attorney, executed sale deed in favour of one Vicons Infrastructure and Environment engineering Ltd. But in the sale deed the interest of A. R. Housing Pvt. Ltd., was recognised and they are shown as ' confirming party'. The various documents produced before this court would show that in fact the confirming party has joined in a joint venture. Who paid to who, who pays to whom and who would pay to whom and Who ultimately owns the property seems to be mind boggling riddle.
29. On this above background, let us now consider whether the complaint of the petitioner discloses any cognizable offence.
30. Art.296 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
Property accruing by escheat or lapse or as bona vacantia:
"Subject as hereinafter provided any property in the territory of India which, if this Constitution had not come into operation, would have accrued to His Majesty or, as the case may be, to the Ruler of an Indian State by escheat r lapse, or as bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner, shall, if it is property situate in a State, vest in such State, and shall, in any other case, vest in the Union:
Provided that any property which at the date when it would have so accrued to His Majesty or to the Ruler of an Indian State was in the possession or under the control of the Government of India or the Government of a State shall, according as the purposes for which it was then used or held were purposes of the Union or a State, vest in the Union or in that State."
31. Any property in the territory of India and if it is situate in a State, shall vest with such State, if there is no rightful owner.
32. The rightful owner was Mrs.Meerabai Dawson. But for the Letters of Administration obtained by the Executors of the last Will and testament of Mrs.Meerabai Dawson, the property should have vested with the State for want of rightful owner. It is also pertinent to note that the relatives of Meerabai Dawson had not claimed any succession to the property. On the face of the various transaction, there is nothing wrong in entering into a sale agreement, create equitable mortgage and purchase the property in an auction sale. There is also nothing wrong in obtaining Letters of Administration and sale of property.
33. Sec.6 (5) of Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA) reads as follows:
6. Capital account transactions:
(5) Without prejudice to the provisions of this section, the Reserve Bank may, by regulation, prohibit, restrict, or regularise establishment in India of a branch, office or other place of business by a person resident outside India, for carrying on any activity relating to such branch, office or other place of business.
34. Sec.6(a) of Foreign Exchange (Acquisition etc)., Regulations 2000 reads as follows;
(a) A person referred to in sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Act, or his successor shall not, except with the prior permission of the Reserve Bank, repatriate outside India the sale proceeds of any immovable property referred to in that sub-section.
35. The disturbing factors in dealing with the property are as follows;
i) the sale agreement dated 22.6.1999 was in favour of M.s Tirven Garments Private Limited represented by its Director L.S. Abinesh Babu.
ii) without any benefit, a mortgage by deposit of title deeds was created by Mrs.Meerabai Dawson in favour of Global Trust Bank Limited for the loan facilities of the agreement holder through a document dated 18.10.1999.
iii) a power of attorney in favour of the above said person dated 18.8.2000 was also executed and on the basis of power of attorney, various documents of the property were deposited by L.S. Abinesh Babu on 27.8.2000.
iv) a letter of confirmation dated 17.8.2001 was signed by Mrs.Meerabai Dawson.
All these documents are on India Non-Judicial Stamp Papers , but signed by Meerabai Dawson at Middlesex, London in the presence of a Commissioner for Oath of England and Wales.
(v) An affidavit of Meerabai was filed before this Court in OP No.93/1975 (in the matter of grant of Letters of Administration of Vedamma Rangachari mother of Meerabai Dawson). This affidavit was sworn on 21.8.2002 and was numbered as Application No.3804 of 2002 on which date Meerabai Dawson was not alive.
(vi) The property was substituted in an auction sale which was purchased by A.R. Housing Private Limited represented by Govindarajulu.
(vii) One Sivananatha raj, Power of Attorney of Executors of the Will of Mrs.Meera Bai applied for Letters of Administration based on the Will which specifically excludes her property in India.
(viii) A.R. Housing Private Limited filed an application for revocation of Letters of Administration and this Court dismissed the application as he had no caveatable interest.
(ix) In pursuant to the Letters of Administration, one Raghul Suresh Narvekar and Subash had sold the property for rupees 20 crores when the market value of the property as per sale deed was rupees 64 crores.
(x) A.R. Housing Private Limited is shown as confirming party.
(xi)The financial arrangements are mind boggling.
(xii)Lastly, under FEMA and FEM Acquisition Regulation, the money which was actually payable to the executors in London,U.K. being the sale consideration of the property of a non resident, can not be repatriated without the permission of The Reserve Bank of India.
36. Though the petitioner claims to be a public spirited person he was also an associate of the the some of the above mentioned persons. Naturally, he knows the various transactions. I am of the considered view that the manner in which the property was dealt with requires a detailed investigation. The sum and substance of the complaint of the petitioner would show prima facie cognizable offences for criminal conspiracy, creation of false and fraudulent documents and money laundering and violation of FEMA act and Regulations.
37. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before a police officer satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information and investigate.
38. In Aleque Padamsee and in Sakri vasu's case (cited supra) the Hon'ble Sureme court has held that the court can not exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 of the code directing the authorities to register the case, investigate and file a final report but the aggrieved person is to approach the higher official or the magistrate. However, I am of the considered view that since the CCB is seized of the matter and the enquiry is still pending, suitable directions can be issued to secure the ends of justice.
39. Therefore, the petition is disposed of, with the direction to the Deputy Commissioner, City Crime branch, Chennai to conduct the enquiry on the complaint pending with the CCB Team I, Chennai and initiate action if any cognizable offence is made out as per section 154(1) of Cr.P.C.
sr To
1. The Director General of Police Govt. Of Tamil Nadu Chepauk, Chenai
2. The Commissioner of Police Greater Chennai City Chennai 600 002