Gujarat High Court
Karimaben Sulemman Lohar Wd/O Late ... vs Alimamad Usman Kureshi on 14 November, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025
undefined
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14139 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1596 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13822 of 2022
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE
=============================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
NO
=============================================
KARIMABEN SULEMMAN LOHAR WD/O LATE SULEMMAN
JUSAB LOHAR & ORS.
Versus
ALIMAMAD USMAN KURESHI & ORS.
=============================================
Appearance:
MS.YOGINI H UPADHYAY(6695) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3,4
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 3
RULE UNSERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
=============================================
CORAM HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE
:
Date : 14/11/2025
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present petitions raising common issues of law, are heard together and decided by this common judgment. The matters were heard finally and were directed to notify for orders on 4.9.2025.
2. Learned advocate Ms. Yogini Upadhyay appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the captioned matters has appraised the Court about the issue involved in Special Civil Page 1 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined Application Nos. 1596 of 2022 and 14139 of 2022. Mr. H. B. Champavat, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent no. 1 being the owner of the vehicle involved, Mr. Dakshesh Mehta, learned advocate has entered appearance on behalf of respondent no.2 Insurance Company, whereas, Mr. Mandipsingh Saluja, learned advocate has entered appearance on behalf of respondent No.3 insurance company. Learned advocate Mr. Saluja has submitted written arguments on behalf of respondent No.2 Insurance Company. The same was permitted to be taken upon record. In order to appreciate the controversy involved, appropriate would be to record the distinct facts of the case.
Special Civil Application No.1596 of 2022:
3. The petitioners are the original claimants who have invoked supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus seeking quashing and setting aside of the order dated 4th May 2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kutch at Bhuj below Exh.33 filed in MACP No. 726 of 1997. The further directions are sought for to decide Page 2 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined application preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in accordance with law.
3.1. The brief facts which can be gathered from the averments made in the claim petition is that the petitioners have approached the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal by filing claim petition under Section 166 of the Act of 1988 praying for an amount of compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs against the respondents on account of the death of Shri Veljibbhai Arjun Prajapati- the husband of the petitioner No.1, who unfortunately succumbed to the injuries caused in motor vehicle accident. The said claim petition was registered as MACP No. 7296 of 1997. In the aforesaid claim proceedings, an application was moved under Section 163 A of the Act of 1988 which was submitted at Exhibit 6, praying for interim compensation on the basis of no fault liability, thereby seeking compensation of an amount of Rs.2,49,500/- as interim compensation. The Tribunal vide order dated 30 th September, 1999, had granted interim compensation to the tune of Rs.2,09,500/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of such application till its realisation. The respondent No.3- Insurance Company had objected to Page 3 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined aforesaid application by submitting their reply at Exh.33. It was specifically contended that the claimants are precluded from seeking compensation under section 166 of the Act, 1988. The Insurance Company had preferred application inter- alia contending that since the claimants have already been awarded compensation under Section 163 -A of the Act of 1988, they are precluded from seeking further compensation under Section 166 of the Act. 3.2 The Tribunal upon hearing the respective parties vide order dated 4th May, 2013, was pleased to allow such application thereby rejecting the claim petition of the present petitioners- original claimants under Section 166 of the Act by holding it as not maintainable, in view of the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited versus Dhanbai Kanji Ghadhvi reported in 2011(2) GLR 1534. Thus, the Tribunal was of the view that since the order is passed under Section 163 A of the Act which is final in nature, the claimants are barred from availing further compensation under Section 166 of the Act, 1988. Hence, the present petition at the instance of the original claimants.
Page 4 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined Special Civil Application No. 13822 of 2022.
4. The petitioners are the original claimants who have invoked supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction against the Tribunal to decide their application under Section 166 of the Act as per the orders passed by this Court. Alternatively, the petitioners have prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 4 th May 2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (Main), Kutch at Bhuj below Exhibit 55 in MACP No. 421 of 1997. 4.1. The brief facts of the case as can be gathered from the averments made in the petition are that the petitioners have approached Tribunal by preparing an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Kutch at Bhuj, which was registered as MACP No. 421 of 1997 against the present respondents, praying for compensation of an amount of Rs. 25 lakhs towards the death of Shri Shamji Mithu Matang, who had unfortunately succumbed to the injuries caused in the motor Page 5 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined vehicle accident. In the aforesaid proceedings, the applicants have also preferred a separate application under Section 163A of the Act of 1988 at Exhibit 6, praying for interim compensation on no-fault liability basis for an amount of Rs.20,49,500/-, by way of interim compensation. The tribunal vide order dated 29th April, 1999, had awarded interim compensation of an amount of Rs.4,61,500/- together with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of filing of such application till its realisation. 4.2 The Tribunal at that stage had clarified that such application under Section 163 A of the Act is an alternative remedy to the remedy contained under Section 140 of the Act. The Tribunal further observed in para- 6 as under :
"6. prima facie at this stage it would be just and reasonable, if the annual income of the deceased is fixed to be Rs.40,000/-. As stated above at the time of evidence of the applicants, the applicants shall be at liberty to prove by cogent evidence that the deceased was earning more than the said amount. However, for the purpose of deciding the interim compensation, it would be just and reasonable, if the annual income of the deceased is fixed at Rs.40,000/".
4.3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed below Exhibit 6, the respondent no.2- Insurance Page 6 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined Company had preferred appeal under section 173 of the Act of 1988 , before this Court, which was registered as First Appeal No. 4532 of 1999. The Hon'ble Division Bench upon appreciation of the submissions made by learned advocates for the respective parties, vide order dated 20 th August, 1999 has partly allowed the said appeal on the limited issue of interest only whereby rate of interest was modified from 15% to 12%. In absence of any appeal being filed by the respondent no.2 Insurance Company, the said order has attained finality. Thereafter, after lapse of 12 years, the respondent no.2- insurance company had preferred an application at Exhibit 55, inter-alia contending that the applicants having availed compensation under Section 163 A of the Act of 1988, in view of the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in the case reported in 2004 ACJ 934 (SC) and 2001 ACJ 827 (SC), the claim petition under Section 166 of the Act of 1988, is required to be dismissed. The Tribunal upon hearing the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and applying the aforesaid principles, vide order dated 4th May, 2013 has allowed such application at Exhibit 55 of the respondent no.2- insurance company and thereby rejecting the claim petition preferred by the present Page 7 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined petitioners original claimants under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. Hence, the present petition at the instance of the original claimants- petitioners hearing. Special Civil Application No.14139 of 2022
5. The present petition is filed at the instance of the original claimants invoking supervisory writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction to the Tribunal to decide their application preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Alternatively, the directions sought to quash and set aside the order dated 4th May, 2013, passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Kutch at Bhuj below Exhibit 50 in MACP No. 146 of 1998. 5.1. The brief facts leading to the filing of present writ petition as can be gathered from the averments made in the claim petition are that the petitioners have approached Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Kutch at Bhuj by preferring claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, which was registered as MACP No. 146 of 1998. The Page 8 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined petitioners have prayed for compensation of an amount of Rs.7 lakhs with interest and proportionate cost from the present respondents- opponents therein, towards the untimely death of Sulemman Jusab Lohar (husband of the petitioner no.1) who had succumbed to the injuries caused in the motor vehicle accident. The petitioners has also preferred separate application under Section 163 A of the Act of 1988 at Exhibit 6, praying for interim compensation on no-fault liability basis for an amount of Rs.2,89,500/-. The Tribunal upon appreciation of the submissions made by learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, vide order dated 30 th November, 1999, had awarded interim compensation of an amount of Rs.2,33,500/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of such application till its realisation. The Tribunal had clarified that the right of the petitioners is kept open to prove the age and income of the deceased while deciding petition under Section 166 of the Act. The Court also observed that the age and income determined at present shall not be considered while deciding petition under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. The respondent No. 3- Insurance Company being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order had approached in appeal under Section 173 Page 9 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined of the Act of 1988 before this Court, which was registered as First Appeal No. 162 of 2000. The said appeal was dismissed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 29th March 2000. The Hon'ble Division Bench while passing the aforesaid order has observed that the award passed under Section 163 A, although final or ad-hoc under structure formula assumes the characteristics of interim award since it has been passed below Exhibit 6 in the main claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Act which is yet to be heard and decided finally. It was therefore observed that the said award is subject to final adjudication and final award which may ultimately be passed in the main claim petition. The appropriate directions were also issued to deposit 70% of the awarded amount with interest and cost within a period of 4 weeks thereafter and 30% of such amount was directed to be released. The 70% of the amount was directed to be invested in the fixed deposit scheme of any nationalized bank and the interest which was to accrue on such amount in the fixed deposit was permitted to be withdrawn by the petitioner's- original claimants. The Court had also taken note of the judgement of the Coordinate Bench passed in the case of R. V. Chudasma versus H. V. Kodala reported in 1999 (1) Page 10 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined GLH 278 against which it was reported by counsel for the Appellant -Insurance Company that a Special Leave Petition being SLP Civil No.8742 of 1999, pending consideration. The Hon'ble Division Bench was of the view that pendency of the aforesaid appeal would have no bearing or any impact on the said order as the Tribunal is yet to pass any final order under Section 166 of the Act if required with necessary modifications. The Hon'ble Division Bench had therefore dismissed the appeal at the admission stage. 5.2. Pending the claim proceedings before the Tribunal, the petitioner's -original claimants have preferred an application at Exhibit 39 on 22.02.2010, thereby seeking permission of the Tribunal to opt to proceed with their application preferred under Section 166 of the Act. The applicants have also undertaken to adjust the amount disbursed and invested pursuant to the award passed under Section 163 A of the Act. The reliance was placed on various orders passed by this Court in the First Appeal as well as writ petition and the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others vs. United India Insurance Company Limited reported in (2004) 5 SCC 385. The Page 11 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined Tribunal vide order dated 17th July 2010 by referring to the decision of this Court in the case of Dhanbai Kanji Ghadhvi (Supra) has taken a view that the amount awarded on interim application preferred under section 163 A of the Act can be adjusted against the award amount which may be finally decided while considering the main claim petition under section 166 of the Act, 1988 and has thereby permitted the original claimants to proceed with the claim petition preferred under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. Without challenging the aforesaid order, subsequently on 12.01.2012, the respondent No.3 Insurance Company had preferred counter application at Exhibit 50, praying for appropriate directions, essentially praying for dismissal of the main claim proceedings pending consideration under section 166 of the Act of 1988. The aforesaid application submitted by the original claimants was objected by the respondent no.3- Insurance Company by submitting their reply at Exhibit No.50, thereby seeking dismissal of the main claim petition under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. The reliance was placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi (supra) as well as the principles laid down in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra). The Tribunal upon hearing Page 12 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions has relied upon vide order dated 4 th May, 2013, and was pleased to allow such application preferred by the respondent insurance company at Exhibit 50. The Tribunal by aforesaid order has held the claim petition preferred under Section 166 of the Act being not maintainable. Hence, the present petition at the instance of the original claimants- petitioners herein challenging the aforesaid order dated 4th May 2013 passed below Exhibit 50 in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 146 of 1998 by Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal (Main), Kutch at Bhuj.
7. Ms. Upadhyay, learned advocate for the petitioners- original claimants has raised question of law by relying upon the unreported judgment of the learned Single judge of this Court in the case of Pushpalattaben Navinchandra vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, rendered in Special Civil Application No.3313 of 2016 dated 24.09.2028 as well as the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Appu Kirankumar Kshatriya vs. Anirudhsinh Bharatsinh Sarvaiya rendered in Special Page 13 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined Civil Application No.14657 of 2019 dated 11.07.2022. Learned advocate have drawn my attention to the facts of the aforementioned case as well as prayer sought for. The attention of this Court was invited to the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge in the case of Pushpalattaben Navinchandra (supra), wherein noticing the controversy involved, the two questions which arose for consideration as framed by the learned Single Judge, are reproduced herein under:
"I. Whether prior to the judgment dated 18.3.2004 delivered by this Hon'ble Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni Vs United India Insurance Co. reported in (2004)5 SCC 385, an application for compensation under Section 163A of the Act was being considered as an interim application claiming interim compensation on "No Fault Liability" basis only, and hence did not preclude grant of final compensation under Section 166 of the Act on Fault Liability basis? And II. Whether the aforestated judgment of Deepal Girishbhai Soni Vs. United India has retrospective applicability or prospective applicability? The effect being that if it operates prospectively, then all applications under Section 163A of the Act, decided prior to the aforestated judgment would continue to operate as interim applications and would not preclude the Courts from deciding Page 14 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined Applications under Section 166 of the Act, giving credit of the amount paid U/s.163A"
7.1. Referring to the aforesaid questions of law, learned advocate has submitted that in the present matters this court is required to examine as to whether the Tribunal has committed any error in dismissing the claim petition without appreciating the legal position that prior to the judgement dated 18th March, 2004, delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra), the general practise which prevailed was an application for compensation filed under section 163A was considered as an interim application, claiming interim compensation on the basis of no fault liability only and the claimants being not precluded from proceeding with the main claim petition preferred under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. Thus, the learned advocate has raised the question of law with regard to applicability of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra), retrospectively or prospectively in the facts of the case? She had further submitted that the aforesaid issue is no more res- integra in view of the decision of learned Single Judge passed Page 15 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined in case of Pushpalattaben Navinchandra (supra). Learned advocate has heavily relied upon the aforesaid legal issue being answered by the learned Single Judge of this Court and has therefore urged this Court to quash and set aside the order under challenge and to pass consequential order of restoring the main claim proceedings under Section 166 of the Act before the Tribunal to its original file and further issue appropriate directions to expedite the claim proceedings to be decided within stipulated time. Learned advocate had further submitted that the aforesaid decision of learned Single Judge in case of Pushpalattaben Navinchandra (supra) has not been assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and has attained finality. She has further submitted that the aforesaid decision has been subsequently followed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Appu Kirankumar Kshatriya (supra). The reliance was also placed on unreported decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited versus Bhaktiben Bhaveshkumar Thacker wd/o Bhaveshkumar J Thacker and others rendered in First Appeal No.2132 of 2004 and allied matters dated dated 29th April, 2019. The attention of this Court was invited to the Page 16 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined contention raised by advocates for the Insurance Company. It was submitted before the Hon'ble Division Bench that the Tribunal had wrongly allowed the claim petitions as the original claimants have already been awarded compensation under Section 163A of the Act, 1988. The aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company was dealt with by the Hon'ble Division Bench by mainly relying upon the earlier judgement of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in First Appeal No.2379 of 2000 dated 23 rd January, 2002. The Court had referred to the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in the case Hansraj Kodala (supra). The contention of the claim petition to be dismissed in view of the fact that the claimants are having received the compensation under Section 163 A of the Act cannot be accepted since the main claim petition under section 166 of the Act was pending consideration and the application preferred under section 163A of the Act was treated as an application for interim compensation and the amount was directed to be adjusted against the final award to be drawn by the Tribunal. In case if the undertaking was not filed by the claimants, it was left open to the appellant Insurance Company to apply to the tribunal for restitution of the amount which was already Page 17 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined disbursed in favour of the claimants.
8. Per contra, Mr. Saluja, learned advocate appearing for the respondent- Insurance Company in one of the petition has vehemently objected to the aforesaid submissions made by learned advocate for the petitioners. In his written arguments submitted in Special Civil Application No.1382 of 2022, learned advocate had submitted that the writ petition, devoid of any merits, is required to be dismissed. Learned advocate had fairly admitted to the interim compensation being awarded under Section 163 A of the Act by the Tribunal and the same being modified by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court reducing the rate of interest from 15% to 12% per annum on the awarded interim compensation and thus the interim award having attained finality in absence of any challenge before the higher forum. However, has supported the impugned order passed by the Tribunal by placing heavy reliance upon the relevant observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) and Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi (supra). Learned advocate had submitted that admittedly the award has been passed under Section 163 A of the Act. The accident occurred Page 18 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined on 8th of November, 1996, i.e. after the insertion of section 163 A and 163 B by the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act 1994, which was enacted in the year 1994. The attention of this Court was invited to the object of inserting section 163 A of the Act by the legislation was to provide speedy and final relief to the victims / legal heirs based on a structure formula, without requiring proof of fault or negligence. He has therefore submitted that the said provision is a special, self- contained code which excludes the rest of the provisions of the Act of 1988. The attention of this Court was also invited to section 163 B of the Act,1988, which specifically provides the claimants to opt for claim of compensation under Section 140 of the Act or under section 163 A of the Act. It further clarifies that either of said sections can be availed and not under both. While inviting my attention to the reasons assigned by the Tribunal, learned advocate had submitted that no error can be therefore found with the approach of the Tribunal in entertaining the objections submitted by the respondent Insurance Company, as the Tribunal has followed the provisions of the Act in the facts of the case. Learned advocate had also placed heavy reliance upon the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Page 19 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) more particularly paragraph 38, 52, 53 and 57 and has submitted that it has been clearly ruled out that the claimant shall be entitled to opt / elect to go either under Section 166 or Section 163A of the Act, but not under both. As regards the submission made by learned advocate for the petitioners on the issue of applicability of the aforesaid principles prospectively or retrospectively, is concerned, learned advocate had submitted that admittedly the accident had occurred on 4 th September, 1998. The aforesaid ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pronounced on 18.3.2004 when the proceedings before the Tribunal were pending consideration. He has therefore submitted that the Tribunal has rightly applied the aforesaid principles in the facts of the case. Referring to the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Dhanbai Kanji Gadhavi (supra). Learned advocate has submitted that almost in similar set of facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that the compensation determined and paid under Section 163A of the Act is final and not an interim one, therefore, the claimant cannot pursue the remedy thereunder simultaneously and he must opt / elect to go either for proceeding under Section 163A or section 166 of the Act, but Page 20 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined not under both. The Hon'ble Supreme Court consequently held the claimant being precluded from further proceeding with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act. Learned advocate had therefore submitted that the aforesaid principles being laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand and therefore has prayed to summarily dismiss the present petitions and to uphold the order passed by the Tribunal.
9. Apart from the aforesaid legal submissions being made on the core issue raised by the learned advocate for the petitioners, learned advocate had drawn my attention to the fact that the writ petitions are grossly delayed and are therefore also not required to be entertained. It was pointed out that the impugned order under challenge in writ petition being Special Civil Application No.13822 of 2022 is dated 4 th of May 2013 whereas the petitions have been filed in the year 2022 i.e. after delay of almost 9 years. In absence of any reasonable explanation with regard to delay being offered in the writ petitions, this court may not invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The reliance was placed on the decision Page 21 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined of Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others reported in 2024 SCC Online 551, more particularly, the observations made in para
9. By making aforesaid submissions, learned advocate has further raised contention that statutory remedy of appeal is provided in view of provision of Section 173 of the Act of 1988 as well as Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has further submitted that it is a settled position of law that where the legislation provides efficacious statutory remedy, the writ Court should not exercise its discretion unless a case is made out on the gross miscarriage of justice. In absence of any averments in this regard being pleaded in the writ petitions, this Court may not exercise its discretion despite statutory remedy of appeal being provided by entertaining the writ petitions under Article 226 read with Article 227. He has therefore urged this Court to dismiss the petitions and to uphold the order of the Tribunal under challenge.
10. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties at length and have also perused the impugned orders passed in the respective claim petitions by the Tribunal. The only question Page 22 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined which arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether the tribunal committed any jurisdictional error while passing impugned orders, in the facts of the case , by applying the legal principles settled by Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Soni in dismissing claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act,1988, where compensation under section 163A was affirmed as interim compensation by appellate court and such compensation was made subject to main petition under section 166 of the Act.?
11. Before dealing with merits of case, though learned advocate for the respondent -Insurance Company in one of the writ petition has raised objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petitions, as against the efficacious remedy of appeal being provided under Section 173 of the Act, 1988, considering the fact that the notice has been issued by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and the matter being pending consideration for substantial period of 3 years, this Court at belated stage of proceedings at flag end where matters are heard finally, is not inclined to dwell into the issue of maintainability as well as on the issue of delay and laches, rather it would be appropriate to deal with the core issue Page 23 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined raised by the learned advocate for the petitioners.
12. On bare appreciation of the facts of the case as recorded earlier, indisputably, the original claim petitions have been preferred at the instance of the present petitioners- original claimants under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. Pending the aforesaid claim petitions before the Tribunal, interim applications have been filed by the original claimants under Section 163 A of the Act, 1988, inter alia praying for interim compensation, pending the adjudication of the main claim proceedings under Section 166 of the Act. It is also an undisputed fact that at appropriate stage, the Tribunal upon appreciation of the facts of each case has passed appropriate orders awarding interim compensation with interest and proportionate costs in favour of the original claimants. The aforesaid interim award granted by the Tribunal was subject matter of challenge in the respective petitions at the instance of the original opponent- Insurance Company, before this Court by way of First Appeal, preferred under Section 173 of the Act, 1988 in sca no. 13822 of 2022 and sca no. 14139 of 2022.
Page 24 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined
13. Considering the controversy raised, it would be appropriate to look into the facts of the case of Deepal Soni (supra), as recorded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which suggest that the appeal was filed by the appellant-claimant against the judgement passed by this Court in First Appeal whereunder the claim of the appellant was calculated, limiting the income of the deceased at Rs.40,000/- pa. The review applications were subsequently filed in view of the judgement pronounced in the case of Hansrajbhai V Kodala (Supra). The aforesaid appeal was heard along with the Special Leave Petition preferred against the judgement of High Court of Himachal Pradesh passed in First Appeal. The Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court doubting the correctness of two Judges Bench decision in the case of Hansrajbhai v Kodala (supra) had referred the matter to a three Judges Bench. Taking a view that the proceedings under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, to be a final proceedings as a result whereof the claimants were debarred from proceeding with their further claim made on the basis of no fault liability in terms of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court was called upon to answer the issue as to whether a proceeding under Page 25 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is a final proceeding, by reason whereof, a claimant, who has been granted compensation under section 163A , is debarred from proceeding with any further claims on the basis of fault liability in terms of Section 166. The Hon'ble three Judges Bench in the case of Deepal Soni (supra), while dismissing the claim and review petitions in terms by order dated 18.93.2004, observed and held as under:
"42. Section 163-A was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000/- having regard to the fact that in terms of Section 163-A of the Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto; compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature. The note appended to column 1 which deals with fatal accidents makes the position furthermore clear stating that from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to be reduced in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive. This together with the other heads of compensation as contained in column Nos. 2 to 6 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that the Parliament intended to lay a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation for proving that the accident occurred owing to negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor vehicle.Page 26 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined
48. By reason of the Section 163-A, therefore, the compensation is required to be determined on the basis of a structured formula whereas in terms of Section 140 only a fixed amount is to be given. A provision of law providing for compensation is presumed to be final in nature unless a contra indication therefore is found to be in the statute either expressly or by necessary implication. While granting compensation, the Tribunal is required to adjudicate upon the disputed question as regard age and income of the deceased or the victim, as the case may be. Unlike Section 140 of the Act, adjudication on several issues arising between the parties is necessary in a proceeding under Section 163-A of the Act.
50. Apart from the fact that compensation is to be paid by applying multiplier method under the Second Schedule other relevant factors, namely, reduction of one-third in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself, general damages in case of death as also in the case of injuries and disabilities as also the disability in non-fatal accidents, a notional income for compensation to those who had no income prior to accident are provided for, are required to be considered which is also a clear pointer to the fact that thereby the Parliament intended to provide for a final amount of compensation and not an interim one.
51. The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/- or less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society.
52. It may be true that Section 163-B provides for an option to a claimant to either go for a claim under Section 140 or Section 163-A of the Act, as the case may be, but the same was inserted 'ex-abundanti Page 27 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined cautela' so as to remove any misconception in the mind of the parties to the lis having regard to the fact that both relate to the claim on the basis of no-fault liability. Having regard to the fact that Section 166 of the Act provides for a complete machinery for laying a claim on fault liability, the question of giving an option to the claimant to pursue their claims either under Section 163-A or Section 166 does not arise. If the submission of the learned counsel is accepted the same would lead to an incongruity.
53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. (See Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Trichur Vs. Ramanuja Match Industries).
56. It is now well-settled that for the purpose of interpretation of statute, same is to be read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect. [See High Court of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat & Ors. Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others vs. Union of India and Others, Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd. vs. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. and Ashok Leyland Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.. The object underlying the statute is required to be given effect to by applying the principles of purposive construction.
57. We, therefore, are of the opinion that remedy for payment of compensation both under Sections 163-A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. One, thus, must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both.
59. The question may be considered from different angles. As for example, if in the proceedings under Section 166 of the Act, after obtaining compensation under Section 163-A, the awardee fails to prove that Page 28 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined the accident took place owing to negligence on the part of the driver or if it is found as of fact that the deceased or the victim himself was responsible therefor as a consequence whereto the Tribunal refuses to grant any compensation; would it be within its jurisdiction to direct refund either in whole or in part the amount of compensation already paid on the basis of structured formula? Furthermore, if in a case the Tribunal upon considering the relevant materials comes to the conclusion that no case has been made out for awarding the compensation under Section 166 of the Act, would it be at liberty to award compensation in terms of Section 163-A thereof?
60. The answer to both the aforementioned questions must be rendered in the negative. In other words, the question of adjustment or refund will invariably arise in the event if it is held that the amount of compensation paid in the proceedings under Section 163-A of the Act is interim in nature."
11. The Court thus held that the remedy for payment of compensation both under Section 163 A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. It was therefore held that it shall be open for the claimant to opt /elect, proceeding under section 163A or 166 of the Act, but cannot avail both remedies simultaneously. As regards the question of adjustment or refund is concerned, the Court was of the view that such eventuality may be considered in a case, if it is held that the amount of compensation paid in the proceedings under Section 163A of the Act is interim in nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has Page 29 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined held that Section 163A nowhere provides that payment of compensation of no fault liability in terms of the structure formula under Schedule 2 is in addition to any right to claim compensation on principle of fault liability. The Court therefore, clarified that though Section 163B provides for an option to a claimant to either go for a claim under Section 140 or Section 163A of the act, as the case may be, but the same was inserted ex-abedentiae cautela, so as to remove any misconception in the minds of the parties to the lis having regard to the fact that both relate to the claim on the basis of no fault liability. Considering the Objects and Reasons of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act of 1994 introducing section 163A in the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that although the Act is a beneficial one and deserves liberal construction in order to implement the legislative intent, but it is right that once the Act itself has a distinct scheme of its own, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. Thus, the Court though held that the remedy for payment of compensation of no fault liability both under section 163A and 166 being final and independent of each Page 30 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined other as statutorily provided and the claimant being precluded from availing the aforesaid remedies simultaneously, agreed with the view expressed by the two Judges Bench, of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hansrajbhai Kodala (Supra) to treat the right to get compensation in addition to the no fault liability under section 163 A of the Act. However, in matters decided by the Tribunal, wherein the amount of compensation under Section 163A is treated as an interim award and part of such award amount being permitted to be withdrawn as appears from the record in the facts of the case, the Court had accepted the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant to treat the application preferred under section 163 A to be filed under Section 140 of the Act and the amount was permitted to be adjusted. At this stage, it would be appropriate to note that in Deepal Soni's case, the claimants have preferred to separate applications ie. Under section 163A and section 166 of the Act which were registered as MACP no. 2133 of 1988 and 2134 of 1998. Despite the aforesaid intention of claimants of having availed two separate remedies and not as an interim application , the Court in it's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, in para 68 to 71, further observed that Page 31 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined the amount invested by the Tribunal may be allowed to be withdrawn by the respondent Insurance Company. Consequently, the Tribunal was directed to proceed to determine their claim petitions filed under Section 166 of the Act in accordance with law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court at that stage had clarified that the same may not be treated as a precedent.
12. Insofar as the submission made by learned advocate for the Respondent Insurance Company referring to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhanbai Kanji Gadhavi (supra), it is evident from the facts of the case as recorded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the challenge was made by the Insurance Company against the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petition by which the order passed by the Tribunal permitting the respondents, who had already obtained compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, to proceed with the application filed under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. It was contended that the accident had taken place on 17th June, 1997 and the claim petition was filed by the legal heirs of the deceased under Section 166 of the Act Page 32 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined and pending such claim proceedings, the application at Exhibit 6 was preferred under Section 163A of the Act seeking compensation on the principle of no fault liability. Such application was partly allowed by the tribunal and pursuant thereto the Insurance Company had deposited the aforesaid amount and the claimants were permitted to withdraw such amount with further direction of investing part of the amount in the fixed deposit. The application was preferred by the Insurance Company objecting to petition under Section 166 in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited versus Hansrajbhai V Kodala reported (2001) 5 SCC 175. The further proceedings were stayed by the tribunal and in meanwhile the Insurance Company preferred an appeal against award under section 163A of the Act, which was dismissed by this Court on the ground of delay. The respondent therefore moved an application seeking permission before the Tribunal to proceed with the claim petition preferred under Section 166 of the Act. At that stage, they had given an undertaking to give credit of the amount awarded to them as compensation in the claim petition filed under Section 163A of the Act. The Tribunal while allowing Page 33 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined such application directed disbursement of the amount in favour of the claimant and part of the amount being invested. It was also clarified that the amount awarded under Section 163A shall be adjusted to the final award to be passed under Section 166 of the Act. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Insurance Company had challenged the aforesaid order by filing writ petition before this Court. The learned Single Judge having dismissed the aforesaid application affirming the view of the Tribunal, the Insurance Company has approached in appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The reliance was placed on the decision of three Judges Bench of this court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra), applying the principles laid down in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) to the facts of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that having obtained compensation finally determined under Section 163 A of the Act, the claimants were precluded from proceeding further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act. In the facts of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disagreed with the reasons assigned by the High Court that section 166 of the Act can be proceeded further if it is filed before passing of an award under section 163A and 166 of the Act as it is contrary to the principle of law laid down by Page 34 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined this court in Deepal Soni's case and is not supported by the scheme envisaged under the Act. However, perhaps the Court's attention was not invited to the observations made in para 68 to 71 in background of the facts recorded in para 5 to 8.
13. Having noted the facts of the case and the legal principles applied, in the aforesaid judgments, it is explicit that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under Section 163A of the Act was not subject matter of challenge and therefore when legal proposition was settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Deepal Soni (supra), the tribunal in absence of appellant court's directions to treat it as interim compensation, had jurisdiction to dwell into aforesaid aspect. Whereas, in the facts of the present case, the Tribunal while awarding compensation has expressly treated the application preferred under Section 163A as interim compensation. Even otherwise appreciating the facts of the case as recorded earlier in this order, the intention of claimants as can be gathered from pleadings and the orders passed by tribunal as well as by this Court in appeal , was to treat application under section 163A of the Act as interim application and in so many Page 35 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined words or has been clarified to be made subject to final adjudication of main claim petition under section 166. In all the petitions, the tribunal had not given any option to the claimant to seek either of the remedies, after judgment of the Hon' ble Supreme Court in case of Deepal Soni (supra). Admittedly, the main claim proceedings preferred by the original claimants under Section 166 of the Act, 1988, were pending consideration as on date of passing impugned orders. Even in appeal preferred before this Court, the Hon'ble Division bench in First appeal no. 162 of 2000 ( Judgement dated 29.03.2000, Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice H. R. Shelat and Mr. Justice H. H. Mehta) and First appeal no. 4532 of 1999 (Judgment dated 20.08.1999, Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.M. Panchal and Mr. Justice R.P. Dholakia) while refusing to entertain the appeal of Insurance company on merits have explicitly stated the award impugned shall be treated as interim compensation. In such circumstances, whether the tribunal was conferred with jurisdiction to once again dwell into issue as to whether to treat section 163A application as final award and by applying subsequent ruling to override the appellate court's direction in absence of any further challenge. In the peculiar and distinguishing facts of Page 36 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined the case, it would be appropriate to extend the benefit of the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 68 to 71 of Deepal Soni's case, by quashing and setting aside the order impugned in the present petitions as well.
14. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 4th May, 2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kutch at Bhuj below Exh.33 filed in MACP No. 726 of 1997, order dated 4th May 2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tri (Main), Kutch at Bhuj below Exhibit 55 in MACP No. 421 of 1997 as well as order dated 4 th May 2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Kutch at Bhuj in below Exhibit 50 in MACP No. 146 of 1998 are hereby quashed and set aside. The claim petitions are directed to be restored to its original file. With this observation, noticing the fact that the claim petitions relate to 1997 and 1998, the Tribunal is directed to expedite the hearing of the claim petitions. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent in each of the petitions.
15. After the order was pronounced, considering the contention of learned advocate Mr. Saluja for respondent Insurance company, as regards delay in challenge to Page 37 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/14139/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/11/2025 undefined impugned orders, this court is of the view that the claimants shall not pressed for interest for the interregnum period of delay caused in preferring writ petition. The claimants are also directed to file fresh undertaking before the tribunal that the award amount received under section 163A of the Act shall be governed by outcome of main claim proceedings. Let such undertaking be filed by the respective claimants at the earliest before the Tribunal before original claim proceedings are fixed for hearing.
sd/-
(NISHA M. THAKORE,J) RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH Page 38 of 38 Uploaded by RATHOD KAUSHIKSINH JILUSINH(HC00957) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 00:52:46 IST 2025