Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gopal Lal vs Tulsibai And Others on 20 March, 2001
Equivalent citations: II(2001)ACC360, 2002ACJ1278, 2001(3)MPHT234
ORDER A.K. Gohil, J.
1. The appellant, owner of the vehicle, has filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short "the Act") against the interim award dated 5-10-1998 passed by the M.A.C.T., Garoth in Claim Case No. 33/98, whereby exonerated the Insurance Company from liability of compensation under no fault liability of Rs. 50,000/- on the ground that the driver of the vehicle was not having a driving licence.
2. The respondent No. 1/claimant Tulsibai filed claim petition for recovery of compensation on account of death of her son namely Jeetu in accident on 5-1-1997 alongwith an application under Section 140 of the Act for interim compensation under no fault liability. The Insurance Company has been impleaded as party filed an objection that Vijay Singh who was driving the vehicle was not holding valid driving licence. The Tribunal upholding the objection, on that ground exonerated the Insurance Company from its liability and directed the appellant/owner and the driver to pay the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- under no fault liability to the claimant, against which owner of the vehicle has preferred this appeal.
3. I have heard Shri Sanjay Sharma, learned counsel for appellant; Shri Ashish Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 1; and Shri P.K. Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 and perused the record. None appeared for respondent No. 2.
4. The submission of Shri Sanjay Sharma, learned counsel for appellant is that the Tribunal has not appreciated the various cases cited by the appellant and has wrongly and illegally exonerated the Insurance Company on the ground that the driver was not having a valid driving licence, whereas this question cannot be considered at this stage while deciding an application under Section 140 of the Act for grant of interim compensation under no fault liability. The learned counsel for appellant cited various decisions to support his contentions.
5. The submission of Shri P.K. Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 3/Insurance Company is that under Sections 140 and 149(2) of the Act, this defence is available to the Insurance Company that if driver was not having a valid driving licence, this can be a ground for exonerating the Insurance Company from its liability of interim compensation and he supported the award of the Tribunal. His further submission was that the defence under Section 149(2) of the Act is available to the Insurance Company also at the time of considering the question of no fault liability under Section 140 of the Act, therefore, the Insurance Company has rightly pleaded, objected and has rightly been exonerated.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for parties the short question before this Court is that whether this defence that the driver was not having a valid driving licence is available to the Insurance Company at the stage of considering the application under Section 140 of the Act, liability to pay compensation on the principle of no fault. I am of the view that under Section 140 of the Act liability of the Insurance Company on a prima facie proof that there is an insurance of the vehicle is absolute and no defence is available to the Insurance Company on this liability at this stage. No doubt various defences provided under Section 149(2) of the Act are available to the Insurance Company but those defences are not available to the Insurance Company in respect of its liability to pay compensation under Section 140 of the Act. The only defence available would be that the offending vehicle was not insured with the Insurance Company in case of death and in case of permanent disablement in addition to insurance, Court can examine the case of permanent disability. The no fault liability provision as propounded in Section 140 of the Act is in the nature of beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer a benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. This provision is peremptory and does not admit any acceptance or defence as this provision provides for immediate relief which is a paramount intention of the legislature behind inserting this provision in the new Act. I find support to this view from a Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Thaglu Singh and others, reported in 1995 ACJ 248, in which it has been held as under :--
"The statutory scheme envisages that if there is a motor accident and death or permanent disablement results from such an accident, owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles involved shall be liable to pay the prescribed compensation without proof of negligence of the deceased or the injured and the amount so paid has to be adjusted out of the compensation found due under the final award. There is no provision requiring the recipient of compensation of no fault liability to refund any part of the amount received at any stage. The legislative intent is to ensure that some succour reaches the victim or the dependants without going into the questions which may arise for consideration while passing the final award. If the vehicle is insured, naturally the liability would fall on the insurer; permitting the insurer at that stage to raise any defence other than that there is no insurance policy in force at the relevant time or to raise the statutory defences contemplated in the succeeding Chapter would be to frustrate the legislative object in introducing the concept of no fault liability. The insured is duly protected inasmuch as if ultimately in the final award the insurer is exonerated, the Tribunal can issue appropriate direction enabling the owner of the vehicle. This could be the only legitimate conclusion to be drawn from the peremptory language of Section 92A of the 1939 Act or Section 140 of the 1988 Act."
7. The Division Bench of this Court has also relied on the decision in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Member, M.A.C.T., reported in 1988 ACJ 612 (Gauhati), Hansaria, J., as he then was, after referring the decisions of High Courts of Punjab and Haryana and Bombay and earlier decisions of the Gauhati High Court observed :--
"The underlying idea behind Section 92A being payment of prompt and immediate compensation, the same cannot be allowed to be frustrated to decide various defences to be raised by the insurance company, the disposal of which would naturally take time. This reading of Section 92A would cause no real prejudice to the insurer as its interest can well be protected, in case it is ultimately found that it is not liable under the policy to indemnify the insured, by passing appropriate order under Section 96(4) of the Act, as observed earlier. I would, therefore, hold that at the stage of passing of the award under Section 92A, the Claims Tribunal is not to apply its mind to the defences available to an insurance company under Section 96(2), or for that matter, whether the company is protected by anything stated in the proviso to Section 95(1) of the Act. In taking this view, I have also borne in mind Section 92E of the Act which has stated that the provision of Chapter VII-A shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force."
8. The Division Bench also find support from Surjeet Singh 's case, 1988 ACJ 1122 (J & K), Dr. Anand, C.J.I., as he then was, after adverting to the decisions of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Bombay and earlier decisions of the High Court expressed agreement with those decisions.
9. M.P. High Court in various decisions in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Dayali and others, reported in 2000 ACJ 295, and in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Janki Devi and others, reported in 2000 ACJ 587 (Patna); and in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sailesh Bharat Kumar Dudhrejiya and others, reported in 2000 ACJ 742; and the decision in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Tulsibai and others, reported in 1997 (2) JLJ 17; and in the case of Sunder Lal Vs. State of M.P. and others, reported in 1998 (1) JLJ 301; and in the case of Mahesh Kumar and others Vs. Munnalal and others, reported in 2000 (1) JLJ 343, has considered and consistently reiterated that no fault liability is statutory liability and defences under Section 149(2) of the Act are not available to the Insurance Company at the stage of interim compensation and they are only available at the time of final award. If the vehicle is insured, the Insurance Company is liable to pay interim compensation and Insurance Company is prevented from taking any kind of defence. Therefore, now it is settled position under the law that under Section 140 of the Act at the stage of deciding an application for interim compensation under no fault liability, no defence is available to the Insurance Company under Section 149(2) of the Act or the question about the violation of terms conditions of policy also cannot be looked into and cannot be considered at the time of awarding any interim compensation under no fault liability in case of death. Therefore, the Insurance Company cannot take this defence and avoid the liability of payment of interim compensation on the ground that the driver was not having a valid driving licence. More so it is a disputed question which cannot be decided without taking any evidence. It is also not the intention of the legislature as has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in detail. Therefore, the award of the Tribunal is absolutely illegal.
10. In this case the Tribunal relying on decision in the case of New India Assurance Co. Vs. Mandar Madhav Tambe and others, reported in 1996 ACJ 253, and also on the decision in the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Susamma Thomas and others, reported in 1994 ACJ 1, has held that the Insurance Company is not liable for payment of interim compensation under no fault liability. But I am surprised to see that in both the cases cited above, this question of no fault liability was not involved. How could the Tribunal placed reliance without seeking the decisions. Copy of the another Supreme Court decision in Civil Appeal No. 6081 of 1997 in the case of United India Vs. Gyan Chand, decided on 2-9-1997 on which reliance has been placed by the Tribunal, is also not available in Trial Court's record. Therefore, it appears to me that the Tribunal has not carefully examined those decisions and has not tried to understand the legal position and ratio of the decisions which were cited before him. It seems that the Tribunal has passed this award in cursory manner without application of mind, ignoring the Division Bench decision and various other decisions of this High Court, which are having binding precedent. It is expected from the Tribunals that they would read and carefully examine the decision of Supreme Court and High Courts and understand the ratio decided therein before ignoring or by passing them as has been done in this case and this kind of practice deserves to be depreciated.
11. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The interim award passed by the Tribunal against the owner of the vehicle is set-aside and it is held that since the Insurance Company has not denied the insurance of the vehicle, the Insurance Company is liable for the payment of the interim compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the claimants, under no fault liability. The Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within 30 days before the Tribunal, if not shall be liable for payment of interest @ 10% p.a. on delayed payment. Insurance Company to bear the cost of the appeal Rs. 1,000/-. Record be returned immediately.
12. Misc. Appeal allowed.