Supreme Court of India
Desh Raj vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 12 February, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(2)ALD(CRI)907, JT2002(SUPPL1)SC54, RLW2003(1)SC69, 2002(2)UJ935(SC), AIRONLINE 2002 SC 417
Bench: D.P. Mohapatra, Brijesh Kumar
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. The accused has filed this appeal assailing the judgment passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowing the appeal filed by the state against the acquittal of the appellant against the order passed by the sessions judge, Hamir Pur, acquitting the accused of the offence punishable under Section 16(1)A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short 'the Act') convicting under Section 7 of the Act and imposing the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-, and in default, six months simple imprisonment in lieu thereof.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised three contentions in support of the appeal.
4. The first contention relates to erroneous appreciation of the material on record by the trial court which was confirmed by the High Court, particularly relating to non-examination of one Suresh Kumar by the accused in support of his defence. According to the defence case, Suresh Kumar was the person who purchased the packets of Madhu mirth which were found to be containing adulterated chilli powder. The trial court observed that his non-examination leads to a reasonable presumption that if examined, he might not have supported the case of the defence. The said observation has been accepted by the High Court.
5. The second contention relates to the defective examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to the learned counsel, under question no. 13, the accused was merely asked that the sample of chilli powder was found to be mis-branded and adulterated, but the contents of the report stating the reasons for holding the sample as mis-branded and adulterated were not specifically put to him. The other contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant relates to the sentence. In this regard, the learned counsel submitted that the prosecution was launched in 1986 and during the last 15 years, the accused appellant has suffered mental tension and has suffered loss in business. In the circumstances, the learned counsel submitted that sentence be modified to the period of imprisonment already undergone without any change in the fine as this Court may consider it reasonable and proper.
6. We have considered the contentions noted above. We have also perused relevant records to which our attention has been drawn. We are not impressed by the contentions raised on the first two counts noted above.
Neither any serious illegality or perversity in appreciation of the evidence has been committed by the trial court or the High Court, neither the non-examination of Suresh Kumar as a defence witness, nor the examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C. can be said to have caused serious prejudice to the case of the accused. Though question no. 13 was couched in general terms but it is not disputed that a copy of the report of the public analyst had been given to the accused before commencement of the trial. In such circumstances, the High Court rightly declined to accept the contention raised on behalf of the defence in this regard.
7. The question which remains to be considered relates to the sentence. Under Section 13(1)A of the Act, the minimum sentence prescribed is one year imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2000/-. The order of sentence passed in the case is in terms of the statutory provision. This provision was introduced in the Act by amendment in 1996 which reflects the legislative policy of deterrent punishment for offences under the Act. Therefore, this contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant has also to be negatived.
8. In the result, the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed.