Karnataka High Court
Sri. K.M. Vishwanath vs State Of Karnataka on 24 November, 2020
Author: John Michael Cunha
Bench: John Michael Cunha
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.1958 OF 2017
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.2295 OF 2017
IN CRL.P.No.1958/2017:
BETWEEN
SRI. K.M. VISHWANATH,
S/O. LATE K.M. RUDRAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
PARTNER,
SRI. LAKSHMI BALAJI EXPORT
AND IMPORT, NO.11,
1ST FLOOR, P.V.K. COMPLEX,
AMBEDKAR ROAD,
COLLEGE ROAD, HOSPET,
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT
NO.64/3, 16TH CROSS
VYALIKAVAL,
BENGALURU - 560 003. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. L.M. CHIDANANDAYYA, ADVOCATE)
AND
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
ATIC BUILDING,
UNIVERSITY OF VETERINARY SCIENCE,
HEBBAL,
2
BENGALURU - 560 062. ... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPL.PP &
SRI. B.S. PRASAD, SPL.PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S 482 OF
CR.P.C. PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS INITIATED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN
SPL.C.C.NO.19/2016 ARISING OUT OF CR.NO.10/2014
FILED BY THE RESPONDENT FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S
409 AND 420 R/W 120(B) OF IPC AND SEC. 21 R/W
4(1A) OF MINES AND MINERALS REGULATION OF
DEVELOPMENT ACT AND RULE 165 R/W 144 OF
KARNATAKA FOREST RULES ON THE FILE OF XXIII
ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPL.
JUDGE, BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT, BENGALURU.
IN CRL.P.No.2295 OF 2017:
BETWEEN:
SRI. G. RAVI KUMAR,
S/O. G. VENKATESHALU,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
PERMANENTLY RESIDING AT
MONTERAL MANOR,
NO. 303, 3RD FLOOR, 103,
SERPENTINE ROAD,
SHOPPING STREET,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BENGALURU - 560 020. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. L.M. CHIDANANDAYYA, ADVOCATE)
AND
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
3
ATIC BUILDING,
UNIVERSITY OF VETERINARY SCIENCE,
HEBBAL,
BENGALURU - 560 062. ... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPL.PP &
SRI. B.S. PRASAD, SPL.PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S 482 OF
CR.P.C. PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS INITIATED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN
SPL. C.C. NO.19/2016 ARISING OUT OF CR.NO.10/2014
FILED BY THE RESPONDENT FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S
409, 420 R/W 120B OF IPC AND SEC.21 R/W 4(1-A) OF
MINES AND MINERALS DEVELOPMENT AND
REGULATION ACT AND RULE 165 R/W RULE 144 OF
KARNATAKA FOREST RULES, ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII
ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND S.J., AND SPL. JUDGE FOR
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, BENGALURU.
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 06.11.2020
AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER,
THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCE, THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioners in these two petitions have challenged the order of taking cognizance and issuance of summons to them by the Special Judge and have sought to quash the proceedings initiated against them. The details of the proceedings and the rank of the petitioners and the gist of the allegations made against them are detailed in the table herebelow:- 4
Criminal Rank
Petition of the Crime Gist of the allegations
Spl.CC.No.
No. parties No.
1958/2017 A2 Accused Nos.1 and 2 being the partners of
M/s.Lakshmi Balaji Export & Import entered into criminal conspiracy with M/s. Eagle Traders and Logistics and M/s. S.B. Minerals and in furtherance of the said conspiracy 10/2014 19/2016 transported 8,562 MT of iron ore from ML 2295/2017 A1 No.2515 to Belekeri Port without valid permit and without payment of requisite charges to the departments and thereby caused loss of Rs.1,02,13,989/- to the State Exchequer and committed offences punishable under Sections 409, 420 read with 120B of IPC and under Section 21 read with Section 4(1A) of MMDR Act and Rule 165 r/w 144 of the Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969.
2. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, the allegations leveled in the charge sheet are directed only against the Firm. The firm is not made as a party/accused. Therefore, prosecution of the petitioners without making the Firm as a party, is illegal and untenable. Secondly, the allegations made against the petitioners do not prima facie disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners. The allegations are not supported by any cogent materials. There is no acceptable evidence to show that the petitioners were involved in the alleged transaction; the learned Magistrate has issued summons to the petitioners 5 without application of mind to the facts of the case; the order passed by the learned Special Judge does not reflect either application of mind or consideration of the material on record and therefore, the impugned order of cognizance and consequent order of summons issued to the petitioners are liable to be quashed.
3. Further, the learned counsel would submit that the order of cognizance passed by the learned Magistrate in relation to the offence under the provisions of MMDR Act, is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction, in view of the bar contained under Section 22 of the MMDR Act. In the absence of any complaint, the learned Special Judge was not empowered to take cognizance of the alleged offences and further the offences under the provisions of the MMDR Act being the principal offences, in view of the incompetency of the learned Special Judge to take cognizance of the said offences, even the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge for the offence under the Penal Provisions and the Forest Act are also vitiated.
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4. Learned counsel for petitioners would further submit that even though the charge under Section 409 of IPC has been invoked, yet, there is no material to show that the property in question was entrusted to any of the partners at any point of time. Even assuming that the entrustment was made to the firm namely M/s. S.B. Minerals, the said firm is not an accused before the Court and therefore, the charge under Section 409 cannot stand against the petitioners. Thus, the learned Counsel has prayed for quashing the proceedings initiated against the petitioners and to quash the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge.
5. Meeting the above arguments, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent would submit that, cogent material has been collected by the Investigating Agency in proof of involvement of petitioners in the alleged offences. Every allegations made in the charge sheet are supported by documents or the statements of the concerned witnesses to show that the petitioners were personally involved in the 7 alleged transactions. Petitioners are prosecuted in their individual capacity and not as the Partners of the Firm and therefore, prosecutions against the petitioners are validly instituted. Insofar as the defects highlighted to by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the matter of taking cognizance of the offences, the learned counsel would submit that, to sub-serve the requirement of Section 22, complaints have been filed by authorized officers before the Special Court and therefore, there is full compliance of requirement of Section 22 of the MMDR Act, and therefore no illegality or defect whatsoever in the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge.
6. With regard to the offence under Section 409 of IPC is concerned, the learned Special Public Prosecutor pointed out that the allegations made against the accused indicate that the iron ore in question was extracted from the List No.2515 and therefore, the same was entrusted to M/s.S.B. Minerals and as such, even the ingredients of Section 409 IPC 8 are made out and thus prayed for dismissal of the petition.
7. In the light of the above contentions, the points that arise for consideration are:
1. Whether the prosecution of the petitioners without making the Firm an accused is tenable under law and facts of these cases?
2. Whether the order of Cognizance and summons issued by the learned Special Judge suffers from illegalities vitiating the proceedings initiated against the petitioners?
3. Whether the charge sheet materials prima facie discloses the commission of alleged offences by the petitioners?
Point No.1
8. As could be seen from the above narration, petitioners have been implicated in the alleged offences in their individual capacity and not as alter ego of the company. There are no allegations in the entire charge sheet that the alleged offences were committed by the firm or company. The question of making the firm or 9 the company an accused would arise only when such company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of the individual who would act on behalf of the company. Only then, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. This is the law laid down in SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2015)4 SCC 609 (paras 40, 42 and 43), which is extracted herebelow:-
"40. It is abundantly clear from the above that the principle which is laid down is to the effect that the criminal intent of the "alter ego" of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the company/corporation. The legal proposition that is laid down in the aforesaid judgment is that if the person or group of persons who control the affairs of the company commit an offence with a criminal intent, their criminality can be imputed to the company as well as they are "alter ego" of the company.
42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, directors, managing director, chairman etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that 10 individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so.
43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision."
9. In the instant cases, the allegations are directed only against the petitioners. The role played by the petitioners has been narrated. It is not the case of the respondent that the alleged acts were committed by the petitioners for and on behalf of the company. They are not prosecuted in their capacity as the partners of the firm because they were partners. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the prosecution launched against them is bad for non-prosecution of the firm or the company does not hold water.
11Point No.2
10. Validity of Order of Cognizance and Summons:
On perusal of the order sheet maintained by the Special Court in the proceedings, it is noticed that order has been passed by Presiding Officer of the Special Court taking cognizance of the offences and issuing summons to the petitioners, which is reproduced hereinbelow:
"Perused the final report. Cognizance is taken against A1 to A7. Register the case and issue summons to A1 to A7 and returnable by 08.01.2016."
11. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/accused that this order does not specify the offences in respect of which cognizance has been taken by the Special Court. It is also not forthcoming in this order as to whether cognizance has been taken in respect of the offences under IPC or under the provisions of MMDR Act or Forest Rules. Nonetheless, it is submitted at the Bar 12 that the summons issued to the accused contained the details of the offences for which the summons were issued. Records also indicate that on appearing before the learned Special Judge, the petitioners moved for bail based on the offences mentioned in the summons. Therefore, it is clear that right from the inception, the petitioners were aware of the offences for which summons were issued to them. It is in this background, the objection raised by the petitioners/accused questioning the correctness and legality of the order of cognizance and the consequent summoning order issued by the Special Court requires to be considered.
12. What is taking cognizance is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. But, it is now well settled that any Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence must apply his mind to the facts of the case for the purpose of proceedings in a particular way. In R.R.CHARI vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, AIR(38) 1951 SC 207, the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on the dicta on GOPAL MARWARI AND OTHERS vs. EMPEROR, AIR (30) 1943 Pat. 245, has observed that, "the word 13 'cognizance' was used in the Code to indicate the point when the Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is a different thing from the initiation of proceedings". Section 209 of the Code also provides for taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate while committing the case to the Sessions Court for trial but, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 209 is quite different from the cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code or the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court before commencing the trial after committal. In the instant cases, undisputedly, the learned Special Judge has proceeded to take cognizance of the alleged offences after the submission of the final report by SIT.
13. The reading of the cognizance order passed by the learned Special Judge clearly indicates that on perusal of the charge sheet submitted by the SIT learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the alleged offences purportedly under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and has proceeded to issue summons to the petitioners/accused, as such, there cannot be any 14 difficulty in holding that by considering the facts of the case as borne on the final report, the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of IPC offences as well as the offences under the provisions of Forest Rules and MMDR Act.
14. It is trite law that while taking cognizance and issuing summons in respect of IPC offences, based on the report under Section 173 of the Code, law does not require the Magistrate to pass elaborate order recording reasons for issuance of summons; though the order must reflect that he has considered the final report and satisfied himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused named in the final report.
15. In BHUSHAN KUMAR vs. STATE OF (NCT OF DELHI), (2012) 5 SCC 424, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the requirement of application of mind in the process of taking cognizance and following the decision in CHIEF ENFORCEMENT OFFICER vs. VIDEOCON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, (2008) 2 SCC 497, has held that in the process thus issued, the 15 Magistrate need not explicitly state the reasons. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the decision in CHIEF ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, read as under:-
"12. A "summons" is a process issued by a court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the court on the given date and time. Wilful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.
13. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued."
16. In the backdrop of the above principle, if the order of cognizance and the summons issued by the learned Magistrate in the instant cases is analyzed, it is clear from the above order that on consideration of the 16 final report submitted by SIT, the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the alleged offences and has issued summons to the petitioners. Therefore, there can be no difficulty in upholding the validity of the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and the summons issued to the petitioners insofar as the IPC and Forest offences are concerned.
17. However, in respect of the offences under the provisions of MMDR Act are concerned, Section 22 of the Act creates a restriction on the courts in taking cognizance of the offences under the Act. The Section reads as under:
"22. Cognizance of offences.― No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or any rules made thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government."
18. Learned counsel for the petitioners/accused has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE (NCT OF DELHI) vs. 17 SANJAY, (2014) 9 SCC 772, in paragraph 70, wherein it is held as under:
" 70. There cannot be any dispute with regard to restrictions imposed under the MMDR Act and remedy provided therein. In any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the Act, the officer empowered and authorized under the Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint before the jurisdictional magistrate. It is also not in dispute that the Magistrate shall in such cases take cognizance on the basis of the complaint filed before it by a duly authorized officer. In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act. In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer is attracted only when such person sought to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or omission which constitute an offence under the Penal Code."
(underlining supplied)
19. What emerges from the above decision is that based on the final report filed under Section 173 of the Code, the Special Court cannot take cognizance of the offences under the provisions of the MMDR Act. Apparently, to get over this restriction, the respondent appears to have filed a complaint in the proceedings 18 before the Special Court in terms of Section 22 of the MMDR Act. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent has made available copy of the complaint filed by the authorized officer before the learned Special Judge which contain the very same allegations as found in the charge sheet submitted by SIT. This complaint therefore could be taken as due compliance of the statutory requirement prescribed in Section 22 of the MMDR Act. But the question still remains to be considered is, whether by mere filing the complaint, can it be said that the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence based on the said complaint as mandated in Section 22 of the MMDR Act?
20. Though it is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused that such exercise has not been done by the Special Court as the impugned order of cognizance does not reflect that the learned Special Judge has looked into the averments made in the complaint yet, what is significant to be noted is that the allegations made in this complaint as well as the facts constituting the offences alleged 19 against the petitioners/accused in the final report filed by the SIT are one and the same. Under the said circumstance, if the learned Special Judge has looked into the allegations made in the final report filed by the SIT and on satisfying himself that these allegations prima facie disclose the commission of offences by the petitioners/accused under IPC as well as under the MMDR Act, it could possibly be held that the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the offences in terms of Section 22 of MMDR Act.
21. In drawing the above conclusion, I am fortified by the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD vs. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND ANOTHER, (2008) 17 SCC 157, wherein it is observed that "whether Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of offence will depend upon circumstances of the particular case, including mode in which case is sought to be instituted and the nature of preliminary action". No doubt, even in the said case it is held that "before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he 20 must have taken notice of accusations and applied his mind to allegations made in complaint or in police report or information received from a source other than a police report, as the case may be, and material filed therewith. It is only when the Magistrate applies his mind and is satisfied that allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence and decides to initiate proceedings against the alleged offenders, that it can be positively stated that he has taken cognizance of the offence."
22. Similar view is taken in MEHMOOD UL REHMAN vs. KHAZIR MOHAMMAD TUNDA AND OTHERS, (2015) 12 SCC 420, wherein it is held that "though no formal or speaking or reasoned orders are required at the stage of Ss.190/204 CrPC, there must be sufficient indication in the order that the Magistrate is satisfied that: (i) the facts alleged in the complaint constitute an offence, and (ii) these facts when considered along with the statements recorded under S.200 CrPC and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under S.202 CrPC, if any, prima facie make the accused answerable before the criminal court."
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23. As the impugned order and the records of the proceedings disclose that the learned Special Judge has considered the material placed before him namely, the charge sheet which contain identical allegations as found in the complaint filed by the authorized officer under Section 22 of the Act, I hold the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and the summons issued by him in respect of MMDR offences is in accordance with Section 22 of MMDR Act.
24. Viewed from another angle, on filing a complaint either under Section 200 Cr.P.C. or under Section 22 of MMDR Act, the course open for the Court/Magistrate was either to take cognizance based on the facts alleged in the complaint or to refer the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. or to postpone the process and hold an enquiry in terms of Section 202 of Cr.P.C. In the instant cases, detailed investigation into the alleged offences having already been undertaken by SIT pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and necessary 22 evidence having been collected in respect of the alleged offences, the Special Court could not have ordered a parallel investigation nor could it have rejected the final report. It is not the case of the petitioners that the report submitted by the SIT is without authority of law. Even otherwise, investigating of the offences is within the domain of the police and the power of the police officer to investigate into cognizable offence is not ordinarily impinged by any fetters. There is no provision under the MMDR Act that the appropriate authority alone shall investigate any complaint of breach of any of the provisions of the MMDR Act. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in KANWAR PAL SINGH vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Crl.Appeal No.1920/2019, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.10707/2019, dated December, 18, 2019), "the violation of Section 4 being cognizable offence, the police could always investigated the same, there being no bar under the MMDR Act". Therefore, it follows that when the police have the power to investigate the contraventions of Section 4 of the Act, they have also the power to submit the final report. Therefore, no illegality could be 23 attached to the final report and the evidence collected by the police officers in proof of the offences investigated by them under the Act. This report, therefore, cannot be excluded from consideration while taking cognizance of the offence under the Act, provided a complaint as required under Section 22 is filed by the authorized officer. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, despite there being a report on investigation, the Court has to either order for fresh investigation or hold an enquiry under Section 202 of Cr.P.C, which would tantamount to nullifying the investigation ordered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Government of Karnataka, which in the circumstances of the case cannot be permitted. It is a cardinal principle of law that every law is designed to further the ends of justice and shall not be frustrated on mere technicalities. When the law authorizes the police/SIT to investigate the offences including the offences under the MMDR Act, the said report cannot be excluded from consideration at the stage of cognizance or issuance of summons to the 24 accused subject to the compliance of the requirements of Section 22 of the Act.
25. In the light of these principles and for the reasons discussed above, and especially keeping in mind the peculiarities of the present cases and the special circumstances arising on account of the investigation report submitted by SIT, in my view, the course adopted by the learned Special Judge in considering the final report for issuing process to the petitioners cannot be faulted with. Likewise, as held in the above decisions, non recording the reasons by the Special Court while issuing summons to the petitioners also cannot be a reason to set aside the order of cognizance and the summons issued to the petitioners. In the circumstances of the case, even if there is an error or omission on the part of the learned Special Judge, it is not something so vital as to cut at the root of jurisdiction so as to render the impugned orders illegal or without jurisdiction so as to quash the entire proceedings as sought for by the petitioners. Since the petitioners were notified of the offences at the earliest 25 point of time before their appearance, there is substantial compliance of the "outward forms of the law" as held by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, AIR 1956 SC 116.
26. As a result, I hold that the impugned order of cognizance and order of summons issued by the learned Special Judge do not suffer from any error or illegality vitiating the proceedings pending against the petitioners. Point No.2 is answered accordingly. Point No.3
27. The allegations made in the respective complaint which are duly supported by the material collected by SIT during investigation undoubtedly make out the ingredients of the offences under Sections 409, 420 r/w 120(B) of IPC and Section 21 r/w 4(1A) of MMDR Act, 1957 and Rule 165 r/w 144 of Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969. In the course of the arguments, the learned Special Public Prosecutor has referred to the relevant documents which prima facie disclose the 26 involvement of the petitioners in the alleged offences. Under the said circumstances, the criminal action having been rightly initiated against the petitioners, I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere in the impugned proceedings. Accordingly, rejecting the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Criminal Petition Nos.1958/2017 and 2295/2017, are dismissed.
In view of dismissal of main petitions, all pending I.As, are also dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE SV