Delhi District Court
Central District vs M/S Unitrolla Computers And Printers on 5 April, 2014
1
IN THE COURT OF SHIRISH AGGARWAL, CIVIL JUDGE -1
CENTRAL DISTRICT, DELHI
SUIT NO: 26/08
UNIQUE CASE ID: 02401C0009502008
Mahesh Inder Singh & Sons (HUF)
12/424, Sunder Vihar,
Outer Ring Road (West),
New Delhi
2. Mr. M. I. Singh
12/424, Sunder Vihar,
Outer Ring Road (West),
New Delhi
3. Mr. H. Singh
12/424, Sunder Vihar,
Outer Ring Road (West),
New Delhi
4. Mr. P. Singh
S/o Mr. M. I. Singh,
12/424, Sunder Vihar,
Outer Ring Road (West),
New Delhi
...Plaintiffs
VERSUS
M/s Unitrolla Computers and Printers
Flat No.514, 5th Floor, Mansarover,
90, Nehru Place, New Delhi
Also at
20, 1st Floor, Mansarover,
90, Nehru Place
New Delhi-110019
.... Defendant
Date of Institution : 04.01.2008
Date on which reserved for judgment : 06.03.2014
Date of Pronouncing Judgment : 05.04.2014
Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:1/19
2
SUIT FOR POSSESSION, RECOVERY OF ARREARS OF RENT,
AND DAMAGES
Judgment
1.The plaintiffs have pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff no.1 HUF owns the property bearing no.514, Mansarovar, 90, Nehru Place, New Delhi-110091 (hereinafter referred to as "the suit property"). It is stated that the defendant is a tenant in the suit property who was inducted as such by way of lease agreement dated 18.10.2003. The lease commenced on 01.11.2003 and was for a period of three years. The rate of rent at which the property was let out was Rs.6500/- p.m.
2. It is pleaded that the lease expired by efflux of time on 31.10.2006. However, the defendant failed to hand over the possession of the suit property. It is stated that the plaintiff has also terminated the tenancy w.e.f. 30.11.2007 by issuing a notice dated 05.11.2007. Therefore, the defendant is in illegal possession of the suit property since 01.12.2007. It is further averred that the defendant has not paid arrears of rent for the period August to November 2007 amounting to Rs.26,000/-.
3. Since the defendant did not vacate the suit property despite termination of tenancy, the defendant is in unauthorized occupation of the same and is liable to pay mesne profits for use of the suit property for the period starting on 01.12.2007 till possession is delivered.
Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:2/19 3
4. On the basis of these averments, the plaintiff filed the present suit for recovery of possession of the suit property, arrears of rent of Rs.26,000/- and damages for the period starting on 01.12.2007 till possession is handed over.
5. After service of summons, the defendant filed written statement. It is stated that the defendant is tenant only under plaintiff no.2 and that plaintiffs no.1, 3 & 4 have no concern with the suit property and there is no relationship between them and defendant. It is further stated that the plaintiff no.1 is not a juristic person and does not have separate legal entity. It admitted the rate of rent but stated that the suit property was let out for a period of five years. It denied having been served with the legal notice dated 05.11.2007. It is pleaded that the lease deed referred to in the plaint is an unregistered document and therefore cannot be read in evidence.
6. It is pleaded in the Written Statement that the defendant had paid a security deposit at the time of entering into the lease agreement and it was agreed between the parties that the amount shall be refunded at the time of termination of lease. It is stated that in case the amount is not refunded, the defendant shall continue to occupy the premises without payment of rent till the time the security amount is refunded.
7. It is further stated that the defendant had tendered cheques to make the payment of rent. However, the cheques have deliberately not been presented by the plaintiffs for encashment.
Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:3/19 4
8. Replication was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs reiterated the correctness of the averments made in the plaint and denied the assertions of the defendant. It is averred that the legal notice dated 05.11.2007 has indeed been served upon the defendant. It was sent by registered post at the suit property as well as at the residential address of a partner of the defendant firm. It is pleaded that the notice sent at the suit property has been received by one Mr. P. D. Bhasin and the one sent at the residence of the partner has been received by one Mrs. Manju Bhasin. The plaintiffs have denied having been given cheques for payment of rent of the period August to November 2007. They admitted that the lease agreement has not been registered but state that the same can be looked into for collateral purposes.
9. By order dated 24.12.2009, the Ld. Predecessor of this court decreed the prayer for possession of the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.
Issues
10. The following are the issues framed by the Ld. Predecessor of the Court by order dated 07.8.2010:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to arrears of rent amounting to Rs.26,000/- alongwith interest? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits at market price alongwith interest beginning from date of illegal possession till the date of vacation of the property? OPP Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:4/19 5 Evidence
11. To prove their case, the plaintiffs examined plaintiff no.2 as PW1, witness from the office of Sub-Registrar, Mehruli and witness from PRO Facilities Services Pvt. Ltd. as PW3. PW1 deposed the facts as mentioned in the plaint and replication and relied upon the following documents:
Ex.P1/1 : Acknowledgment of plaintiff
no.2 dated 19.6.2010 as proof of
obtaining possession
Ex.P1 & P2 : Site Plans
Mark A : Registered lease deed dated
20.11.2009
Mark B : Receipt No.46688 dated 12.3.2010
Mark C : Invoice dated 19.01.2010
Mark D : Invoice dated 23.4.2010
Mark E : Statement of account for the period
01.04.2004 to 24.05.2010
12. Despite grant of opportunity, the defendant did not cross-examine PW1. By order dated 21.5.2012, the defendant was proceeded against ex-parte.
13. The witness from office of Sub-Registrar proved the lease deed dated 20.11.2009 which pertains to another property in Nehru Place as Ex.PW2/X.
14. The witness from the office of PRO Facilities Pvt. Ltd., PW3 has proved invoices as Ex.PW3/1 to Ex.PW3/5, statement of accounts as Ex.PW3/6 and original clearance certificate as Ex.PW3/7.
Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:5/19 6
15. Plaintiffs' evidence was closed on 04.7.2013. The defendant has not led any evidence.
16. I have perused the record and have heard arguments. The suit has been filed within the period of limitation. This court has jurisdiction to try the present suit. The issue-wise findings are as under:
Issues No.1 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to arrears of rent amounting to Rs.26,000/- alongwith interest? OPP
17. This issue need not be decided as prayer no.b as made in the plaint has already been withdrawn on 06.3.2014.
Issue No.2 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits at market price alongwith interest beginning from date of illegal possession till the date of vacation of the property? OPP
18. Onus to prove this issue was upon the plaintiff.
19. Before it is decided whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of mesne profits, a preliminary objection raised by the defendant shall be decided. It is stated in the Written Statement that it is only plaintiff no.2 who is the landlord of the defendant and that the plaintiffs no.1, 3 & 4 have no concern with the suit property. It is pleaded that there is no relationship between them and defendant. These assertions made by the defendant have Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:6/19 7 been denied by the plaintiffs in the replication. The defendant has not led any evidence in support of this contention. Therefore, adverse inference shall be drawn against it. Reference in this behalf is made to Section 114 of the Evidence Act and the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Adivekka Vs. Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh AIR 2007 SC 2025.
20. In the case of "Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikikrao and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1441", where a party did not appear in the witness box to state his case on oath and did not offer himself to be cross- examined, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"15. It was defendant No. 1 who contended that the sale deed, executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff, was fictitious and the whole transaction was a bogus transaction as only Rs. 500 were paid as sale consideration to defendant No. 2. He further claimed that payment of Rs. 4,500 to defendant No. 2 at his home before the registration of the deed was wholly incorrect. This plea was not supported by defendant No. 1 as he did not enter into the witness box. He did not state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath in the Trial Court and avoided the witness box so that he may not be cross examined. This, by itself, is enough to reject the claim that the transaction of sale between defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff was a bogus transaction.
16. Where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh vs Gurdial Sigh and Anr. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and Ors. AIR (1930) Lahore 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh AIR (1931) Bombay 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh's case (supra). The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath and Anr. held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an inference adverse against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:7/19 8 the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand and Ors., drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act against a party who did not enter into the witness box."
21. The defendant did not come to the witness box and make itself available for cross-examination. Therefore, it shall be presumed that the case set up by the defendant that the defendant no.2 is the landlord is false.
22. I am of the opinion that even if the assertion of the defendant that it is only plaintiff no.2 who is the landlord is correct, the suit is still maintainable as joinder of other persons as plaintiffs may at best only be an irregularity and does not prejudice the defendant. For the same reason, even if the contention of the defendant that plaintiff no.1 is not a juristic person and does not have separate legal entity is correct, same does not disentitle the other plaintiffs to the reliefs sought by institution of the present suit.
23. Now it shall be determined if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of mesne profits for the period starting on 01.12.2007 till possession of the suit property was handed over.
24. The defendant has disputed the assertion of the plaintiffs that the defendant had not tendered rent. Even if this contention is accepted to be correct, it does not affect entitlement of the plaintiff to recover mesne profits since the plaintiffs are not alleging termination of tenancy on the basis of breach of conditions Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:8/19 9 of tenancy but on the basis of expiry of tenancy period and service of notice terminating the tenancy. Hence, the aforesaid contention of the defendant is of no relevance to the present issue and is not required to be determined herein. The only contention of the defendant that merits consideration is whether the tenancy period had expired and notice dated 05.11.2007 was served upon the defendant and if so, the effect thereof.
25. PW1 has testified that as per agreement between the parties, the lease was for a period of three years and had commenced on 01.11.2003.
26. On the other hand, the defendant has contented that the lease was for a period of five years. However, no evidence has been led by the defendant in this regard. Therefore, adverse inference shall be drawn against it. Reference in this behalf is made to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Adivekka Vs. Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh AIR 2007 SC 2025 and Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikikrao and Another AIR 1999 SC 1441. It shall be presumed that contention of the defendant that lease was for a period of five years is false.
27. As is evident from the pleadings, the defendant has not disputed having executed the lease agreement dated 18.10.2003. All that has been contented is that the lease agreement was unregistered and since the lease was admittedly for a period of more than eleven months, same cannot be read in evidence. The Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:9/19 10 plaintiffs have not denied that the lease deed is unregistered. Since the lease deed is unregistered, in view of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, its contents cannot be read in evidence except as evidence of collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. Collateral transaction does not include reading in evidence the duration of the lease as stated in the lease deed. Therefore, the period of tenancy prescribed under the lease deed cannot be taken into consideration.
28. In view of the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi passed in the case of Earthtech Enterprises Ltd. v. Kuljit Singh Butalia, RFA No.184/2012 dated 06.02.2013 and Punjab National Bank v. Ganga Narain Kapoor, AIR 1994 All 221, the lease shall be deemed to be a lease from month-to-month which is terminable with fifteen days' notice, as laid down in Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. This position of law is also clearly borne out from the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Deenar Builders Ltd. v. M/s. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. AIR 2000 Del
147. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under :
"In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy.
Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property".
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29. According to the plaintiffs, the tenancy has been terminated by service of notice in conformity with the aforementioned provision. In support of this contention, the plaintiffs have placed reliance on the testimony of PW1 i.e. plaintiff no.2 himself. PW1 has stated in the affidavit Ex.PW1/A that the aforementioned legal notice was duly served upon the defendant. It is stated in the replication that the notice was served upon the defendant at the suit property itself and at the residential address of the defendant's partner and which terminated the tenancy. It is deposed that the notice was sent by registered AD and speed post.
30. The address at which the notice was sent is that of the suit property and where the partner of the defendant was admittedly residing. It is also not the case of the defendant that it was not in occupation of the suit property or that the partner of the defendant was not residing at the said residential address when the legal notice was dispatched. From the testimony of PW-1, it is clear that the notice had been sent at the correct addresses. The defendant has failed to disclose any reason which could have prevented the service of notice upon it. Under Section 114 of Evidence Act, the existence of facts which are likely to have happened in the ordinary course of human conduct and business may be presumed. Particular reference may be made to illustration
(f) of Section 114. By common course of business, the legal notice would have been received by the defendant. Under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also, the service of legal notice upon the defendant may be presumed.
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31. As held in the case of Madan Lal Sethi Vs. Amar Singh Bhalla, 1980 (2) AIRCJ 543, a mere bald denial by the defendant of service of notice is not sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 114 of illustration (f) of the Evidence Act. Some other evidence to show the interruption of post has to be adduced by the tenant.
32. On this point, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has, in the case of Vinod Khanna v. Bakshi Sachdev (Deceased) through LRs, AIR 1996 Delhi 32 noted thus:
"From Ex. P-1 to P-11 it is proved and established that the aforesaid notice dated 12.12.1988 (Ex. P-1) terminating the tenancy was dispatched to defendant No. 2 at its registered office and also to the appellant No. 1 and 3 at their addresses at 5, Golf Links, where they were admittedly residing, as is disclosed from the evidence of DW 1/appellant No. 1. In view of the despatch of the said notices to the appellants/defendants individually at their proper addresses now the question arises as to whether a presumption of service of notice could be drawn in favour of the plaintiff or not. The basic law of presumption of service of notice is permitted under the provisions of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and also under the provisions of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The earliest case on the issue of drawing of presumption of service under such circumstances is probably the case of Hari Har Bannerjee v. Ram Shashi Roy, AIR 1918 Privy Council 102, wherein it was held that if a letter properly directed containing a notice to quit, is proved to have been put in the post office, it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office and was received by the person to whom it was addressed and that presumption would apply with still greater force to letters which the sender had taken the precaution to register. In the case of M/s. Madan v. Wazir J.V. Chand the Apex Court had held that all that a landlord can do is to comply with the provision is to post a prepaid registered letter (acknowledgment due or otherwise) containing the tenant's correct address and that once the same is done and a letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it and that it can then be presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The above being the settled law and in the present case it having been proved by the plaintiffs that a notice as envisaged under Section 106 of Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:12/19 13 the Transfer of Property Act having been issued by the plaintiffs to the concerned defendants at their residential address in accordance with law, it can well be presumed under the aforesaid provisions - statutory as well as case laws - that the said notices have been duly served on the said defendants and therefore, in that view of the letter we do not find any infirmity to interfere with the findings of the learned trial court that the notice terminating the tenancy was duly, properly and validly served on the defendants."
33. Reference may also be made to the case of C.C. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr., 2007 (2) DCR 321 SC in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business".
34. Also, the defendant did not put any question to the witness to suggest that the notice was not served upon the defendant or that it was not dispatched by registered AD or speed post. It appears that the defendant did not propose to contradict him in this regard.
35. Failure to cross-examine PW1 implies acceptance of correctness of testimony of the witness. The defendant has also not adduced any evidence to rebut or controvert the testimony of the witness. Nothing has been brought on the record that could discredit the said witness or impeach his testimony.
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36. Therefore, it shall be presumed that the notice was sent by registered AD and speed post and was indeed served upon the defendant.
37. PW1 has deposed that the legal notice prescribed that the tenancy has been terminated with effect from 30.11.2007. The notice was dispatched by registered AD and speed post. Having regard to the ordinary course of business, it is reasonable to assume that the notice (which was dispatched from and was destined for Delhi) reached the defendant on or before 15.11.2007. The notice clearly afforded fifteen days' time to the defendant to vacate the suit property. The notice satisfies the requirement of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. By way of the said legal notice, tenancy of the defendant stood terminated, in keeping with Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The defendant therefore became liable to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff by 30.11.2007. Since this was admittedly not done and the defendant was in unauthorized occupation of the suit property, the defendant must pay charges for use of property for the period starting on 01.12.2007 till possession is handed over. This inference is strengthened by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Charan v. Sheoji Bhai and another AIR 1977 SC 2270, in which it was held that the occupant of a premises is liable to pay mesne profits/damages with effect from the day on which tenancy was terminated.
38. PW1 has deposed that plaintiffs have obtained Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:14/19 15 possession of the suit property on 19.6.2010. In this regard, the plaintiffs have also relied upon an acknowledgment of plaintiff no.2 dated 19.6.2010 proved as Ex.PW1/1.
39. In these facts and circumstances, it is held that plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of mesne profits from the defendant from the period starting on 01.12.2007 till 19.6.2012. This issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.
Quantum of Mesne Profits:
40. The quantum of mesne profits is next required to be ascertained. Mesne profits has been defined by Section 2(12) of Code of Civil Procedure as profits which the wrongful occupant actually received or might have, with ordinary diligence, received. It has been consistently laid down in a catena of decisions that mesne profits must be awarded on the basis of the market rate of rent.
41. PW1 has stated in his affidavit Ex.PW1/A that the suit property could fetch rent at the rate of Rs.115 per square feet per month. He has tendered in evidence copy of the registered lease deed of another property in the same area which was let out at the rate of Rs.115 per square feet per month on 20.11.2009. Same is Ex.PW2/X.
42. He has further testified that he has verified from other occupants of the building where the suit property is situated and Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:15/19 16 real estate agents and has found that rental value of similar premises has been varying from Rs.110 to Rs.150 per square feet per month, since the year 2007. He has further deposed that with facilities at the building at which the suit property is located, the suit property can easily be rented out at the aforementioned rates. It has also been testified that the suit property is located in neighbourhood of the best commercial and official areas of Delhi.
43. In the Written Statement, there is no reference of the market rate of rent which the suit property could fetch. The defendant has not cross-examined PW1 on the point that the suit property could fetch rent of Rs.41,055/- p.m. nor has the defendant led any evidence in this regard. As has already been held hereinabove, due to the failure of the defendant to cross-examine PW1, it appears that the defendant did not propose to contradict the plaintiffs with regard to the aforementioned market rate of rent.
44. The testimony of PW1 as to the rate of rent has remained unchallenged. Nothing could be elicited during cross- examination which could cast doubt on the assertion of the plaintiffs as to the fair market rate of rent. Failure to cross-examine the witness implies acceptance of correctness of his testimony on that matter. The defendant is therefore deemed to have accepted that Rs.41,055/- per month is the market rate of rent.
45. The defendant consciously continued to occupy the suit property despite knowing that on failure to handover possession, Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:16/19 17 he would be liable to pay damages. Since the defendant chose to overstay despite being aware of the consequential damages of which he had been put to notice, I find no ground to refuse to grant damages at the said rate.
46. Also, this court can take judicial notice of the general rise in rental rates in Delhi. Reference may be made to the case of Bakshi Sachdev (D) by L.Rs. v. Concord 1993 RLR 563 and Vinod Khanna v. Bakshi Sachdev AIR 1996 Delhi 32 wherein Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that the damages and mesne profits can be granted at a higher rate than the agreed rate of rent after the expiry of the tenancy and after taking judicial notice of the phenomenal rise in rents in Delhi. At the same time, since there is adequate material to indicate the market rate of rent, mesne profits/damages need not be restricted to the agreed rate of rent, particularly when there is nothing to suggest that the contractual rate of rent was in sync with the market rate.
47. Having regard to the testimony of witnesses, the fact that the suit property was let out for commercial purpose, the location and extent of the suit property, it can safely be inferred that the fair market rate of rent would be Rs.41,055/- per month. Admittedly, no charges have been received by the plaintiffs for usage of the suit property by the defendant after termination of tenancy except for what has been paid during pendency of the suit i.e. Rs.1,62,500/-(as has been testified by PW1 in paragraph no.11 of his affidavit Ex.PW1/A). The plaintiff is therefore entitled to recovery of mesne profits/damages at the said rate after adjusting Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:17/19 18 Rs.1,62,500/-.
48. For the aforesaid reasons, the plaintiffs are held entitled to recover damages from the defendant at the rate of Rs.41,055/- per month from 01.12.2007 till the date of recovery of possession i.e. 19.6.2010. However, for the relief of damages, the plaintiff can be called upon to pay deficient court fee.
Relief
49. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.
50. A decree is passed in favour of plaintiffs directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff mesne profits of Rs.10,89,677/- computed at the rate of Rs.41,055/- per month from, and including, the month of December, 2007 till the date on which vacant possession of the suit property is handed over by the defendant to the plaintiffs i.e. 19.6.2010 and after adjusting the amount already paid by the defendant during pendency of the suit for this period i.e. Rs. 1,62,500/-. The plaintiffs are also entitled to pendente lite interest on the aforesaid sum at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till the date of decree and future interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of decree till realization. This direction shall be executable only after payment of appropriate court fees on Rs.12,52,177.50/- after setting off the court fee paid on the aforesaid sum by the plaintiff at the time of institution of the plaint.
Mahesh Inder Singh (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s Unitrolla Computers Suit No.26/08 Page No:18/19 19 The plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs of the suit from the defendant.
Decree sheet shall be prepared accordingly.
File be consigned to Record Room.
(Announced in the open court (SHIRISH AGGARWAL)
on 05.4.2014) CIVIL JUDGE-1
CENTRAL DISTRICT
DELHI
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