Kerala High Court
Aniyan Yohannan vs State Of Kerala on 2 December, 2022
Author: Shaji P.Chaly
Bench: Shaji P.Chaly
W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :1:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
FRIDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 11TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WP(C) NO. 5735 OF 2013
PETITIONER/S:
1 ANIYAN YOHANNAN
AGED 50 YEARS
S/O.C.YOHANNAN, KOCHUTHUNDIL HOUSE, VELIYANADU,
EDAKKATTUVAYAL VILLAGE, KANAYANNUR TALUK, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT.
2 K.Y.JAMES
AGED 45 YEARS
S/O.C.YOHANNAN, KOCHUTHUNDIL HOUSE, VELIYANADU,
EDAKKATTUVAYAL VILLAGE, KANAYANNUR TALUK, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT.
BY ADV SRI.VARGHESE C.KURIAKOSE
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL SELF
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001.
2 THE TRIBUNAL FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001.
3 THE EDAKKATTUVAYAL GRAMA PANCHAYATH
GRAMA PANCHAYATH OFFICE, EDAKKATTUVAYAL, REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT.
4 THE SECRETARY
EDAKKATTUVAYAL GRAMA PANCHAYATH,PANCHAYATH OFFICE,
EDAKKATTUVAYAL-682 313.
5 CHERIYAN K ANTHROAYOSE
S/O.K.ANTHRAYOSE, THALIYACHIRA KAKOOTHIL HOUSE,
NELIYANADU P.O.,-689 590
BY ADVS.
R5 BY SRI.ABRAHAM VAKKANAL SR.
SRI.DIJO SEBASTIAN
SRI.V.K.GOPALAKRISHNAN
SRI.V.A.MUHAMMED
SRI.PAUL ABRAHAM VAKKANAL
R1 BY SRI. JOBY JOSEPH, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
SRI. ROHITH
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
28.11.2022, THE COURT ON 02.12.2022, THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :2:
SHAJI P. CHALY, J.
---------------------------------------------------------
W.P.(C). No. 5735 of 2013
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Dated this the 2nd day of December, 2022.
JUDGMENT
The petitioners have filed this writ petition challenging Exhibit P14 order dated 06.02.2013 passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions, Thiruvananthapuram in I.A.No. 195 of 2013 in Unnumbered Appeal of 2013, whereby the Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay of 189 days assigning the reason that, it has no power to condone the delay exceeding 30 days.
2. The petitioners had filed an appeal before the Tribunal challenging a decision dated 27.04.2012 of the Edakkattuvayal Grama Panchayat, Ernakulam District, along with a petition for condonation of delay of 189 days. The Tribunal, after considering Rule 8(3) of the Tribunal for the Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999 ('Rules, 1999' for short); Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and relying upon a judgment of this Court in Thomas Thomas and another v. Kottayam Municipality and another [2008(4) KHC 26], has dismissed the interlocutory application by holding that the appeal is barred by limitation, in view of the particular limitation prescribed under Rule 8(3) of the W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :3: Rules, 1999. It is, thus, challenging the legality and correctness of the said order of the Tribunal, the writ petition is filed.
3. The sole question to be considered is whether there is any illegality or arbitrariness or other legal infirmities in the order passed by the Tribunal requiring interference in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. Respondent No.5 i.e., one Cherian K. Anthrayose, has filed a detailed counter affidavit supporting the findings rendered by the Tribunal.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners Sri. C. Varghese Kuriakose, learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. Joby Joseph and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 5 th respondent Sri. Abraham Vakkanal, and perused the pleadings and material on record.
6. Rule 8(3) of the Rules, 1999 prescribes the procedure with respect to the filing of appeals before the Tribunal, and it stipulates that the petitions under sub-Rules (1) and (2) shall be in form 'C' and the same shall be submitted before the Tribunal within thirty days from the date of the notice or order or proceedings against which the petition is filed or within ninety days in cases where decision has not been taken within sixty days of filing appeal before the Local Self Government Institutions.
W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :4:
7. The proviso thereto makes it clear that the Tribunal may admit a petition submitted within one month after the said time limit, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within the time limit. Therefore, on a reading of the proviso to Rule 8(3) of the Rules, 1999, it is clear that the Tribunal has only the power to extend the period of limitation by thirty days.
8. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 specifies that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
9. On a reading of sub-Section (2) of Section 29, it is clear that Rules, 1999 is a special law by which the period of limitation is different from the period prescribed by the schedule of Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore, the limitation prescribed under the Special Rules has to be followed. The said question was considered by this W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :5: Court as well as the Apex Court in various judgments, which would be dealt with hereafter.
10. The basic contention advanced by the petitioners in this writ petition is that they have approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 19704 of 2010 challenging the decision taken by the Panchayat and the same was dismissed, and even though an appeal was preferred as W.A.No. 1642 of 2012, the same was also dismissed. However, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Division Bench of this Court has left open the liberty of the petitioners to approach the Tribunal with an application under the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay and therefore, there was an express direction issued by this Court to entertain the application submitted by the petitioners for condoning the delay of 189 days.
11. It is also contended that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would come into play, since the petitioners were diligently prosecuting proceedings before this Court in a writ petition, which will have to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation for filing the appeal. Relying upon Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned counsel has also submitted that since the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions is a District Judge, it has the trappings of a civil court and therefore, Section 14 W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :6: of the Act, 1963 would apply as if it is a court.
12. In that regard, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision of a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises and another v. Principal Secy. Irrigation Deptt. and others [(2008) 7 SCC 169], in which the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the scope of condonation of delay in filing an application challenging the award of an Arbitrator under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vis-a-vis Sections 3, 5, 14 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In my considered opinion, the findings are rendered therein by the Apex Court taking note of the peculiar features of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vis-a-vis the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the facts involved in the said case. This would be clear from the findings rendered by the Apex Court as follows:
"31. To attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, five conditions enumerated in the earlier part of this judgment have to co-exist [Ed.: See para 21, above.] . There is no manner of doubt that the section deserves to be construed liberally. Due diligence and caution are essential prerequisites for attracting Section 14. Due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute standards. Due diligence is a measure of prudence or activity expected from and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances. The time during which a court holds up a case while it is discovering that it ought to have been presented in another court, must be excluded, W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :7: as the delay of the court cannot affect the due diligence of the party. Section 14 requires that the prior proceeding should have been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence. The definition of good faith as found in Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act would indicate that nothing shall be deemed to be in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. It is true that Section 14 will not help a party who is guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction. However, there can be no hard-and-fast rule as to what amounts to good faith. It is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case. It will, in almost every case be more or less a question of degree. The mere filing of an application in wrong court would not prima facie show want of good faith. There must be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party. In the light of these principles, the question will have to be considered whether the appellant had prosecuted the matter in other courts with due diligence and in good faith.
32. As is evident from the facts of the case, initially the appellant had approached the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Chitradurga for setting aside the award made by the arbitrator. On direction dated 29-10-2002 issued by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chitradurga, the appellant had presented the application for setting aside the award before the learned District Judge, Chitradurga. Before the learned District Judge, Chitradurga an objection was raised by the respondent that the application was not maintainable before the said court and that the application was maintainable before the learned Judge, City Civil Court, Bangalore. The District Judge, Chitradurga by an order dated 3-2-2003 held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application submitted by the applicant and accordingly returned the application for presentation before the appropriate W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :8: court. The question of jurisdiction was seriously contested between the parties not only before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chitradurga but also before the learned District Judge, Chitradurga. The question of jurisdiction had to be considered by the courts below because of establishment of the City Civil Court, Bangalore under a special enactment and in view of the definition of the word "court" as given in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district. The record does not indicate that there was pretended mistake intentionally made by the appellant with a view to delaying the proceeding or harassing the respondent. There was an honest doubt about the court competent to entertain the application for setting aside the award made by the arbitrator. The mere fact that the question of jurisdiction is an arguable one would not negative good faith because the appellant believed bona fide that the court in which it had instituted the proceeding had jurisdiction in the matter. By filing the application in the courts which had no jurisdiction to entertain the same, the appellant did not achieve anything, more particularly when the lis was never given up. Under the circumstances this Court is of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka was not justified in concluding that the appellant had not prosecuted the matter in other courts with due diligence and in good faith. The said finding being against the weight of evidence on record, is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. We, therefore, hold that the appellant had prosecuted the matter in other courts with due diligence and in good faith and, therefore, is entitled to claim exclusion of time in prosecuting the matter in wrong courts. Therefore, the appeal arising from SLP (C) No. 15619 of 2005 will have to be allowed."W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 :9:
13. One of the learned Judges of the Bench has delivered a separate concurring judgment, considering two questions of law; (i) whether Limitation Act, 1963 is inapplicable to a proceeding in a court, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and (ii) even if the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable, whether the applicability of Section 14 of the said Act is excluded to proceedings under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and it is held as follows:
"Re: Question (I)
36. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the AC Act", for short) is a self-contained code relating to arbitration and all matters incidental thereto including limitation. He submitted that Section 34(3) of the AC Act prescribes the period of limitation for an application for setting aside the arbitral award, when such period can be extended and the limit to which it could be extended. Section 43 of the AC Act makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 ("the Limitation Act", for short) applicable only to proceedings in arbitration and not to proceedings in court. Therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act are inapplicable to proceedings in a court under the AC Act.
37. To decide this question, reference to the relevant provisions of the AC Act and the Limitation Act is necessary.
38. Part I of the AC Act relates to arbitration. It contemplates a party approaching a court in three circumstances:
(a) for grant of interim measures under Section 9;
(b) for setting aside an arbitral award under Section W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 10 : 34(1); and
(c) for filing appeals under Section 37.
As Section 9 deals with applications for interim measures, the question of limitation does not arise. In regard to applications for setting aside an award under sub-section (1) of Section 34, sub-section (3) thereof prescribes a limitation of three months, different from the period of one month prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Section 37 does not prescribe any period of limitation for filing appeals. If the Limitation Act is inapplicable to court proceedings under the AC Act, there will be no limitation for filing appeals under Section 37. If the Limitation Act is applicable, the period of limitation for appeals filed under Section 37 of the AC Act will be governed by Article 116 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
39. Section 43 of the AC Act, relates to limitation and it is extracted below:
"43. Limitations.--(1) The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in court.
(2) For the purposes of this section and the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred in Section 21.
(3) Where an arbitration agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration provides that any claim to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless some step to commence arbitral proceedings is taken within a time fixed by the agreement, and a dispute arises to which the agreement applies, the court, if it is of opinion that in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused, and notwithstanding that the time so fixed has expired, may on such terms, if any, as the W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 11 : justice of the case may require, extend the time for such period as it thinks proper.
(4) Where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the dispute so submitted."
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines 'court' as follows:
"2. (1)(e) 'court' means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes."
40. Let me next refer to the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides for the bar of limitation. It provides that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. "Prescribed period" means that period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act. "Period of limitation" means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 12 : Schedule to the Limitation Act [vide Section 2(j) of the said Act]. Section 29 of the Limitation Act relates to savings. Sub-section (2) thereof which is relevant is extracted below:
"29. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
41. Article 116 of the Schedule prescribes the period of limitation for appeals to the High Court (90 days) and appeals to any other court (30 days) under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is now well settled that the words "appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" occurring in Article 116 refer not only to appeals preferred under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but also to appeals, where the procedure for filing of such appeals and powers of the court for dealing with such appeals are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. (See decision of the Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel [AIR 1964 SC 1099] .) Article 119(b) of the Schedule prescribes the period of limitation for filing an application (under the Arbitration Act, 1940), for setting aside an award, as thirty days from the date of service of notice of filing of the award.
42. The AC Act is no doubt, a special law, consolidating and amending the law relating to arbitration and matters W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 13 : connected therewith or incidental thereto. The AC Act does not prescribe the period of limitation, for various proceedings under that Act, except where it intends to prescribe a period different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act. On the other hand, Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings--both in court and in arbitration--under the AC Act. There is also no express exclusion of application of any provision of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the AC Act, but there are some specific departures from the general provisions of the Limitation Act, as for example, the proviso to Section 34(3) and sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 43 of the AC Act.
43. Where the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for appeals or applications to any court, and the special or local law provides for filing of appeals and applications to the court, but does not prescribe any period of limitation in regard to such appeals or applications, the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act will apply to such appeals or applications and consequently, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will also apply. Where the special or local law prescribes for any appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, then the provisions of Section 29(2) will be attracted. In that event, the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act will apply, as if the period of limitation prescribed under the special law was the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for the appeal or application by the special law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 will apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law. The object W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 14 : of Section 29(2) is to ensure that the principles contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to suits, appeals and applications filed in a court under special or local laws also, even if it prescribes a period of limitation different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act, except to the extent of express exclusion of the application of any or all of those provisions.
44. It may be noticed at this juncture that the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedings in courts and not to any proceeding before a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. Consequently Sections 3 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings before the tribunal. This means that the Limitation Act will not apply to appeals or applications before the tribunals, unless expressly provided."
14. Therefore, it can be seen that the Apex Court had held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to proceedings under Section 34(1) of the Act, 1996 on the basis of the peculiar features of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vis-a-vis the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963. But, on the other hand, the Rules, 1999, has not recognised the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to attract the application of the provisions thereunder, for the purpose of condoning the delay exceeding 30 days. Moreover, Section 14 of the Act, 1963 only applies to a court and not to Tribunals as in the instant case, as clearly held by the Apex Court in Consolidated Engineering (supra). There lies the distinction of Section 34 of the W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 15 : Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; wherein the challenge made is to the District court, to which Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply.
15. The question with respect to the entertainment of an application for condonation of delay by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions was considered by a Division Bench of this Court (to which I am a party) in Rermal Padmanabhan v. Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions [2015 (3) KLT 201], wherein it is clearly held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply to the Tribunal, in view of the special limitation prescribed under Rules, 1999. The said judgment was rendered by this Court taking into account the judgment of the Apex Court under similar circumstances in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. [(2010) 5 SCC 23], wherein the Apex Court considered the special limitation prescribed under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the judgment in Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi [(2010) 9 SCC 162], wherein the Apex Court considered the special limitation prescribed under Section 13(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and also the judgment of the Apex Court in Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. [(2013) 10 SCC 765], wherein the W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 16 : Apex Court emphasizes the need for strict compliance with the statutory scheme, and held that it is not permissible to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds, if statute does not permit the same.
16. Taking into account the law laid down by this Court in Rermal Padmanabhan (supra) and considering the special limitation prescribed under Rules, 1999, I am of the considered opinion that the contentions advanced by the petitioners on the basis of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 may not have any force at all.
17. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that the petitioners have not made out a case to interfere with Exhibit P14 order dated 06.02.2013 passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions in I.A.No. 195 of 2013 in Unnumbered Appeal of 2013.
Needless to say, writ petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed.
sd/- SHAJI P. CHALY, JUDGE.
Rv W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 17 : APPENDIX OF WP(C) 5735/2013 PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
Exhibit P1 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE PARTITION DEED NO.
250/2000 OF SRO, EDAKATTUVAYAL.
Exhibit P2 TRUE PHOTOSTAT COPY OF THE COMPLAINT GIVEN TO THE HONOURABLE CHIEF MINISTER AND REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER.
Exhibit P3 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 28.05.2010 GIVEN BY THE VILLAGE OFFICER TO THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR.
Exhibit P4 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 26.05.2010.
Exhibit P5 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE OBJECTION DATED 28.05.2010.
Exhibit P6 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 13.04.2010.
Exhibit P7 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT DATED 08.06.2012 IN WPC NO. 19704/2010 PASSED BY THIS HONOURABLE COURT.
Exhibit P8 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT DATED 17.03.2013 IN WRIT APPEAL NO. 1642/2012 PASSED BY THE HONLE DIVISION BENCH OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT.
Exhibit P9 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE DECISION DELIVERED DATED 27.04.2012.
Exhibit P10 TRUE PHOTOSTAT COPY OF THE COVERING LETTER. Exhibit P11 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION ISSUED BY THE ASST. EXE.ENGINEER TO THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER DATED 08.03.2012. Exhibit P12 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE APPEAL MEMORANDUM BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT DATED 31.01.2013.
Exhibit P13 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE PETITION AS I.A. NO.
195/2013 IN APPEAL CHALLENGING THE DECISIONS BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P14 TRUE PHOTO STAT COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.02.2013 DISMISSED EXT. P13 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN I.A. NO. 195/13.
RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:
Exhibit R5(a) LOCATION MAP OF TH PROPERTIES . Exhibit R5 A PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWING BLOCKING OF WATER CHANNEL WITH SOIL.
Exhibit R5 C TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT DTD. 1.04.2010.
Exhibit R5 D TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, MULANTHURUTHI DTD. 01.04.2010.
Exhibit R5 E TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE 4TH W.P.(C) No. 5735/2013 : 18 : RESPONDENT DTD. 07.04.2010.
Exhibit R5 F TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, PVIP, PERUMBAVOOR DTD. 19.04.2010. Exhibit R5 G TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE PANCHAYAT COMMITTEE DTD. 29.04.2010.
Exhibit R5 H TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE TAHSILDAR DATED 30.06.2010.
Exhibit R5I TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE TAHSILDAR DTD.
05.08.2010.
Exhibit R5 J TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 29.01.2015. Exhibit R5 K TRUE COPY OF THE SITE SURVEY PLAN DTD. NIL. Exhibit R5 L TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION SUBMITTED TO THE PANCHAYAT SECRETARY. DTD. 31.05.2010.
Exhibit R5 M TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION FILED BY R5 BEFORE THE PANCHAYAT SECRETARY DTD.
04.06.2010.
Exhibit R5 N TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 14.01.2016. Exhibit R5 O TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 07.12.2015. Exhibit R5 P TRUE COPY OF THE MASS PETITION DATED 25.09.2015.
Exhibit R5 Q TRUE COPY OF THE PANCHAYATH RESOLUTION. DTD.
01.10.2015.
/True Copy/ PS To Judge.
rv