Delhi District Court
Mst. Nadra Begum vs Sardar Harkanwal Singh on 13 May, 2015
1
In the Court of Ms. Namrita Aggarwal
CCJ Cum Additional Rent Controller1 (Central)
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
Case No. E 467/13
Unique I.D. No. 02401C0275872014
In the matter of :
Mst. Nadra Begum
W/o Sh. Tajuddin
R/o K116, Hauz Khas Enclave,
New Delhi110016. ...........Petitioner
Versus
Sardar Harkanwal Singh
S/o Late S. Inder Singh
Shop no. 1523, Church Road,
Kashmere Gate, Delhi110006.
Also at :
Shop no. 1515, Church Road,
Kashmere Gate, Delhi110006. ...........Respondent
ORDER
13.05.2015
1. Vide this order, I shall dispose off the application moved by respondent for grant of leave to defend the eviction petition filed by the petitioner u/s 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1956 [in short, 'the Page 1 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 2 Act'].
2. An eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner Mst. Nadra Begum against the tenant/respondent Sardar Harkanwal Singh for vacation of the tenanted premises, i.e., shop no. 1523 at ground floor, Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi110006, as shown in colour red in the site plan annexed alongwith the petition on the ground of bonafide requirement under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act.
3. The case of the petitioner is that the ancestors of the petitioner were owners of shop no. 1523, Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi and she become the owner of the said shop by virtue of a family settlement dated 29.12.1997. That during his lifetime, the petitioner's father inducted the respondent as a commercial tenant in the tenanted premises, where from he started running his business of scooter centre. It is averred by the petitioner that since 2000, the suit premises is not in use and is lying locked.
4. The family of the petitioner comprises of five members consisting of the petitioner herself, her husband Sh. Tajuddin and three sons namely, Sh. Zuhaib Athar, Sh. Mohd. Yusuf Jibran and Sh. Ramiz Shija. Page 2 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 3 That the tenanted premises is bonafidely required by the petitioner for her son Sh. Mohd. Yusuf Jibran, who is presently running his business of plastic raw material as a sole proprietor under the name & style of M/s Qamruddin & Sons from premises bearing no. 669, Shish Mahal, Kishan Ganj, Telewara, Delhi, which belongs to Delhi Wakf Board and is a tenanted premises. The said premises is under tenancy of Sh. Mohd. Yasin, i.e., the Uncle (Taya) of Sh. Mohd. Yusuf Jibran. The son of the petitioner has no legal right, title or interest in the said premises from where he is presently running his business. The said premises is locked an is siutated in one of the worst densely populated areas of Old Delhi where there is lot of problems of parking, loading, unloading, etc. due to heavy traffic in the said area. It is submitted that the petitioner and her family members have no other reasonable suitable accommodation available with them to carry out business activities of her said son and thus, the petitioner is in bonafide need and requirement of the tenanted premises. It is further submitted by the petitioner that earlier an eviction petition bearing no. 83/2012 was filed by the petitioner for shop no. 1522 and godown no. 1533, Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi, for the bonafide requirement of her husband.
On the above stated grounds, the present eviction petition has been filed by the petitioners against the respondents for vacation of the Page 3 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 4 tenanted premises.
5. Summons were served upon the respondent who filed leave to defend application taking various grounds interalia :
a) That the petitioner has several commercial and residential properties all across Delhi apart from eight properties as mentioned on page 44 of the Family Settlement Deed bearing Municipal Nos. 1521 (First Floor), 1521 (Second Floor), 1522 (Ground Floor), 1523 (Ground Floor), 1533 (Ground Floor), 1533A (First Floor), 1536 (Ground Floor), 1536A (First Floor). The petitioner also has shops bearing no. 9 & 10 situated in B 7 & 8, Vishal Market, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Kingsway Camp, New th Delhi and premises bearing no. 407, 4 Floor, Sahyog Building, 58, Nehru Place, Kalkaji, New Delhi. Even otherwise, an eviction order with respect to property bearing no. 1522 and 1536 was passed in favour of the petitioner which comprises of four shops and thus, the bonafide requirement of the son of the petitioner can very well be met from these alternative suitable accommodations available with the petitioner.
b) That the petitioner has wrongly alleged that the tenanted premises is lying vacant and locked. It is submitted that the business of Page 4 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 5 spare auto parts is being run by the respondent from the tenanted premises under the name & style of M/s Scooter Centre.
c) That the respondent had paid a sum of Rs. 25,000/ as pagri to the landlords in 1962 and even had incurred expenses in the repairs, fittings and the upkeep of the tenanted shop.
d) That the tenanted premises falls within the same area from where the son of the petitioner Sh. Mohd. Yusuf Jibran is presently doing his business and the said area lacks infrastructure of wide roads and regulated traffic being a highly densely populated hub of business and thus, the reasoning regarding the bonafide requirement of the petitioner can by no stretch of imagination be fulfilled from the tenanted premises. Even otherwise, the requirement is not proportionate to the space as available in the tenanted premises which is merely 10 x 6 ft..
e) That great hardship will be caused to the respondent if the tenanted premises is got vacated as he is running a shop from the tenanted premises.
6. Reply to the application for leave to defend has been filed by the petitioner wherein the petitioner has denied all the averments made by the respondent in his leave to defend application stating that the Page 5 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 6 petitioner has mentioned in the original eviction petition that the eight properties at Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi are occupied by different tenants and no shop is available to the petitioner and her family members to carry on business by her son Sh. Mohd. Yusuf Jibran. It is further submitted that shops no. 9 & 10 situated at Vishal Market, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Kingsway Camp, Delhi, was purchased in the name of the petitioner by her father Sh. S.H. AtiqurRehman on 09.07.1982 and 10.08.1982 respectively and since then, both the shops are under tenancy of M/s. Harsons, the partnership firm of her father Sh. S.H. Atiq urRehman and her two brothers namely, Sh. Shahid Atiq and Sh. Nasir Atiq. It is submitted that M/s. Harsons is having its regd. office at 479192, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. That earlier M/s Harsons was having a Wholesale Drug Licence under Drug & Cosmetics Act and shop no. 9 was being used for purpose of storing the medicines till 31.12.1998 and shop no. 10 was being used for the purpose of storing Britania Biscuits, etc.. Thereafter, M/s Harsons started running business of Plastic Artificial Flowers in Chandni Chowk, Delhi and used shops no. 9 & 10 at Kingsway Camp, Delhi for storing plastic raw materials as a godown. The copy of the Partnership Deed between the various partners of M/s Harsons dated 24.11.2006 is filed by the petitioner. As far as property no.
th 407, 4 Floor, Sahyog Building, Nehru Place is concerned, the petitioner Page 6 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 7 is not the exclusive owner of the said property. There are four joint owners of the flat wherein the petitioner is just one of the coowners. The said flat is under tenancy of M/s Consulting Engineering Services (India) Pvt. Ltd.. Even the copy of the Lease Deed has been filed by the petitioner. Regarding the eviction petition bearing no. 83/2012, it is submitted that it does not comprises of four shops and it comprise of one shop and a godown. Even otherwise, the petitioner has not obtained possession of the said premises since the matter is pending before the Ld. Appellate Court. Moreover, the said shop was taken by the petitioner for the bonafide requirement of the husband of the petitioner, whereas, the present petition has been filed for the bonafide requirement of the petitioner's son. It is further submitted by the petitioner that the respondent had opened the tenanted premises for sometime after receiving summons of the present eviction petition. Petitioner has denied that pagri amount of Rs. 25,000/ was paid by the respondent to the ancestors of the petitioner at any point of time towards the tenanted premises. It is further stated by the petitioner that though, it is not denied that the tenanted premises as well premises from where the son of the petitioner is presently carrying on his business is located in the same area having same PIN code but there is a lot of difference in parking facilities, nature of density, road infrastructure, etc.. The premises no. Page 7 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 8 669, Sheesh Mahal, Kishan Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi is situated in a narrow gali of about 6 x 7 ft., while, the suit premises is situated on the main road, i.e., Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. Moreover, premises no. 669, Sheesh Mahal, Kishan Ganj, Delhi is under tenancy of Mohd. Yasin, uncle of the son of the petitioner and the son of the petitioner has no right, title or interest in the said premises. Further, it is stated that the respondent with an ulterior motive has mentioned wrong area of the tenanted premises, while the measurement and area of the shop is mentioned by the respondent himself in the site plan as 124.22 sq. ft.. It is stated by the petitioner that the correct calculation of the area of the shop is 138.2 sq. ft..
7. Rejoinder has been filed wherein respondent has reaverred what was averred by him in his leave to defend application.
8. A supplementary affidavit in support of application for leave to defend was filed on behalf of the respondent stating that the respondent had received knowledge of certain facts and circumstances through various applications filed under the Right to Information Act, which are material and relevant for the just and proper adjudication of the present proceedings. It is averred by the respondent that two other properties Page 8 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 9 st namely, 2001, 1 Floor, Shivaji Road, Azad Market, Delhi and Plot no. 72, Badli Industrial Area, Delhi, are also owned and in possession of the petitioner and her son. Vide RTI reply dated 07.03.2014, it was confirmed that M/s Qamruddin & sons are depositing tax in respect of plot no. 72, Badli Industrial Area, Delhi. It is further submitted that with respect to st property no. 2001, 1 Floor, Shivaji Road, Azad Market, Delhi, reply to RTI application states that there is no entry of the aforesaid property in the record and that the petitioner has illegally and unscrupulously destroyed the records. It is further submitted by the respondent that on inquiry, it was revealed that there was no tenancy of property no. 669, Sheesh Mahal, Teliwara, Azad Pur, Delhi, according to the rent records.
9. Reply to the said application has been filed by the petitioner wherein it is stated by the petitioner that the respondent is not entitled to file any supplementary affidavit u/s 25B of the DRC Act, after the expiry of 15 days from the service of summons in a petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. It is submitted that the said supplementary affidavit has been filed by the respondent after one and a half year from the date of service of summons, i.e., from 11.07.2013 and thus, the same cannot be looked into for any purpose. It is further submitted that the son of the petitioner is the sole proprietor of M/s Qamruddin & Sons and he has no right and Page 9 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 10 interest in M/s S. Qamruddin & Sons, which is another firm of his two uncles, namely, Sh. Fasihuddin and Sh. Mohd. Yasin, who are the partners in the said firm. It is stated that the property bearing no. 2001, st 1 Floor, Shivaji Road, Azad Market, Delhi and plot no. 72, Badli Industrial Area, Delhi, do not belong to the petitioner or her son, as st alleged by the respondent. Property bearing no. 2001, 1 Floor, Shivaji Road, Azad Market, Delhi is owned by Sh. Shafiquddin and the sons of said cousin are using the same for their office purposes for their firm "Vaza Decor". As far as plot no. 72, Badli Industrial Area, Delhi is concerned, there was a Lease Deed executed by the President of India in favour of M/s S. Qamruddin & Sons, in which at the time of execution of the Lease Deed, there were six partners. Later on, some of the lessees and LR's of deceased lessees relinquished their rights in favour of Sh. Fasihuddin and Sh. Mohd. Yasin, both partners of M/s. S. Qamruddin & Sons, by way of registered Relinquishment Deed dated 01.04.2009 and thereafter, the said plot was purchased by way of Conveyance Deed dated 18.03.2010 from the Government of NCT of Delhi by the said two brothers of the husband of the petitioner, both partners of M/s S. Qamruddin & Sons. Moreover, the said plot has been sold by the two partners of M/s S. Qamruddin & Sons in April, 2011. With regard to property no. 669, Sheesh Mahal, Teliwara, Azad Market, Delhi, Page 10 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 11 it is submitted that the said property is a Wakf property and is managed by the managing committee appointed by the Delhi Wakf Board. The Delhi Wakf Board is not receiving the rent of the said property since, it is not managed directly by the Delhi Wakf Board. The managing committee used to receive rent from the tenants of Wakf properties and even a letter dated 13.10.2005 was issued by the Delhi Wakf Board, in which, name of the tenant and rate of rent was also mentioned in respect of property no.
669. Copy of the said letter has been filed by the petitioner. It is submitted that the managing committee is receiving rent from Mohd. Yasin with respect to the said property no. 669 and even, copy of the said rent receipt has been filed on record.
10. I have heard the contentions of both the parties with respect to the filing of additional affidavit by the respondent.
11. In Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (Dead) through his LR's, (2010) 2 SCC 15, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that : "The statutory time period of 15 days for filing of leave to defend application is inflexible and whatever has to be stated in the leave to defend application with respect to the facts and events, which have happened prior to 15 days period, must be stated in the leave to defend application Page 11 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 12 itself and not by way of subsequent affidavit or documents."
12. In the present case, additional affidavit was filed by the respondent after one and a half years of receiving of summons in the present case and this subsequent affidavit relates to the availability of alternative accommodation with the petitioner prior to expiry of 15 days time period for filing of leave to defend application. Hence, the additional affidavit cannot be allowed to brought on record by the respondent in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court. Even otherwise, the respondent has sought to state that the petitioner is in occupation of two additional alternative accommodations by way of this subsequent st affidavit, i.e., (a) Property No. 2001, 1 Floor, Shivaji Road, Azad Market, Delhi and (b) Plot No. 72, Badli Industrial Area, Delhi.
13. With respect to Plot No. 72, Badli Industrial Area, Delhi, the petitioner has filed the copy of Perpetual Lease Deed in favour of M/s S. Qamruddin & Sons, in which petitioner and her son is not having any concern. Even otherwise, copy of Conveyance Deed filed by the petitioner clearly shows that Sh. Fasihuddin and Sh. Mohd. Yasin, i.e., partners of M/s. S. Qamruddin & Sons purchased the said property on 18.03.2010 by way of Conveyance Deed and hence, the petitioner and Page 12 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 13 her son has nothing to do in the said property.
st
14. With respect to property no. 2001, 1 Floor, Shivaji Road, Azad Market, Delhi, no substantial proof has been filed by the respondent to show that the said property is in possession of the petitioner. Even, reply of RTI application dated 26.02.2014 clearly states that there is no entry st with respect to property bearing no. 2001, 1 Floor, Shivaji Road, Azad Market, Delhi. Hence, the contentions raised by the respondent in the supplementary affidavit are of no substance. Respondent has miserably failed to prove that these two properties, as alleged in the additional affidavit, are under the possession of the petitioner or her son.
15. I have heard the arguments on behalf of both the parties on the application for leave to defend and perused the record carefully.
16. Proviso (e) to Section 14(1) is a special provision which has been enacted by the legislature for the class of landlords who require the premises genuinely and their requirement is bonafide and they do not have any suitable accommodation. The essential ingredients for attracting the proviso (e) of the Section 14(1) are : Page 13 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 14
a) The said premises are bonafide required by the landlord either for himself or for his family member.
b) The landlord or the family member has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.
These twin thresholds are to be satisfied conjunctively in order to attract the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) and the absence of even one of the said ingredients clearly makes the said provision inapplicable.
17. The satisfaction of the two requirements of bonafide need and no reasonably suitable accommodation has been time and again emphasized by the Supreme Court of India in several cases and more recently in the case Deena Nath Vs. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:
"The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement Page 14 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 15 must be bonafide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bonafide requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in subsection (e) of Section 12(1) of the Act in respect of accommodation let for residential purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the Court is dutybound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other reasonably suitable non Page 15 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 16 residential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant which does not show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision. Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind that statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). If it is found that the court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective then the finding regarding bonafide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment."
18. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean Page 16 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 17 "in good faith and genuine i.e. without fraud or deceit". Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bonafide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own.
19. The meaning of "bonafide" in the context appears to be in two Page 17 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 18 folds. (a) the need of the landlord must be a genuine one and not a frivolous one. (b) landlord is not motivated by extraneous considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant with a view to let it out again to another tenant at a higher rent. Ownership as well as landlordtenant relationship:
20. The respondent has not disputed the ownership of the petitioner over the tenanted premises or the existence of landlordtenant relationship.
Bonafide requirement :
21. It is stated by the petitioner that the tenanted premises is bonafidely required by her for her son, namely, Sh. Mohd. Yunus Jibran for running his business of plastic raw material from the said premises since presently, the son of the petitioner is carrying on his business from the tenanted premises under the tenancy of his uncle (Taya) bearing no. 669, Sheesh Mahal, Teliwara, Azad Pur, Delhi. The son of the petitioner has no right, title or interest in the said property and even otherwise, the said property is situated in one of the worst densely populated area of old Page 18 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 19 Delhi, where there is lot of problem of parking, loading and unloading, etc. due to heavy traffic. On the other hand, the respondent has refuted the said bonafide requirement stating that the location of the tenanted premises is also the same as of the shop from where the son of the petitioner is presently carrying on his business and therefore, requirement of the petitioner's son cannot be met with from the tenanted premises. It is not denied by the respondent that the tenanted premises is situated on the Church Road, which is the main road and thus, wider in area as compared to shop bearing no. 669, Sheesh Mahal, Kishan Ganj, Telewara, Delhi, which is situated in a bylane and thus, there is a lot of problem in parking, loading and unloading, etc.. Even otherwise, the respondent/tenant cannot dictate terms upon the landlord/petitioner telling her as to from where her son should start his prospective business. This discretion lies with the landlord/petitioner and none else.
22. Further, the respondent has averred that he had paid pagree amount to the forefathers of the petitioner while taking tenanted premises on rent but no proof of the same has been filed by the respondent. In absence of any proof of the same, the said contention of the respondent remains to be a mere bald allegation without any substance. Page 19 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 20
23. The other contention made by the respondent by way of supplementary affidavit, though, the same was not allowed to be taken on record is that vide reply of RTI application on 03.11.2014, it was revealed that with respect to property no. 669, Sheesh Mahal, Telewara, Azad Pur, Delhi, there is no tenancy as per the rent records and thus, the said property is not under the tenancy of uncle of the petitioner's son. The petitioner, on the other hand, has filed a letter dated 13.10.2005 issued by the Delhi Wakf Board to the Secretary of the Managing Committee clearly stating the name of the tenant in the said property to be Mohd. Yasin @ Rs. 532/ per month. Copy of the said letter is also placed on record by the petitioner. Even, the copy of rent receipts have been filed by the petitioner wherein, uncle of petitioner's son Sh. Mohd. Yasin had paid rent to the Managing Committee of the Delhi Wakf Board, thus, proving that the said property is under the tenancy of his uncle and the son of the petitioner has no right, title or interest therein. This clearly proves that the son of the petitioner is presently carrying on his business from the tenanted premises an thus, he cannot be denied of his right to start his business from the shop under his own ownership and which is more conveniently located as compared to the tenanted premises from where he is presently carrying on his business activities. Thus, the bonafide requirement of the petitioner qua the tenanted premises stands Page 20 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 21 proved for running business by her son.
Availability of alternative suitable accommodation :
24. The respondent has contended that the petitioner has alternative th property, i.e. Flat no. 407, 4 Floor, Sahyog Building, 58, Nehru Place, Kalkaji, New Delhi. The petitioner has refuted this allegation by alleging that the said property is under the joint ownership of the petitioner alongwith three other persons, namely, Mrs. Merharunnisa, Mrs. Afshan Saeed and Mrs. Sanoober Sulatana and even otherwise, the said flat is presently occupied by the tenant M/s. Consulting Engineering Services (India) Pvt. Ltd.. Petitioner has also placed on record the copy of Lease Deed dated 08.08.2006 executed between all the coowners and the tenant M/s. Consulting Engineering Services (India) Pvt. Ltd.. The execution as well as veracity of the said Lease Deed has not been challenged by the respondent, thus, proving that the said flat is under tenancy of M/s Consulting Engineering Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. and thus, the said flat is not readily available for the exclusive use of the petitioner. Thus, the said property cannot be termed as alternative suitable accommodation available with the petitioner for meeting out the bonafide requirement of her son. Moreover, the business of petitioner's Page 21 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 22 th son cannot be conveniently carried out from the 4 floor and thus, the ground floor property would be more suitable accommodation as th compared to 4 floor property for the said business.
25. Further, the respondent has alleged that the petitioner is also having occupation of shop no. 9 & 10 situated at B78, Vishal Market, Bhai Paramanand Colony, Kingsway Camp, Delhi. According to the respondent, these shops are lying vacant and thus, are suitable for the need of the petitioner's son. The petitioner has refuted these assertions by stating that though, these shops are owned by her, being purchased in her name by her deceased father but the same are under tenancy of M/s Harsons, the partnership firm of her father Sh. S.H. AtiqurRehman and her two brothers namely, Sh. Shahid Atiq and Sh. Nasir Atiq. It is submitted that M/s. Harsons is having its regd. office at 479192, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. That earlier M/s Harsons was having a Wholesale Drug Licence under Drug & Cosmetics Act and shop no. 9 was being used for purpose of storing the medicines till 31.12.1998 and shop no. 10 was being used for the purpose of storing Britania Biscuits, etc.. Thereafter, M/s Harsons started running business of Plastic Artificial Flowers in Chandni Chowk, Delhi and presently, is using shops no. 9 & 10 at Kingsway Camp, Delhi for storing plastic raw materials for Page 22 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 23 godown purposes. The petitioner has placed on record the letter dated 01.06.1995 written on behalf of the said firm to Drug Controller seeking renewal of wholesale drug license for godown at shop no. 9. This letter pertains to the period when the said firm was involved in medicines business. Photocopy of the renewal of said license in favour of M/s Harsons has also been placed on record. The petitioner has also placed on record the copy of the Partnership Deed dated 24.11.2006 executed between the various partners of M/s Harsons. The respondent has not disputed the veracity of the Partnership Deed as well as Drug License issued in favour of M/s Harsons, thus proving that M/s Harsons is presently carrying on business of Plastic Artificial Flowers in Chandni Chowk and using the abovesaid two shops bearing no. 9 & 10 at Kingsway Camp for storing the plastic raw materials and are using the said shops for godown purposes and thus, the said shops cannot be termed as alternative suitable accommodation available with the petitioner to meet out the bonafide requirement of her son. Further, the respondent has failed to place to record any documentary proof to show that these two shops are lying vacant and not under the possession of the tenant M/s Harsons.
26. The respondent has also alleged that the petitioner has obtained Page 23 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 24 vacant peaceful possession of the premises bearing no. 1522 & 1536 on the ground of bonafide requirement of her husband by way of a separate eviction petition bearing no. 83/2012. It is averred that the said evicted area comprises of four shops and thus, the said shops can be used by the petitioner to meet out the bonafide requirement of her son as well. The petitioner, on the other hand, has admitted that an eviction order was passed in respect of shop bearing no. 1522 and godown bearing no. 1536 but it is alleged that same are required for the bonafide requirement of the husband of the petitioner and therefore, the same cannot be used by her son. It is denied that the said premises have four shops. The petitioner has also stated that till date, the petitioner has not obtained the vacant peaceful possession of the said premises as the matter is pending before the Ld. Appellate Court. In these circumstances, these two premises also cannot be termed as alternative suitable accommodation available with the petitioner to meet out the requirement of her son.
27. Further, as far as alleged premises on the first and second floors of the suit premises is concerned, the same cannot be termed as alternative suitable accommodation as definitely the shop at ground floor would fetch much more customers as compared to the first and second Page 24 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13 25 floor. In these circumstances, the respondent has failed to prove the availability of alternative suitable accommodation with the petitioner to meet out the bonafide requirement of her son.
28. Thus, from the discussion made above, respondent has failed to raise any triable issue, which requires evidence to be proved. The petitioner, on the other hand, has clearly established her bonafide requirement regarding tenanted premises. Hence, the application for leave to defend filed by respondent is ordered to be dismissed. Consequently, eviction order is liable to be passed against the respondent u/s Section 25 B (4) of the Act. In view of above, petitioner is held entitled for recovery of the tenanted premises, i.e., shop no. 1523 at ground floor, Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi110006, as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed with the petition. However, the petitioner would not be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises before expiration of six months from today in view of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act.
Announced in open Court (Namrita Aggarwal)
on 13 Day of May, 2015.
th
CCJ cum ARC1 (Central)
[This order contains 25 pages.] Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
Page 25 of 25 Mst. Nadra Begum Vs. Sardar Karkanwal Singh. E467/13