Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ram Jurti Mishra vs Jiya Lal Gujar on 22 May, 2020
Author: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
Bench: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
Cr.R. No. 3191/2016
Ram Murti Mishra and others
Vs
Jiya Lal Gujar and another
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Shri Adarsh Muni Trivedi, learned senior counsel with Shri S.K.
Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Shri S.K. Patel, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
Mohd. Siddhqui, learned P.L.for the respondent No.2/State.
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ORDER
(22.05.2020) This revision petition under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated 06.09.2016 in Session Trial No.99/2016 passed by learned Special Judge (SC/ST), Jabalpur, whereby charges for offence punishable under Sections 294, 323/34, 506-II of IPC and Section 3(1)(10) of SC/ST Act have been framed against the petitioners.
2. Case of prosecution in brief is that respondent No. 1 has filed a private complaint before JMFC, Jabalpur, requesting to take cognizance against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Sections 307, 324, 323, 294, 427 and 506-B of IPC as well as Sections 3(1)(10) and 3(2)(5) of SC/ST Act. After recording the statement of complainant and other witnesses, the learned JMFC came to the conclusion that prima facie case is made out against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 294, 323/34, 506-II of IPC and Section 3(1)(10) of SC/ST Act. Thereafter the learned JMFC has 2 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 committed the case before Special Judge (Atrocity) who framed the challenged charges by passing the impugned order.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned trial Court committed grave error of law in framing the charges for the alleged offences against the petitioners as no material is available in the case. He submits that the learned ASJ as well as JMFC have failed to see that the complainant did not allege that the accused does not belong to the SC/ST community which is a necessary ingredient to constitute the offence under SC/ST Act. He further submits that the complainant has not filed any MLC or loss certificate, hence, no offence is made out against the petitioners. Even if the contents of the complaint are taken into consideration, the dispute between the petitioners and respondent No. 1 is of civil in nature, therefore, the petitioners cannot be prosecuted in criminal case. The respondent No. 1 was trying to raise construction of his house over the Nazul land and making boundary wall over the land belonging to the petitioners and when the petitioners obtained interim order from the Court of Tehsildar, then he falsely implicated them. He further submits that the learned ASJ failed to see that the complainant did not disclose about the eye witness of the incident in his statement. The learned JMFC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. in a complaint filed under the provision of SC/ST Act whereas under the Act, only Special Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance under this Act. With the aforesaid, he prays for allowing this revision and quashment of the charges framed by the learned Special Judge.
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4. On the other hand, learned P.L. For the State as well as learned counsel for respondent No.2 oppose the prayer and submit that there is sufficient material available on record for framing the charges for the aforesaid offences. The petitioners have abused and hurt the complainant and also threatened him, therefore, at this initial stage of trial, this revision petition may not be allowed. The petitioners may raise all the grounds before the trial Court at appropriate stage of trial.
5. Heard all the parties and perused the case. Before embarking on the facts of the case, it would be necessary to consider the legal aspects first. Since, by filing this revision petition, the petitioners have challenged the charges framed by the learned trial Court, therefore, it is appropriate to deal with the relevant provision of Cr.P.C under Sections 227 and 228, same reads as under:
"227. Discharge. If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."
6. If Court finds that there is sufficient material is showing to connect the accused with the aforesaid offences then Section 228 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 comes into role, provision is also quoted as under:
"228. Framing of charge.(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial 4 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant- cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause
(b) of sub- section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried."
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate Vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja and others reported in AIR 1990 SC 1962 has held as under:-
"7. Again in Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274: (AIR 1980 SC 52) this Court observed in paragraph 18 of the Judgment as under:
"The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding, the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence".
From the above discussion it seems well-settled that at the Sections 227-228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face-value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case."
8. Further, in the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another reported in AIR 1979 SC 366, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again has held as under:-
"Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:(1) That the 5 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out:
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be, fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."
9. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568 has held as under:-
"23. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material, Satish Mehra case, holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided."
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. S.B. Johari and others reported in 2000(2) M.P.L.J (SC) 322, has also held as under:-
6Cr.R. No. 3191/16
"4...........It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross examination or rebutted by defence evidence, if any, cannot show that accused committed the particular offence. In such case, there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjayya and Others etc. reported in (1990) 4 SCC 76, after considering the provisions of Sections 227 and 228, Cr.P.C., the Court posed a question, whether at the stage of framing the charge, the trial court should marshal the materials on the record of the case as he would do on the conclusion of the trial. The Court held that at the stage of framing the charge inquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from such materials constitute the offence with which the accused could be charged. The Court may peruse the records for that limited purpose, but it is not required to marshal it with a view to decide the reliability thereof. The Court referred to earlier decisions in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39, Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 4 and Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affair, West Bengal vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja (1979) 4 SCC 274 and held thus:
"From the above discussion it seems well settled that at the Sections 227-228 stage the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may for this limited purpose shift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (emphasis supplied)
11. In another judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sanjay Choudhary & others reported in 2010(1) M.P.J.R. (SC) 36 has held as under:- 7 Cr.R. No. 3191/16
"10. After analyzing the terminology used in the three pairs of sections it was held that despite the differences there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of a prima facie case to be applied.
11. The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, even if there is a strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the court to frame a charge. At that stage, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of conviction. That being so, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed."
12. Hence, after careful reading of the above cited pronouncement, it is manifest that it is well-settled principle of law that at the stage of Section 227-228 of Cr.P.C., the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom are taken at their face-value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the accused has no right to produce any material. The scope of revisional jurisdiction is very limited and same can be invoked where the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous. It is also well settled principle of law that while considering the question of framing the charges, the Court has undoubted power to shift and weigh the evidence of limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicious against the accused, the Court will be fully justified in framing the charge and proceeding with the trial. 8 Cr.R. No. 3191/16
13. Since the learned senior counsel for the petitioners raised the ground of jurisdiction of JMFC for taking cognizance in private complaint pertains to offence of SC/ST Act. The counsel submits that the learned JMFC has no jurisdiction to take the cognizance as under
the Act, only special Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance. In this regard in the case of Gangula Ashok v. State of A.P., (2000) 2 SCC 504, The Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"16. Hence we have no doubt that a Special Court under this Act is essentially a Court of Session and it can take cognizance of the offence when the case is committed to it by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. In other words, a complaint or a charge-sheet cannot straight away be laid down before the Special Court under the Act."
14. Further, on perusal of the case, it appears that the JMFC took the cognizance vide order dated 16.12.2013 and subsequently the Act was amended and the requirement of committal of the case by the Magistrate has been moved away. Therefore, in such circumstances, the ground of jurisdiction raised by the petitioners' counsel is hereby discarded.
15. Now, in view of the above principle, I revert back to the facts of the case by examining the documents annexed with the case to evaluate whether the material, annexed with the complaint, are sufficient to frame the charges of aforesaid offences. Regarding Section 294, 323/34 and 506-II of IPC
16. Before evaluating the facts, it would be necessary to read the relevant provisions of IPC, same are mentioned as under:-
294. Obscene acts and songs.-- Whoever, to the annoyance of others--(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or 9 Cr.R. No. 3191/16
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.
17. Now, I read Section 323 IPC which prescribed the punishment for voluntarily causing hurt, same is also quoted as under :-
"323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.-- Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
18. Further, Section 319 and 321 defined the meaning of "Hurt" and "Voluntarily Causing Hurt", which also reads as under :-
319. Hurt - Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
321. Voluntarily causing hurt.--Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".
19. Now, read the Sections 506 IPC, same is read as under :
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.--
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-- And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both." 10 Cr.R. No. 3191/16
20. Further, Section 503 IPC speaks about the definition of criminal intimidation, which is also necessary to be quoted herein under :-
"503. Criminal intimidation.--Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation."
21. On careful reading of the provision of Section 294 IPC, it is clear that the act which is defined in the Section will be an offence when same takes place in a public place to the annoyance of others. Further, Sections 319 and 321 of IPC provide that whoever does any act with an intention to cause hurt (bodily pain, disease or infirmity) to any person or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause such hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily causing hurt". So far as legal aspect of Section 506 of IPC is concerned, it deals with the punishment when the accused has committed the offence of criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation has been defined under Section 503 IPC. Intimidation is intentional behavior, would cause a person of ordinary sensibilities to fear, injury or harm. The offence of criminal intimidation constitutes the threat of injury to a person's person, reputation or property or to another person's person, reputation or property in which that person is interested with the intention to cause alarm or cause him to do an act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do any act which that person is 11 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
22. In the present case, on perusal of statement of complainant, it appears that the dispute between the parties occurred six times. First time on 31.03.2011, when the complainant was raising construction, petitioner No. 1 came there and threatened the complainant. Thereafter, On 23.04.2011, when the complainant was again raising construction, petitioner No. 1 again came there along with four other persons and assaulted the complainant's wife. According to the complainant, he made an effort to lodge the FIR but the police had not taken any action against petitioner No. 1. Third time, on 10.06.2011, for the same dispute, petitioner No. 1 sent some persons to attack on the complainant. Co-incidently, the police official also reached there and called petitioner No. 1 and advised him to demark the land. Thereafter, petitioner No. 2 (son of petitioner No. 1) approached the Tahsil Court and got stay in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 11/1 whereas as per spot verification, the disputed land does not belong to said khasra number., hence, after taking the certified copy of the same, the complainant again started raising construction. Thereafter, on 13.07.2011, the punks of petitioner No.1 demolished the construction raised by the complainant. Fifth time, on 18.07.2011, the petitioners along with other persons came there armed with weapons. They abused the complainant and his family members and made some caste remark over them. They attacked on wife of the complainant who saved her life by hiding herself. They also tried to assault the complainant. The 12 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 complainant stated that the police did not register the FIR, consequently, on 21.07.2011, the petitioners demolished the rest of the construction. In his complaint, he stated that he made various complaints to various authorities but the police has registered the case only under two sections.
23. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that there is a civil dispute about the property and the complainant party was encroaching the land of petitioners/accused. According to petitioner's counsel, the petitioners have been falsely implicated in this case with mala fide intention of the complainant. The facts related to aforesaid submission of petitioner's counsels will be proved only from the evidence in trial. Preliminary without considering proper evidence, it can not be said that petitioners/accused falsely implicated in this case. It is admitted position that learned Judicial Magistrate took the cognizance against the petitioners/accused after the proper inquiry under Section 200 and 202 of Cr.P.C. The scope of inquiry under Section 200 and 202 is very limited and same has been duly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Umrao Singh Vs. Sate of UP and others reported in 2012 Cr.L.J. 2370 has held as under:-
"In Harekrushna Mohanty v. Adikando Behera: 1966 Cr.L.J. 64, has been held by Orissa high court as under:-
"4. To appreciate the contention, the scope of Sections 202 and 203, Cr PC may be examined. An enquiry u/s 202 is to be directed only for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. Section 203 lays down that the complaint may be dismissed after consideration of the statements on oath of the complainant and the witnesses and the result of the investigation or enquiry, if any, under Sec. 202, if 13 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 the Magistrate in his judgement thinks that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. The scope of the Section is no longer in controversy. The principles laid down in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra, AIR 1963 SC 1430 may be summarised for convenience:
(i) Since the very question for consideration is whether the accused should be called upon to face an accusation, he has no right to take part in the proceeding, nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. As a necessary corollary it follows that the Magistrate cannot put any question to the witnesses at the instance of the accused.
(ii) The Magistrate is, however, free to put such questions to the witnesses of the complainant as he may think proper in the interest of justice.
(iii) It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interest of an absent accused but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made.
(iv) Whether the complaint is frivolous or not is, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of materials placed before him by the complainant.
Whatever defence the accused may have can only be inquired into at the trial. If, however, from the evidence given by the complainant a reasonable defence is established, or the accused is entitled to a benefit of doubt, the complaint can be dismissed.
(v) The Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate to support a conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry.
(vi) The object of enquiry u/s 202 is to ascertain whether the allegations made in the complaint are intrinsically true. In order to satisfy himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding u/s 203, the Magistrate is entitled to consider the evidence recorded at the inquiry u/s 202, the statements of the complainant and his witnesses on oath and the result of the investigation or inquiry, if any. He is not entitled to rely upon any materials besides this. Following the aforesaid principles in that particular case, their Lordships held that where the Magistrate had ordered an enquiry u/s 202 by another Magistrate, it was not open to him to consider the statement recorded during the investigation by the police, or the evidence adduced before him during the inquiry arising out of another complaint on such extraneous matter, the proceeding was held to be vitiated. Similarly, their Lordships held the inquiry by the Magistrate as vitiated as two persons, who were associates of the accused, were examined as Court witnesses on the 14 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 suggestion of the accused, who was permitted to appear through counsel at the enquiry."
From the above exposition of law by the apex court and various High Courts, now it is well settled that only statements of complainant and witnesses u/s 200 and 202 of the code and result of an investigation directed u/s 202 only can be considered by the Magistrate while proceeding u/s 203/204 of the code. However, Ld. CJM, while passing impugned order transgressed such well de-marketed area of power and hence committed illegality by usurping power not vested in him. It pointed out that in the trial, which was proceeding against the applicant/complainant and his associates, conclusions by the police were based on evidences of different persons than what was mentioned in the complaint by the applicant complainant, albeit both related with murder of Budha Singh, and hence it was desirable that both the versions be tested on the anvil of truthfulness. Ld. CJM therefore, fell in gross error in passing the impugned order.
24. On perusal of case it appears that the order of taking cognizance under Section 294, 323/34 and 506-II of IPC by the learned Judicial Magistrate is based upon proper inquiry. Therefore, I find sufficient prima facie material which shows that the petitioners abused, hurt and threatened the complainant and his family members on the dispute of land. Therefore, the ingredients for the offences of Sections 294, 323/34 and 506-II of IPC for framing the charges , are prima facie satisfied in the case.
Regarding Section 3(1)(10) of SC/ST Act
25. Before adverting to the facts of the case, I find it necessary to reproduce the above said provision, same are mentioned herein under:-
3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.--
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--
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Cr.R. No. 3191/16
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
26. In the case of Gorige Pentaihah Vs. State of A.P. reported in (2008) 12 SCC 531, it is held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that to bring home the case under the provision of SC/ST Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused is not a member of SC/ST community. The relevant para is quoted herein under :
"6. In the instant case, the allegation of Respondent 3 in the entire complaint is that on 27-5-2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (Respondent 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate Respondent 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law."
27. Further, in the case of Mahendra Bhatt Vs. of State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Utt 1022, the High Court of Uttarakhand has followed the Gorige Pentaihah's case and held as under :
"5. I find force in the argument put forth on behalf of the accused applicants inasmuch as a bare perusal of the FIR itself reveals that there is no mention whatsoever in the said FIR that the accused applicants are not the members of the Scheduled Case or Scheduled Tribe community and the complainant and his brother were intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate them within public view.16 Cr.R. No. 3191/16
6. It is settled law that when the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the accused applicants to face the criminal trial under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law."
28. In the present case, on perusal of the complaint as well as statements of the complainant, there is no mention in the said complaint and statements that the accused petitioners are not members of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community and the complainant was intentionally insulted or intimidated by them with an intent to humiliate him within public view. Moreover, there is no specific allegation made by the complainant against the petitioners regarding cast remark in public view. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the complainant is of 'Gurjar' cast which comes under the category of SC community and offence of SC/ST Act is made out against the petitioner but on careful reading of the complaint and the statement of witnesses I find that the respondent did not mention this fact in his complaint. It also appears that the dispute pertains to raising construction over the government land.
29. Therefore, in absence of the basic ingredients of the offence under SC/ST Act and specific allegation, compelling the petitioners to face the trial for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act, would not according to spirit of law made in this regard.
30. Therefore, this petition is partly allowed. The petitioners are hereby discharged for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. However, proceedings under Sections 294, 323/34 and 506-II IPC shall be continued against the accused/petitioners in 17 Cr.R. No. 3191/16 accordance with law, as prima facie case under these sections is made out against them.
31. C.C. as per rules.
(Rajendra Kumar Srivastava) Judge L.R. Digitally signed by LALIT SINGH RANA Date: 2020.05.23 15:26:30 +05'30'