Telangana High Court
Padala Narayana Goud vs The State Of Telangana on 7 April, 2026
THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.7590, 7592, 7598, 7599, 7600, 7601,
7602 and 7603 of 2025
% Dated:07.04.2026
Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025:
Between:
# Padala Narayana Goud, S/o. Pedda Venkati,
Aged about 49 years, R/o. Rathalapump Road,
Korutla Proper and Mandal, Jagtial District
.. Petitioner
(Petitioner/Complainant)
And
$ The State of Telangana, rep., by its
Public Prosecutor, High Court,
Hyderabad and another .. Respondents
Respondent/Accused ! Counsel for petitioners : Mr. Harikishan Kudikyala ^ Counsel for respondent State : Mr. E. Ganesh, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor <GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 297
2. AIR 1979 SC 14
3. AIR 1964 SC 529
4. AIR 1967 SC 1326
5. (1997) 2 SCC 210
6. AIR 1980 SC 531 2 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.7590, 7592, 7598, 7599, 7600, 7601, 7602 and 7603 of 2025 DATE OF ORDER : 07.04.2026 Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025:
Between:
Padala Narayana Goud, S/o. Pedda Venkati, Aged about 49 years, R/o. Rathalapump Road, Korutla Proper and Mandal, Jagtial District .. Petitioner (Petitioner/Complainant) And The State of Telangana, rep., by its Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad and another .. Respondents Respondent/Accused COMMOM ORDER:
Criminal Petition No.7590 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.294 of 2025 in C.C.No.8 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."3
JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch
2. Criminal Petition No.7592 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.291 of 2025 in C.C.No.6 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
3. Criminal Petition No.7598 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.292 of 2025 in C.C.No.7 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
4. Criminal Petition No.7599 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.290 of 2025 in C.C.No.6 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
5. Criminal Petition No.7600 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.295 of 2025 in C.C.No.8 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant 4 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
6. Criminal Petition No.7601 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.289 of 2025 in C.C.No.5 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
7. Criminal Petition No.7602 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.288 of 2025 in C.C.No.5 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
8. Criminal Petition No.7603 of 2025 is filed with the following prayer:
"... to call for the records relating to the order passed in Crl.M.P.No.293 of 2025 in C.C.No.7 of 2016 dt. 10-6-2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla and quash the same, and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
9. Heard Mr. Harikishan Kudikyala, learned counsel for petitioners, Mr. E. Ganesh, learned Public 5 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch Prosecutor for respondent No.1-State and Mr. G.B.S.S. Papa Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.2
10. Since the subject matter in Crl.P.Nos.7590, 7592, 7598, 7599, 7600, 7601, 7602 and 7603 of 2025 is similar in nature, they are heard together. In all these matters, the respondent/accused is one Daram Veeranath, S/o Chandra Mohan. It is alleged that the accused borrowed an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- in each of these eight (8) matter(s)/case(s), on different dates, from four petitioners/complainants. In other words, the accused borrowed Rs.40,00,000/- each from four persons i.e., petitioners/complainants in these matters.
11. In this batch, chief examination of accused was done, cross examination was done partly, further cross examination was deferred by the complainants. Having deferred, petitioners/complainants filed petitions seeking direction to send the specimen signature 6 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch signed by the accused to FSL before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla. The learned Magistrate dismissed all the criminal miscellaneous petitions filed, by orders dated 10.06.2025. These criminal petitions are filed challenging the dismissal orders. Facts are similar in all these matters, relief sought is same.
12. For convenience, facts in Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 are discussed.
13. Petitioner is the complainant, a complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short 'Cr.P.C.') for an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (for short 'NI Act') before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla. He states that respondent No.2/accused took a hand loan of an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- for his legal necessities on 12.09.2013 by executing a promissory note on the same day. Petitioner/complainant and 7 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch respondent No.2/accused were friends. Petitioner/ complainant demanded to clear the amount. Accused/respondent No.2 took the promissory note and issued a cheque bearing No.049187 on 10.06.2014 drawn in State Bank of India at Metpally. Thereafter, petitioner/complainant presented the cheque on 10.06.2014 at State Bank of Hyderabad. A memo dated 14.06.2014 was issued by bank authorities with an endorsement "funds insufficient", thus, the cheque stood dishonored.
14. A legal notice, dated 25.06.2014, was issued by petitioner/complainant directing respondent No.2/ accused to pay the amount of Rs.20,00,000/- with interest within 15 days. Notice was served on accused on 02.07.2014. The accused neither gave a reply to the legal notice nor paid the amount. Hence the complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. for an offence u/s 138 of NI Act. The said complaint is taken on file and is 8 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch numbered as C.C.No.8 of 2016 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Korutla.
15. Matter did not see light of the day or at least the examination was not completed till 2025 almost 9 years, for an offence under Section 138 of NI Act. Least of all, this Court can only express its displeasure that the matter under Section 138 of N.I. Act is kept pending for nine (09) years.
16. The present criminal petition is filed challenging the order dated 10.06.2025 passed in Crl.M.P.No.294 of 2025 in C.C.No.8 of 2016, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla.
17. Crl.M.P.No.294 of 2025 in C.C.No.8 of 2016 was filed under Section 311 A read with 451 and 91(1) of Cr.P.C by petitioner/complainant seeking a direction to send the specimen signature of accused to Forensic Science Laboratory (for short 'FSL'). 9
JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch
18. Learned counsel for petitioner/complainant submitted that the petition to send the specimen signature of accused to FSL was denied on an erroneous ground that once the complainant has filed evidence relating to ingredients of Section 138 of NI Act, presumption is raised against the accused and accused has to rebut the presumption. It is further submitted that the refusal to send the specimen signature to FSL on the ground that the signatures on the MoA (Memo of Appearance), depositions, cannot be treated as admitted signatures as they are not contemporary signatures of accused is bad in law.
19. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused submitted that petitioner/complainant is making a false allegation that respondent No.2/accused has lent the amount of Rs.20,00,000/-. That accused never had financial difficulties to borrow such huge amounts. It is further submitted that accused did not issue any cheques 10 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch to the complainant. It is also submitted that the question of issuing cheques does not arise if promissory note(s) was/were issued (as claimed by petitioner/complainant).
20. It is submitted by learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused that the learned Magistrate after considering the submissions has rightly dismissed the Crl.M.P.No.294 of 2025, as petitioner/complainant filed evidence relating to the ingredients of Section 138 of N.I. Act and the presumption is against the accused.
21. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manorama Naik v. The State of Odisha and another 1 had held that it is left for the wisdom of the trial Court to apply its mind and to act as per Sections 45, 47 or 73 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'the Act, 1872'). 1 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 297 11 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch
22. Heard learned counsels, perused the record and considered rival submissions.
23. A criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 311A r/w 451 & 91(1) of Cr.P.C. (Page No.10 of material papers) was filed by the complainant seeking a direction to send the specimen signature(s) signed by accused person before banking authorities, MoA and deposition (DW1) signed by accused for comparison of signature on cheque (P1) for expert opinion to FSL. The petition was dismissed by the learned Magistrate of First Class at Korutla on 10.06.2025. The following is the operative portion of the order:
"4. Heard both sides.
5. Perused the record, on perusal it is clear that the defense of the accused is that the signature on the cheque does not belong to him. Now, on going through the provision of Sec.138 of NI Act once the complainant has filed the evidence relating the ingredients of Sec.138 of NI Act the presumption is raised against the accused. Now it is the bounded duty of the accused to rebut the said presumption. Even though as per the contentions of the complainant if the petition is allowed, the signatures on the 12 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch MOA, depositions cannot be treated as admitted signatures as they are not contemporary signatures of accused.
Hence, as no useful purpose would be served in allowing the said petition this court finds it appropriate to dismiss the petition.
6. IN THE RESULT, Petition is dismissed."
24. Evidence deposed by accused is on record. In chief examination of DW1 i.e., accused deposed that he had acquaintance with petitioner/complainant since 20 years and that petitioner/complainant filed a suit for recovery of money on 12.05.2013 for an amount of Rs.12,00,000/-. He further deposed that there is no possibility by complainant to give an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- again on 12.09.2013. That he did not issue any promissory note and cheque for amount of Rs.20,00,000/-. He denied of taking any money and also denied receipt of any legal notice.
25. In the cross examination, he stated that he and petitioner/complainant are classmates, but has no close acquaintance (contrary statement to that of chief 13 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch examination on acquaintance). He deposed that he neither took loan of Rs.20,00,000/- nor a loan of Rs.12,00,000/-. He stated that he did not execute any promissory note(s) for amount of Rs.20,00,000/- on 12.09.2013.
26. When accused was confronted with the cheque, in the cross examination, he admitted that the cheque belongs to him, but denied the signature. Further he added that only his name is written on the cheque but cheque does not belong to him (contrary statement). Witness added that 20 years back some cheques were left with RK groups. When accused was confronted with memo of appearance, he denied his signature. Accused further added that he signed on the memo of appearance. When accused is confronted with cheque and memo of appearance, he admitted his signature on the memo of appearance but denied the signature on the cheque. Further cross examination of 14 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch DW1/accused (respondent herein) was deferred by complainant counsel.
27. From the chief and cross examinations conducted so far, it is apparent that respondent No.2/accused has denied his signature on the cheque.
28. From the order of the learned Magistrate, it is evident that the Magistrate did not compare the signature with the specimen signature on memo of appearance (MoA) and depositions. Reasoning in the order is that presumption is against the accused and the signatures on MoA and deposition are not contemporary signatures. Court did not take any steps to send the specimen signature to FSL. It is trite to take note of relevant Sections of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
29. Section 45 of the Act, 1872 is as follows:
"45. Opinions of experts.
When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science or art, or as to 15 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch identity of handwriting [or finger impressions] [Inserted by Act 5 of 1899, Section 3. For discussion in Council as to whether [finger impressions] include [thumb impressions,] see Gazette of India, 1898, Pt. VI, p.24.], the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, [or in questions as to identity of handwriting] [Inserted by Act 18 of 1871, Section 4.] [or finger-impressions] [Inserted by Act 5 of 1899, Section 3. For discussion in Council as to whether [Finger impressions] include [thumb impressions,] see Gazette of India, 1898, Pt.VI, p.24.] are relevant facts.
Such persons are called experts.
Illustrations
(a) The questions is, whether the death of A was caused by poison.
The opinions of experts as to the symptoms produced by the poison by which A is supposed to have died, are relevant.
(b) the question is, whether A, at the time of doing a certain act, was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law.
The opinions of experts upon the question whether the symptoms exhibited by A commonly show unsoundness of mind, and whether such unsoundness of mind usually renders persons incapable of knowing the nature of the acts which they do, or of knowing that what they do is either wrong or contrary to law, are relevant. 16
JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch
(c) The question is, whether a certain document was written by A. Another document is produced which is proved or admitted to have been written by A. The opinions of experts on the question whether the two documents were written by the same person or by different persons, are relevant."
30. Section 47 of the Act, 1872 is as follows:
"47. Opinion as to handwriting, when relevant.
When the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact.
Explanation. - A person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he has seen that person write, or when he had received documents purporting to be written by that person in answer to documents written by himself or under his authority and addressed to that person, or when, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him.
Illustration The question is, whether a given letter is in the handwriting of A, a merchant in London.
B is a merchant in Calcutta, who has written letters addressed to A and received letters 17 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch purporting to be written by him. C is B's clerk, whose duty it was to examine and file B's correspondence. D is B's broker, to whom B habitually submitted the letters purporting to be written by A for the purpose of advising with him thereon.
The opinions of B, C and D on the question whether the letter is in the handwriting of A are relevant, though neither B, C nor D ever saw A write."
31. Section 73 of the Act, 1872 is as follows:
"73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved.
In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose.
The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.
[This section applies also, with any necessary modifications, to finger impressions.] [Inserted by Act 5 of 1899, Section 3.]"18
JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch
32. On a perusal of Section 73 of the Act, 1872, it can be inferred that Court can compare the signature/handwriting on the cheque/instrument/ document with the admitted signature/handwriting of the accused. Needless to state that Court has to be cautious, prudent and careful while undertaking such exercise.
33. Before venturing any further, it is pertinent to refer to the relevant judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State (Delhi Administration) vs. Pali Ram2 held as follows:
"Construed in the light of the English Law on the subject, which is the legislative source of this provision, it is clear that such comparison may be made by a handwriting expert (Section 45) or by one familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned (Section 47) or by the Court (Section
73). The two paragraphs of the section are not mutually exclusive. They are complementary to each other. Section 73 is therefore to be read as a whole in the light of Section 45.
2 AIR 1979 Supreme Court 14 19 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch In addition to Section 73, there are two other provisions resting on the same principle, namely Section 165, Evidence Act and Section 540, Cr.P.C. 1898, which between them invest the Court with a wide discretion to call and examine any one as a witness, if it is bona fide of the opinion that his examination is necessary for a just decision of the case."
34. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee and Others vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee 3 (since deceased and after him his legal representatives and Others), a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held as follows:
"Besides it is necessary to observe that expert's opinion as to handwriting is an opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on such evidence it is useful to see the evidence corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence."
35. In Fakhruddin vs. State of Madhya Pradesh4, the Apex Court held as follows:
"10. Evidence of the identity of handwriting receives treatment in three sections of the Indian Evidence Act. They are Section 45, 47 and 73.
3 AIR 1964 SC 529 4 AIR 1967 SC 1326 20 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch Handwriting may be proved on admission of the writer, by the evidence of some witness in whose presence he wrote. This is direct evidence and if it is available the evidence of any other kind is rendered unnecessary. The Evidence Act also makes relevant the opinion of a handwriting expert (Section 45) or of one who is familiar with the writing of a person who is said to have written a particular writing. Thus besides direct evidence which is of course the best method of proof, the law makes relevant two other modes. A writing may be proved to be in the handwriting of a particular individual by the evidence of a person familiar with the handwriting of that individual or by the testimony of an expert competent to the comparison of handwritings on a scientific basis. A third method (Section 73) is comparison by the court with a writing made in the presence of the Court or admitted or proved to be the writing of the person.
11. Both u/s 45 and Section 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from frequent observations and experience. In either case the court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. One such means open to the court is to apply its own observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the disputed ones, not to become an handwriting expert but to verify the premises of the expert in the one case and to appraise the value of the opinion in the other case. This comparison depends on an analysis of the characteristics in the admitted or proved writings and the finding of the same characteristics in large measure in the disputed writing. In this way 21 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch the opinion of the deponent whether expert or other is subjected to scrutiny and although relevant to start with becomes probative. Where an expert's opinion is given, the court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that the two writings are by the same person. This is not to say that the court must play the role of an expert but to say that the court may accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert or other witness."
36. The Supreme Court in Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab 5 held as follows:
"... expert opinion must always be received with great caution........it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law."
37. In State (Delhi Administration) vs Pali Ram (2 supra), the Apex Court held as follows:
"It will be seen that the first paragraph of Section 73 is, in substance, a combined version of Section 48 of the English Act II of 1855 and Section 8 of the English Criminal Procedure Act, 1865. The second paragraph of Section 73 is substantially the same as 5 (1977) 2 SCC 210 22 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch the English Law condensed by Taylor in the above- quoted portion of paragraph 1871.
Just as in English Law, the Indian Evidence Act recognises two direct methods of proving the handwriting of a person:
(1) By an admission of the person who wrote it.
(2) By the evidence of some witness who saw it written.
These are the best methods of proof. These apart, there are three other modes of proof by opinion a. They are:
(i) By the evidence of a handwriting expert.(Section 45 )
(ii) By the evidence of a witness acquainted with the handwriting of the person who is said to have written the writing in question. (Section 47).
(iii) Opinion formed by the Court on comparison made by itself. (Section 73) All these three cognate modes of proof involve a process of comparison. In mode (i), the comparison is made by the expert of the disputed writing with the admitted or proved writing of the person who is said to have written the questioned document. In (ii), the comparison takes the form of a belief which the witness entertains upon comparing the writing in question, with an exemplar formed in his mind from some previous knowledge or repetitive observance of the handwriting of the person concerned. In the case of (iii), the comparison is made by the Court with the sample writing or exemplar obtained by it from the person concerned.
A sample writing taken by the Court under the second paragraph of Section 73, is, in substance and reality, the same thing as "admitted writing"
within the purview of the first paragraph of Section 73, also. The first paragraph of the Section, as already seen, provides for comparison of signature, 23 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch writing, etc. purporting to have been written by a person with others admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written by the same person. But it does not specifically say by whom such comparison may be made. Construed in the light of the English Law on the Subject, which is the legislative source of this provision, it is clear that such comparison may be made by a handwriting expert (Section 45) or by one familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned (Section 47) or by the Court. The two paragraphs of the Section are not mutually exclusive. They are complementary to each other.
Section 73 is therefore to be read as a whole, in the light of Section 45. Thus read, it is clear that a Court holding an inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of an offence triable by itself or by the Court of Session, does not exceed its powers under Section 73 if, in the interests of justice, it directs an accused person appearing before it, to give his sample writing to enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert chosen or approved by the Court, irrespective of whether his name was suggested by the prosecution or the defence, because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the Court before which he is ultimately put up for trial, to compare the disputed writing with his (accused's) admitted writing, and to reach its own conclusion with the assistance of the expert.
The Hon'ble Apex court Further held:
Since even where proof of handwriting which is in nature comparison, exists, a duty is cast on the Court to use its own eyes and mind to compare, the admitted writing with the disputed one to verify and reach its own conclusion, it will not be wrong to say 24 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch that when a Court seised of a case, directs an accused person present before it to write down a sample writing, such direction in the ultimate analysis, "is for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare" the writing so written with the writing alleged to have been written by such person, within the contemplation of Section 73. That is to say, the words 'for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare' do not exclude the use of such "admitted"
or sample writing for comparison with the alleged writing of the accused, by a handwriting expert cited as a witness by any of the parties. Even where no such expert witness is cited or examined by either party, the Court may, if it thinks necessary for the ends of justice, on its own motion, call an expert witness, allow him to compare the sample writing with the alleged writing and thus give his expert assistance to enable the Court to compare the two writings and arrive at a proper conclusion."
38. In Murarilal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 6, the Apex Court in deviation to its earlier judgment in Pali Ram's case (2 supra)) held as follows:
"11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, that opinion- evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. But, having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the 6 AIR 1980 SC 531 25 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgments of this Court are often flaunted."
39. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy vs. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) Thr Lrs. & Anr. (Civil Appeal NoS.7818-7819 OF 2009) held as follows:
"8. By now, it is well settled that the Court must be cautious while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and not substantive in nature. It is also settled that it may not be safe to solely rely upon such evidence, and the Court may seek independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a given case. Generally, mere expert evidence as to a fact is not regarded as conclusive proof of it. In this respect, reference may be made to a long line of precedents that includes Ram Chandra and Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381, Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 26 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch 1964 SC 529, Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210, and S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 596.
We may particularly refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), where it was observed that the evidence of a handwriting expert can rarely be given precedence over substantive evidence. In the said case, the Court chose to disregard the testimony of the handwriting expert as to the disputed signature of the testator of a Will, finding such evidence to be inconclusive. The Court instead relied on the clear testimony of the two attesting witnesses as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will.
9. On the other hand, in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704, this Court emphasised that reliance on expert testimony cannot be precluded merely because it is not corroborated by independent evidence, though the Court must still approach such evidence with caution and determine its creditworthiness after considering all other relevant evidence. After examining the decisions referred to supra, the Court was of the opinion that these decisions merely laid down a rule of caution, and there is no legal rule that mandates corroboration of the opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. At the same time, the Court noted that Section 46 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter "the Evidence Act") expressly makes opinion evidence open to challenge on facts.
In Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi), (2003) 1 SCC 21, without referring to Section 46 of the Evidence Act, this Court reiterated the observations in Murari Lal (supra) and stressed 27 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch that the Court must exercise due care and caution while determining the creditworthiness of expert evidence.
10. In our considered opinion, the decisions in Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) strengthen the proposition that it is the duty of the Court to approach opinion evidence cautiously while determining its reliability and that the Court may seek independent corroboration of such evidence as a general rule of prudence. Clearly, these observations in Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) do not go against the proposition stated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra) that the evidence of a handwriting expert should rarely be given precedence over substantive evidence."
40. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Manorama Naik's case (1 supra) held as follows:
"That apart, the signatures and handwriting of the person can also be proved under Sections 45, 47 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, opinion of the handwriting expert is not the only way or mode of providing the signature and handwriting of a person."
41. Though there is no legal Bar to compare the disputed signatures with the admitted signatures, as a matter of prudence, caution, the Court(s) should not embark upon itself/themselves in exercise of comparing signatures or hand writings when the 28 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch signature/hand writing is denied. It is advised to refer the same to an expert opinion. The opinion of the expert aids in the decision of the Court depending upon the quality of the opinion rendered. The opinion has to be impeccable, supported by assigning cogent and convincing reasons.
42. The accused is not disputing the cheque (belonging to him) but denying the transaction and the signature on the cheque. The cheque in question has been presented to a bank and the bank returned with an endorsement 'Funds Insufficient'. The material on record sufficiently suggests that the bank has not returned the cheque with endorsement that the 'Drawer Signature Differs'. In the absence of any such endorsement, that the 'Drawer Signature Differs', it is presumed that the cheque belongs to the drawer of the cheque.
29
JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch
43. When a cheque/instrument is presented to the bank for clearance, the banker is obligated to verify the signature on the cheque, the balance in the account and also for inconsistencies, if any, before processing the cheque/instrument further. During the process, if any inconsistencies are noted. An endorsement will be issued noting all the inconsistencies refusing to honour the cheque/instrument presented.
44. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused denied the signature on the cheque. In the order, the trial Court observed that the admitted signatures on MoA and deposition of DW1/accused are not contemporary signatures. It is averred by the complainant that cheque bearing No.049187 is dated 10.06.2014 and the accused has signed on it.
45. It defies the logic of this Court as to how the trial Court could have dismissed the petition on the ground that the signatures on memo of appearance (MoA) and 30 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch deposition(s) are not contemporary signatures. The memo of appearance (MoA) and deposition(s) can only be subsequent to the date of filing of the complaint. In other words, memo of appearance (MoA) and deposition(s) can only be of a later date, i.e., to that of the date on the cheque, cheque is said to have been issued on 10.06.2014 bearing No.049187.
46. The trial Court not only erred but misconceived in dismissing the criminal miscellaneous petition assigning/holding the reason that signatures on the MoA and deposition(s) are not contemporary signatures, this was one of the reasons assigned in the order. Needless to state that, the presumption is against the accused, when evidence relating to ingredients of Section 138 of NI Act is filed by the complainant.
47. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the option left open to the Court was to refer the signature 31 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch on the cheque to FSL with the admitted signatures of the accused on the memo of appearance (MoA), deposition(s) of DW1 and the bank opening form, seeking for an expert opinion. Instead of sending the specimen signature signed by the accused to the FSL, the trial Court dismissed the petition.
48. Having considered the material on record, the submissions made and in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court deems it appropriate to grant liberty to the petitioner/complainant to file fresh criminal miscellaneous petition seeking a direction to send the specimen signature by the accused to FSL. The petitioner/complainant shall file the criminal miscellaneous petition within two (02) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, is directed to pass fresh orders taking into consideration the observations made by this Court supra, within a period of two (02) 32 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch weeks from the date of filing of fresh criminal miscellaneous petition.
49. For reasons aforesaid, the order in Crl.M.P.No.294 of 2025 in C.C.No.8 of 2016 dated 10.06.2025 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, deserves to be quashed and is accordingly quashed. Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 is allowed.
50. In Crl.P.Nos.7590, 7598, 7599 and 7602 of 2025, the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, is on similar lines, which is extracted supra at paragraph No.22 of this order.
51. In Crl.P.Nos.7592, 7600, 7601 and 7603 of 2025, the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, is on similar lines, which is as follows:
"4. Heard both sides.
5. On perusal of the record, the present petition is filed to summons the bank manager along with the bank opening form for sending the said from to FSL to be compared along with the signature on the cheque with admitted documents. However as 33 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch the signature on the bank opening form cannot be considered as contemporary signature and the same cannot be sent to FSL.
Hence, when there is no useful purpose to summons the bank manager as such the present petition cannot be allowed.
6. IN THE RESULT, Petition is dismissed."
52. The orders passed by Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, in the criminal miscellaneous petitions i.e., Cr.M.P.Nos.291, 295, 289, 293 of 2025 are under challenge in Crl.P.Nos.7592, 7600, 7601 and 7603 of 2025. The order is based on the reasoning that the bank opening form cannot be considered as contemporary signature and the same cannot be sent to FSL. This Court is not inclined to uphold the reasoning of the trial Court. The reasons for not upholding are stated in Paragraph Nos.41 and 42 of this order and also for the other reasons stated supra.
53. The orders passed by Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, in all the criminal miscellaneous petitions which are under challenge in this batch of 34 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch criminal petitions deserve to be quashed and are accordingly quashed. The seven (7) criminal petitions, other than Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 (already allowed supra at paragraph No.48) are also allowed.
54. For reasons aforesaid, the orders of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, dated 10.06.2025, in Crl.M.P.No.290 of 2025 in C.C.No.6 of 2016; in Crl.M.P.No.292 of 2025 in C.C.No.7 of 2016, in Crl.M.P.No.291 of 2025 in C.C.No.6 of 2016, in Crl.M.P.No.295 of 2025 in C.C.No.8 of 2016, in Crl.M.P.No.289 of 2025 in C.C.No.5 of 2016, in Crl.M.P.No.288 of 2025 in C.C.No.5 of 2016, in Crl.M.P.No.293 of 2025 in C.C.No.7 of 2016, all order(s) dated 10.06.2025 are hereby quashed. Accordingly, Crl.P.Nos.7599, 7598, 7592, 7600, 7601, 7602 and 7603 of 2025 are allowed.
55. The petitioners/complainants in seven (7) criminal petitions are at liberty to file criminal 35 JAK, J Crl.P.No.7590 of 2025 and batch miscellaneous petitions within two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order seeking a direction to send the specimen signature signed by the accused to FSL. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, is directed to pass fresh orders taking into consideration the observations made by this Court supra, within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of filing of fresh criminal miscellaneous petitions.
56. For reasons aforesaid, all eight (8) Criminal Petitions are allowed and eight (8) orders of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Korutla, dated 10.06.2025 are quashed, with liberty to petitioners/complainants as observed above.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
___________________________ ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI, J Date:07.04.2026 kgk/KH/plp