Madras High Court
T.Sanjeeva Rao vs The Director Of School Education on 27 March, 2012
Author: P.Jyothimani
Bench: P.Jyothimani
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 27.3.2012
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE P.JYOTHIMANI
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VIJAYARAGHAVAN
W.A.No.574 of 2010
T.Sanjeeva Rao .. Appellant
Vs.
1. The Director of School Education
Directorate of School/Public Instruction
College Road, Chennai 6.
2. Madras Christian College Higher Secondary
School, 46, Harrington Road
Chetpet, Chennai 1. .. Respondents
PRAYER: Appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 20.1.2010 in W.P.No.13045 of 2006.
For Appellant : Mr.R.Subramanian
For Respondents : Mr.P.S.Shivashanmugasundaram
Additional Government Pleader
for 1st respondent
Mr.Sanjay Mohan
for M/s.Ramasubramaniam Associates
for 2nd respondent
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by P.JYOTHIMANI,J.) The writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 20.1.2010 passed in W.P.No.13045 of 2006 filed by the appellant. The learned Judge, under the impugned order, while dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant, has held that the second respondent/school, being a minority school, is not having an obligation of constituting a School Committee for the purpose of dealing with disciplinary proceedings against teaching and non-teaching staff and, therefore, held that the order passed by the second respondent/school in removing the appellant from service as a teacher cannot be said to be illegal.
2. The said order of the learned Single Judge is questioned by the appellant on various grounds, including:
(i)that the charges framed against the appellant are flimsy in nature and they have no basis whatsoever and the appellant having been appointed as a Telugu Teacher cannot be compelled to do any other work other than the work for which he was appointed;
(ii)that the appointment of an Enquiry Officer has taken away his right of effectively defending himself;
(iii)that Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (for brevity, "the Act") contemplates the constitution of School Committee in respect of the aided school and the second respondent, being an aided school, ought to have constituted a School Committee which alone is entitled to go into the disciplinary proceedings against the teaching and non-teaching staff; and
(iv)that when the second respondent/school imposes a major punishment of dismissal or removal from service, as per Section 22 of the Act prior approval from the competent authority should have been obtained and inasmuch as such approval has not been obtained, the order of removal passed by the second respondent/ School is liable to be set aside.
3.1. Mr.R.Subramanian, learned counsel for the appellant would vehemently contend that when once Section 22 of the Act explicitly contemplates prior approval in case of dismissal or removal from service, one cannot say that the said provision will not apply to a minority institution. Even though he would admit that the second respondent/ School claims itself to be a religious minority institution, he would contend that inasmuch as Section 22 of the Act contemplates the procedure to be followed and the same has not been heeded to, the order of removal has to be set aside, especially when the second respondent/school, admittedly, is a fully aided minority institution.
3.2. The learned counsel would submit that as a minority institution, the second respondent/school is bound by the provisions of the Act. To buttress the said argument, he would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M.A.Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 and further add that as long as the institution gets aid from the Government, since it is public money which is dealt with, the provisions of the Act should be strictly followed. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the removal which is the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition, affects the interest of not only the appellant, but also affects the national interest and, therefore, by quoting the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M.A.Pai Foundation case, supra, he would submit that the removal from service cannot be held to be valid looking from any angle.
3.3. According to the learned counsel, the above aspects have not been considered by the learned Single Judge and he would submit that the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, has only taken note of Section 15 of the Act and held that the constitution of the School Committee is not a mandatory requirement for minority institution, since it has got a fundamental right under the Constitution of India, which, according to the learned counsel, cannot be taken refuge by the second respondent/school, since the right to administer contemplated under Article 30 of the Constitution of India is not to mal-administer. In other words, he would submit that the removal of the appellant from service in such an arbitrary manner should be treated as mal-administration by the second respondent/School and, therefore, the second respondent/school loses its fundamental right granted under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India.
4.1. On the other hand, Mr.Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/school would submit that when once it is admitted that the second respondent/school is an aided minority institution, there is no question of constituting a School Committee at all and for that purpose he would rely upon the judgments rendered by two Division Benches of this Court, of which one judgment is in respect of the second respondent/School itself, and in the said judgment it has been held that the constitution of the School Committee as per Section 15 of the Act in respect of Madras Christian College Higher Secondary School is not a mandatory requirement. He would also state that when Section 15 of the Act is not applicable, as already held by the Division Bench, which has become final, consequently, Section 22 of the Act also does not apply, as Section 22 of the Act is a corollary to Section 15 of the Act.
4.2. By referring to various portions of the judgment in T.M.A.Pai Foundation case, supra, he would submit that it is not as if the minority institution has got carte blanche. When a minority institution obtains grant from the Government, it has to account for the grant and uniform policy of the Government has to be implemented. However, in respect of the administration of the institution, the Government cannot interfere in any manner, because such interference will amount to making inroads into the fundamental rights guaranteed to the minority institutions. He has also referred to the decision in Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v. Union of India, (1986) 4 SCC 707, wherein the Supreme Court has reiterated the said stand.
4.3. The learned counsel for the second respondent would refer to the counter affidavit filed by the Government in the writ petition, wherein the Government has come forward with a clear case that the second respondent/school, being a minority institution, need not obtain any sanction from the educational authorities mandatorily.
4.4. He would further submit that there is an agreement entered into between the appellant and the second respondent while the appellant entered into service and as per Clause 7(1) of the agreement, the second respondent/school has got a right to terminate the service of the teacher and the only thing required is that an opportunity of being heard must be given while conducting the enquiry, but only in cases where on the ground of incompetence a teacher or non-teaching staff is to be removed from service, it requires approval from the educational authorities and that is a safeguard given to prevent any arbitrary action by the management and in the present case, it is not based on incompetence the appellant was removed from service and it is based on various charges framed against him, in respect of which an enquiry was conducted and, in fact, the appellant has participated in the said enquiry partly and in respect of the remaining part, he refused, for which fault cannot be attributed to the second respondent/school.
4.5. He would submit that if the appellant has any grievance, it is not as if he is left in lurch and his right of first appeal under Section 23 of the Act is not taken away and even if he loses in the first appeal, there is a second appeal which is provided to the Tribunal, which is a judicial authority constituted as per the provisions of the Act. Therefore, even if the appellant wants to point out infirmities or illegalities in the procedure, it is for him to approach the appellate authority and it cannot be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the second respondent, apart from the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent and have gone through the order of the learned Judge and given our anxious thought to the issues involved in this case.
6. On facts, it is clear that the second respondent/School is an aided minority institution. The right given to a minority institution has been constitutionally guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, which is as follows:
"Article 30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.-
(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice."
7. It is true that the minority institution, which is religious or linguistic, is having its own right of administering its institution. The Supreme Court in categoric terms has held that the right to administer means not to mal-administer and of course, in cases where the minority institution is functioning in an improper manner which would amount to mal-administration, the Supreme Court has been interfering in such cases for the purpose of giving redressal to such persons affected by mal-administration.
8. On the facts of the present case, it is seen that certain charges have been levelled against the appellant in the communication of the second respondent dated 17.11.2004. The appellant, who was appointed as a Secondary Grade Teacher (Telugu) in the second respondent/School, was charged with various allegations, namely (i) that in spite of being asked to stay after school hours to help the school boys in activities like supervised study, additional coaching, NSS, JRC, Scout, etc., he was defying the orders of the management; (ii) that he as a Telugu Teacher was given only four periods in a week when other teachers were given 24 to 30 periods a week and it was in those circumstances, the Head Master has allotted the appellant substitution work, which according to the second respondent/School, the appellant refused to do and therefore, it amounts to insubordination; (iii) that he failed to participate in the assembly every day; and (iv) that the appellant failed to sign the acquittance register from the month of February, 2002.
8. It was based on the said allegations, an Advocate was appointed as an enquiry officer and the management appointed one Karthikeyan as the presenting officer to represent its case. An enquiry was conducted. In the enquiry, it is seen that the appellant has originally participated, of course subsequently the appellant did not participate. The Enquiry Officer after completing the enquiry has submitted report and based on the report, the impugned order has been passed on 23.9.2005, which is as follows:
"There is no substance in your response cited above (item no.04), you are removed from service as Post Graduate Assistant with immediate effect.", thereby removing the appellant from service.
9. In respect of the second respondent/school, a similar question arose relating to one another teacher N.Ganapathy in W.P.No.6322 of 2006 (N.Ganapathy v. Director of School Education and others), as to whether Section 15 of the Act applies, thereby mandating the second respondent/school to constitute the School Committee for the purpose of proceeding with disciplinary proceedings against teaching and non-teaching staff. By an order dated 6.3.2006, a learned Judge of this Court, after analysing the provisions of the Act, has held that by virtue of the constitutional guarantee granted under Article 30 of the Constitution of India, there is no obligation on the part of the second respondent/school to constitute a School Committee. The operative portion of the order is as follows:
"3. In my opinion, the relief sought for in this writ petition cannot be granted. The school in which the Petitioner is employed is a minority educational institution and the Director of School Education cannot in any way nominate any person to be an Additional Member of the enquiry conducted by the School and in such an event, it would amount to interference in the right guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution of India to the minority educational institution. Right to establish and administer minority educational institution includes right to take disciplinary action against the erring teachers employed therein. Nevertheless such an action can be taken strictly in accordance with the Procedure and Rules under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 by the properly constituted committee by enquiring into the charges after affording sufficient opportunity to the teacher. However, summary procedure for dismissal is not contemplated even in an educational institution merely on the sole ground that it is a minority educational institution."
10. Thereafter, the appellant filed W.P.No.9133 of 2006 challenging a notice dated 21.2.2006 issued by the second respondent directing the appellant to appear in the enquiry before the Enquiry Officer. A learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein and aggrieved by the same the second respondent filed W.A.No.1159 of 2006. A Division Bench of this Court, while disposing of W.A.Nos.1159 and 1160 of 2006 (Madras Christian College Higher Secondary School v. N.Ganapathi and others), by judgment dated 12.1.2010, has held in clear terms that Section 15 of the Act is not applicable to the second respondent/School. In fact, in the said judgment, the Division Bench has referred to the various observations made by the Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, supra, apart from the decision in the Secretary, Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T.Jose and others, (2007) 1 SCC 386. The operative portion of the said judgment is as follows:
"20. Therefore, it is clear that Section 15 of the Act is not applicable to the appellant school. Further, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Division Bench of this Court, in its order, dated 19.4.2007 passed in the case of T.Nagarajan vs. The Director of School Education, Chennai-6 and three others in W.A.Nos.621 of 2007 after elaborately referring to the decision of the Apex Court in T.M.A.Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka ((2002) 8 SCC 481) and in The Secretary, Malankara Syrian Catholic College vs. T.Jose and Others ((2007) 1 SCC 386) has held as under:-
'It is thus seen that all along, it has been consistently held by various benches of the Supreme Court that the state cannot under the cover or garb of adopting regulatory measures tend to destroy the administrative autonomy of the institution or start interfering with the core of the management of the institution so as to render the right of the administration of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory. Such an interference is violative of Article 30(1) and would be wholly inapplicable to the institution concerned. Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974 which contemplates formation of the School Committee speaks of participating and inclusion of the headmaster and the seniormost teachers employed in the school, and applying this provision in case of a minority institution would amount to encroachment on the right of the minority institution to administer the school.' ...
22. The contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent based on certain observations made in T.M.A. Pai Foundations cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that that decision has been referred and discussed at length by the Division Bench of this Court and only thereafter, it has been held that Section 15 of the Act which contemplates formation of the School Committee is not applicable to the minority educational institutions. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned proceedings issued to the respective petitioners in the writ petitions are against the Rules as observed by the learned Single Judge. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the impugned proceedings, place, time and location for the enquiry have been mentioned and the same has been stated in the affidavit filed by the petitioners in support of the writ petition and the respective petitioners have also stated that they have appeared before the enquiry officer and therefore, it cannot be contended that they were not aware as to before whom they have to appear for the enquiry. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, with great respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge."
Therefore, in respect of the second respondent/school itself there has been an authoritative pronouncement by the Division Bench of this Court holding that there is no mandatory duty on the part of the institution in constituting the School Committee for the purpose of conducting disciplinary proceedings against the teaching and non-teaching staff.
11. The First Bench of this Court also had an occasion to decide a similar issue in respect of another Christian School in W.A.No.621 of 2007 (T.Nagarajan vs. The Director of School Education, Chennai-6). By referring to the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution of India, enumerated above, the First Bench presided by A.P.Shah,C.J. (as His Lordship then was) has observed as follows:
"5. It is thus seen that all along, it has been consistently held by various benches of the Supreme Court that the state cannot under the cover or garb of adopting regulatory measures tend to destroy the administrative autonomy of the institution or start interfering with the core of the management of the institution so as to render the right of the administration of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory. Such an interference is violative of Article 30(1) and would be wholly inapplicable to the institution concerned. Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974 which contemplates formation of the School Committee speaks of participating and inclusion of the headmaster and the seniormost teachers employed in the school, and applying this provision in case of a minority institution would amount to encroachment on the right of the minority institution to administer the school. The Full Bench decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant has no application to the case on hand, since there was no occasion for the Full Bench to consider the case relating to a School Committee in a minority institution. Therefore, the contention that the appellant cannot be proceeded for the disciplinary action unless a School Committee is formed is without any substance."
Therefore, it is clear that when an institution is a minority institution, simply because it is aided whether 100% or otherwise, it does not mean that the Government or legislature either by governmental order or statute can impinge on such right of the minority institution in establishing and administering the institution of its own. Inasmuch as it has been held that Section 15 of the Act is not applicable to a minority institution, there is no difficulty to come to a conclusion that Section 22 of the Act, which is only a consequential one, is also not applicable as far as the factual situation is concerned.
12. It is relevant to point out at this stage that the Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case, supra, has held that the right guaranteed to minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India implies that the Government cannot attempt to interfere with the administration and management of the institution in any form diluting the right conferred under the Constitution. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:
"143. This means that the right under Article 30(1) implies that any grant that is given by the State to the minority institution cannot have such conditions attached to it, which will in any way dilute or abridge the rights of the minority institution to establish and administer that institution. The conditions that can normally be permitted to be imposed, on the educational institutions receiving the grant, must be related to the proper utilization of the grant and fulfilment of the objectives of the grant. Any such secular conditions so laid, such as a proper audit with regard to the utilization of the funds and the manner in which the funds are to be utilized, will be applicable and would not dilute the minority status of the educational institutions. Such conditions would be valid if they are also imposed on other educational institutions receiving the grant."
In the said judgment, the earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v. Union of India, (1986) 4 SCC 707 was quoted with approval to the effect that any regulation providing for prior approval for dismissal in respect of a minority institution was invalid, however, holding that such person who is affected has got a right of appeal, which right cannot be taken away. The relevant portion of the judgment is as under:
"124. ......... In Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Assn. v. Union of India, (1986) 4 SCC 707 the regulation providing for prior approval for dismissal was held to be invalid, while the provision for an appeal against the order of dismissal by an employee to a tribunal was upheld. "
13. Ergo, the right of appeal which has been conferred on teaching and non-teaching staff against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other persons employed in private schools as provided under Section 23 of the Act is certainly not taken away. A reference to Section 23 of the Act, which is as follows:
"Section 23: Appeal against orders of punishment imposed on teachers and other persons employed in private schools:- Any teacher or other person employed in any private school-
(a) who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated; or
(b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered, or interpreted to his disadvantage, by any order, may prefer an appeal against such order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different such authorities or officer as may be prescribed for different classes of private schools.
Explanation: In this section, the expression 'order' includes any order made on or after the date of the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date", makes it clear that the same is applicable to any teacher. Hence, as against the order or removal, if really the appellant has got any grievance on the factual issue, namely that the charges are flimsy in nature; and that the appellant is not bound to do any other work than for which he was appointed, he has to prefer an appeal and the said issues can certainly be canvassed by him before the appellate authority constituted under Section 23 of the Act.
14. It is also relevant to point out that even if the appellant loses his right before the first appellate authority, the Act provides for a second appeal under Section 24 of the Act, which is as follows:
"Section 24: Second appeal in case of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of appointment of teachers or other persons employed in private schools:
If the appeal under Section 23 was against the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or the termination otherwise of the appointment of any teacher or other person employed in any private school, such teacher or other person or the educational agency aggrieved by any order made in any such appeal, may prefer an appeal against that appellate order to the Tribunal", and that appeal is provided to a Tribunal, which is a judicial authority. While the appellant has got an effective remedy available if he is affected by any factual circumstances, he ought to have approached the appellate authority in stead of filing a writ petition. Therefore, it is not as if the appellant is left in lurch, even if his contention is that he is singled out by the management arbitrarily for the purpose of removing him at any cost.
15. On a reference to the counter affidavit filed by the Government in the writ petition, it is clear that the Government has taken a correct stand, in our view, that obtaining sanction or approval for removal in respect of the second respondent/school is not mandatory, even though it is true that such approval is a condition precedent in respect of non minority aided schools. The reliance placed by Mr.R.Subramanian, learned counsel for the appellant heavily on the counter affidavit filed by the Government, especially paragraph (10), which is as follows:
"10. The petitioner did not send any application to the departmental authority. Secondly, the dismissal of the petitioner was not approved by the District Educational Officer, Chennai South, till date. The petitioner neither turned up for duties nor made any request to the management. The petitioner simply filed this writ petition. It is further submitted that the employee was dismissed by employer. The approval for the same is a must under the rules. The dismissal was not approved by the competent authority. The second respondent has not taken further action to reinstate the petitioner or to pay salary from their own funds. It is respectfully submitted that obtaining sanction and approval for the removal/dismissal from the first respondent is not mandatory. Obtaining prior permission to dismiss/remove/terminate the services of a teacher is a precondition for teachers employed in Non-Minority Aided Schools. It is not applicable as for the Minority Schools are concerned. The petitioner has not challenged any order of the first respondent. Hence it is liable to be dismissed itself as for as first respondent is concerned. It is therefore prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the writ petition against the first respondent herein and thus render justice.", certainly will not come to the rescue of the appellant.
16. The further submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that even as per the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent/School, the School has taken a lenient view of removing the appellant from service, instead of dismissing him from service, considering the productive years of service put in by him, and therefore there is a contradiction between the charges framed by the second respondent/ School against the appellant and the said counter affidavit, in our considered view, has no meaning. The contents of the said paragraph relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are as follows:
"12. It is further submitted that after carefully analysing the evidences placed and the supporting documents, the Enquiry Officer has come to conclusion that all the four charges leveled against the petitioner as per charge memo dated 17.11.2004 stand proved vide Enquiry Report dated 06.07.2005. It is submitted that the law member of the second respondent school Mr.S.W.Kanagaraj having concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer vide its letter to the Board of Directors dated 27.07.2005 in all aspects. The committee of the second respondent school discussed the matter and recommended "Removal from service" instead of dismissal considering the number of productive years he had put in the respondent school to enable him to look for employment elsewhere. In view of the said recommendation, the second respondent management issued a show cause notice to the petitioner as to why an order of removal should not be passed. The petitioner replied vide letter dated 21.09.2005. It is submitted that the said reply was considered and having found no substance in it, an order of removal from service was passed with immediate effect vide letter dated 23.09.2005 and the same was communicated to the Petitioner."
From an attentive reading of the said paragraph, we do not see any contradiction. The second respondent appears to have taken a lenient view of removing the appellant from service instead of dismissing him from service, probably for the reason that the dismissal casts a stigma on the service career of the appellant, since he cannot get any re-employment and he has got sufficient years of service available. Thus, using of the words "productive years" does not mean as if the second respondent/School has given a certificate apropos the good conduct of the appellant.
17. Lastly, it is brought to the notice of this Court about the agreement entered into between the appellant and the second respondent/School at the time when the appellant has entered into service. A reference to Clause (7) of the said agreement makes it abundantly clear that the school authority can terminate the service of the teacher without any notice in cases of wilful neglect of duty; serious misconduct; gross insubordination'; mental unfitness, etc., which requires only an opportunity to be heard, which is inherent in any disciplinary proceedings. But in cases where on the ground of incompetence any teacher is to be removed by the second respondent, the second respondent is expected, as per the agreement, to obtain prior approval from the District Educational Officer. For the purpose of proper appreciation of the said power of the school, it is apposite to extract Clause 7(1) of the agreement, which is as follows:
"7. (1) That the school authority shall have the power to terminate the service of the teacher when he becomes a permanent member of the staff of the said school:-
(a) Without notice for any or all of the following reasons:-
Wilful neglect of duty; serious misconduct; gross insubordination; mental unfitness; suspension or cancellation of teacher's certificate by the Director of Public Information under the Madras Educational Rules.
(b) With three months' notice or three month's salary in lieu thereof for the following reasons:-
Incompetence, retrenchment, physical unfitness, or any other good cause:
Provided that -
(i) the school authority shall not terminate the services of the said teacher whether summarily or otherwise without informing him in writing of the grounds on which they intend to take action and giving him what in their view is a reasonable opportunity, for stating his case in writing, and before coming to a final decision, shall duly consider, his statement and if he so desires give him a personal hearing;
(ii) the school authority shall not except with the previous permission of the District Educational Officer, terminate the services of the said teacher for incompetence if he has put in five years of efficient service after being confirmed in his appointment;
(iii) it shall be lawful for the school authority at any time, if satisfied on medical evidence that the said teacher is unfit, and is likely for a considerable period to continue unfit by reason of ill-health, for the discharge of his duties as such teacher, to terminate his services on paying him three months salary less any amount which may have been paid to him as leave allowance after the date of his last appearance in the school for the regular discharge of his duties as teacher subject to a minimum of one month's full salary."
The reliance placed on the said clause by the learned counsel for the appellant is again certainly not useful to the case of the appellant. What is contemplated under the said agreement is that only in cases where the management seeks to remove a teacher on the ground of incompetence, it requires approval from the District Educational Officer and that is for the purpose of preventing arbitrary termination of any teacher on the ground of incompetence by the management. But in cases where there is insubordination or misconduct, etc., it is for the management to take action to terminate the service, but the only requirement is that an opportunity must be given to that teacher. Even a statute which fails to speak about the principles of natural justice must be read as if the principles of natural justice are inherent in the statute. On the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that the appellant has been given opportunity to participate in the enquiry. If the appellant participates only partly and fails to participate in the full enquiry, it does not mean that the second respondent is responsible for the same and no one can jump to a conclusion that the principles of natural justice have been violated. Therefore, in the absence of violation of the principles of natural justice, we do not see any infirmity in the order of the learned Judge.
18. The law is equally well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is basically concerned with the correctness of the decision-making process and not the merit of the decision. If the authority for arriving at such decision does not follow the bare bones of requirements of law, namely the principles of natural justice or audi alteram partem, the court interferes. Applying the said yardstick, we do not see any reason to interfere with the finding of the second respondent/School as well as the finding of the learned Single Judge.
19. It is brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel for the appellant that as against the original impugned order passed by the second respondent/School, the appellant has approached the first respondent and it is only after the first respondent passes order, the appellant can invoke his right of filing an appeal under Section 23 of the Act, followed by further appeal under Section 24 of the Act. If such representation of the appellant is pending with the first respondent, the first respondent shall pass appropriate orders in the manner known to law. There is no impediment for the educational authorities to pass such orders by virtue of this judgment.
In the result, the writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed and the order of the learned Single Judge is confirmed. No costs. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2010 is closed.
sasi To:
The Director of School Education Directorate of School/Public Instruction College Road, Chennai 6