Delhi District Court
Satish Chand Aggarwal vs The State (Govt Of Nct Of Delhi) on 2 July, 2008
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S.K. SARVARIA
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUGDE NEW DELHI
Criminal Appeal No. 07/2003
1. Satish Chand Aggarwal
son of Sh Khairati Lal Aggarwal
of M/s Aggarwal Chemical Works
475, Teliwara, Shahdra, Delhi
2. M/s. Aggarwal Chemical Works
475, Teliwara, Shahdra, Delhi
Appellants
VERSUS
The State (Govt of NCT of Delhi)
Respondent
Date of Institution : 18.03.2003
Date when arguments were
heard/filed : 4.6.2008
Date of Judgment : 2.7.2008
JUDGMENT
This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 25.2.2003 passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi by which he convicted the appellant M/s. Aggarwal Chemical Works and Satish Chand Aggarwal under section 7 read with section 16 of Prevention of :2: Food Adulteration Act (in short PFA Act). While appellants Rattan Kumar, M/s Thakur Brothers and appellant Pramod Kumar are acquitted by the learned trial court and appellant Yoginder Pal Aggarwal and Shiv Dayal Thakur left this mortal world. By subsequent order on sentence dated 27.2.2003 the learned Trial court has sentenced the appellant Satish Chand Aggarwal to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to deposit fine of Rs 1000/. In default of payment of fine he was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The appellant firm was sentenced to deposit a fine of Rs 5000/. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order on sentence passed by the learned trial court appellants have preferred this appeal. BRIEF FACTS The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 23.9.88 at about 1.15 pm Food Inspector Sh Arun Kumar purchased a sample of food color viz. Caramel (Acid proof) from appellant Rattan Kumar at M/s. Thakur Brothers, 1479, S.P. Mukherjee Marg, Delhi where it was stored for sale. The sample consisted of three packets/bottles containing one kg of food color each. Each bottle was separately fastened, marked and sealed as per PFA Act. One counter part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis in intact condition. Public Analyst found the sample of caramel (acid proof) content conforming to the standards. However, there was violation of section 2(ix) (k), Rule 32 (e)
(f), 48A (VI)/48 C and rule 38 of PFA Act. After obtaining the sanction for prosecution from competent authority the complaint was filed :3: against the appellant.
NOTICE Separate notices under section 7 read with section 16 for the offence punishable under section PFA Act were given to the accused persons namely Yoginder Pal Aggarwal, M/s. Aggarwal Chemical Works, Rattan Kumar Thakur, M/s. Thakur Brothers(through Rattan Kumar Thakur), Parmod Thakur, M/s. Aggarwal Chemical Works ( through Yoginder Pal Aggarwal) Satish chand Aggarwal to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
PROECUTION EVIDENCE In support of its case the prosecution has examined six witnesses in all. PW1 Sh Arun Kumar, Food Inspector, PW2 Sh P.K. Jaiswal, Ex Local Health Authority, PW3 Sh R.K. Ahuja, Assistant Local Health Authority, PW4 Sh J.P. Sodhi, Head Clerk, Sales Tax Office Ward No. 41, PW5 Sh Davinder Sharma, LDC Sales Tax, PW6 Sh Krishan Kumar, Record Clerk, City Zone MCD and closed its evidence. PLEA AND DEFENCE OF THE ACCUSED/APPELLANTS In his statement under section 313 CrPC the appellant Satish Chand Aggarwal stated that he was sleeping partner of M/s Aggarwal Chemical. Yoginder Pal was incharge and responsible for day to business of the said firm. Consent had been granted in a mechanical manner without application of mind and complaint has been filed in routine without any basis against him. No intimation was served upon :4: him through postal authority. Appellant further stated that in the year 198586 there was a blast in his factory M/s. Aggarwal Chemical Works. Since then, they had stopped the manufacture of food colour (ceremal acid proof). The firm was manufacturing colour for industrial purpopse only and not for human consumption. The matter was reported in the newspaper.
In his statement under section 313 Cr. P.C. accused Firm M/s Aggarwal Chemical through its authorized representative Yogender Pal stated that in the year 1984 when his firm sold the sample of caramel acid proof there was no requirement of ISI. Batch number, code number were clearly mentioned on the label. It was written 618, 6 was the month of manufacture and 18 as date. Their batch number and code number and date of the manufacture are the same. M/s Aggarwal Chemical Works was a partnership firm during the year 1984 but Yogender Pal alone was incharge and responsible for conduct of business of the firm. Consent has been granted in a mechanical manner without application of mind.
In their defence evidence appellants examined DW1 Sh Rattan Kumar Thakur and DW2 Sh Satish Aggarwal as defence witnesses and closed their defence evidence.
FINDINGS:
I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the trial could record, the appeal file , the written arguments filed on behalf of the appellant and the relevant provisions :5: of law, carefully. Despite opportunities given that the oral arguments addressed nor written arguments filed on behalf of the respondent State.
The contentions on behalf of the appellants are that in the absence of bill/invoice a vendor cannot be given the benefit of a warranty of the manufacturer printed in the label. The proof of the Bill of the manufacturer in the court is a must for acquittal of the vendor but the coaccused the vendors were let off by the learned trial court without proof of the bill/invoice of the appellants. It is argued that the sale was made to Thakur Brothers, the coaccused in the year 1984 85, i.e., before the incorporation of the Rule 48C and the sample data was manufactured much earlier. Therefore, Rule 48C is inapplicable against the appellants. It is argued that the sale was for industrial use as shown in the vendor's receipt issued to Food Inspector by the vendor, the coaccused. The next argument is that as regards Rule 32
(e), i.e., mentioning batch No. on the label this clause was declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court to be beyond the scope of Rule making authority and hence is invalid so the appellant cannot be held guilty for the same. The next contention is that the appellant No.1 was not the person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the Appellant No.2 firm within the meaning of section 17 of the PFA Act so he cannot be held guilty in the present case. In support of these arguments several authorities are also relied upon which will be discussed later.
:6: Before appreciating the arguments raised on behalf of the appellants it is to be pointed out that out of the seven accused persons who faced trial before the learned trial court one accused Shiv Dayal Thakur expired even before filing the complaint against the accused persons before the learned trial court and the coaccused Yoginder Pal Agarwal died during pendency of the case before the learned trial court. Out of the remaining five accused persons the coaccused Ratan Kumar Thakur and coaccused M./S. Thakur Brothers, 1479, SP Mukherjee Marg, Delhi were acquitted by the learned trial court by the same impugned judgement on 25/2/2003 while the present two appellants were convicted and sentenced.
In support of his contention that in the absence of bill/invoice issued by the appellants being manufacturers in favour of the vendors coaccused persons who are acquitted by the learned trial court, the acquittal is not justified and so also the conviction of the appellants the learned counsel for appellants has relied upon the following authority:
In M/s. Murlidhar Shyamlal & Anr v. State of Assam 1996 (II) All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal (AIPFAJ) 82 (SC), relied on behalf of the appellants , it was observed as follows :
"9........In view of the above warranty as envisaged under Form VIA, there must be specific mention therein by the dealer or distributor or manufacturer, that the article of food sold was in the same nature and quality of :7: the article of food, as the case may be. Then only he would get acquitted, though the article of food was found adulterated. It would be then open to the prosecution to proceed against the manufacturers, dealer or distributor.
10. It is then contended that cash memo contains such a recital and he has taken us through the evidence stated by the witness. From the evidence, it is not clear that it contained a warranty as prescribed in Form VI A. Counsel seeks to place reliance on the judgment of this Court in K. Ranganatha Reddiar v. The State of Kerala (1969) 2 SCC
457. In that case, since the cash memo was produced as a part of the record and on consideration of recitals, this Court had considered that when a cash memo was given by the dealer to the accused, it must be construed in the language employed therein and the benefit of doubt was given. In this case, we cannot make any guess as to what would be the nature of the language used in the cash memo which was not filed in the absence of any specific recital therein. As seen in the recital of the Panchanama, there is no mention thereof as envisaged in Form IVA. Under these circumstances, we are constrained to confirm the conviction and sentence minimum period of six months and is a mandatory after the Amendment Act, 1976, we cannot interfere with the sentence."
The section 14 of the PFA Act so far is relevant, makes it mandatory for the manufacturer to give warranty to the article of the :8: food in the prescribed form. The proviso to the section shows that every manufacturer etc has issued a bill, cash memo or the invoice in respect of the food article to the vendor then it shall be deemed to be a warranty given by the manufacturers etc. Therefore, if a bill, invoice or cash memo is produced by the vendor then he is absolved from the liability in the case. But the bill, cash memo or the invoice cannot be said to be the only mode by which sale by the manufacturer etc to the vendor of the food item is proved. In the absence of such a document the sale by manufacturer etc to the vendor can be proved by the record of the vendor or of the manufacturer etc pertaining to the sale of the food item. Likewise it can also be proved by way of admission of the manufacturer etc that the sale of the food article in question was done by the manufacturers etc to the vendor. In Muralidhar Shyam Lal's case (supra) relied on behalf of the appellants the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the absence of cash memo searched the recital of the panchnama to know if the sale was made to the vendor. Coming to the facts of the present case, here it is not disputed that the sale of the sampled article was made by the appellant No.2 to the vendor, the co accused persons who in turn sold the sample to the Food Inspector. This fact is specifically admitted by appellant No.2 partnership firm through its partner Shri Yoginder Prasad Agarwal by document Ex PW2/X1 in response to the letter issued by the Department of Prevention of Food Adulteration by stating that the sale made to M./S. Thakur Brothers was effected in the year 1984/1985. Therefore, the learned trial court rightly held that the vendor was not liable and was :9: entitled to the benefit of label warranty. The Muralidhar Shyam Lal's case (supra) does not come to the rescue of the appellants. In any case since the sampled article was found to conform to the specified standards, the question raised pales into insignificance. Also, because there is no appeal against the acquittal of the vendors filed by the prosecution before this court, there is no need to go into details of the circumstances leading to acquittal of the coaccused vendors in the present appeal.
In Dwarka Nath and another v. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1972 FAC 1 (SC), relied on behalf of the appellants it was observed as follows :
"22..........It is difficult for us to appreciate how the giving of the batch number or the code number alone without giving any further particulars such as date of manufacture of the article of food and the period within which the said article has to be utilised, used or consumed and the quantity of the article in a cantainer, will prevent the Public or the purchaser being deceived or misled as to the character, quality or quantity of the article. No attempt has been made by the respondent to establish any relation between the giving of the batch number or the code number with the public or the purchaser being prevented from being deceived or misled in respect of the matters referred to in clause (d). We are not able to find any rational or even a remote :10: connection between the batch or code number artificially given by a packer and the public or the purchaser being prevented from being deceived or misled as to the character, quality or quantity of the article, contained in a sealed tin.
23. There is no definition of the expression "batch number" or "code number" either in the Act or the Rules. It is also admitted that even assuming that the batch or code number has to be given, there is not further obligation to specify in the label the date of packing and manufacture of the article of food or the period within which the article of food has to be utilised, used or consumed. In the absence of any obligation to give the particulars mentioned by us above, the public or the purchaser will not be able to find out even the freshness of the contents of a cantainer. Therefore, it follows that merely giving an artificial batch number or code number will not be of any use to the public or to the purchaser. In view of all these circumstances we are of the opinion that rule 32 (e) is beyond the rule making power even under Section 23 (1) (d) of the Act. The appellants could not be convicted for any violation of clause (e) of rule 32 as the said provision, as pointed out above, is invalid."
In Bharat Arora and other v. The State 2001(1) FAC 41 (Del), also relied on behalf of the appellants it was observed as follows:
"2. The gravamen of the charge against the petitioner was that the batch number was not mentioned on the labels of the tins used for storing the food articles, to viz., mixed pickels, :11: which was contrary to the provisions of Rule 32
(e). Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that no prosecution could be launched against the petitioner for the alleged violation of the rule 32(e) of the Rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act inasmuch as the said rule has been declared by the Supreme Court as ultra vires in the case of Dwarka Nath v. MCD 1972 FAC 1. In my opinion, the aforesaid statement of the learned counsel merits acceptance."
It was further held as follows:
"In my opinion, the case in hand is squarely convered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath and thus the petitioners' prosecution is liable to be quashed."
In the light of the above dictum of Hon 'ble Supreme Court and our Hon'ble High Court I am compelled to accept the argument of learned counsel for appellant that the appellants cannot be held guilty for violation of Rule 32. It was also argued on behalf of the appellants that as regards the violation of Rule 32 (e) the complainant has admitted that the figure 618 printed on the label could be the batch. No. It is to be noted that the sample in question was taken by the Food Inspector on 23/9/1988. The submission on behalf of the appellants is that the new Rule 32 came into being by GSR 422 (E) dated 29/4/1987 and will be effective with effect from 29/4/1989., i.e., after the sample was lifted in 1988. There is great force in the arguments raised on behalf of the appellants as regards violation of Rule 32.
:12: As regards the argument that appellant No.1 was neither person in charge nor responsible for the daytoday affairs of the appellant No.2 partnership firm the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following case law:
In Commissioner and Director of Agriculture, Govt. of A.P. Hyderabad v. Tropical Agro Systems India Ltd., Vijayawada 2001 (1) FAC 43 (AP) (DB), it was observed as follows :
"14. To launch a prosecution therefore, against the alleged Directors there must be a specific allegation in the complaint as to the part played by them in the transaction. There should be clear, and unambiguous allegation as to how the Directors are in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. The description should be clear. It is true that precise words from the provisions of the Act need not be reproduced and the Court can always come to a conclusion in facts of each case. After all while analysing common sense cannot be left in cold storage. But still in the absence of any averment or specific evidence the net result would be that complaint would not be entertainable."
In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Des Raj and another 1984 (II) FAC 163 (Del) (DB), relied on behalf of the appellants, it was observed as follows :
"9...........The existence of following three conditions must be proved:
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(i) The partner sought to be made liable must be in charge of the partnership business.
(ii) He must be responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the partnership, and
(iii) The relevant time for the fulfilment of the aforesaid two conditions is the commission of the offence and not before or after the same.
In the present case, the aforesaid conditions do not stand proved. There is no evidence at all that at the time of commission of the offence, Om Parkash was in charge of or responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the partnership. The learned counsel for the Corporation relied upon the statement of Shri Prem Parkash, Food Inspector, to the effect that on 3rd May 1973 when he went to deliver a copy of the report of the Public Analyst at the premises in question, he found Om Parkash and Jai Ram Singh working and selling goods at the shop.
According to the said learned counsel that raised an inference that Om Parkash was also in charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the partnership firm. Learned counsel for proving existence of partnership relied upon the statement of Pritam Lal Chawla (PW3), Inspector, Incometax, Naya District, I. P. Estate, New Delhi, who brought the file maintained in incometax department relating to the respondents and stated that respondents 2 to 5 were partners of respondent No. 6 firm M/s. Manak Chand Jai Ram Singh.
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10. But the mere fact that Om Prakash was found working at the shop on 3rd May 1973, which was much later to the date of commission of the offence is of no relevance.
That cannot prove that he was in charge of and was conducting the business of the partnership on the date of the commission of the offence which was 29th March 1973."
In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kishan Lal 1975 FAC 292 (Del) (DB), relied on behalf of the appellants, it was observed as follows :
"6.There is, however, no evidence on the record from which it may appear that the respondent was at the time the offence was committed in charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company. The statement filed under section 5 of the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, on which reliance was placed by the prosecution, itself shows that besides the respondent three other persons were his associates or partners. In defence Ram, Kumar Kaushal, a head clerk in the time and pay office of Swatantra Bharat Mills, was produced and he deposed that from July 7, 1964 Kishan Lal was working in the Mills. He further stated that the attendance register showed Kishan Lal to be on duty in the Mills on April 24, 1969 from 630 a.m. to 230 p.m.
7. In the absence of evidence that the respondent was at the time the offence was committed in charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of :15: the Company, section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act had no application to the case."
In State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand and others 1981(I) FAC 374 (SC), again relied on behalf of the appellants, it was observed as follows :
"7........In the present case the second respondent was sought to be made liable on the ground that he along with the first respondent was in charged of the conduct of the business of the firm. Section 23C of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 which was identically the same as Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act came up for interpretation in G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta, 1971 Vol. III S.C.R. 748. It was observed as follows :
"What then does the expression `a person in charge and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of a company mean'? It will be noticed that the word 'company' includes a firm or other association and the same test must apply to a director incharge and a partner of a firm incharge of a business. It seems to us that in the context a person should be in over all control of the day to day business of the company or firm. This inference follows from the wording of Section 23C(2). It mentions director, who may be a party to the policy being followed by a company and not be in charge of the company. Further it mentions manager, who usually is in charge of the business but not in overallcharge. Similarly the other officers may be in charge of only :16: some part of business."
8. The evidence in the present case shows that it was respondent No. 1 and not respondent No. 2 who was in over all control of the day to day business of the firm. The second respondent is not liable to be convicted merely because he had the right to participate in the business of the Partnership Deed."
Coming to the facts of the present case there is no convincing evidence on record that the appellant No.1 was looking after the affairs of the appellant No.2 , the partnership firm during the relevant period. The prosecution at the most has proved that the appellant No. 1 was the partner of the partnership firm, i.e., appellant No.2 which is not sufficient to foist vicarious liability upon the appellant No.1. The appellant No. 1 has taken the plea that he was member of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi during the period 1983 to 1/1/1990. He has proved his identity card Ex DW2/A which supports his plea. He as DW2 stated that he never did any business activity during 5/2/1983 to 1/1/1990 related to the said firm. He was sleeping partner and his name was in record but he never carried out any activity in the capacity of business partner. There is nothing in the crossexamination of the appellant No.1, DW 2 which may discredit his this statement. The fact that the appellant No. 1 was a Municipal Councillor during the period 1983 to 1/1/1990 is not disputed by the prosecution before learned trial court. Further the other partner of the appellant No.2 firm has also stated both in the letter Ex PW2/X1 as well as in his statement :17: recorded by the learned trial court under section 313 CrPC that appellant No.1 was only a sleeping partner in the firm. Under the circumstances, the learned trial court did not appreciate this aspect residing section 17 of the PFA Act qua appellant No.1 as regards the vicarious liability alleged against him by the prosecution by virtue of section 17 of the PFA Act. The appellant No.1 is entitled to acquittal on this count alone. The other partner of the partnership firm appellant No.2 Yoginder Prasad Agarwal who admitted himself to be looking after the affairs of the firm in the letter Ex PW2/X1 has left for heavenly abode during pendency of trial before learned trial court.
The next question raised is that Rule 48C was made effective with effect from 26/3/1985 but the sample in question was collected by Food Inspector from the vendor on 23/9/1988 so no liability of the appellants arises under the said Rule 48C. Reliance is placed upon the authority reported as Corn Products Company (India) Ltd. Mumbai and another v. State of Maharashtra and others 2002 (1) FAC 251 (Bom) wherein, it was observed as follows :
"12..........In the Notifications issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Department of Health, dated 15th April, 1988 and 29th March, 1990, it is an admitted position that the use of Brominated Vegetable Oils was not restricted during February 1990 when the soft drink concentrate were admittedly manufactured and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners, have committed any offences under the provisions :18: of the Prevention of rood Adulteration Act and Rules framed thereunder. The contention of the respondent that the manufacturer was liable on account of the sale of the said articles by the retailer at the time when the sale had become unlawful, cannot be accepted. It is inconceivable to prosecute a person who does what is right and proper and complies with the law should be made responsible for something which takes place long after he parted with the goods."
The contention on behalf of the appellants is that the sample was lifted in 1988 and the the sampled article was sold to the vendor by the appellant No.2 firm in the year 198485, i.e., before the incorporation of Rule 48C and the goods in question must have been manufactured much earlier. There is lack of direct evidence of the parties on the question when the sale was made by the manufacturer of the sampled article to the vendor in this case. Although the burden to prove the case as a whole lies on the prosecution but in the circumstances when the documentary proof as to the actual sale of the article by the manufacturer to the vendor is supposed to be with the manufacturer and vendor in the form of bill/invoice/cash memo issued by the manufacturer to the vendor, or by the other record , it is for them also to bring on record the actual position. The vendor who sold sampled article to the Food Inspector has not produced the cash memo/bill/invoice issued by the manufacturer, i.e., appellant No.2 to them. Likewise, the appellants have also not produced it. The plea of :19: the appellants is that their manufacturing unit caught fire and the records of appellant No.2 were destroyed in it and for this purpose they have proved the newspaper cuttings dated 8/5/1986 Ex. DW1/1 and Ex . DW1/X2. Therefore, they were unable to produce the court to show that the sampled articles were sold prior to the coming into force of the Rule in question.
There is another very important circumstance in this case which cannot be overlooked. The learned trial court has relied heavily upon the document Ex PW2/X1 sent by the deceased partner Shri Yoginder Prasad Agarwal in which he has admitted that the article in question was sold to the vendor the coaccused in the case , to acquit the co accused persons. The document proved on the record of the court should be read as a whole. Normally, if the document is to be relied it should be relied as a whole. There has to be some compelling evidence or circumstances to rely on one part of the same document and discard the other. This document is proved by the prosecution witness PW2 in the crossexamination. It appears that it is only on the basis of the document that the appellants and the deceased partner Joginder Prasad Agarwal were impleaded as accused persons in the complaint case as in this document the name of the partners and the sale of the sampled article to the vendor is admitted by the manufacturer and the photocopy of the partnership deed was enclosed for reference to the PFA Department. The fact that the document was sent to PFA Department prior to filing of the complaint against the :20: appellants and the other accused persons, in response to the letter of the PFA Department and also the fact that the deceased partner of appellant No.2 Yoginder Prasad Agarwal has made admission about very incriminating facts about the constitution of the firm and name of its partners and about himself and about sale of the article in question to the vendor shows that this letter was sent , without any legal consultation , in the ordinary course of business by the person in charge of and responsible to the affairs of the partnership firm by stating the factual and correct position in his knowledge. Therefore, I am of the view that the document should be relied as a whole and not for exonerating the vendor accused persons alone as done by the learned trial court. This important document lends support to the case of the appellant is that the sale of the article in question to the vendor coaccused was made in the year 198485. The fact that Rule 48C came into being by virtue of Notification GSR 28.3 (E). Dated 26/3/1983 and was to take effect with effect from 26 /3/1985 cannot be in dispute. This Notification copy of which is placed on record on behalf of the appellants, makes it necessary to have ISI mark on Caramel Food Grade with effect from 26/3/1985. The record of the appellant No.2 firm having been destroyed in the year 1986 in fire is also reported in the newspapers the relevant part of the copies of which are proved on behalf of the appellants before learned trial court, as referred before and also this fact is highlighted in the document Ex PW2/X1 which fact raises presumption in favour of the appellants the sale of sampled article was made to the vendor coaccused by the :21: appellants/manufacturerst prior to come into force of the Notification in question as argued on behalf of the appellants.
It has to be remembered that although the burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution is the essential requirement of the criminal trial and there are two important principles in favour of the accused. One, the burden to prove its defence by the accused can be successfully discharged by proving his case on preponderance of probabilities and even by the defence which may throw a reasonable doubt in prosecution case. Two, if there are two views possible as to any circumstance or fact, one view favouring the prosecution and the other the accused, the view which supports the case of the accused is to be accepted. These two principles if applied to the above question certainly entitles the appellants to the benefit of doubt by accepting the view that the sale of the sampled article was made to the vendor prior to coming into force of the Rule 48C. There is another argument raised on behalf of the appellants that it is not proved that the sale of sampled article was for human consumption and the receipt is issued by the vendor to the Food Inspector show that it was for industrial use which fact also finds mention on the label of the sampled article. But the definition of food as given in section 2 (v) of the PFA Act includes not only the food articles or drink for human consumption but also flavouring matter and condiments. The caramel colour, the sampled article , even if used by :22: any industrial unit for the purpose of use in food articles for sale would certainly fall within this definition of 'food 'given in the PFA Act. Therefore, I am unable to accept this contention raised on behalf of the appellants.
In the light of the aforesaid facts and findings the appellants, in my view, are entitled to benefit of doubt in this case. RESULT OF APPEAL:
In view of the above discussion the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgement of conviction and the consequent impugned order on sentence passed by the learned trial court against the appellants are setaside. The appellants are acquitted of the offences under sections 7/16 of the PFA Act read with Rules 32 and 48C for which they were convicted by the learned trial court. The fine, if paid by the appellants in terms of the impugned order of sentence passed by the learned trial court, be directed by the learned trial court to be refunded to them. The bail bonds furnished in the appeal are cancelled. The trial court record be returned alongwith the copy of this judgment. The judgment be sent to the server (www.delhidistrictcourts.nic.in). The appeal file be consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open court on nd 2 day of July, 2008 (S. K. SARVARIA) Additional Sessions Judge New Delhi :23: