State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Sales Manager, Autopace Network Pvt. ... vs Harvinder Singh & Others on 23 May, 2024
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
PUNJAB, CHANDIGARH.
First Appeal No.54 of 2023
Date of institution : 23.01.2023
Reserved On : 16.05.2024
Date of decision : 23.05.2024
Sales Manager, Autopace Network Private Limited, through its
Authorised Representative, Plot No.112-113, Industrial Area, Phase-1,
Chandigarh in Complaint mentioned as the Sales Manager, Autopace
Network Pvt. Ltd. (Authorized Maruti Suzuki Dealer) A-1, Focal Point,
Dera Bassi, District SAS Nagar (Mohali);
2nd Address: Purse Plaza, Chandigarh-Ambala Highway, Dera Bassi,
District SAS Nagar (Mohali).
3rd Address: near PNB Opposite Chander Hospital, Chandigarh-
Ambala Highway, Dera Bassi, District SAS Nagar (Mohali).
....Appellant/OP No.2
Versus
1. Harvinder Singh son of Sh. Malkiat Singh, V&PO Bolarh Kalan,
Tehsil and District Patiala.
2. Dharmender Singh son of Hukam Singh, resident of Village
Jawala Kalan, Tehsil Dera Bassi, District SAS Nagar (Mohali).
....Respondents/Complainants
3. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., through the General Manager, 1,
Nelson Mandela Road, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi-110070.
4. Modern Automobiles (Authorized Maruti Suzuki Dealer), 4 M.W.
Industrial Area, Phase-1, Chandigarh.
.....Respondents/OPs No.1 & 3
First Appeal under Section 41 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 against the
order dated 23.12.2021 passed by the
First Appeal No.54 of 2023 2
District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali).
Quorum:-
Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Daya Chaudhary, President
Ms. Simarjot Kaur, Member
1) Whether Reporters of the Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2) To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes/No
3) Whether judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes/No Present:-
For the Appellant : Sh. P.K. Kukreja, Advocate
For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Sh. J.S. Moudgil, Advocate.
JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY, PRESIDENT
Appellant/OP No.2 i.e. Sales Manager, Autopace Network Private Limited through its Authorized Representative has filed the present Appeal under Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 being aggrieved by the order dated 23.12.2021 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali) (in short, "the District Commission") in CC No.579 of 2015.
2. It would be apposite to mention here that hereinafter the parties will be referred, as had been arrayed before the District Commission.
3. Briefly, the facts of the case, which are necessary for disposal of the present Appeal, are that Respondents No.1 & 2/Complainants had filed CC No.579 of 2015 before the District Commission with the prayer that the directions be issued to the OPs to First Appeal No.54 of 2023 3 refund the total price of the car i.e. ₹3,11,585/- along with interest @ 12% per annum or to replace the car with the new one and also to pay a composite amount of ₹6.50 lacs towards compensation including litigation expenses.
4. Notices of the Complaint were issued to the OPs. OPs No.1 & 2 had appeared and filed separate replies, wherein certain preliminary objections were raised. All other averments as made in the Complaint were denied and it was prayed that the compliant be dismissed. However, OP No.3 did not appear before the District Commission despite service and was proceeded ex parte vide order dated 04.02.2016.
5. By considering the contents of the Complaint and reply thereof filed by OPs No.1 & 2, the Complaint was allowed against OP No.2 and it was dismissed against OP No.1 vide impugned order dated 23.12.2021 by issuing directions to OP No.2 to pay a consolidated amount of compensation of ₹3 lac along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of purchase of the car within a period of 30 days from the date of the order.
6. Said order dated 23.12.2021 passed by the District Commission has been challenged by the Appellant/OP No.2 by way of filing the present Appeal by raising a number of arguments.
7. There was a delay of 298 days in filing of the Appeal. Misc. Application No.438 of 2023 has been filed for condonation of delay, First Appeal No.54 of 2023 4 which is supported by an Affidavit. Reply to said Application has also been filed.
8. Mr. P.K. Kukreja, learned Counsel for the Appellant/OP No.2 has submitted that the Complainant had intentionally not impleaded the dealer i.e. M/s Autopace Networks Pvt. Ltd., who was a necessary party and had only impleaded the then Sales Manager personally as OP No.2. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the impugned order dated 13.12.2021 was never served upon the Appellant or even upon the earlier Sales Manager as he had resigned from the job. The address of the OP pertains to Sales Manager of stock yard, which used to be usually remained closed. The case was being contested before the District Commission through Counsel and it remained pending for a longer period for one reason or the other. Learned Counsel has further submitted that a number of cases were there before the District Commission and some of the cases were transferred from District Commission, Mohali to other District Commissions of the State. Further, it has been submitted that in the year 2021, the District Commission had reserved the order without hearing the parties. Thereafter, the Authorized Representative of the Appellant was present before the District Commission on 01.10.2021 and he was told by the Court staff that all the cases of the period of more than 5 years were kept reserved and in case there was any urgency, the notice would be issued to the parties to address the First Appeal No.54 of 2023 5 arguments. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the Appellant was not attending the Court after 01.10.2021. However, the Counsel for the Appellant and the Authorized Representative used to appear before the District Commission on each and every date prior to said date. Learned Counsel has further submitted that on 09.01.2023, some police officials had visited the office of the Appellant for execution of the process of the District Commission against one Jagjit Singh, the earlier Sales Manager and had informed the Appellant about the passing of the impugned order. So, the Appellant came to know about the passing of the order for the first time on 09.01.2023. Thereafter, the Appellant had approached the Counsel at Chandigarh and enquired about the status of the Complaint. Thereafter, the Counsel had confirmed about the passing of the impugned order dated 23.12.2021 against OP No.2. Further, the Appellant had approached the District Commission with the request to supply the copy of the order as per the provisions of the Act but his request was not accepted and the copy of the order was not delivered/sent to him. Thereafter, the Appellant had filed an Application to supply the certified copy of the order on payment basis and the same was delivered to him for the first time on 10.01.2023. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the applicant was shocked to know that the Complaint had been decided without issuing any notice, as none was present at the time of hearing of the case and as such the Appellant was deprived from contesting First Appeal No.54 of 2023 6 the case or raising oral arguments before the District Commission. Learned Counsel has further submitted that during the period of COVID-19, the limitation for filing the Appeals/cases was extended as per the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 and thereafter also the directions for extension of the period of limitation were issued from time to time and the limitation period was extended w.e.f. 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022. The period of limitation for filing the Appeal had expired on 31.03.2022 but the period w.e.f. 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 is required to be excluded. At the end, learned Counsel has submitted that the Appellant came to know about the passing of the impugned order only on 09.01.2023 and thereafter the Appeal was immediately filed on 23.01.2023. The delay in filing of the Appeal was neither wilful nor intentional but it was for the reasons as mentioned above and as such the delay in filing of the Appeal is liable to be condoned.
9. Mr. J.S. Moudgill, learned Counsel for Respondents No.1 & 2/Complainants has opposed the submissions made by learned Counsel for the Appellant. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the Appellant had concocted a false story that the address of the Appellant/OP No.2 pertain to Sales Manager of stock yard, which usually remained closed. It has been submitted that Appellant was contesting the Complaint before the District Commission and had filed the written reply and evidence. There is First Appeal No.54 of 2023 7 long delay in filing of the Appeal and no satisfactory explanation has been given for condonation of delay and as such, the delay cannot be condoned. The Appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
10. We have heard the arguments raised by learned Counsel for the parties. We have also carefully perused the impugned order passed by the District Commission and all other relevant documents available on the file.
11. The Appellant has prayed for condonation of delay of 298 days in filing of the Appeal on the ground that the free certified copy of the impugned order dated 23.12.2021 was never served/supplied upon the Appellant or upon the earlier Sales Manager, who had resigned from the job. He came to know about the passing of the impugned order only on 09.10.2023 when some police officials had visited the office for compliance of the impugned order and thereafter the certified copy of the order was obtained from the District Commission on 10.01.2023 and thereafter Appeal was filed on 23.01.2023 without any further delay.
12. On perusal of the record of the District Commission, it is apparent that notices of the Complaint were issued to the OPs on 09.11.2015 and the Appellant/OP No.2 had appeared through Counsel before the District Commission on 24.12.2015. Reply of OP No.1 was received through post. However, none had appeared on behalf of OP First Appeal No.54 of 2023 8 No.3 and ultimately it was proceeded ex parte vide order dated 04.02.2016. The Appellant/OP No.2 had also filed the written reply and evidence in support of its defence. The written arguments were also filed by the Appellant/OP No.2 before the District Commission on 04.10.2018. Thereafter, the case was fixed for arguments and the case was adjourned on a number of occasions for arguments and the Counsel for OP No.2 had been appearing in the case. OP No.2 had appeared before the District Commission through Sh. Rakesh Kumar, HR Manager on 27.02.2020 also but thereafter, none had appeared on behalf of OP No.2.
13. The stand of the Appellant is that the Appellant was present before the District Commission on 01.10.2021 and he was informed by the Court staff that all the cases, which were more than 5 years old, were kept reserved and in case there was any necessity, the notice would be issued to the parties to address their arguments. However, none remained present on behalf of OP No.2 and no such reason was mentioned in the zimni order dated 01.10.2021, which is reproduced as under:
"Present: None for the Complainant None for OP Nos.1 and 2 OP No.3 ex parte.
Ld. President is away to Ropar for performing his duties there. Put up for 04.01.2022 for further proceedings.
Bench Clerk/01.10.2021."First Appeal No.54 of 2023 9
14. On perusal of said zimni order dated 01.10.2021, it is apparent that the Appellant has taken a wrong stand that he was informed by the Court staff that all the cases more than 5 years old were kept reserved and in case there was any necessity, the notice would be issued to the parties to address the arguments. The case was simply adjourned to 04.01.2022 for further proceedings, as the President was away to Ropar for performing his duties there.
15. Further the plea raised by the Appellant is that the free certified copy of the impugned order dated 23.12.2021 was never served upon him and the passing of the impugned order came to his notice only on 09.01.2023 when the police officials had visited his office for compliance of the impugned order passed by the District Commission. However, the facts remains that the Appellant had been contesting the Complaint by way of filing the written reply and evidence and even the written arguments were filed on his behalf. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Appellant was not having any knowledge about the pendency of the Complaint as well as passing of the impugned order.
16. The Appellant has also filed Misc. Application No.970 of 2023 seeking permission to place on record the free certified copy of the impugned order stating that it was received by him on 27.07.2023. It was further stated therein that the free certified copy sent to the Appellant was received back un-served with the postal report 'no such First Appeal No.54 of 2023 10 person'. On the other hand, the Appellant has raised the plea that the free certified copy of the impugned order was never served upon him. However, as already mentioned above, the Appellant had been contesting the Complaint by way of filing written reply and evidence and even the written arguments were filed on his behalf. So, non- receipt of the free certified copy is of no help to the Appellant.
17. The impugned order was passed by the District Commission on 23.12.2021. Admittedly, due to the pandemic of COVID-19, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had passed following order dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No.3/2020 in re:
Cognizance of Extension of Limitation":
3. "This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/Applications/ suits/Appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State).
4. To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country, including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March, 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings."
18. The period of limitation to file any Suit, Appeal, Application or any other proceedings was further extended in view of order No.95 of 2021 dated 29.09.2021 passed by the Hon'ble National Commission in pursuance of the order dated 23.09.2021 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.A. No.665 of 2021 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 titled as "In Re: Cognizance For Extension of First Appeal No.54 of 2023 11 Limitation". The Hon'ble Supreme Court had further extended the period to file such cases till 01.03.2022 vide order dated 10.01.2022 passed in the said case.
19. In view of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble National Commission vide Office Order No.7 of 2022 dated 14.01.2022 had issued the following directions:
"II. Computation of delay in such matters in which Limitation expires between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022:
The delay in filing the matters, i.e., Revision Petitions, First Appeals, Consumer Complaints, Written Statements, Applications, etc., where limitation is expiring between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022, shall be computed in the following manner:
(i) The period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded for computing limitation.
(ii) Limitation shall be further extended by 90 days from 01.03.2022, i.e. till 29.05.2022.
Since 29.05.2022 is Sunday, the matters filed on 30.05.2022 will be considered to have been filed within limitation. However, if matters are filed on 31.05.2022 or thereafter, then delay shall be computed from 30.05.2022 onwards.
(iii) The matters in which the limitation (provided in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 or the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, as may be applicable) is expiring during the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 (i.e., before 01.03.2022) and such a matter is filed during the same period (i.e., from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022) with some delay, such matter shall be treated as having been filed within the limitation.
3. The directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court shall not apply to the matters filed/instituted against such orders which shall be passed by the State Commissions on or after 01.03.2022. In such an event, the standard procedure for computation of limitation shall apply."
20. As per the aforesaid directions issued by the Hon'ble National Commission and also the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 from First Appeal No.54 of 2023 12 time to time, the limitation period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 was to be excluded. The Limitation period was further extended for 90 days w.e.f. 01.03.2022 till 29.05.2022.
21. Even in case the said period w.e.f. 15.03.2020 to 29.05.2022 is excluded as per the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 due to COVID-19 but thereafter also the Appeal was not immediately filed but it was filed by the Appellant only on 23.01.2023 i.e. after huge delay of about 8 months. No 'sufficient cause' has been mentioned by the Appellant as to why the Appeal was not filed within the period of limitation.
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled as Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation & Anr. Civil Appeal No.2075 of 2010 decided on 26.02.2010 had rejected/dismissed the Application for condonation of delay of 4 years in filing an Application in setting aside an ex parte decree on the ground that the explanation given for condonation of delay was not satisfactory. The relevant portion of said judgment as mentioned in Para-13 & 14 is reproduced as under:
"13. From what we have noted above, it is clear that the Law Department of Respondent No.1 was very much aware of the proceedings of the first as well as the second suit. In the first case, Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel was appointed as an advocate and in the second case Shri B.R. Sharma was instructed to appear on behalf of the Respondents, but none of the officers is shown to have personally contacted either of the advocates for the purpose of filing written statement and preparation of the case and none bothered to appear before the trial Court on any of the dates of hearing. It is a First Appeal No.54 of 2023 13 matter of surprise that even though an officer of the rank of General Manager (Law) had issued instructions to Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel to appear and file vakalat as early as in May 2001 and Manager (Law) had given vakalat to Shri B.R. Sharma, Advocate in the month of May 2005, in the Application filed for condonation of delay, the Respondents boldly stated that the Law Department came to know about the ex parte decree only in the month of January/February 2008. The Respondents went to the extent of suggesting that the parties may have arranged or joined hands with some employee of the corporation and that may be the reason why after engaging advocates, nobody contacted them for the purpose of giving instructions for filing written statement and giving appropriate instructions which resulted in passing of the ex parte decrees. In our view, the above statement contained in para 1 of the Application is not only incorrect but is ex facie false and the High Court committed grave error by condoning more than four years' delay in filing of Appeal ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
14. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the Application for condonation of delay filed by the Respondents is dismissed. As a corollary, the Appeal filed by the Respondents against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed as barred by time.
23. In another case titled as Basawaraj & Anr. v. The Spl.
Land Acquisition Officer Civil Appeal No.6974 of 2013 decided on 22.08.2013, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had declined to condone the delay, as the sufficient explanation for condonation of delay was not furnished. The relevant portion of said judgment is reproduced as under:
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be First Appeal No.54 of 2023 14 exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the Application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof that that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201.)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:
"330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence".
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by First Appeal No.54 of 2023 15 long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches.
(See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The Application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.
16. In view of above, no interference is required with impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The Appeals lack merit and are, accordingly, dismissed. ..."
24. In one more case titled as Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. Civil Appeal No.7696 of 2021 decided on 16.12.2021, the Hon'ble Supreme Court by relying upon the aforesaid judgment had refused to condone the huge delay of 1011 days in filing the Second Appeal for want of bonafide and sufficient cause/reasons.
25. Further, the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in case "Union of India & Ors. Vs Hari Singh", 2009(4) RCR (Civil)-654, had declined to condone the delay for taking the matter in a casual manner. In Para-7, it was observed as follows:-
First Appeal No.54 of 2023 16
"Even otherwise, no explanation is forthcoming from 15.09.2004 to 18.01.2005 for not filing the Appeal. The pleadings in Application itself show that the matter was being taken in most casual manner, without bothering for the law of limitation".
26. In view of the facts and circumstances as well as the law as laid down in the above noted judgments, it is settled proposition of law that the delay cannot be condoned in case the party fails to show any 'sufficient cause' for condonation delay. In the present case, the Appellant was well aware about the pending of the complaint as well as passing of the impugned order, as he was contesting the Complaint by way of filing the written reply and evidence and even the written arguments were filed on his behalf. No 'sufficient cause' or explanation has been mentioned in the Application for condonation of delay in filing of the Appeal.
27. Accordingly, finding no force in the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the Appellant, the Misc. Application No.438 of 2023 for condonation of delay in filing of the Appeal is dismissed. Since the Application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, so the Appeal is also dismissed being barred by limitation.
28. Since the main case has been disposed off, so all the pending Miscellaneous Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed off.
29. The Appellant had deposited a sum of ₹25,000/- at the time of filing of the Appeal. Said amount, along with interest which has First Appeal No.54 of 2023 17 accrued thereon, if any, shall be remitted by the Registry to the District Commission forthwith. Respondents No.1 & 2/Complainant may approach the District Commission for the release of the same and the District Commission may pass appropriate order in this regard in accordance with law.
30. The Appeal could not be decided within the statutory period due to heavy pendency of court cases.
(JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY) PRESIDENT (SIMARJOT KAUR) MEMBER May 23, 2024.
(Gurmeet S)