Madhya Pradesh High Court
Amit Kumar Mishra vs The State Of M.P. on 29 July, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 MP 903
Author: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
Bench: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
Cr.A. No.2029/1997
Amit Kumar Mishra
Vs
State of M.P.
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Shri Ranjan Banerjee with Shri Manish Reja, learned amicus
curiae for the appellant.
Shri Ishtyaq Husain, learned G.A. for the respondent/State.
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ORDER
(29.07.2020) This criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant being aggrieved by the judgment dated 19.09.1997 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdol in Session trial No. 51/93 whereby the learned judge has convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304-II as well as Section 324 of IPC and sentenced to him for R.I. for 5 years and 2 years respectively with fine of Rs. 500/- each and default stipulation.
2. According to case, on 27.07.1993, when at about 8 PM, deceased (Basant Tiwari) and victim (Arvind Tiwari-PW-5) were returning after attending nature's call then on the way, appellant/accused met them and asked for cigarette on which deceased stated that he has no money then accused assaulted him with knife on left side of lower abdomen saying that he would kill him. Thereafter, when victim Arvind Tiwari caught hold the accused/appellant, he also assaulted him also on his right forearm with knife. Thereafter the appellant ran away from the spot. 2 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 Thereafter, at about 8:45 pm, the deceased lodged the FIR against the appellant, and they were sent for medical examination to the District Hospital Shahdol. The injuries found on the body of deceased and victim, were simple in nature but the deceased had been admitted in Male Surgical Ward for further treatment. On 29.07.1993, dying declaration had also been recorded by the Naib Tehsildar/P.D. Shrivastava (PW-4) in the presence of Dr. Pradeep Khare (PW-11). Dr. A.K.Shrivastava (PW-12) opined that the injuries sustained by deceased were dangerous to life. Thereafter, the deceased had been shifted to Victoria Hospital Jabalpur where on 09.09.1993 at about 10:30 pm, he died. Post mortem has also been conducted and Dr. D.K. Saklle (PW-10) prepared the post mortem report (Ex. P-14-A) and opined that the cause of death is cardiorespiratory failure due to pyogenic peritonitis. Vide Ex. P-4, weapon i.e. knife (katar) was seized from the possession of appellant/accused which was also sent to FSL for chemical examination, report is annexed in the record as Ex.P-1. Thereafter, the trial Court has framed the charges of the offence of Sections 302 and 324 of IPC. The accused/appellant abjured his guilt and asked for trial. After examining all the prosecution witnesses and evaluating the material available on record, the learned trial Court acquitted the appellant/accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC but the Court found sufficient evidence to convict the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304-II and Section 324 of IPC.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court erred in convicting the appellant whereas no 3 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 offence is made out against him. The trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that allegedly the incident took place in dark and no independent witness who saw the appellant-accused in spot has been examined. the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case. He further submits that the learned trial Court erred in holding that the death of Basant Tiwari (deceased) occurred due to injuries sustained by him on the day of incident but there is no iota of evidence to connect the death of deceased with the injuries inflicted to him. Further, Doctor who had given treatment to the deceased at Shahdol and Jabalpur have not been examined by the prosecution. Original bed head ticket was also not produced in the Court which clearly indicate that the appellant is not guilty for the aforesaid offences. He further submits that so far as conviction under offence of Section 324 of IPC is concerned, same has been passed in respect of victim Arvind Tiwari (PW-5) who has entered into compromise with the appellant and on 11.10.2017 the statement of victim has also been recorded by the registrar J-II of this registry. The learned trial Court itself found that the fact that the weapon which was seized from the possession of appellant/accused was same which was used in crime has not been found proved. Hence, the prosecution case is doubtful and benefit of said doubt should be given to the appellant/accused. The statement of medical examiners itself shows that the injury sustained by the deceased was not enough in ordinary course to cause his death. Therefore, the judgment passed by learned trial Court is not sustained and deserves to be set aside. In support of his contention he has relied the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 4 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 Sukhar Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2000 Cri. L. J. 29 and Moti Singh and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1964 SC 900.
4. On the other hand learned G.A. for the respondent opposes the appeal submitting that there is sufficient evidence available on the record to convict the appellant for the aforesaid offences. It is duly proved that the dispute arose from demanding cigarette by the accused/appellant and no refusal by the deceased, the appellant assaulted the deceased and victim with knife which was seized from his possession. The witnesses are stable with their version and they have duly supported the prosecution case. So far as fact of compromise in respect of offence of Section 324 of IPC is concerned, it is true the victim Arvind Tiwari arrived at amicable settlement but the offence of Section 324 of IPC is non compoundable and at this appellate stage, the appellant and victime came not make compromise. Therefore, no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment and this appeal deserves to be dismissed.
5. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
6. On perusal of record, it is found that the FIR has been registered by deceased Basant Tiwari on 27.07.1993 soon after the incident. It was alleged by the deceased that when he and Arvind Tiwari (PW-5) were returning after attending the nature's call, on the way due to dispute arose from demanding cigarette by the appellant/accused, the appellant/accused assaulted the deceased with knife (kattar) which caused injury on his lower abdomen. It was also alleged that the appellant/accused inflicted injury to victim-Arvind Tiwari too. Although, the learned trial Court has also framed the 5 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 charge of Section 302 of IPC but due to lack of evidence, the appellant hs been convicted in lesser offence i.e. 304-II of IPC for causing death of deceased.
Regarding Finding of conviction under Section 324 of IPC
7. The learned trial Court found that the appellant/accused also inflicted injury to victim-Arvind Tiwari (PW-5), therefore, the Court has convicted the appellant/accused for the offence of Section 324 of IPC. On perusal of case file, it is found that on 11.10.2017, the Victim-Arvind Tiwari and appellant were present before the Court and they were directed to remain present before Registrar J-II for recording their compromise. On perusal of verification report dated 11.10.2017, it is found that the compromise took place between the Victim-Arvind Tiwari and appellant without any force, fear, compulsion, threat or any influence. The leearned counsel for the State opposes the said compromise saying that the offence of Section 324 of IPC is not compoundable and at this appellate stage it can not be done by the parties. The offence was committed on 27.07.1993 and at that time offence under Section 324 of IPC was compoundable. The said offence is no longer compoundable since 31.12.2009 by the amendment Act, 25 of 2005. In this issue, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Abdul Sufan Laskar and others Vs. State of Assam reported in 2008(9) SCC 333, it is held that offence committed prior to date of incident when such offence became non-compoundable, the said offence allowed to be compounded by the parties. Therefore, compromise which is taken place between the Victim-Arvind Tiwari and appellant is hereby allowed. Consequently, the appellant is 6 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 acquitted from the offence of Section 324 of IPC in relation to victim- Arvind Tiwari.
Regarding conviction under Section 304-II IPC
8. First considerable question is whether the death of deceased occurred due to the injury sustained by him on dated 27.07.1993 ? Dr. A.P. Pathak (PW-8) stated in his deposition that on 27.07.1993, the deceased and victim were brought before him and he found injury of size 1.5x1/2x1/2 inch on left inguinal of deceased. He further stated that the deceased was admitted on male surgical ward and on 28.07.1993 due to critical condition of him, he informed the police for recording his dying declaration. Further, Dr. A.K. Shrivastava (PW-12) stated in his deposition that on 27.07.1993 at about 8 pm, the deceased was admitted by Dr. A.P. Pathak (PW-8) and subsequently, on 28.07.1993, in the morning at about 8:30 O'clock, the deceased was examined by Dr. S.C. Tripathi, who found the general condition of deceased was normal, but some swelling was present on his abdomen. He further stated that in the evening the deceased was examined by Dr. P. Tharwani and at that time deceased was vomiting and tenderness and hardness were present on his abdomen. X-ray was also performed. On 28.07.1993, Dr. A.K. Shrivastava (PW-12) has examined the deceased and found the health condition of deceased was low. He advised to operate the deceased. At 11:30 pm, the operation was performed by Dr. S.C. Tripathi. He further stated that on 29.07.1993 while operating the deceased, one incised wound found on his left iliac. On coughing by the deceased, omentum was getting out from the said wound. Further, on 7 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 inspection, health condition of deceased was deteriorating but during the period from 31.07.1993 to 05.08.1993, his health condition was improving. On 06.08.1993 and 07.08.1993, his health condition was going worst hence he has been referred to Medical College, Jabalpur. The witnesses (Dr. A.K. Shrivastava) opined that the injury of deceased was dangerous to life on lack of proper medical care.
9. Further, on 09.09.1993 at about 10:00 pm, the deceased died and his post mortem was performed by Dr. D.K. Sakalle (PW-
10) who opined that the cause of death is cardiorespiratory failure due to pyogenic peritonitis. He found a wound on the abdomen of deceased. Further he opined that due to pus collected on abdomen, the deceased died due to cardiorespiratory failure.
10. Therefore, it is found proved that deceased sustained injury with sharp edged weapon on 27.07.1993. He was operated on 29.07.1993 but due to his ill health condition, on 07.08.1993, he was referred to Medical Hospital, Jabalpur and on 09.09.1993 he died and on 10.09.1993 his post-mortem was conducted in which the cause of death is found cardiorespiratory failure due to pyogenic peritonitis. Hence, there is no hesitation to say that the death of deceased was occurred due to injury sustained to him on the day of incident.
11. Now the considerable question is whether the appellant/accused inflicted injury to deceased by sharp edged weapon.
12. As per FIR, on the dispute arose from demanding ciggrate, the appellant assaulted the deceased and when the victim- Arvind intervened, he assaulted him too. Arvind Tiwari (PW-5) is a 8 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 star witness of case and on perusal of statement of Arvind Tiwari (PW-5), he stated that a scuffle took place between the deceased and appellant/accused and at that time the accused assaulted the deceased on his abdomen with knife and when he intervened to save him, the appellant assaulted him on his left arm and chin with knife. The learned counsel for the appellants suggested that the witness Arvind Tiwari did not identify the accused due to dark night but the suggestion has denied by the Arvind Tiwari. No material contradiction and omissions are found in the statement of Arvind Tiwari. His evidence is wholly reliable and duly corroborated with the medical evidence as on perusal of MLC as well as statement of Dr. A.P. Pathak (PW-8), it appears that the injuries found on the persons of deceased as well as victim were same as the victim Arvind Tiwari disclosed in his statement. The Arvind Tiwari is the injured witness of the case, so his presence at the time of incident is found proved.
13. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 421, has held as under:-
"36. The evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weightage as his presence on the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present at the time of occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the 9 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness." Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein."
14. Further, In the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1957 SC 614:-
"10.............High Courts in India in which the court insisted or corroboration of the testimony of a single witness, not as a proposition of law, but in view of the circumstances of those cases. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established:
(1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated.
One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.
(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes.
11. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that "no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact". The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the 10 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's Law of Evidence -- 9th Edn., at pp. 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in Section 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted". Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely:
(1) Wholly reliable.
(2) Wholly unreliable.
(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way -- it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on 11 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution"
15. It is also stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court that where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, his presence cannot be doubted as he was injured in the incident. His deposition must be given due weightage. His deposition cannot be brushed aside merely because there were some trivial contradiction or omission.
16. The FIR was also lodged by the deceased promptly. A.B. Singh (PW-4) who was posted as ASI at the time of incident wrote the FIR on 27.07.1993 under instruction of deceased, he proved the signature of deceased in the FIR, the FIR is named, so it can also be treated as dying declaration of deceased. In this regard, in the case of Dharam Pal and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2008) 12 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 17 SCC 337 in para 16 and 17, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the report dictated by the deceased fully satisfied all the ingredient for being made admissible as a dying declaration, the paras are quoted as under:-
"16. The learned counsel for the appellants further argued before us that the alleged dying declaration which was given the shape of an FIR could not be made the basis of conviction when the original document signed by the deceased was not brought on record. The learned counsel for the appellants tried to prove before us that the deceased was not in a position to speak and which becomes apparent from the testimony of his father. However, it would not be correct to say so. The evidence of PW 7, Dr. R.P. Goel shows that the condition of the deceased was good and that he was in a position to speak. It would not be appropriate for us to read between the lines by giving unnecessary meanings to the testimony of Raghu. It cannot be left out of sight that Raghu also said that the deceased dictated the FIR to the police. In any view of the matter, the report of occurrence was dictated by the deceased himself and the same was read over to him after which he had put his thumb impression on the same. This report is admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act as a dying declaration. It is true that the original document signed by the deceased was not brought on record, but in our view, the FIR has rightly been admitted as a dying declaration. There appears no reason for the police to falsely implicate any one of the accused inasmuch as, initially, the report dictated by the deceased was taken down as a non-cognizable report under Section 323 IPC. If the police were to implicate the accused, they would not have taken down the report as a non-cognizable report in the very first place itself.
17. That apart, the report dictated by the deceased fully satisfied all the ingredients for being made admissible as a dying declaration. To ascertain this aspect, we may refer to some of the general propositions relating to a dying declaration. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act deals with dying declaration and lays down that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, such a statement is relevant in every case or proceeding in which the cause of the person's death comes into question. Further, such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not at the time when they were made under expectation of death and whatever may be the nature 13 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 of the proceedings in which the cause of his death comes into question."
17. Further, P.D. Shrivastava (PW-4) Naib Tehsildar who recorded dying declaration of deceased in the presence of doctor Pradeep Khare (PW-11) who assessed the mental condition of deceased was fit to give such declaration. In his cross examination, no suggestion regarding false statement by the deceased or being his tutor have been given by the defence. In dying declaration, the deceased stated that the appellant/accused assaulted him with knife on his abdomen. Hence, there is sufficient material to say that the accused/appellant assaulted the deceased on vital part of body I.e. abdomen with knife and he had knowledge that injury was likely to cause the death of deceased. So far as admissibility of dying declaration is concerned, in the judgment of Muthu Kutty And Another Vs. State BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE T.N. reported in (2005) 9 SCC 113, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, 14 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat [(1992) 2 SCC 474.
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104.
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552.
(iii) The Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618).
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264).
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P. 1981 Supp SCC 25).
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455).
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769)
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. 1988 Supp SCC 152)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390)
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700)
16. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of the alleged dying declaration in the 15 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 instant case has to be considered. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must like any other evidence, satisfy the court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.
(See Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P. 1993 Supp (1) SCC 327)
17. There is no material to show that the dying declaration was result or product of imagination, tutoring or prompting. On the contrary, the same appears to have been made by the deceased voluntarily. It is trustworthy and has credibility."
18. Further, the Raghvendra (PW-9), who was the Investigating Office of the case recorded the statement of deceased during investigation, in which the deceased stated same version as mentioned above against the appellant/accused. Under these circumstances, it can be said that the death was result of injury caused by appellant/accused. The learned trial Court has appreciated the evidence in proper manner holding the appellant guilty for the aforesaid offence. The judgments cited by the appellant is having different set of facts and do not applicable in this case. Therefore, conviction passed under Section 304-II of IPC by the trial Court is not interferable and it is hereby affirmed.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant also argued on the point of sentence submitting that the appeal is of year 1997 and now more than two decades have been passed, the appellant may be released on the sentence already undergone by him. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not persuaded with the 16 Cr.A. No. 2029/1997 submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and his prayer is rejected.
Conclusion:-
20. From the above said discussions, the appeal is partly allowed and on the basis of compromise, the appellant is acquitted from the offence of Section 324 of IPC in relation to act committed against victim Arvind Tiwari. So far as conviction and sentence passed under Section 304-II of IPC in respect of deceased Basant Tiwari is concerned, same is found justifiable and not itnerferable. Hence, the bail bond furnished by the appellant is forfeited and the appellant is directed to surrender himself before the trial Court within two weeks to suffer the remaining jail sentence. If the appellant does not surrender before the trial Court, the Court shall be free to take necessary action in accordance with law.
21. I appreciate the assistance provided by learned amicus curiae. Registry is directed to send the copy of this judgment to legal service authority so that remuneration be paid to learned amicus curiae for his valuable legal assistance.
(Rajendra Kumar Srivastava) Judge L.R. Digitally signed by LALIT SINGH RANA Date: 2020.07.29 17:23:08 +05'30'