Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Onkar vs State Of Punjab on 15 December, 2015
Bench: Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, Amitava Roy
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1724 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL) NO.2544/2014)
ONKAR APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB RESPONDENT (S)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent/State.
3. This appeal by special leave is filed by the husband of the deceased who was convicted for the offence under Section 304B IPC and imposed with sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment by the Trial Court which was affirmed by the High Court in the impugned order.
4. The case of the prosecution was that the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Narendra Prasad deceased/Kuldip Rani was married to the Date: 2016.01.04 18:25:48 IST Reason: appellant in February, 1999 and she died under 1 mysterious circumstances, namely, by consuming poison on 21.12.1999. To bring the case under Section 304B IPC, the Trial Court mainly relied upon PW.4/Avtar Singh, who is none other than the brother of the deceased who preferred the complaint alleging that after two months of the marriage of the appellant with the deceased she complained about the harassment meted out to her by the appellant, her father-in-law/ Harbans Lal, mother-in-law/Shakuntala, father-in-law's younger brother Ram Kumar and Ram Kumar's wife Shanti. According to the deceased, they all taunted her by saying that only an almirah and black and white T.V. alone was given in dowry nothing more. They also stated to have compelled the deceased to bring colour television and scooter apart from Rs.1,00,000/- cash for purchasing a car for the appellant. PW.4 further alleged that such harassment was reported to him by the deceased in July-August, 1999 and subsequently after two months grand father-in-law of the deceased, namely, Durga Dass came to the village assuring them that in future there would be no such complaint of harassment of the deceased, so 2 saying the said Durga Dass took her back to the in-law's place. On 17.12.1999, the deceased stated to have again went to her parental home and reiterated the harassment meted out to her by all the accused. Ultimately, on 21.12.1999, PW.4 was informed that the deceased died.
5. It was based on the said complaint charge-sheet was laid as against all the above accused for the offence under Section 304B read with Section 34 IPC and ultimately while the appellant and his parents were found guilty and convicted for the said offence, the other two accused, namely, Ram Kumar and his wife Shanti were acquitted by the Trial Court. The High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellant alongwith his parents after scrutinizing the evidence mainly of PW.4 held that there were no incriminating circumstances established to show the involvement of the parents-in-law of the appellant and the conviction as against the appellant was confirmed for the offence under Section 304B IPC. The High Court also declined to interfere with the sentence imposed on him.
6. Mr. Ajay G. Majithia, learned counsel appearing for the appellant after taking us 3 through the judgment of the High Court and the evidence of PW.4 contended that though in order to bring the case under Section 304B the ingredients, namely, marriage within seven years and mysterious death of the deceased was prevalent, there was no evidence much less legally acceptable one to show that there was any harassment meted out to the deceased at the instance of the appellant soon before her death in order to affirm the conviction imposed as against him. Learned counsel submitted that what weighed with the Division Bench to acquit the parents of the appellant would equally apply to the case of the appellant, inasmuch as the main reliance for the conviction of the appellant as well as his parents was that of PW.4, who was held to be a star witness and in the circumstances if his version given holds good for the other accused, namely, the parents of the appellant, in the same breath the appellant could not have been convicted and his conviction ought to have been set aside. It is relevant to note at this very point that as against the acquittal of the parents of the appellant, the State has not chosen to file any 4 appeal. We are, therefore, only concerned with the case of the appellant.
7. Mr. Jayant K. Sud, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State of Punjab submitted that the evidence of PW.4 was reliable, inasmuch as his version was truthful and, therefore, when the Trial Court and the High Court chose to rely on his version, which was corroborated by the independent witness, namely, PW.5, the Sarpanch of the village as well as PW.6 there was no reason to interfere with the judgment impugned in this appeal.
8. The learned counsel also relied upon a judgment of this Court in Yanob Sheikh alias Gugu v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 428 to support his submission that simply because the version of a witness was not believed in respect of some other accused, on that score the conviction imposed on some other accused cannot be disbelieved. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2015) 6 SC 477, to contend that the expression “soon before the death of the deceased” as stipulated in Section 304B cannot be construed 5 to mean immediately before the death and, therefore, the harassment which took place about eight months prior to the death of the deceased must be construed as the harassment meted out to the deceased soon before her death. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the conviction imposed on the appellant as confirmed by the High Court does not call for interference.
9. Having heard the respective counsel and having perused the impugned judgment as well as that of the Trial Court and the evidence of PW.4, we are convinced that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is forceful. A perusal of the complaint disclose that according to him two months after the marriage of the deceased with the appellant, the harassment on account of dowry started as was disclosed to him by the deceased. It is his consistent stand that such harassment on the subsequent occasion were also by all the accused including the appellant without there being any degree of variation in the role played by each one of them. The evidence of PWs.5 and 6 were also simple corroboration of 6 the version of PW.4 and nothing more. The medical evidence was clear to the effect that there was no injury on the body of the deceased nor was there any indication to show that poison was administered into the deceased by force.
10. In the said circumstances, we have to consider the question whether the relevant ingredients of Section 304B IPC, namely, as to it was shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in connection with any demand for dowry except the ipse dixit of PW.4 supported by PWs.5 and 6 there was no other material.
11. We do agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the expression “soon before her death” need not necessarily mean immediately before the death, but can even be stretched to a period which can be found to be reasonably close to the death of the deceased. But still when we appreciate the evidence of PW.4 and the conclusion reached by the Courts below, his evidence was right from the beginning directed towards all the accused in 7 equal proportion without any overt act at the instance of the appellant and based on the said evidence when the Trial Court exonerated uncle of the appellant and his wife and by the High Court the parents of the appellant, we are unable to appreciate the conclusion of the High Court that on the very same evidence the appellant alone could be isolated and convicted. The stray distinction which the High Court wanted to state, namely, that the parents of the appellant and the uncle of the appellant were living separately cannot be a ground to hold that with the meager evidence available on record, the appellant alone should be held responsible for the death of the deceased.
12. In the circumstances, the benefit should go to the appellant and consequently, we are convinced that the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. Moreover, the appellant is stated to have already undergone five years incarceration in jail. Taking into account all the above aspects, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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13. The appellant shall be set at liberty, if his detention is not required in any other case.
................................J. [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA] ................................J. [AMITAVA ROY] NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 15, 2015.
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ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.6 SECTION IIB
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2544/2014
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 01/08/2013 in CRLA No. 29/2002 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh) ONKAR Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for bail, permission to file additional documents and office report) (For Final Disposal) Date : 15/12/2015 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY For Petitioner(s) Mr. Ajay G. Majithia,Adv.
Mr. Shekhar Kumar,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jayant K. Sud,AAG Ms. Jasleen Chahal,Adv.
Mr. Honey Khanna,Adv.
For Mr. Kuldip Singh,AOR UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order. The appellant shall be set at liberty, if his detention is not required in any other case.
(NARENDRA PRASAD) (SHARDA KAPOOR)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 10