G.Raman Alias Ramachandran vs The Superintendent Of Police on 17 September, 2012

[Cites 71, Cited by 0]

Madras High Court

G.Raman Alias Ramachandran vs The Superintendent Of Police on 17 September, 2012

Bench: S.Manikumar

       

  

  

 
 
 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 17/09/2012

CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR

W.P(MD)No.12272 of 2012
and
M.P.(MD).Nos.1 & 2 of 2012

G.Raman alias Ramachandran	 	       .. Petitioner
			
Vs.

1.The Superintendent of Police,
  Karur District.

2.The Deputy Superintendent of
  Police, Karur Town Sub
  Division, Karur.

3.The Inspector of Police,
  Karur Town Police Station,
  Karur.					.. Respondents

PRAYER

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari,  calling for the records relating to
impugned order passed the 2nd respondent retaining the petitioner's name in the
history sheet dated 31.12.2011, quash the same.

!For petitioner ... Mr.Prasanna Vinoth,
		    for Mr.G.R.Swaminathan
^For respondents... Mr.A.K.Baskara Pandian,
		    Special Government Pleader

:ORDER

Challenge in this writ petition is to an order passed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur Town Sub Division, Karur, retaining the petitioner in History Sheet till 31.12.2012.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that though he was involved in three crime numbers, two of them have ended in acquittal. He further submitted that though he submitted a representation, dated 30.12.2011, seeking for deletion of his name from the History Sheet, the Inspector of Police, Karur Town Police Station, Karur, has failed to respond. In the said circumstances, earlier he was constrained to file W.P.(MD).No.1282 of 2012 for a mandamus, directing the respondents therein to delete the name of the petitioner in the History Sheet No.135/2009, maintained by the Inspector of Police, Karur Town Police Station, Karur District. The said writ petition came to be dismissed on the ground that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur Town Sub Division, Karur, the second respondent herein has decided to retain the petitioner in the History Sheet of Karur Town Police Station till 31.12.2012. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order, retaining him in History Sheet.

3. Assailing the correctness of the order passed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur Town Sub Division, Karur District and placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in W.P.(MD)Nos.2286 of 2005 and batch, (S.Vani and the Superintendent of Police, Sivagangai District and others), dated 15.09.2008, and in W.P.No.5677 of 2007, (L.Ravindran Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Chennai and others), dated 22.03.2012, Mr.Prasanna Vinodh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur Town Sub Division, Karur, has failed to consider that the petitioner was not involved in any serious crime affecting peace and public tranquility, and that therefore, there is non application of mind on the part of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur Town Sub Division, Karur, the second respondent herein, to the provisions warranting opening and retention of History Sheet. He further submitted that had the Inspector of Police, Karur Town Police Station, Karur, forwarded the details of acquittal in Crime Nos.2773 of 2009 and 80 of 2010, which are favourable to the petitioner, then the second respondent would not have retained the petitioner in the History sheet. Thus, he submitted that there is a failure on the part of the second respondent in taking into consideration, Police Standing Order 758 which reads that when any information favourable to an individual for whom a History Sheet is being kept is received, it shall be entered therein.

4.Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

5. In the case on hand, History Sheet has been opened on 30.12.2009. The petitioner was involved in the following crimes:

(i) Crime No.2773/2009, under Section 147, 148, 294(b), 323 & 506(ii) IPC;

(ii)Crime No.80/2010, U/s.447, 427, 294(b), 506(ii) IPC;

6.Thereafter, the petitioner has also come to adverse notice in Crime No.1132 of 2011, under Section 323 and 506(ii) IPC on the file of the Karur Town Police Station, Karur and on 14.10.2011, the petitioner has been enlarged on bail. The Inspector of Police, Karur Town Police Station, Karur District, in his request for extension of History Sheet till 31.12.2012, has stated that monitoring the petitioner is required.

7.Opening and retention of History Sheet, the scope and exercise of the powers by the Police Officers have been considered in a decision of this Court in Ganesan Vs. the Superintendent of Police, Virudhunagar, Virudhunagar District, reported in (2011) 1 MLJ (Cri) 214, wherein this Court held as follows;

"45.Reading of the Police Standing Orders dealing with opening and retention of history sheets for different kinds of persons, such as, convicts, rowdies, known depredators, suspects and others shows that the authorities who are empowered to open and retain such sheets, have to arrive at a subjective satisfaction, as to whether the abovesaid persons, either by habit or disposition commit, attempt to commit, aid or abet the commission of offences involving breach of peace. An isolated act or commission cannot be characterised as a habitual act or commission involving breach of peace or law and order. While forming an opinion that the person is believed to be addicted to or aid or abet, the commission of crime, whether convicted or not, the Sub- Inspector of Police and his men have to collect information and that the same has to be ascertained before making a recommendation to an officer of and above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, in whose jurisdiction, such person is ordinarily resident either permanently or temporarily.

46.Opening of history sheet in the case of persons convicted for offences involving imprisonment for life under Chapter XII and XVII and conviction for offences under Section 395 to 402, I.P.C. in the case of prisoners, Sections 392 to 394, I.P.C. and under Sections 75 of the Indian Penal Code, house breaking theft Section 109 Cr.P.C., 110 Cr.P.C. depending upon the number of convictions stated in Police Standing Order 747, is automatic, at the time of conviction of such persons.

47.Whereas, in the case of opening of history sheets for rowdies as per Form 112, where, some persons are classified as rowdies, the orders of the Superintendent of Police or concerned Sub-divisional Officer have to be obtained, on the basis of the information and facts ascertained by the Station House Officer, and his men. Persons who habitually commit, attempt to commit, or abet, the commission of offences involving breach of peace or (b) Persons bound over under Sections 106 and 107, Criminal Procedure Code or (c) Persons who have been convicted under Section 75 of the Madras City Police Act or twice in two consecutive years, under Section 3 Clause 12 of the Town Nuisance Act, or (d) Persons either convicted under Section 49-A of the Madras City Police Act, 1888 (Madras Act III of 1888) or under Section 4 of the Madras Gaming Act, 1930 (Madras Act III of 1930), or reasonably suspected to be habitually committing or abetting the commission of the offences, are classified as rowdies. Clause 4 of Police Standing Order 749, enjoins a duty on the police to enter the names of history-sheeted rowdies in the station register of a known depredator and that rowdies should be checked regularly by beat Police Constable Constables in rural Police Stations and by rowdy patrols in large towns, as also by the Sub- Inspectors (Law and Order). The checking, however should be discretely done by the method of enquiries and not in the manner of domiciliary checks.

48.Police Standing Order dealing with opening and retention of History Sheets in relation to the nature of offences stated in Police Standing Order 749(2)(a) to (d), makes it explicit that a duty is cast on the Sub-Inspector of Police, Station House Officer/ Inspector of Police and his men to collect, verify and ascertain as to whether a person is known or believed to be addicted to or aid and abet, the commission of crime and that there should be active criminality, affecting breach of peace or law and order. Criminality, as conceived in the police Standing Orders, is commission of offences by the individual or aiding commission of offences or, by inducing/instigating commission of offences by other some person.

49.History sheet is ordinarily retained for two years, in the case of persons convicted of offences mentioned in Police Standing Order 747. Where retention of history sheet is considered necessary after two years of registration, orders of an officer of and above the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police/Deputy Superintendent of Police, must be taken for extension in the first instance upto the end of the next December and further annual extension from January to December. Police Standing Orders, thus, makes it clear that the conduct and activities of history-sheeted persons shall be monitored for a specified period during which period, they should not come to any adverse notice and the authority empowered to extend the period of retaining his name in the history sheet, should have reason to believe that such history- sheeted person is habitually addicted to or aid or abet, the commission of offence.

50.Keeping surveillance or vigil on a history-sheeted person should not be made permanent, mechanically, as it would affect his freedom of life and liberty. The discretion conferred on the police is both objective and subjective in nature. Objective satisfaction with reference to the conduct of a history- sheeted person, to prevent commission or aiding or abetting of offences, by such persons, involving breach of peace or law and order. The subjective satisfaction should be based on valid materials and it cannot be at the whims and fancies of the police officers. Reading of the Police Standing Order shows that the discretion conferred on the police officers is in-built, subject to the limitations, including a specific period, provided under the said orders and it is not for any unlimited period, unless the conduct of the history-sheeted person is required to be monitored continuously.

51.As the discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the Police Officers to open and retain a history sheet is to curtail his freedom and right of privacy, there should be awareness on the part of the authority and it should be on the basis of surveillance materials, where that a reasonable man would by probable reasoning arrive at a conclusion or infer that a person has to be necessarily included in the History sheet. 'Belief', in the case on hand, means a degree of conviction of the truth of something especially based on a consideration or examination of the evidence and the authorities vested with discretion of opening and retaining history sheets should prove that on the examination of the data that there is awareness on their part indicating their state of mind that by probable reasoning, they come to a conclusion or infer, about the conduct of person, for whom a History sheet is opened or retained. The record of events and the materials should be considered with care and the authority concerned should pass an order, reflecting that he has thought over the matter deliberately with care and it has been found necessary, as a result of such careful examination, an order opening or retaining a history sheet is required to be passed.

52. The Discretion conferred on the authorities is controlled by factors which are in built in PSO 746, which states that history sheets can be broadly opened in respect of persons who are "known or believed to be addicted to or aid and abet the commission of crime, whether convicted or not, or who are believed to be habitual receivers". History sheets can also be re-opened in respect of following persons:

"a)Persons once convicted under any section of the Indian Penal Code are considered to be likely to commit crime;

b)Persons, not convicted, but believed to be addicted to crime"."

53.PSO 747 deals with automatic opening of history sheets at the time of conviction for persons convicted and shall be retained for two years after release from jail. It also deals with opening of a history sheet of a known depredator against whom an order has been passed under Section 356 Cr.P.C., and it shall not be closed, until the period during which he is required to report changes of residence, has elapsed. History sheet can be opened for suspects, under the orders of the Superintendent or Divisional Officer, if so empowered by the Superintendent for the persons included in PSO 749.

54.As per PSO 749 (4), all registered rowdies should be kept under the same type of watch as envisaged for registered suspects. The names of History sheeted rowdies should be entered in the Station check register of KDs and the rowdies should be checked regularly by beat police constables in rural police stations and by rowdy patrols in large towns as also by the Sub Inspectors (Law and Order). The checking however should be discretely done by the method of enquiries and not in the manner of domiciliary checks. Inspectors and Divisional Officers when they visit the area should make their own independent enquiries and note their findings in the history sheets and in inspection reports, if any. All reports against notorious rowdies entered in the General diary of the Station or matters brought to light on enquiries in the petitions should be entered against them in the personal sheets and should be dated.

55.As per PSO 748, where retention of a history sheet is considered necessary after two years of registration, orders of an officer of and above the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police/Deputy Superintendent of Police must be taken for the extension in the first instance upto the end of the next December. The above order shall be applied to the rowdy sheets also.

56.As per PSO 751, history sheets for suspects shall be maintained from the date of registration upto the end of December, after which, orders of an Officer of and above the rank of Assistant Superintendents of Police/Deputy Superintendent of Police, as to their discontinuance, or retention for a further period from January to December where necessary, shall be obtained. As per PSO 752, the following persons are to be closely watched:

"1)Persons for whom history sheets have been opened shall be informally watched by the Police or village headman.

2)Close watch bad characters should be written, K.Ds. First and then suspects, in red ink as contemplated in Police Standing Order No.368(3) followed by non-close watch bad characters in blue or black ink, in the same order. All these entries should be beat wise.

3)The date of expiry of the History sheet shall be noted in the remarks column against each bad character.

4)Whenever a history sheet is opened for a bad character for the first time, he shall be under close watch.

5)The bad character returning from jail should be under close watch. If they settle down and are of good character, close watch can be removed".

57.PSO 759 deals with transfer of history sheets. The said order states that history sheet of a person who changes his residence to another station limits, shall be forwarded to that station through the Divisional Officer. (2)The history sheet of a bad character who changes his residence from police station in the State of Tamil Nadu to a Station in another State shall be forwarded by the Station House Officer of the Tamil Nadu Station to the Superintendent of Police, through the usual channel, and the latter shall forward the sheet confidentially to the Superintendent of Police of the District in which the individual concerned has taken up residence. Reciprocal arrangements have been made with other States in this matter and History sheets of bad characters who have changed their residence from other States, when received by the Superintendents of Police from the Police authorities of these State will be dealt within accordance with Orders Nos.757, 758, 759 (1).

58.As per PSO 762, the surveillance of a suspect, other than ordinary criminal shall be conducted in a confidential manner. As per PSO 763, persons for whom history sheets have been opened may, at the discretion of the Station House officer, be entered in the village headman's register of known depredators and suspects (Appendix XVIII to the village officer's and riot manual, 1931 edition) and it shall be obligatory upon the village headman to report their movements to the police station.

59.Chapter XLIII deals with Surveillance and PSO 764 deals with reporting movements. As per said order,

i)movements of persons closely watched under order No.752 and of those registered under the Tamil Nadu Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 1948, shall be promptly reported by one Station House officer to another (in Enquiry Roll Form A) (Form No.118). The receipt of such roll shall be immediately acknowledged and a report as to the presence of the bad character made with the least possible delay. If the bad character is a person to be closely watched and becomes a temporary resident within the limits of another station, he should be entered by the police of the latter station in the register in Form No.57, vide order No.368.

ii)The roll shall be retained until the individual moves on,when it will be forwarded to the Station of his destination. If this State is other than the one at which the criminal is registered, the Station House Officer of the latter station shall be informed of the movement. When persons closely watched under Order No.752 are likely to use the Railway, intimation of their movements should also be given to the nearest Railway Police Station.

60.Police Standing Orders makes it explicit that the Sub Inspector of Police has to make necessary enquiries and ascertain the same before making a request to the Sub Divisional Officer to open or retain a history sheet. The Sub Divisional Officer or the Superintendent of Police after consideration of the surveillance report should arrive at a reasonable conclusion, as to the existence of materials warranting retention of the rowdy list. The discretion conferred on the police authorities under the Police Standing Orders is to subserve the object, viz., to control the prevention of crime and protection to others from crime and the surveillance data has to be carefully examined by the Station House Officer or the Competent Person, while recommending opening or retaining a rowdy list.

61.Thus it could be seen, that an elaborate procedure and the manner in which the surveillance data has to be collected and ascertained, are set out in the Police Standing Orders. Intimation of the movements of the persons closely watched under PSO 752 is also given to the nearest railway police stations. Needless to say that when movements of the persons are watched, there is an invasion of right of privacy. This intrusion of privacy is authorised to control, prevention of crime and to protect others from crime and if the person against whom the history sheet is opened is free from any taint or suspicion for over a considerable period of time, the Sub Divisional Officers/Superintendent of Police has to exercise his discretion in favour of those branded as rowdy, so as to allow himself to be free in the best interest of the society. The Sub Divisional Officers should not be swayed away by any bald statement of his subordinates seeking opening or retention of history sheets, unless it is considered necessary or where an automatic opening of history sheet is necessary, as in the case of conviction for the offences stated in the police standing orders.

62. In a situation of this nature, keeping in mind the nature of the duties required to be performed by the law enforcing agencies, the discretion to be exercised by the second respondent should be on sound principles of fairness, reasonableness and it should be in accordance with the object sought to be achieved while opening or retaining a rowdy history sheet.

63...

64. The power has to be exercised with regard to the duty arising from the nature of the action to be performed by the Sub-Divisional Officers. The conditions on the basis of which the power has to be exercised and the repercussions or consequences of such exercise on the price and freedom of the individual has to considered. It has to borne in mind, that the power exercised, restricts the freedom and liberty of an individual.

65. The criteria for opening a history sheet therefore, is the subjective satisfaction of the authority and it has to be arrived at, on the reasonable belief or knowledge that the person, for whom the history sheet is opened or retained, is habitually addicted or aid or abet, the Commission of Crime, whether convicted or not etc. While arriving at the subjective satisfaction, current doings in other words, the activities of such persons which are informative and useful, based on the facts ascertained both by the Sub-Inspector and his men from the date of last entry shall be made month-wise for close watch of characters and quarterly for non-close watch of characters."

8. Reverting back to the case on hand, it could be deduced from the supporting affidavit that there were three criminal cases pending against the petitioner between 2009-2011. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a person can be included or retained in the History Sheet, only if there is any breach of peace or tranquility, cannot be countenanced in law, as Police Standing Orders do not impose such a stringent condition. What is required to be considered by the Police Officers is adherence to the provisions from PSO 746 to 749.

9. To countenance the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court deems it fit to extract few decisions, which explain the expressions "Law and Order", "Public Order, Peace and Public Tranquility".

(a) On the aspect of "public safety", the Hon'ble Apex Court in Romesh Thappar Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 : 1950 SCR 594, has held that "public safety" ordinarily security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as securing public safety. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the context.

(b) In Revana Siddaiah Vs. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1952 Mys 85 ; (1952) Crl.L.J. 1526, it has been held that 'public order' has a comprehensive meaning so as to include public safety in its relation to the maintenance of public order and maintenance of public order involves consideration of public safety. They are closely allied concepts.

(1953) Cr.L.J. 1786, it has been held that the 'public order' in the State list must be interpreted to include public safety in its relation to maintenance of public order, as both of them being interdependent.

(d)In Ram Manohar Lohiya Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1968 All 100, it has been held that:

"Public order" is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. Even if 'public order' and 'public tranquility' are not entirely co-extensive in content the decision do not, in my opinion, leave any room for doubt that public tranquility is at least an essential constituent of 'public order' and that 'public order' is a comprehensive concept including within itself as one of its integral parts 'public tranquility'."

(e) Distinguishing the aspects of "Law and Order" and "Public Order", in Amiya Kumar Karmakar Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 672 :

AIR 1972 SC 2259, the Apex Court has held that the true distinction between the areas of "law and Order" and "public Order" lies not merely in the nature of quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case, it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect "public Order".

(f) In Kanu Biswas Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1656, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph Nos.6 to 8 has held as follows;

"6.The distinction between the concept of public order and that of law and order has been adverted to by this Court in a number of cases. In the case of Dr Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, 1966 (1) SCR 709, Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) said that any contravention of law always affected order, but before it could be said to affect public order, it must affect the community at large. He considered three concepts, law and order, public order and the security of the State, and observed that to appreciate the scope and extent of each one of them, one should imagine three concentric circles. The largest of them represented law and order, next represented public order and the smallest represented the security of the State. An act might affect law and order but not public order, just as an act might affect public order but not the security of the State. In the subsequent case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) SCC (Cri) 67, the Court dealt with the matter in the following words: "Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different."

7. The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order, according to the dictum laid down in the above case, is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?

8. The principle enunciated above has been followed by this Court in the case of Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 498 and Nandlal Roy alias Honda Dulal Roy alias Pagea v. State of West Bengal (WP No. 15 of 1972, decided on April 11, 1972). In the light of what has been observed above, we have no doubt that each one of the incidents of September 26, 1971 and November 4, 1971, was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. When two passengers are robbed at the point of knife while travelling in a third class compartment of a running train the act of the miscreants affects not only the passengers who are deprived of their valuables but also the other passengers who watch the whole thing in fear as helpless spectators. There is bound to be consequent terror and panic amongst the travelling public. Likewise, attack directed against a police party on the platform of a railway station by exploding bombs is bound to create panic and confusion among the passengers at the railway station. The acts in question in the very nature of things would adversely affect the even tempo of life of the community and cause a general disturbance of public tranquility."

(g) In Babul Mitra @ Anil Mitra Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1973 SC 197 : (1973) 1 SCC 393, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. The act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different. The act of setting fire to the school building was creating panic in the minds of the police personnel of the State from performing their legitimate duties in the maintenance of law and order in the State. Such acts are connected with "public order".

(h)In Ram Ranjan Chatterjee Vs. State of West Bengal reported in (1975) 4 SCC 143 : AIR 1975 SC 609 (611), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the acts which "Law and Order" are not different from the acts which affect "public Order". Indeed, a state of peace or orderly tranquility which prevails as a result of the observance or enforcement of internal laws and regulations by the Government, is a feature common to the concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order'.

(i) In Angoori Devi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 371 : (1989) 1 SCC 385, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that if the act is confined to an individual without directly or indirectly affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it may be a matter of law and order only. But where the gravity of the act is otherwise and likely to endanger the public order.

(j)In Mageswari Vs. District Magistrate and District Collector of Salem, reported in 1991 (1) MWN Crl. 28 a Division Bench of this Court has held that "An act disturbing "public order" is one which is directed against the society and not against an individual in the sense that it does not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public peace and tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance which affects the life of the community in the locality which determines the nature and character of breach of public sector.

(k) In Kamlakar Shankar Patil Vs. B.Akashi, reported in (1994) Cr.L.J. 1870, it has been held that 'public order' has a very wide connotation and the same is the basic need in any organised society. It implies to the orderly State of society and community in which citizens can peacefully pursue their normal activities of life.

(l) In Babulal Vs. State of Orissa, (1995) Cr.L.J.307 and M.Karunanidhi Vs. M.Raman, AIR 1968 Mad. 54, it has been held that "public order" is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquility prevailing among the members of political society as a result of the internal regulation enforced by the Government which they have instituted. Public order requires absence of disturbance of a state of serenity in society, but it goes further; it means, what the French designate order publique defined as an absence of insurrection, riot, turbulence, or crimes of violence.

(m) In Commissioner of Police Vs. C.Anita, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 467, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows;

"7. ..The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression "law and order" is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, "public order" has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting "public order" from that concerning "law and order". The question to ask is:

"Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?"

This question has to be faced in every case on its facts.

8. "Public order" is what the French call "ordre publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, is:

does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? (See Kanu Biswas v. State of W.B., AIR 1972 SC 1656)

9. "Public order" is synonymous with public safety and tranquility: "it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State". Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum, which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. [See Ram Manohar Lohia (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, 1966 (1) SCR 709]

10. "Public order", "law and order" and the "security of the State"

fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. (See Kishori Mohan Bera v. State of W.B., (1972) 3 SCC 845, Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of W.B., (1969) 1 SCC 10, Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) SCC (Crl) 67 and Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of W.B., (1972) 1 SCC 498).

11. The distinction between "law and order" and "public order" has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghosh case, (1970) SCC (Cri) 67. According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. The Court pointed out that (SCC p. 100, para 3) the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different.

(See Babul Mitra v. State of W.B., (1973) 1 SCC 393 and Milan Banik v. State of W.B., (1974) 4 SCC 504).

12. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and, therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different.

13. The two concepts have well-defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganised crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. Law and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. "Law and order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order" just as "public order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State". (See Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar, ((1974) 1 SCC 185, Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 2 SCC 185, T.K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 6 SCC 168 and State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub. (1980) 3 SCC 57).

(n) In Romesh Lal Jain Vs. Naginder Singh Rana, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 294, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the expression 'public order' has a distinct connotation and the investigation into the offence under the Essential Commodities Act, may not be equated with the maintenance of public order as is commonly understood.

10. Powers exercised by the Police officers in opening and retaining History / Rowdy sheets cannot be narrowed down or crippled only to the extent of activities effecting public peace and tranquility. Police standing orders confer powers on the authorities, to take into consideration the larger meaning to the expression "public order", which also includes public peace and tranquility. Merely because there is absence of public peace and public tranquility, those involved in crimes, cannot claim any indefeasible right that his name should be removed from the History / Rowdy sheet. The crime in which he is involved may not even attract public peace and tranquility, but it may involve public safety.

11. The contention that the Police Officers are precluded from exercising their discretion to arrive at a subjective satisfaction for opening or retention of History / Rowdy sheet, except under the circumstances of breach of peace and tranquility, cannot be countenanced. Maintenance of public peace and tranquility is also the duty of the law enforcing agencies to maintain public order and that it may also be taken into consideration as one of the factors to monitor a person. Breach of public peace and tranquility cannot be the only decisive factor, to be considered for opening or removal of the person's name from the History sheet. Danger to peace and public tranquility is inbuilt in maintenance of public order. The Police has to play an important and effective role in maintenance of public order and in the matter of opening and retention of History Sheet, they cannot be restricted to arrive at a conclusion, only on the basis of breach of peace and tranquility, which has a limited meaning and which is within the scope and connotation of the expression "Public Order". Potentiality to disturb public peace and tranquility is also a ground to monitor activities of a person, by the Police, even if a person is not involved in a crime, which would be essentially one of the functions of the police, but that has to be done, only when there are adequate materials to exercise that discretion, otherwise, it would be affecting right of privacy of an individual. The conduct leading to breach of peace or public tranquility or likely to cause, may also be one of the factors to keep monitoring for any specified period.

12. The contention that the Inspector of Police, Karur Town Police Station, Karur, has failed to forward the details of acquittal of the petitioner in Crime Nos.88 of 2010 and 2773 of 2009 and that has resulted in failure to adhere to Police Standing Order 758, also cannot be countenanced for the reason that the Inspector of Police Karur Town Police Station, Karur, the third respondent herein, has specifically stated that monitoring of the petitioner's conduct is required for a specific period i.e., till 31.12.2012. Mere acquittal in criminal cases does not mean that surveillance is not required. Police Standing Orders dealing with the opening or retention of the History Sheet specifically states that if there are materials to indicate that a person is known or believed to be addicted to or to aid and abet the commission of crime, whether convicted or not convicted or believed to be habitual offender, then, retention of the petitioner's name in the History Sheet is permissible. In any event, it may not be for a permanent period, but, it may be for a specified period, to be reviewed periodically, and if the authority, after considering all the materials, including current doings, arrives at a conclusion that the name has to be deleted from the history sheet, it should be done immediately. In such an event, display of the photograph should be removed, but a record, with the photograph, should be maintained in the office or in the District Crime Record Bureau. It should not be presumed that a person included in the History Sheet will always indulge in criminal activities. Reformation is possible, even in the case of a hard core criminal. If the photographs of all the persons, addicted to or abet the crime and convicted have to be displayed in public places, it would be long list. Only those who fall within the parameters of the Police Standing Orders should be maintained in the respective Police Stations and the District Crime Record Bureau and after proper consideration of their current doings, their photographs may be displayed to caution the general public. On the aspect of displaying their photographs, this Court in Ganesan case cited supra at para 67 has held as follows;

"67. Branding a person as a history sheeted rowdy has a tainted image in the society as compared to others. Needless to say that his relationship with others and the prospects of personal development may not remain the same. Characterisation of a person is stigmatic, if any photographs is displayed in some conspicuous places in the area where he resides, or in public places, and it affects not only his personal rights, but there is every likelihood of damage being caused to the members of his family and it cannot be lost sight of. Innocent children of such persons could be even looked down, if the officer, mechanically under the guise of prevention of crime and to protect others, open or extend history sheets, which has an impact on the right of privacy of not only the individual against whom the order is passed, but also causes harm to other person's rights. Therefore, a fair and reasonable decision should be taken, taking into consideration the Constitutional rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the interests of the State. It should be noted that at time of opening a history sheet, the individual is not informed of the decision taken by the authorities behind his back and that the information collected is discreet. Needless to say that every person wants to live with dignity and he cannot be condemned arbitrarily. It is also to be borne in mind that estrangement of the members of a history sheeted rowdy, in social gatherings, etc., is not uncommon in our society. Therefore, opening or retention of history sheets, which interferes with the right of privacy of a person, should be done strictly adhering to the parameters inbuilt in the Police Standing Orders, keeping in mind the object sought to be achieved.

13. Though in K.J.Doraisamy Vs. The Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Erode, reported in 2006(5) CTC 829, The Hon'ble Mr.Justice Ramasubramanian has dealt with a case of display of photographs of defaulters of bank loans and the decisions considered by this Court on the aspect of infringement of right of privacy are worth reproduction:

"8. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 asserted in its preamble that "recognition of the human dignity and of the equal and in alienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the World". Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, ratified by India reads as follows:

" (1) No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, human or correspondence, nor to lawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

9. Though International Human Rights norms or International Conventions cannot be effectuated by Courts, the principles contained therein have been imported into the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution, whenever they fell for interpretation. Drawing inspiration from Article 11 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, the Supreme Court held in Jolly George Varghese v. The Bank of Cochin , AIR 1980 SC 470 that " the march of civilisation has been a story of progressive subordination of property rights to personal freedom ". Though in the earliest decision in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra , AIR 1954 SC 300, the Supreme Court held that there is no justification to import the right to privacy into our Constitution by a process of strained construction, analogous to American Fourth Amendment, it was for the first time in the year 1963 that the right to privacy was recognised as part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, in the minority view expressed by Justice Subba Rao in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. , AIR 1963 SC 1295. Though the majority view was otherwise, Justice Subba Rao held that the concept of liberty in Article 21 was comprehensive enough to include privacy and that a person's house, where he lives with his family is his "castle" and that nothing is more deleterious to a man's physical happiness and health than a calculated interference with his privacy . The following extract from the minority view expressed by Justice Subba Rao and Justice Shah in the said judgment, laid the foundation for the development of the Law relating to the right to privacy:

"The Scientific methods used to condition a man's mind are in a real sense physical restraints, for they engender physical fear channelling one's actions through anticipated and expected grooves. So also the creation of conditions which necessarily engender inhibitions and fear complexes can be described as physical restraints. Further, the right to personal liberty takes in not only a right to be free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his private life."

10. The right to privacy came into focus in a much more pronounced way in Govind v. State of M.P. And Others , 1975 (2) SCC 148. Recognising that the right to privacy is not explicit in our Constitution, the Supreme Court held in paragraph-23 of the said judgment as follows:

" 23. Individual autonomy, perhaps the central concern of any system of limited Government, is protected in part under our Constitution by explicit Constitutional guarantees. "In the application of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has been but what may be". Time works changes and brings into existence new conditions. Subtler and far-reaching means of invading privacy will make it possible to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a definition of privacy raises serious question about the propriety of judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution . Of course, privacy primarily concerns the individual. It therefore relates to and overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of other rights and values".

11. After holding that the right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, family, marriage, mother hood, procreation and child rearing, the Supreme Court went on to hold in the same judgment that a claimed right must be a Fundamental Right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . In paragraphs 25 and 27, the Supreme Court expounded the theory further, on the following lines:

" 25. Rights and freedoms of citizens are set forth in the Constitution in order to guarantee that the individual, his personality and those things stamped with his personality shall be free from official interference except where a reasonable basis for intrusion exists. "Liberty against Government", a phrase coined by Professor Corwin expresses this idea forcefully. In this sense, many of the Fundamental Rights of Citizens can be described as contributing to the right to privacy."

" 27. There are two possible theories for protecting privacy of home. The first is that activities in the home harms others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere thought that individuals might be engaging in such activities and that such 'harm' is not constitutionally protectible by the State. The second is that individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from societal control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from projecting on the World the image they want to be accepted themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers rather than the realities of their natures."

12. Highlighting the importance of the right guaranteed under Article 21, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in his separate but concurring judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , 1978 (1) SCC 248, held as follows:

"Life is a terrestrial opportunity for unfolding personality, rising of higher states, moving to fresh woods and reaching out to reality which makes our earthly journey a true fulfillment - not a tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury signifying nothing, but a fine frenzy rolling between heaven and earth. The spirit of man is at the root of Article 21. Absent liberty, other freedoms are frozen."

13. The right to life was held to be inclusive of the right to live with human dignity, in Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746. In paragraph-6 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held that "the right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence and that it means something much more than just physical survival." In paragraph 7, the Supreme Court went on to hold as follows:

" 7. But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights."

14. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu , 1994 (6) SCC 632 is a turning point in the history of the development of the law of privacy in India. The question concerning the freedom of the press vis-a-vis the right to privacy was examined by the Supreme Court at length in the said case. Dealing with the origin of the said right, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 9 as follows:

" 9. The right to privacy as an independent and distinctive concept originated in the field of Tort law, under which a new cause of action for damages resulting from unlawful invasion of privacy was recognised. This right has two aspects which are but two faces of the same coin - (1) the general law of privacy which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy and (2) the constitutional recognition given to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental invasion. The first aspect of this right must be said to have been violated where, for example, a person's name or likeness is used, without his consent, for advertising - or non-advertising - purposes or for that matter, his life story is written - whether laudatory or otherwise - and published without his consent as explained hereinafter. In recent times, however, this right has acquired a constitutional status. We shall proceed to explain how? Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in our Constitution but has been inferred from Article 21 ."

15. After an elaborate discussion of the American, Australian and English Case Law, the Supreme Court summarised the principles flowing from the discussion, in paragraph 26 as follows:

" 26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion:

(1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent - whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical.

If he does so, he would be violating the right to pri vacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.

(2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including Court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others . We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz. , a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.

(3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) above - indeed, this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he was written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt of Court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule.

(4) So far as the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them.

(5) Rules 3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any similar enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media.

(6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit, or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media."

16. In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India , 1997 (1) SCC 301 , relating to the tapping of telephones, the Supreme Court categorically affirmed in paragraph 17 of its judgment that the right to privacy is a part of the right to "life" and "personal liberty" enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution and that the said right cannot be curtailed "except according to procedure established by law". At the same time, the Apex Court also added a note of caution in paragraph 18 as follows:

" 18. The right to privacy - by itself - has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case."

17. Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z', 1998 (8) SCC 296, arose out of a claim for damages made by a person against the hospital which disclosed the fact that the patient tested positive for HIV (+) infection, resulting in his proposed marriage being called off and the patient being ostracised by the Community. Dealing with the contention that the right to privacy was invaded, the Supreme Court held in paragraphs 27 and 28 as follows:

" 27. Right of privacy may, apart from contract, also arise out of a particular specific relationship which may be commercial, matrimonial, or even political. As already discussed above, doctor-patient relationship, though basically commercial, is, professionally, a matter of confidence and, therefore, doctors are morally and ethically bound to maintain confidentiality. In such a situation, the public disclosure of even true private facts may amount to an invasion of the right of privacy which may sometimes lead to the clash of one person's "right to be let alone" with another person's "right to be informed".

" 28. Disclosure of even true private facts has the tendency to disturb a person's tranquility. It may generate many complexes in him and may even lead to psychological problems. He may, thereafter, have a disturbed life all through. In the face of these potentialities, and as already held by this Court in its various decisions referred to above, the right of privacy is an essential component of the right to life envisaged by Article 21."

Though certain observations made in the said judgment, were later held to be uncalled for by a Three Member Bench of the Supreme Court in Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z' , 2003 (1) SCC 500, the law laid down on the right to privacy was not upset.

18. Thus, by judicial pronouncements, the right to privacy and dignity were held to be part of the Fundamental Right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution right from the decision of the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh's case . However, all the decisions referred to above did not put a stamp on such right as an absolute or in violable right.

19. In Govind v. State of M.P. , 1975 (2) SCC 148, the Supreme Court held as follows:

"There can be no doubt that privacy - dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied only when an important counter vailing interest is shown to be superior."

In paragraph 28 of the same judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows:

"28. The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a Fundamental Right, we do not think that the right is absolute .

20. Even in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu , 1994 (6) SCC 632, cited supra, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy has to go through a case-by-case development and that the concepts dealt with herein are still in the process of evolution. In paragraph 28 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court made it clear that the impact of Article 19(1)(a) read with Clause (2) thereof on Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code are not gone into by the Court and that they may have to await a proper case.

21. In Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z' , 1998 (8) SCC 296 cited supra, the Supreme Court again made it clear that the right to privacy is not an absolute right, in the following words:

"The right however is not absolute and may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or more or less or protection of rights and freedom of others."

22. In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India , 2003 (4) SCC 399 , arising out of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Representation of People (Amendment) Ordinance 2002, dealing with the requirement to furnish information by a candidate contesting an Election, the Supreme Court held that " by declaration of a fact, which is a matter of public record, that a candidate was involved in various criminal cases, there is no question of infringement of any right of privacy ". Even with regard to the declaration of assets by candidates, the Supreme Court held that a person having assets or income is normally required to disclose the same under the Income Tax Act or such similar Fiscal Legislation. The Supreme Court in the said case placed primacy on " the right to information " first adverted to in State of U.P. v. Raj Narayan , 1975 (4) SCC 428 and followed in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India , 1981 (Supp) SCC 87 and amplified in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms , 2002 (5) SCC 294.

23. Dealing with the right to privacy and personal liberty, in the context of proceedings for divorce in which one of the parties to the litigation was alleged to be of unsound mind and was required to undergo a medical examination, the Supreme Court held in Sharda v. Dharmpal , 2003 (4) SCC 493, as follows:

"The right to privacy in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution is not an absolute right."

"If there were a conflict between the Fundamental Rights of two parties that right which advances public morality would prevail."

24. Again in People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India , 2004 (9) SCC 580, arising under The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, requiring any member of the public to disclose information to the Police, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is not an absolute right and it is subservient to that of security of State."

14. Restriction against the Police from disclosing public record of history / rowdy sheet cannot be said to be actuated by malice, on the other hand, it can be defended on the ground of discharge of their duties to caution and protect the public from being a victim to a crime. Public disclosure of history / rowdy sheet may amount to invasion of right of privacy, but, as held in Mr.'X' Vs. Hospital reported in (1998) 8 SCC 296, it is not a absolute right. In the reported case, the Supreme Court held that "the right, however, is not absolute as may be lawfully restricted for prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or more or less or protection of rights and freedoms of others. As stated supra, in People's Union of Civil Liberties Vs. Union of India, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 399, the Supreme Court held that "by declaration of fact, which is a matter of public record, that a candidate was involved in various crimes, there is no question of infringement of any right of privacy. Again in Sharada Vs. Dharmapal, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 493, the Apex Court held that "the right of privacy in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not an absolute right". If there was a conflict between fundamental rights of two persons, that right which advances public morality would prevail. The action of the Police in making a public disclosure may place the person in a humiliating position, and infringe his right of privacy, but his personal rights cannot be given preference, when the law enforcing agencies have a duty to protect the general public from the persons engaged in crimes, by disseminating information, when they exercise their police powers to maintain law and order, public order, public safety and also to prevent breach of peace and tranquility.

15. Displaying the photographs of a History Sheet person, is not totally prohibited under Police Standing Orders and as per the Standing Orders, their photographs, if available, has to be maintained. A Known Depredator, whose photograph is displayed, would only make the public aware of his involvement in crime. Police has a duty to make the public aware of the crimes, persons involved, their modus operandi, and the law enforcing agencies cannot be chained, by orders of Court not to engage in such activity, in bringing about awareness. 'Privacy' has been defined as "the rightful claim of an individual to determine to which he wishes to share himself with others and control over the time, place and circumstances to communicate with others. It means the individual's right to control dissemination of information about himself, it is his own personal possession. It is well accepted that one person's right to know and be informed may violate another's right of privacy. Public has the right to know about corruption, nepotism, law breaking, abuse or arbitrary exercise of power, law and order, economy, media, science and technology, etc., which are matters of public interest. Right of information is a facet of freedom of speech and expression, enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Shrouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol.4 (IV Edition), defines "Public Interest" as "A matter of public or general interest, does not mean that which is a interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which a class of community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liability are affected. In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), 'Public Interest', is defined as follows:

"Public Interest - Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interest of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local State or national Government...."

16. In public interest, the Police has got a right to disseminate information, concerning law and order, and crime. Display or publication of a photograph of a History Sheeted Rowdy, may be contended to infringe upon a person's right, in so far as it affects his identity, reputation in the minds of others, but at the same time, public interest would prevail over private interest.

17. In view of the above, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has not made out a case to substantiate that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur Town Sub Division, Karur, has committed a manifest illegality in passing an order, contrary to the object, as explained in the Police Standing Orders, warranting retention of a person in a History Sheet. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. No costs.

gcg To

1.The Superintendent of Police, Karur District.

2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karur Town Sub Division, Karur.

3.The Inspector of Police, Karur Town Police Station, Karur.

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Madras High Court