Karnataka High Court
N Suresh vs Commissioner Of Police, Bengaluru on 25 July, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25th DAY OF JULY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION (HABEAS CORPUS) No.53 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
N. SURESH
SON OF LATE NALAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.177,
NEW BILMANGALA
100 FEET ROAD, INDIRANAGAR,
1ST STAGE,
BENGALURU-560 038.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ROHAN VEERANNA TIGADI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
BENGALURU
NO.1, INFANTRY ROAD,
BANGALORE
KARNATAKA-560 001.
2. STATE OF KARNATAKA
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
SAMPANGI NAGARA,
BENGALURU, KARNATAKA-560 001
(REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY -
LAW AND ORDER)
2
3. SUPERINTENDENT
CENTRAL PRISON,
KALABURGI-585 308.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. B.A.BELLIAPPA, SPP-1 A/W
SRI. P.THEJASH, HCGP)
THIS WP(HC) IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS DECLARING THE DETENTION OF VISHNU, AGED ABOUT 23
YEARS AND SON OF SURESH ILLEGAL AND SET HIM AT LIBERTY
FORTHWITH AFTER QUASHING THE ORDER BEARING REFERENCE
NO.10/CRM(4)/DTN/2025 DATED 02/04/2025 (ANNEXURE "A")
PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION 3(1) OF THE
GOONDA ACT, THE ORDER BEARING REFERENCE NUMBER HD 192
SST 2025 DATED 08/04/2025 (ANNEXURE "B") PASSED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION 3(3) OF THE GOONDA ACT AND
ORDER BEARING REFERENCE NUMBER HD 192 SST 2025 DATED
29/04/2025 (ANNEXURE "C") PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
UNDER SECTION 13 OF THE GOONDA ACT AND ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 14.07.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY,
DR.K.MANMADHA RAO, J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
3
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO) This Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) is filed by father of the detenu by name Vishnu S/o N Suresh aged about 23 years (for short 'detenu') challenging the order of detention passed by the respondents and also prayed to quash them. The petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:
a. Issue a writ of habeas corpus declaring the detention of Vishnu, aged about 23 years and son of Suresh illegal and set him at liberty forthwith after quashing the order bearing reference dated No.10/CRM(4)/DTN/2025 02/04/2025 (Annexure "A") passed by the 1st Respondent under Section 3(1) of the Goonda Act, the order bearing reference number HD 192 SST 2025 dated 08/04/2025 (Annexure "B") passed by the 2nd Respondent under Section 3(3) of the Goonda Act and order bearing reference number HD 192 SST 2025 dated 29/04/2025 (Annexure "C") passed by the 2nd Respondent under Section 13 of the Goonda Act;
b. Call for the records bearing reference No. 10/CRM(4)/DTN/2025 dated 02/04/2025 (Annexure "A") from the Respondents;
2. Brief facts of the case are that the detenu has been in the habit of indulging in acts which are in violation of public peace 4 since 2018 and has been involved in serious criminal offences such as attempt to murder, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, assault, house-breaking, theft, voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapon, wrongful restraint and criminal intimidation, among other offences which have instilled fear and insecurity in the minds of the public and engaging in illegal activities, violating bail conditions after being released on bail. Being a nuisance to law and order, despite being prosecuted in the criminal cases in which he was involved, he continued to engage in illegal activities, made a habit of committing criminal acts, and continued to commit criminal acts repeatedly. The order of detention issued on 02.04.2025 is sought to be confirmed under Section 3(1) of the Goondas Act. Since, 2018, 01 case in Pulakeshinagar police station of Bangalore city, 01 case in Byyappanahalli police station, 01 case in Avalahalli police station, 07 cases in Indiranagar police station, 01 case in Sulibele police station of Bangalore city, in total 11 cases have been registered.
(i) The Pulakeshinagar Police registered a case in Crime No: 201/2018 for the offence punishable under section 392 of IPC in which case came to be closed.5
(ii) The Byyappanahalli police registered a case in Crime No: 213/2018 for the offences punishable under sections 341, 302, 397, 471, 506(B), 201 r/w. 34 of IPC and Investigation is completed, Charge Sheet is filed and same is pending before the Juvenile Justice Board in J.C. No:61/2019.
(iii) The Avalahalli Police registered a case in Crime No: 08/2021 for the offences punishable under sections 150, 120(b), 302, 201, 35, 37 r/w.
34 of IPC and the petitioner was admitted to bail on 15.07.2021 in Criminal Petition No.4311/2021. Investigation is completed, Charge Sheet is filed and same is pending before the ACJM Court at Bengaluru. Subsequently, case committed to PDJ Session Court Bengaluru in S.C.No.120/2021.
(iv) The Indiranagar Police registered a case in Crime No: 220/2022 for the offences punishable under sections 454, 380 of IPC which came to be acquitted.
(v) The Sulibele Police registered a case in Crime No: 55/2022 for the offence punishable under section 379 of IPC and which is under investigation.
(vi) The Indiranagar Police registered a case in Crime No: 276/2024 for the offences punishable 6 under sections 309(6), 3(5) of BNS Act, 2023 and Investigation is completed, Charge Sheet is filed and same is pending before the X ACMM Court in C.C.No.52311/2025.
(vii) The Indiranagar Police registered case in Crime No: 27/2025 for the offences punishable under sections 109, 238 (B), 249(B) of BNS Act 2023, which is under investigation.
(viii) The Indiranagar Police registered case in Crime No: 28/2025 for the offences punishable under sections 109, 352, 238(b), 249(b) of BNS Act, 2023 which is under investigation.
(ix) The Indiranagar Police registered case in Crime No: 29/2025 for the offences punishable under sections 109, 352, 238(b), 249(b) of BNS Act, 2023 which is under investigation.
(x) The Indiranagar Police registered case in Crime No: 30/2025 for the offences punishable under sections 309(6), 238(b), 249(b) of BNS Act, 2023 which is under investigation.
(xi) The Indiranagar Police registered case in Crime No: 31/2025 for the offence punishable 7 under sections 109 of BNS Act, 2023 which is under investigation.
3. Thus, in the cases registered against the detenu, the rowdy sheet was opened and monitored and despite being seized and remanded by the Court, without bringing about any change in his life style, the detenu being in violation of the bail conditions and opportunities given to him to lead a better life, continuously failed to attend valid court hearings, engaging in criminal activities and continuing to commit criminal acts tending to destroy the welfare of the society, being harmful to public order. According to the Hooligan Act, it appears to be essential to maintain public order and security in the metropolitan city of Bangalore and it is reasonable to keep the said detenu in preventive custody.
4. The respondents found that presence of the detenu was causing disturbances to public order and tranquility and he was becoming menace to the society. Therefore, the detenu was detained based on the detention order passed by the respondent No.1-Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru vide order dated 02.04.2025, the same was sought for confirmation by 8 respondent No.2 u/s. 3(3) of the Goondas Act on 05.04.2025 i.e., three days after the Order dated 02.04.2025 without giving adequate time to the detenu for submitting the representation. The same was confirmed by the respondent No.2 - the Government vide Confirmation Order dated 08.04.2025. Thereafter, the detenu had submitted a representation dated 09.04.2025 to the Advisory Board which was also received by the respondent No.2 on 11.04.2025 for reviewing the detention order. The Government on considering the representation, passed order dated 11.04.2025 rejecting the said representation.
5. The Government after obtaining the opinion from the Advisory Board and following the procedures under the Goondas Act, confirmed the order of detention, by its order dated 08.04.2025 (Annexure - B). The Government vide order dated 29.04.2025 (Annexure - C) ordered to detain him for a period of one year from 02.04.2025 (Annexure- C) under the Goondas Act.
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6. We have heard the arguments of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned HCGP for respondents.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the orders passed by the respondent No.2 as well as confirmed by the Government are illegal, contrary and ultra vires the Goondas Act. Section 2(g) of the said Act defines a "goonda" as one who habitually commits or attempts to commit offences under Chapters 8 (Sections 141 to 160, IPC), 15 (Sections 295 to 298, IPC), 16 (Sections 299 to 377, IPC), 17 (Sections 378 to 462, IPC) or 22 (Sections 503 to 510, IPC) now replaced by corresponding provisions in the BNS Act. The allegations in Crime Nos.27/2025, 28/2025, 29/2025, 30/2025 and 31/2025 pertain only to Sections 238 and 249 of the BNS Act committed by the detenu and his family, which correspond to Sections 201 and 212 of the IPC-- neither of which fall within the scope of the offences enumerated under Section 2(g) of the Goondas Act. Therefore, invocation of the Goondas Act is patently erroneous. Further, the Detenu was in judicial custody from 11.02.2025 to 10 25.02.2025 and was not present when his brother allegedly came to the house after commission of the purported offence dated 08.02.2025 and 09.02.2025, rendering the allegations factually untenable.
8. It is further submitted that the respondent authorities have relied upon criminal cases that are either closed or irrelevant to the invocation of preventive detention under the Goondas Act. Crime No.201/2018 stands closed, and in Crime No.220/2022 the Detenu was acquitted by a Competent Criminal Court. Out of 11 cases cited by the respondents, 7 cases do not relate to offences listed under Section 2(g) of the Goondas Act and hence, reliance on the same is legally impermissible. The subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is therefore, vitiated due to reliance on extraneous and irrelevant material. That the remaining 4 cases, even if assumed to be active, pertain merely to maintenance of law and order and not to public order, which is a necessary precondition for invoking Section 3 of the Goondas Act. Preventive detention under the Goondas Act requires a proximate and substantial threat to public order. 11 The alleged involvement of the Detenu in these 4 cases viewed in isolation or collectively, does not cross that threshold. Therefore, the Goondas Act cannot be invoked for detaining the detenu. Hence, Detentions Orders are ultra vires the Goondas Act.
9. It is submitted that except for Crime No.276/2024, all other antecedents invoked in support of the Detention Order are over three years old. Furthermore, one of the cases has been closed by the Juvenile Justice Board, and another resulted in acquittal. The absence of any proximate or continuous pattern of habitual criminal conduct renders the Detention Order invalid for lack of a live and proximate link between past conduct and the need for preventive detention. It is a settled principle of law that stale incidents cannot form the basis for invoking preventive detention.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that the respondents have failed to consider relevant and material facts, including the detenu's bail orders and applications, despite his liberty at the time of passing the Detention Order. Judicial precedents require the detaining 12 authority to consider the effect of bail on the likelihood of the detenu committing further acts prejudicial to public order. In the instant case, there is no reference to or analysis of the detenu's bail status. Besides, the Detention Order relies on extraneous considerations by referring to criminal antecedents of the Detenu's father and brother, which is manifestly arbitrary and in contravention of constitutional protections under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11. It is also submitted that the constitutional right of the detenu to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India has been rendered illusory. The detention order dated 02.04.2025 was forwarded for confirmation by the State Government on 05.04.2025, i.e., within 3 days, leaving no real opportunity for the Detenu to submit his representation to the first respondent as mandated by the judgment in the case of Suresh B. Shetty v. State of Karnataka reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 4234, wherein this Court directed that a period of 7 days be given to detenu to submit their representations to the Commissioner of Police/District Magistrate passing the Order prior to them 13 being sent to respondent No.2 for confirmation u/s.3(3) of the Goondas Act.
12. It is submitted that the Detention Order fails to mention the timelines within which the detenu ought to have preferred his representation to the Commissioner of Police, State Government and the Advisory Board. violating procedural safeguards under the Goondas Act. Unlike statutes such as COFEPOSA or PIT NDPS Act, 1988, wherein the powers of the officers and State are co-extensive but under the Goonda Act, such powers are limited and distinct. As per Section 3(1) of the Goonda Act, the detention order ceases to operate if not confirmed by the State Government within 12 days. Therefore, the Commissioner of Police could have considered revocation of the detention only within this limited timeframe. In this context, it was imperative for the detention order to disclose the timeline for making representation to the Commissioner.
13. It is also submitted that the Advisory Board has not communicated its decision on the representation submitted by the Detenu dated 09.04.2025, thereby violating Article 22(5) 14 of the Constitution of India. The Detention Order also suffers from non-compliance with the judgment in the case of Jayamma v. Commissioner of Police reported in ILR 2019 Kar 1543, where it was mandated to annex documents relied upon under each ground. In light of these multiple procedural, legal, and constitutional violations, the Detention Order is liable to be quashed.
14. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following judgments:-
• Jayamma v. Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru reported in ILR 2019 Kar 1543;
49. xxx (7) If any representation is submitted by the detue before the Detaining Authority, addressing the same to the Detaining Authority, government, or to Advisory Board, irrespective of the fact that, to whom it is addressed, the same shall be as early as possible considered by the appropriate Government, before sending the papers to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government revokes the detention order and directs release of the detenu, there arises no question of sending the case papers to the Advisory Board.
xxx 15 • Smt. Gracy v. State of Kerala and another reported in (1991) 2 SCC 1;
8. xxx The question, therefore, is: Whether one of the requirements of consideration by government is dispensed with when the detenu's representation instead of being addressed to the government or also to the government is addressed only to the Advisory Board and submitted to the Advisory Board instead of the government? On principle, we find it difficult to uphold the learned Solicitor General's contention which would reduce the duty of the detaining authority from one of substance to mere form. The nature of duty imposed on the detaining authority under Article 22(5) in the context of the extraordinary power of preventive detention is sufficient to indicate that strict compliance is necessary to justify interference with personal liberty. It is more so since the liberty involved is of a person in detention and not of a free agent. Article 22(5) casts an important duty on the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu at the earliest to afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order which implies the duty to consider and decide the representation when made, as soon as possible. Article 22(5) speaks of the detenu's 'representation against the order', and imposes the obligation on the detaining authority. Thus, any representation of the detenu against the order of his detention has to be considered and decided by the detaining authority, the requirement of its separate consideration by the Advisory Board being an additional requirement implied by reading together clauses (4) 16 and (5) of Article 22, even though express mention in Article 22(5) is only of the detaining authority. Moreover, the order of detention is by the detaining authority and so also the order of its revocation if the representation is accepted, the Advisory Board's role being merely advisory in nature without the power to make any order itself. It is not as if there are two separate and distinct provisions for representation to two different authorities viz. the detaining authority and the Advisory Board, both having independent power to act on its own.
9. It being settled that the aforesaid dual obligation of consideration of the detenu's representation by the Advisory Board and independently by the detaining authority flows from Article 22(5) when only one representation is made addressed to the detaining authority, there is no reason to hold that the detaining authority is relieved of this obligation merely because the representation is addressed to the Advisory Board instead of the detaining authority and submitted to the Advisory Board during pendency of the reference before it. It is difficult to spell out such an inference from the contents of Article 22(5) in support of the contention of the learned Solicitor General. The contents of Article 22(5) as well as the nature of duty imposed thereby on the detaining authority support the view that so long as there is a representation made by the detenu against the order of detention, the aforesaid dual obligation under Article 22(5) arises irrespective of the fact whether the representation is addressed to the detaining authority or to the Advisory Board or to both. The mode of address is only a matter of form which cannot whittle down the requirement of the 17 constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) enacted as one of the safeguards provided to the detenu in case of preventive detention.
• Makuko Chukwuka Muolokwo v. State of Karnataka, rep., by its Secretary and others reported in ILR 2020 Kar 5447;
10. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of SMT. GRACY, (supra) is to the effect that even if a representation is made by the detenue to the Advisory Board, it is the duty of the appropriate Government to decide the same independently and uninfluenced by the views/opinion expressed by Advisory Board. Careful perusal of the principles laid down in paragraph 17 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R. KESHAVA, (supra) will show that in absence of a representation addressed to the appropriate Government or absence of the knowledge of the representation having been made by the detenue, the appropriate Government's failure to decide the same independently is not unconstitutional or illegal. However, in the present case, we are dealing with the case where the State Government had a clear knowledge of the representation made by the detenue. Firstly, the representation dated 6th May, 2020 was sent to the Advisory Board through the Chief Superintendent of the Central Prison. Secondly, there is an endorsement appearing on the covering letter of the Chief Superintendent of the Central Prison, Bengaluru enclosing therewith a copy of the representation made by the detenue. The endorsement is admittedly by a Section Officer of the Government. In the statement of objections filed by the Detaining Authority, it is 18 admitted that the Advisory Board heard the petitioner on his representation. In paragraph 30, there is a specific admission to that effect. The only contention raised in paragraph 31 is that the representation was not given before the first meeting of the Advisory Board. Paragraph 17 of the statement of objections filed by the State Government, it is admitted that the petitioner had made a representation on 6th May, 2020. Paragraph 17 of the statement of objections reads as under:
"17. It is submitted that consequently, the Advisory Board has fixed the date of hearing on 04.05.2020 through video conference vide Letter dated 30.04.2020. A copy of the notice 30.04.2020 is produced herewith and marked as ANNEXURE- R9. It is further submitted that the petitioner had made a Representation on 05.05.2020 to the Advisory Board Government and other through the Superintendent of Central Prison, Bengaluru against the Detention Order.
11. xxx
12. xxx
13. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the facts of the case before the Apex Court in the case of it KESHAVA, (supra) were entirely different from the facts of the case in the case of SMT. GRACY, (supra). In the case of R. KESHAVA, the Government had no knowledge of the representation. It is in the light of this factual position that the Apex Court held that the decision in the case of SMT. GRACY, (supra) had no 19 application to the facts of the case before it. The other two decisions relied upon by the State are not on the point involved. It must be noted here that the right conferred upon the detenue under Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India is to ensure that a representation made by the detenue is considered at the earliest.
14. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the decision of the Apex Court rendered in if. KESHAVA, (supra) will not apply, inasmuch as, the representation of the detenue is not yet decided by the State Government though it has knowledge about the th representation from 6 May, 2020 and though it was received by it. Moreover, in this case, the Detaining Authority cannot plead ignorance about the representation. Therefore, this is a case where the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of. SMT. GRACY, (supra) will squarely apply. Hence, there is a violation of the rights conferred upon the petitioner-detenue under Clause (5) of the Article 22 of tire Constitution of India and, therefore, continuation of order of detention is rendered illegal.
• Sumaiya v. The Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 & another reported in 2007 (2) MWN (Cr.) 145 (DB);
5.5. xxx If delay was caused on account of any indifference or lapse in considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. In other words, it is for the authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing of the 20 representation. It is not enough to say that the delay was very short. Even longer delay can as well be explained. So the test is not the duration or range of delay, but how it is explained by the authority concerned.
xxx • Sarabjeet Singh Mokha v. District Magistrate, Jabalpur and others reported in (2021) 20 SCC 98;
50. Article 22(4), in guaranteeing a right to make a representation to the detenu, understandably creates a corresponding duty on the State machinery to render this right meaningful. In Section D.1 of the judgment, we have detailed this Court's settled precedent on the detenu's right to make a representation and for it to be considered expeditiously
-- failing which the detention order would be invalidated. However, this right would ring hollow without a corollary right of the detenu to receive a timely communication from the appropriate Government on the status of its representation -- be it an acceptance or a rejection.
51. This Court, in considering claims of delay in the appropriate Government's dealing with the representation of a detenu, has included delays in communication of such rejection. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh [State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 1] had noted that such a delay formed a part of the infraction on the detenu's constitutional right under Article 22(4). K.N. Saikia, J. speaking on behalf of this Court, had held: (SCC p. 54, para 19) 21 "19. In the instant case we are satisfied that after receipt of the xerox copy from the Central Government, the State Government took only 13 days including 4 holidays in disposing of the representation. Considering the situation prevailing and the consultation needed in the matter, the State Government could not have been unmindful of urgency in the matter. But the facts remain that it took more than two months from the date of submission of the representation to the date of informing the detenu of the result of his representation. Eight days were taken after disposal of the representation by the State Government. The result is that the detenu's constitutional right to prompt disposal of his representation was denied and the legal consequences must follow."
(emphasis supplied) • Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 509;
32. Likewise, in the present case, we are not concerned as to whether the conditions imposed by the Magistrate would have taken care of the apprehension expressed by the detaining authority; of the detenu indulging in further smuggling activities. We are more concerned with the aspect that the detaining authority did not consider the efficacy of the conditions and enter any satisfaction, however subjective it is, as to the conditions not being sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging in such activities.
33. Ameena Begum [Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 22 754] , noticed with approval Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] and extracted para 32 from the same (Vijay Narain Singh [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] ) : (SCC pp. 35-36) "32. ... It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within ... not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court."
(emphasis supplied)
34. The criminal prosecution launched and the preventive detention ordered are on the very same allegations of organised smuggling activities, through a network set-up, revealed on successive raids carried on at various locations, on specific information received, leading to recovery of huge 23 cache of contraband. When bail was granted by the jurisdictional court, that too on conditions, the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities; which is the very basis of the preventive detention ordered. • Suresh B. Shetty v. State of Karnataka and others reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 4234; More specifically pargraphs No.27 and 28 wherein, this Court has observed that as the period in which the representation needs to be filed has not been specified in the order of detention made, the right to file the representation becomes illusory. • Rashid Kapadia v. Medha Gadgil and others reported in (2012) 11 SCC 745;
• Rajammal v. State of T.N. and another reported in (1999) 1 SCC 417;
• Devesh Chourasia v. District Magistrate, Jabalpur and others reported in (2022) 20 SCC 531;
• Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and others reported in (1980) 4 SCC 531;
• Ammena Begum v. State of Telangana and others reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587;
• Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Malik v. Union of India and others reported in (1992) 1 SCC 1;
• Alakshit v. State of Maharashtra, through its Principal Secretary and another reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 7439;
24• Promod Singla v. Union of India reported in (2023) 2 SCR 793;
• Rajasthan Public Service Commission and another v. Harish Kumar Purohit reported in (2003) 5 SCC 480;
15. Learned HCGP submitted office file of the detention proceedings.
The learned HCGP appearing for the respondents would submit that in order to monitor his criminal activities, a "A" category Rowdy Sheet was opened in Indiranagar Police Station on 26.04.2022 vide order No.HSD/RS/03/2022. The Detaining Authority, after careful consideration, was satisfied that ordinary penal laws were insufficient to curb the detenu's incorrigible criminal conduct. Therefore, exercising powers under Section 3 of the Goondas Act, the Detention Order dated 02.04.2025 was issued as a preventive measure to ensure maintenance of public order. Despite repeated warnings and opportunities granted by the Authorities and the Courts, the detenu has failed to reform and continued to indulge in criminal activities, indicating his habitual tendencies even after lawful intervention. It is emphasized that the persistent 25 involvement of the detenu in criminal activities was deemed a genuine and immediate threat to the normal rhythm of public life, thereby necessitating the need for preventive detention.
16. It is contended that there exists no statutory requirement mandating the detaining authority to provide a fixed time for submission of representation before the confirmation of detention. The detenu was clearly informed, both orally and in writing, about his right to make a representation. The relevant addresses of the respondents were also furnished. Despite having a period of 6 days before the confirmation order dated 08.04.2025, the detenu chose not to exercise this right. There is no procedural lapse or violation of rights in this regard. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 8 of the Goondas Act have been scrupulously followed, and the representation dated 09.04.2025 was duly considered and rejected on 11.04.2025.
17. It is submitted that the State Government has discharged its obligation to consider representations even when the representation was addressed to the Advisory Board. The detenu's repeated involvement in criminal acts of grave 26 nature has severely disrupted public peace. The detaining authority, upon due application of mind and independent assessment of materials including voluminous documentation of 363 pages, found the detenu's conduct to fall squarely within the ambit of "Goonda" under Section 2(g) of the Goondas Act. The contention that past acquittals or discharge from cases should prevent detention is legally flawed; preventive detention can be invoked independently of acquittals if there exist preventive grounds.
18. It is further submitted that the detenu had been in judicial custody until 28.10.2024, and thus, the period of 156 days from his release till the Detention Order is not unreasonable. A rigid timeline cannot be imported to assess proximity in preventive detention cases, and a realistic, case- specific approach must be adopted. The delay in issuance of the detention order is attributable to the necessity of collecting data from multiple police stations across the city and handling additional criminal cases that arose during the material period. It is a settled position of law that such intervening conduct by the detenu cannot be held against the detaining authority while considering the issue of proximity. Further, it has been 27 substantiated that the detenu, even while under a bond under Section 117 of the Cr.P.C., continued to engage in criminal activities. The Special Executive Magistrate and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, East Division, ordered his judicial custody from 11.02.2025 to 25.02.2025 for the breach of said section, which reinforced the need for preventive detention.
19. It is argued that each ground of the detention must be assessed independently. Therefore, even if one ground is found to be sufficient, the Detention Order would stand valid. The Detaining Authority has also rightly invoked Section 6A of the Goondas Act, which incorporates the "Doctrine of Severability". Even if one or more grounds of detention are found to be unsustainable, the order of detention shall nevertheless stand valid if one of the grounds survives legal scrutiny. The reliance placed on criminal antecedents of the detenu's father and brother was merely illustrative and not determinative of the detention. The Detaining Authority's reasoning was found exclusively on the conduct of the detenu himself.
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20. Section 6A of the Goondas Act reads as under:
6A. Grounds of detention severable.-
Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 3, which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds, and accordingly ,- (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are ,-
(i) vague ; (ii) non-existent ; (iii) not-relevant ;
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person; or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever ; and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or the officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention ;
(b) the Government or the officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), after being satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.
21. To buttress his arguments, the learned HCGP placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Priyadarshini v. Commissioner of Police, by order dated 29 03.05.2025, passed in WPHC No.31/2025, wherein, this Court has arrived at a conclusion as follows:
"So far as non-mentioning of specific time is concerned, it is not a criterion to hold an order as invalid, as hyper-technical grounds would not outweigh considerations of public order and safety."
As per the above ruling there is no requirement for affording a fixed period before issuing the Confirmation Order. The Court held that technicalities should not override the objective of maintaining public order. Further, the grounds of detention were furnished within 5 days, as per Section 8 of the Goonda Act, and the Confirmation Order was passed within the 12-day limit.
22. Section 8 of the Goondas Act, reads as under:-
"When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government."
23. It is also submitted that the bail orders relied upon by the petitioner has also been duly considered wherever 30 applicable. In several cases, the question of bail does not arise due to either acquittal or lack of arrest. The record also reveals that there exists a continuous chain of criminal activity across multiple years and jurisdictions, showing a clear pattern of habitual and incorrigible conduct. The Advisory Board has also opined affirmatively on the necessity of detention. The detenu's actions have been rightly assessed as prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, necessitating preventive detention to safeguard society from further threats.
24. In support his contentions, the learned HCGP has placed reliance on the following judgments:-
• Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1988) 3 SCC 153, Para 10 The courts should not merely, on account of delay in making an order of detention, assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
• Malwa Shaw v. State of W.B., reported in (1974) 4 SCC 127, Para 2 A period of five months elapsing between the date of the alleged incident and passing of the detention order, a period not unreasonably long so as to discredit the subjective satisfaction of the detaining magistrate.31
• Noor Salman Makani v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 381, Para 4 Excluding the intervening holidays, the delay in disposing of the representation comes to only five days, which cannot be said to be undue • Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 81. Para 38 While disposing of the representation, time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive (reiterated) • Gautam Jain v. Union of India, reported in (2017) 3 SCC 133, Paras 21, 03 & 27 The Act provides that where there are a number of grounds of detention covering various activities of the detenu spreading over a period or periods, each activity is a separate ground by itself, and if one of the grounds is irrelevant, vague or unspecific, then that will not vitiate the order of detention When there were various grounds which formed the basis of the detention order, and even if the documents pertaining to one particular ground were not furnished, that ground could be ignored applying the principle of segregation, and on the remaining grounds, the detention order is still sustainable.
• Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1988) 3 SCC 153, Para 12 The detention order cannot be said to be vitiated because of some of the grounds of detention being non- existent, irrelevant, or too remote in point of time to furnish a rational nexus for the subjective satisfaction of 32 the detaining authority. It is usually from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (reiterated) • Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., reported in (1975) 3 SCC 198, Para 32 Order of preventive detention may be made either before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. • Priyadarshini v. Commissioner of Police, reported in WPHC No.31 of 2025, Paras 18 & 21 A delay of 164 days would not, in itself, be the criterion to view the order of detention in a tinted glass.
A mere delay in passing the preventive detention order will not make an order bad and vitiated.
So far as non-mentioning of specific time is concerned, it is not a criterion to hold an order as invalid, as hyper-technical grounds would not outweigh considerations of public order and safety.
25. We have gone through the entire material placed before us and considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP, we are of the opinion that all the procedures prescribed under Goondas Act, were strictly complied with prior to passing of the Detention Order. The detenu has been committing the crime against the 33 innocent persons. All the offences committed by the detenu are serious and series in nature in the following manner:
[[ Sl. Police Station Law suit Section of the Act Current stage No number
1. Pulakeshinagar PS 201/2018 392 of IPC Case closed
2. Baiyappanahalli 213/2018 341, 302, 397, 471, Pending in Court PS 506(2), 201 R/w 34 of IPC
3. Avalahalli PS 08/2021 150, 120(b), 302, Pending in Court 201, 35, 37 R/w R/w 34 of IPC
4. Indiranagar P S 220/2022 454 and 380 of IPC Acquitted
5. Sulibele P S 55/2022 379 of IPC Under investigation
6. Indiranagar PS 276/2024 309(6) and 3(5) of Pending in Court BNS
7. Indiranagar P S 27/2025 238(a) and 249(c) of Under BNS investigation
8. Indiranagar P S 28/2025 238(a) and 249(c) of Under BNS investigation
9. Indiranagar P S 29/2025 U/S 238(a) and 249(c) Under of BNS investigation
10. Indiranagar P S 30/2025 U/S 238(a) and 249(c) Under of BNS investigation
11. Indiranagar P S 31/2025 U/S 238(a) and 249(c) Under of BNS investigation
26. It is observed that the contravention of law always affects order, but before it can be set to affect public order. It must affect the community or public at large as a disturbance 34 to public order, the specific activity has an impact on the broader community or the general public, revoking feelings of fear, panic or insecurity. Accordingly, the detenu was detained by an order indulging in serious criminal offences such as, murder, attempt to murder, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, assault, house-breaking, theft, voluntarily casuing hurt by dangerous weapon, wrongful restraint and criminal intimidation, other offences that have instilled fear and insecurity on individuals of locality. The petitioner got released on bail in the criminal cases registered against him and committed breach of conditions of bail. The respondents after subjective satisfaction of the materials placed before them passed the Detention Order. There is no illegality in the said Orders.
27. Further, it is observed that the detenu has been given an opportunity for making a representation, not only has to be at the earliest, also a reasonable time of seven days has to be given to the detenu to make representation under Section 8(1) of the Goondas Act. Accordingly, the detenu has submitted representation which has been considered. 35 Thereafter, the detaining authority had passed the appropriate detention order.
28. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the orders challenged in the writ petition, does not suffer from any infirmity as such. The detaining authority passed the impugned order with subjective satisfaction arrived at on the basis of the materials placed on record.
Accordingly, Writ Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE Sd/-
(DR. K.MANMADHA RAO) JUDGE BNV Ct-adp