Allahabad High Court
National Insurance Company Ltd. vs Smt. Seema Devi And 3 Others on 2 November, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 2553
Author: Vivek Kumar Birla
Bench: Vivek Kumar Birla
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 50 Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER DEFECTIVE No. - 459 of 2020 Appellant :- National Insurance Company Ltd. Respondent :- Smt. Seema Devi And 3 Others Counsel for Appellant :- Komal Mehrotra Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant.
2. Present appeal has been filed challenging the award dated 16.7.2020 passed by Commissioner / Deputy Labour Commissioner, Gorakhpur in E.C. Case No. 79 of 2015.
3. Challenging the impugned award submission is that in view of the provision of Section 21 (1) (b) of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) learned Commissioner at Gorakhpur did not have the jurisdiction to decide claim petition inasmuch as the claimants are resident of district Siwan and the accident had also taken place in district Siwan. The vehicle was also insured by the branch office of the appellant-Company at district Siwan in the State of Bihar. It was further submitted that even in her statement the claimant no. 1 had stated that she has come from district Siwan and therefore, the claimants are not resident of Gorakhpur. Submission, therefore, is that the amendment is totally without jurisdiction.
4. It was further submitted that no notice under Section 10 of the Act was given to the Insurance Company and as such the claim petition was not maintainable. He has drawn attention to the substantial questions of law framed in the present appeal, which are quoted as under:-
"A. Whether the finding recorded by the Commissioner Employee compensation while deciding preliminary issue is illegal, erroneous and misappraisal of the records?
B. Whether the present claim petition was not maintainable as the learned Commissioner lacked jurisdiction in view of Section 21 of the Act?
C. Whether analogy derived by the Commissioner Employees Compensation Act while deciding preliminary issue is perverse and based on no reasoning?
D. Whether in the absence of notice under section 10 of the Employees Compensation Act the claim petition is maintainable without any prayer for waiver of the statutory notice?"
5. Submission, therefore, is that the claim petition itself was not maintainable in absence of notice under Section 10 of the Act without there being any prayer for waiver of the same and that in any case in view of Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act the Tribunal at Gorakhpur was coram non judice. Submission is that the impugned award is, therefore, without jurisdiction.
6. I have considered the submissions and have perused the record.
7. Before proceeding further it would be relevant to note Section 10 and Section 21 (1) (b) of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923, which are quoted as under:-
"10. Notice and claim.- (1) No claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner hereinafter provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred before him within two years] of the occurrence of the accident or, in case of death, within two years] from the date of death:] Provided that, where the accident is the contracting of a disease in respect of which the provisions of sub- section (2) of section 3 are applicable, the accident shall be deemed to have occurred on the first of the days during which the workman was continuously absent from work in consequence of the disablement caused by the disease:
Provided further that in case of partial disablement due to the contracting of any such disease and which does not force the workman to absent himself from work, the period of two years shall be counted from the day the workman gives notice of the disablement to his employer:
Provided further that if a workman who, having been employed in an employment for a continuous period, specified under sub- section (2) of section 3 in respect of that employment, ceases to be so employed and develops symptoms of an occupational disease peculiar to that employment within two years of the cessation of employment, the accident shall be deemed to have occurred on the day on which the symptoms were first detected:] Provided further that the want of or any defect or irregularity in a notice shall not be a bar to the entertainment of a claim]--
(a) if the claim is preferred] in respect of the death of a workman resulting from an accident which occurred on the premises of the employer, or at any place where the workman at the time of the accident was working under the control of the employer or of any person employed by him, and the workman died on such premises or at such place, or on any premises belonging to the employer, or died without having left the vicinity of the premises or place where the accident occurred, or
(b) if the employer or any one of several employers or any person responsible to the employer for the management of any branch of the trade or business in which the injured workman was employed] had knowledge of the accident from any other source at or about the time when it occurred:
Provided further, that the Commissioner may entertain] and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been given, or the claim has not been preferred], in due time as provided in this sub- section, if he is satisfied that the failure so to give the notice or prefer] the claim, as the case may be, was due to sufficient cause.
(2) Every such notice shall give the name and address of the person injured and shall state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the date on which the accident happened, and shall be served on the employer or upon any one of] several employers, or upon any person responsible to the employer for the management of any branch of the trade or business in which the injured workman was employed.
(3) The State Government may require that any prescribed class of employers shall maintain at their premises at which workmen are employed a notice- book, in the prescribed form, which shall be readily accessible at all reasonable times to any injured workman employed on the premises and to any person acting bona fide on his behalf.
(4) A notice under this section may be served by delivering it at, or sending it by registered post addressed to, the residence or any office or place of business of the person on whom it is to be served, or, where a notice- book is maintained, by entry in the notice- book.] (emphasis supplied)
21. Venue of proceedings and transfer - (1) Where any matter under this Act is to be done by or before a Commissioner, the same shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and to any rules made hereunder, be done by or before the Commissioner for the area in which-
(a) the accident took place which resulted in the injury; or
(b) the [employee] or in case of his death, the dependant claiming the compensation ordinarily resides; or
(c) ..........
(1A) ........
(2) ..........
(3) .........
(4) .........
(5) ........."
(emphasis supplied)
8. Now insofar as the submission that the claim petition was not maintainable in absence of notice under Section 10 of the Act, in Section 10(1)(b) a proviso has been added, whereby the Commissioner is empowered to entertain a claim petition and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been give, or the claim has not been preferred, in due time as provided in this sub-section, if he is satisfied that the failure so to give the notice or prefer the claim, as the case may be, was due to sufficient cause. Therefore, in such view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that in a case of beneficial legislation the requirement of the notice cannot be inferred in strict sense so as to hold a claim not maintainable in absence of notice under Section 10 of the Act. Clearly, the Commissioner is empowered to entertain and decide the claim to compensation.
9. Insofar as the applicability of provision of Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act is concerned, again the provision has to be interpreted in the manner so as to serve the purpose and object of this beneficial piece of legislation.
10. Therefore, although, I am of the opinion that the substantial questions of law as framed in the present memo of appeal do not arise for consideration, however, in view of the arguments raised by learned counsel for the appellant and in view of the observations made and as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sir Chunilal vs. Mehta Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314, I proceed to decide the question nos. B and D as framed in the memo of appeal in view of the fact that such questions are repeatedly raised before this Court by the Insurance Company in appeals filed before this Court. Relevant paragraph 6 of Sir Chunilal (supra) is quoted as under:-
"6. We are in general agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court and we think that while the view taken by. the Bombay High Court is rather narrow the one taken by the former High Court of Nagpur is too wide. The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law."
(emphasis supplied)
11. It is the golden rule of interpretation that the provisions of any Act have to be read so as to achieve the aims and object of the Act. The Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 has been enacted with a object that this is an Act to provide that payment by certain classes of employers to their employees of compensation for injury by the accident.
12. It is needless to point out that it is too well settled that this Act is a piece of social security and welfare legislation and its dominant purpose is to protect the workman and, therefore, the provisions of the Act should not be interpreted too narrowly so as to debar the workman from compensation which the legislature thought they ought to have.
13. A reference may be made to a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Singh vs. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others 1986 (2) SCC 614, paragraph 11 whereof are quoted as under:-
"11. In interpretation of statutes, Courts have steered clear of the rigid stand of looking into the words of the Section alone but have attempted to make the object of the enactment effective and to render its benefits unto the person in whose favour it is made. The legislators are entrusted with the task of only making laws. Interpretation has to come from the Courts. Section 17-B on its terms does not say that it would bind awards passed before the date when it came into force. The respondents' contention is that a Section which imposes an obligation for the first time, cannot be made retrospective. Such sections should always be considered prospective. In our view, if this submission is accepted, we will be defeating the very purpose for which this Section has been enacted. It is here that the Court has to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation which has found acceptance whenever a progressive social beneficial legislation is under review. We share the view that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. Plain words have to be accepted as such but where the intention of the legislature is not clear from the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the Court's duty to discern the intention in the context of the background in which a particular Section is enacted. Once such an intention is ascertained the Courts have necessarily to give the statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. Now, it is trite to say that acts aimed at social amelioration giving benefits for the havenots should receive liberal construction. It is always the duty of the Court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or object of the Act. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the havenots and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided. This Section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases. It would be doing injustice to the Section if we were to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two before it came into force."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In Bharat Singh (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court has taken the view that welfare legislation should be given a purposive interpretation safeguarding the rights of the have-nots rather than giving a literal construction. In case of doubt the interpretation in favour of the worker should be preferred.
15. A reference may also be made to judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Rais and another 2016 (2) AICC 1502 (DB). Paragraphs 19 and 20 whereof are quoted as under:-
"19. In the written statement on behalf of the appellant a plea has been raised that application of the respondent no.1 is barred by Section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 for want of statutory notice. A Workman, who is injured in accident, is duty bound to give a notice of it informing in writing without delay to the employer. The object of giving such notice appears to enable the employer to verify the accident and its nexus with the course of his employment, however, no claim for compensation will be rejected in case of accident resulted in the death of the workman in the premises of the employer or within his control or the employer had knowledge of the accident from any other source. Thus, there is no hard and fast rule about the compliance of Section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, which may render the claim not maintainable.
20. In the present case, the employer has not opposed the claim on the basis of want of notice. The Insurance Company has no locus to raise this plea. Moreover, in the application for compensation in para 11 specific plea has been mentioned that respondent no.1 had the knowledge of the accident, which resulted in the death of the deceased Mohd. Asif. For this reason there was no need to give notice under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. This plea has not been controverted by the respondent no.1, who is the employer. In this background, we are of the opinion that in the present case the Commissioner has rightly waived the condition of notice and on this account no fault can be found in the impugned judgment and order."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the present case, in paragraph 16 of written statement the owner / employer / insured has categorically stated that they have informed the Insurance Company Branch Officer Siwan in writing about the accident and death of Driver Govind Kumar. Further, they have not challenged the absence of notice under Section 10 of the Act and employer / insured has not opposed the claim on the basis of want of notice under Section 10 of the Act, Thus, Insurance Company cannot raise this plea.
17. In such view of the matter, facts as well as law as involved, in present case, insofar as notice under Section 10 of the Act is concerned, are fully covered the observation made by Hon'ble Division of this Court in Rais (supra).
18. In what circumstances and context a statute provision can be considered to be mandatory or directory a reference may also be made to a landmark judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. T. Rajan vs. T.P.M. Sahir 2003 (8) SCC 498. Paragraph 49 whereof is quoted as under:-
"49. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is procedural in nature although employs the word "shall" may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. (See Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd v. Municipal Board, Rampur AIR 1965 SC 895, State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma 1996 (3) SCC 364, Venkataswamappa v. Special Dy. Commr. (Revenue) 1997 (9) SCC 128 and Rai Vimal Krishna v. State of Bihar 2003 (6) SCC 401)"
(emphasis supplied)
19. It is the settled law that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Suffice to refer to a latest judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sugandhi (dead) by Lrs. and another vs. P. Rajkumar Rep. By his Power Agent Imam Oli 2020 SCC Online SC 870. Paragraph 10, whereof is quoted as under:-
"10. It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way the of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under sub-rule (3)."
(emphasis supplied)
20. No doubt, in the very first line of Section 10 (1) of the Act the word used is "shall" that "No claim for compensation 'shall' be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of accident ......", has been used. It is also equally correct that in a normal sense word "shall" is used in mandatory sense. However, it is also golden rule of interpretation that in the field of law, to give the statute a purposeful or functional interpretation and that it should promote the purpose or the object of the Act, as observed in Bharat Singh (supra), a construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would lead to injustice, should always be avoided. Keeping this in mind, coupled with the discretion given to the Commissioner by proviso to 3rd proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act by using word "may" that "provided further, that the Commissioner 'may' entertain and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been given, ........ was due to sufficient reason," to my mind, this discretion left with the Commissioner can be best exercised if the word "shall" in first line of Section 10(1) of the Act is taken or interpreted as directory and not mandatory, moreso, when this point is related to procedural part of preferring a claim, and to my mind, it is not referable to substantive right of a claimant, which stood accrued the moment untoward incident or accident has taken place. Moreso, when the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation.
21. Accordingly, it is held that in view of the Act being a beneficial piece of legislation enacted for the benefit of the have-nots and the Commissioner having been given power to entertain the claim petition and decide the same even in absence of notice under Section 10 of the Act, the interpretation of statutory requirement of giving notice under Section 10 of the Act is merely 'directory' and cannot be held to be 'mandatory', which may render the claim not maintainable.
22. Insofar as the applicability of provision of Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act is concerned, again the provision has to be interpreted in the manner so as to serve the purpose and object of this beneficial piece of legislation as the manner in which interpretation has to be given to this clause also is already settled by the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Singh (supra) as noted above.
23. Insofar as territorial jurisdiction in such cases of accident and death is concerned, a reference may be made to certain judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Mantoo Sarkar vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others 2009 (2) SCC 244, Malati Sardar vs. National Insurance Company Limited and others 2016 (3) SCC 43 and Morgina Begum vs. Md. Hanuman Plantation Limited 2007 (11) SCC 616.
24. Paragraphs 16, 18, 20, 21 and 23 of Mantoo Sarkar (supra) are quoted as under:-
"16. We say so because ordinarily an appellate court shall not, having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entertain an appeal on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the court below unless he has been prejudiced thereby. Other respondents did not raise any question of jurisdiction. Although one witness each had been examined on behalf of the truck owner and owner of the bus, neither a question of lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised nor the question of any prejudice had been argued. It is only the first respondent who raised the question of territorial jurisdiction. However, no prejudice was caused to the appellant by the claim petition being tried by the MACT at Nainital.
18. The Tribunal is a court subordinate to the High Court. An appeal against the Tribunal lies before the High Court. The High Court, while exercising its appellate power, would follow the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure or akin thereto. In view of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellate court to pose unto itself the right question, viz., whether the first respondent has been able to show sufferance of any prejudice. If it has not suffered any prejudice or otherwise no failure of justice had occurred, the High Court should not have entertained the appeal on that ground alone.
20. A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to subject matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of claim. As a matter of fact the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. If the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, in our opinion, the Court should not have, in absence of any finding of sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first respondent, entertained the appeal.
21. In Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd., [ (2007) 5 SCC 591], this Court has held :
"17. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. If the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure are given effect to, even if the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal had no jurisdiction, in view of the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the respondent suffered any prejudice, they could not have questioned the jurisdiction of the court. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan this Court held: (AIR p. 342, paras 6-7) `6. ... If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was `coram non judice' and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position.
7. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, should not be entertained by an appellate court, except as provided in the section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections could be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the section has come in--and deservedly--for considerable criticism; but amidst much that is obscure and confused, there is one principle which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or undervaluation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise.
The reference to Section 578, now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it.
With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.' "
23. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the appellant herein was a labourer. The justness or otherwise of the amount of compensation has not been disputed before us. If the High Court judgment is to be complied with, appellant would again have to initiate another proceeding either at Bareilly or Gurgaon or at Delhi or at Jabalpur. The same evidence would have to be rendered once again."
(emphasis supplied)
25. Paragraphs 14 and 16 of Malati Sardar (supra) are quoted as under:-
"14. We are thus of the view that in the face of judgment of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra), the High Court was not justified in setting aside the award of the Tribunal in absence of any failure of justice even if there was merit in the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, the fact remained that the insurance company which was the main contesting respondent had its business at Kolkata.
15. Reliance placed on decisions of this Court in G.S. Grewal and Jagmittar Sain Bhagat is misplaced. In G.S. Grewal, the subject matter of dispute was not covered by the definition of "service matters" under Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 and on that ground, it was held that the Armed Forces Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter. Thus, it was a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Similarly in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat, the claimant before the Consumer Protection Forum was found not be a "consumer" under Section 2(1) (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and on that ground the order of the consumer forum was held to be without jurisdiction. The said cases did not deal with the issue of territorial jurisdiction.
16. The provision in question, in the present case, is a benevolent provision for the victims of accidents of negligent driving. The provision for territorial jurisdiction has to be interpreted consistent with the object of facilitating remedies for the victims of accidents. Hyper technical approach in such matters can hardly be appreciated. There is no bar to a claim petition being filed at a place where the insurance company, which is the main contesting parties in such cases, has its business. In such cases, there is no prejudice to any party. There is no failure of justice. Moreover, in view of categorical decision of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra), contrary view taken by the High Court cannot be sustained. The High Court failed to notice the provision of Section 21 CPC."
(emphasis supplied)
26. In the case of Morgina Begum (supra) even this controversy regarding provision of interpretation of Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act has also given. Paragrpahs 6, 7, 8 and 9 whereof are also quoted as under:-
"6. Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act clearly provides that the claim petition may be filed by the claimant where the claimant ordinarily resides. In our opinion, the expression `ordinarly resides' means where the person claiming compensation normally resides at the time of filing the claim petition. The proviso to Section 21 which is also relevant for the present controversy, provides that in case the Commissioner, other than the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident took place, entertains the claim petition then he shall give a notice to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area and the state Government concerned. The Amended Section 21 has been specifically introduced in the Act by Amending Act No. 30 of 1995 with effect from 15th September, 1995 in order to benefit and facilitate the claimants. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Amendment of the Act, a copy of which has been produced before us, clearly mentions that the amendment has been brought about for benefits of the claimants viz. either the workmen or their dependents. The relevant portion of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, reads as under:-
"It is also proposed to introduce provision for facilitating migrant workmen to file compensation claims before the Commissioners having jurisdiction over the area where they or their dependents ordinarily reside. Provision for transfer of compensation from one Commissioner to another has also been made."
7. The idea behind introduction of this amendment is that migrant labourers all over the country often go elsewhere to earn their livelihood. When an accident takes place then in order to facilitate the claimants they may make their claim not necessarily at the place where the accident took place but also at the place where they ordinarily reside. This amendment was introduced in the Act in 1995. This was done with a very laudable object, otherwise it could cause hardship to the claimant to claim compensation under the Act. It is not possible for poor workmen or their dependents who reside in one part of the country and shift from one place to another for their livelihood to necessarily go to the place of the accident for filing a claim petition. It may be very expensive for the claimants to pursue in such a claim petition because of the financial and other hardship. It would entail the poor claimant traveling from one place to another for getting compensation. Labour statutes are for the welfare of the workmen.
8. This Court has in Bharat Singh v. Management of New Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and Ors., [1986] 2 SCC, 614 has taken the view that welfare legislation should be given a purposive interpretation safeguarding the rights of the have-nots rather than giving a literal construction. In case of doubt the interpretation in favour of the worker should be preferred.
9. The view which we are taking has been taken by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of S.K. Saukat Ali Alias Sekho S.K. v. Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation-cum-Deputy Labour Commissioner, Cuttack and Ors., (1999) 2 Transport and Accident Cases 638 (Ori) and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Noorjahan v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Hyderabad and Anr. (1999) 3 T.A.C. 276 (AP). Hence, we are of the opinion that the view taken by both these High Courts is correct. A claimant can apply before the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area where the claimant resides, and it is not always necessary to prefer a claim petition where the accident has taken palce. This is for the facility of the workmen and advances the cause of welfare of the worken. Therefore, the view taken by the Gauhati High Court in the impugned order that the claim petition could only be filed at the place where the accident had taken place, cannot be sustained. Section 21 (1)(b) read with its proviso is a beneficial legislation for the welfare of the workmen and by the above, interpretation, it will advance the cause of the workmen. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Gauhati High Court in the impugned order cannot be sustained and accordingly we set aside the impugned order."
(emphasis supplied)
27. Clearly, as per the law laid down the claim petition cannot be rejected on the ground of territorial jurisdiction alone, where the claims are preferred under such beneficial piece of legislation.
28. On perusal of record, I find that although the vehicle was insured in the branch office of the appellant-Company at district Siwan and the accident had also taken place in district Siwan (Bihar), however, in paragraphs 16 and 18 it has been categorically stated that the claimants are landless labourers and have shifted to District Gorakhpur and are residing there. It has futher been stated that the opposite party no. 1 is also permanent resident of District Kushinagar and that the Insurance Company has its regional office at Gorakhpur (which is not in dispute). Hence, in the light of law settled by Hon'ble Apex Court that once the insurance Company has branch offices at different places, therefore, no substantial injury or injustice was done to the insurance-Company.
29. In such view of the matter, I do not find that any substantial question for consideration before this Court has arisen in this appeal on facts of the case. However, the question nos. A and D as framed in the memo of appeal are considered and answered in the light of the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sir Chunilal (supra) against the Insurance Company, that requirement of notice under Section 10(1) of the Act is directory in nature and the claim petition would be maintainable and cannot be thrown in absence thereof, and that in view of Section 21 of the Act, as the Insurance Company has branch office everywhere and therefore, no prejudice is caused to the company, the Tribunal did not lack jurisdiction to decide the claim petition.
30. Present appeal is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.
Order Date :- 2.11.2020 Lalit Shukla