Kerala High Court
Chithambaran Ponnappan vs Viswambaran And Anr. on 12 January, 2000
Equivalent citations: AIR 2001 KERALA 205, (2000) 2 CIVILCOURTC 329, (2000) 2 KER LT 128, (2000) 1 KER LJ 591
Author: M.R. Hariharan Nair
Bench: M.R. Hariharan Nair
ORDER M.R. Hariharan Nair, J.
1. The revision petitioner, who is the Judgment-debtor in O.S. No. 37 of 1985 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Alappuzha, has raised two questions in this revision. They are: (1) whether in a decree for specific performance the Court can extend the time for deposit of the purchase price subsequent to the decree; and (2) whether an application for extension of time is required as a condition precedent for the Court to grant extension of time.
2. A decree for specific performance was passed in the case in favour of the present respondent, who was the plaintiff in the suit on 27.02.1986. One of the conditions in the decree was that the balance of sale consideration, due to the present revision petitioner should be deposited within one month from the said date. There was no such deposit made till 20.03.1997. When the question of executing the decree arose, the revision-petitioner took the stand that the decree has become unenforceable in consequence of the failure on the part of the plaintiff in depositing the balance of the purchase money within the time granted by the Court and in that respect there was failure on the part of the plaintiff himself to comply with the directions in the decree. The Court below, as per the impugned order, discarded the said contention and found that though the deposit was belated, the delay was condonable. This was done without a written application on the part of the plaintiff to condone the delay.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the respondent, who relied on the decision in Joseph George v. Chacko Thomas (1992 (1) KLT 6) in support of his contention that as long as the decree is not rescinded under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and the Court has the power to extend the time and that this can be done even without a written application in that behalf.
4. In the instant case, the justification given by the plaintiff for not making the deposit in time was the fact that the defendant himself took up the matter in appeal and on the dismissal of the appeal on 15.10.1992 even a second appeal was filed which was dismissed only on 15.02.1996. Thus, here is a case where the decree was not excutable atleast till 15.02.1996. Where there is failure on the part of the decree-holder to deposit the purchase price or where there is failure to deposit other sums to comply with the terms of the decree, the judgment-debtor is not without any remedy. He has got a right, under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, to seek rescission of the contract. In the Instant case, the revision petitioner has not resorted to the said power and as such the decree continues to be enforceable. Then what remains is whether the Court was justified in allowing extension of time.
5. The contention of the revision-petitioner, that the Court has no power to extend the time, has to fail in view of the specific mention in Section 28 of the Act itself, that the power to rescind the decree would arise where there is failure on the part of the purchaser or lessee to pay the purchase money or other sum due under the decree "within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the Court may allow". The power to extend the time is thus inbuilt in Section 28 itself, and as such the revision petitioner cannot be heard to contend that there is no power on the part of the Court to extend the time.
6. What remains to be considered is whether a written application is necessary for extension of time. Here is a case where, even in the decree the Court below allowed the decree-holder time to make the deposit. Mere failure on the part of the decree-holder to deposit the amount does not render the decree ineffective or release the judgment-debtor from the decree ineffective or release the judgment-debtor from his liability to satisfy the decree. It is only when there is wilful default on the part of the decree-holder to make the deposit, that the Court would be justified in refusing extension of time. There is no such wilful default evident in the present case and as such the Court below has the authority and power, under Section 148 of the C. P. C. to extend the time and to proceed with the execution albeit the deposit was belated. That there exists power on the part of the execution Court to extend the time even without application is clear from the decision in K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P. S. S. S. Chettiar (AIR 1980 SC 512) also.
7. In the above circumstances, I find absolutely no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the impugned order. The revision is without merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The question whether the revision-petitioner is entitled to be compensated, in consequence of the belated deposit, will be an aspect which has to be considered by the execution Court, if it is raised, in accordance with law and after hearing the respondent.