Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
D. Sivakesava Reddy vs Kanni Ammal & Ors1And In The Case Of ... on 8 April, 2026
Author: R Raghunandan Rao
Bench: R Raghunandan Rao
APHC010013762006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3206]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF APRIL
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO
S.A.No.611 of 2006, W.P.No.19156 of 2017 and C.C.Nos.68 of 2016, 700 of
2020 & 1648 of 2022
SECOND APPEAL NO: 611/2006
Between:
1. D. SIVAKESAVA REDDY, S/O LATE D. SIARAMI REDDY
AGRICULTURE R/O NALLAMADA POST AND MANDAL,
ANANTAPUR DISTRICT
...APPELLANT
AND
1. SMT CHENNAMMA K BHARATHI, W/o K. Prabhakar Reddy Household
R/o D.No.2-3-391, Venkatramana Yayout, Tirupathi, Chittoor District
...RESPONDENT
Appeal under section ___________ against orders IA NO: 1 OF 2006(SAMP 1429 OF 2006 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased To suspend the operation of the Judgement and decree in OS No.359/1997 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri, Anantapur pending disposal of the Second Appeal.
IA NO: 1 OF 2007(SAMP 3197 OF 2007 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to bring the Petitioners 1 and 2 herein as Legal representatives of the deceased 2 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch sole appellant on record as appellants 1 and 2 respectively in SA.No. 611/2006 in the interest of justice IA NO: 1 OF 2012(SAMP 3048 OF 2012 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date for hearing of the main appeal preferably in the first week of Novermber 2012.
IA NO: 1 OF 2013(SAMP 2276 OF 2013 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to pass order restraining the Respondent, in changing the nature, creating third party interest under a deed of conveyance or otherwise, in respect of the suit scheudle properties and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2016(SAMP 313 OF 2016 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased hear and dispose of the above SA No.611/2006 as expeditiously as possible IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased Pleased to grant temporary injunction restraining the Respondents or their agents or henchmen from interfering with possession, alienating or altering the Petition Schedule Property to third party in the interest of justice Counsel for the Appellant:
1. SITA RAM CHAPARLA Counsel for the Respondent:
1. ...
2. PUSHPA KUMARI.B
3. K MOHAN RAMI REDDY Date of Reserved : 06.02.2026 Date of Pronouncement : 08.04.2026 Date of Upload : 08.04.2026 3 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch The Court made the following Common Judgment:
As all these cases arise out of the same dispute and between the same parties, they are being disposed of, by way of this common order.
2. Heard Sri Sita Ram Chaparla the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in S.A.No.611 of 2006 and Sri Patanjali Pamidighantam, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents.
3. The parties are being referred to as they are arrayed in O.S.No.359 of 1997. The deceased 1st defendant had married Smt. Thulasamma. Four daughters were born to this couple, namely Smt. Sarojamma, Smt. Lakshmikanthamma, Smt. Chennamma alias K. Bharathi and Smt. Girijamma. Smt. Thulasamma, the wife of the 1st defendant and the mother of the plaintiff had passed away even before the marriages of any of the daughters had been performed. On account of the demise of Smt. Thulasamma, the property belonging to her had devolved upon the four daughters and the deceased 1st defendant herein. The marriages of three daughters were performed in 1974. These three daughters namely Smt. Sarojamma, Smt. Lakshmikanthamma and Smt. Girijamma, before their marriage, along with the 1st defendant herein, had gifted their shares in the property of Smt. Thulasamma to the plaintiff that is Smt. Chennamma alias K. Bharathi. These gifts were by way of registered deeds of gifts, dated 07.05.1974 & 09.08.1974. These documents were marked as Exhibits A.1 to A.3, in the suit.
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4. The marriage alliance of the plaintiff was fixed in December, 1974 and the marriage was performed in the month of February, 1975. At that stage, the plaintiff had executed a registered deed of gift, dated 19.12.1974, transferring all the property, which had been gifted to her, by her three sisters and the deceased first defendant, apart from her share which had devolved upon her, on account of the demise of her mother, to the deceased first defendant. It is the contention, of the plaintiff, that the property was transferred to the 1st defendant only for the purposes of his livelihood and with a clear understanding that the property would revert back to the plaintiff after the demise of the 1st defendant. After the execution of Exhibit B-1 and after the marriage of the plaintiff had been performed, the 1st defendant had contracted a 2nd marriage. At that stage, the plaintiff is said to have confronted the 1st defendant, on the ground that the property had been given to the 1st defendant solely for his livelihood with the understanding that the property would be revert back to the plaintiff, while the second marriage was in violation of the said undertaking. The 1st defendant is said to have convinced the plaintiff that her interest would not be harmed in any manner, by the second marriage, and that he would continue to safeguard the property, in her favour.
5. The defendant No.1 had continued to cultivate the suit schedule property, during his lifetime. In the course of time, children were also born to the 1st defendant, out of his second marriage. In the year 1995, the 1st defendant is said to have stopped paying any part of usufruct to the plaintiff. At that stage, the plaintiff, having realized that the 1st defendant had all around 5 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch misused his relationship with her to transfer the property, to his children, born from second marriage, had issued a legal notice. The 1st defendant is said to have replied to the legal notice with false allegations. On account of these facts, the plaintiff filed O.S.No.359 of 1997 before the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri, seeking cancellation of the deed of gift, dated 19.12.1974; the delivery of suit schedule property to the plaintiff; mesne profits as well as costs of the suit. The suit was decreed by the trial court on 20.02.2004. Aggrieved by this judgment/decree, the 1st defendant filed AS.No.21 of 2004 before the Senior Civil Judge, Kadiri. This appeal came to be dismissed on 21.11.2005. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the 1st defendant filed S.A.No.611 of 2006. During the pendency of this appeal, the 1st defendant had passed away and his son and wife were brought on record as appellants 2 &3.
6. Sri Sita Ram Chaparla, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that the allegations made in the plaint are incorrect and there were no conditions attached to the deed of gift, dated 19.12.1974, as alleged by the plaintiff. He would further contend that the suit itself was barred by limitation inasmuch as the deed of gift was executed and registered on 19.12.1974 while the suit came to be filed in the year 1997 and the same is barred by limitation, by any stretch of imagination.
7. Sri Patanjali Pamidighantam, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, would contend that the facts pleaded in the plaint have been proved by the plaintiff entering the witness box, as P.W.1, and no part of her 6 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch evidence was shaken in the cross-examination . He would further submit that the 1st defendant, which was alive during the pendency of the suit and the first appeal, had chosen not to enter the witness box and as such, an adverse inference against the 1st defendant would have to be drawn by this Court. He would submit that the suit is within limitation inasmuch as the plaintiff had discovered the true nature of the deed only in the year 1995 and had filed the suit in the year 1979 which is within the period of three years stipulated under the Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. He would also submit that E.P.No.104 of 2006 filed for execution of the Judgment/decree, of the trial court, dated 20.02.2004 had been allowed by an Order, dated 17.05.2006 and possession of the property had been delivered, to the plaintiff, on 08.06.2006.
8. The pleading in the plaint is that the plaintiff was in the care and protection of the 1st defendant, till her marriage, in February, 1975, and was under the total control, and influence of the 1st defendant, as she had no independent advice and had implicit faith in the 1st defendant. The plaintiff pleads that the 1st defendant being the father of the plaintiff was in a position to dominate her will and taking advantage of this position, he had exercised undue influence over the plaintiff and obtained a nominal deed of gift, dated 19.12.1974. The plaintiff contends that this transaction was devoid of good faith.
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9. The plaintiff also goes on to the plead that the 1st defendant had persuaded her to execute the deed of gift on the ground that he would be left alone, with no means of livelihood, once the plaintiff, after her marriage, settles down with her husband, at her marital home and that he would need sustenance for his livelihood. The plaintiff also pleads that she continued to believe her father, the 1st defendant, even when he got married a second time, on account of his position of dominance over her. She contends that she finally understood and recognized that her father, the 1st defendant was misusing his position of dominance over her, to deprive her of her property, only when he brought the brothers, of his second wife, to his house. At that stage, she got issued a legal notice on 27.02.1997 claiming that the gift executed by her in favour of the 1st defendant, dated 19.12.1974 is void. In the cause of action paragraph, in the plaint, the plaintiff states that the cause of action for the suit arose on 19.12.1974 when the plaintiff executed a deed of gift in favour of the 1st defendant and the year 1995 when the plaintiff came to know about the fraud committed by the 1st defendant.
10. The 1st defendant filed a written statement admitting the execution of the deeds of gift by him and his three daughters to the plaintiff and the subsequent deed of gift executed by the plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant also stated that he was blessed with a son and two daughters, from the second wife he had married, after the marriages of his daughters.
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11. The 1st defendant took the defence, that there was no undue influence on the plaintiff and the transaction was done in good faith and no undue influence was involved. The specific pleading of the 1st defendant is that, the property was conveyed to the 1stdefendant, as all the daughters had got married and left the house leaving behind the 1st defendant who required sustenance for his livelihood and betterment. It is also contended that his second marriage was actually arranged by the plaintiff and other three daughters.
12. In the trial court the following issues came up for consideration:
I. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for setting aside the gift deed, dated 19.12.1974?
II. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for delivery of possession by the defendants?
III. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for Rs.20000/- towards mesne profits and Rs.1000/- for future profits by the defendant?
IV. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
V. To what relief?
13. The trial court accepted the contention of the plaintiff that the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, on account of their relationship, were in a fiduciary relationship and the 1st defendant taking advantage of this position of dominance over the plaintiff had obtained the deed of gift from the plaintiff. On that ground, the trial court had held in favour of the plaintiff, in relation to issues1 to 3. On the question of limitation, the trial court held that Article-91, in the schedule to the Limitation Act, (the trial court was referring to Article 91 of 9 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch the Limitation Act, 1908) would be applicable and that the starting point for the period of limitation, would not be the date of execution of the gift deed but the time when the fraud becomes known to the wronged party. The trial court then held that the plaintiff discovered the true nature of the deed, only in the year 1995, and accordingly, the suit was within limitation. The trial court had also held that the relevant date would be the date on which the plaintiff discovered the nature of the deed and not the date when she escaped from the influence by which the 1st defendant dominated her.
14. In the appeal, the appellate Court framed the following issues:-
I. Whether the judgment and decree of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri is erroneous?
II. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration that the gift deed executed by her in favour of defendant is null and void?
III. To what relief?
15. As can be seen from the aforesaid issues, the question of limitation was not framed as one of the issues. However, the said issue was considered, in paragraph No.31, of the judgment in appeal. The appellate court accepted the contention of the plaintiff that she became aware of the nature of the deed of gift only from 1995 when the behavior of the 1st defendant had changed. On that basis, the appellate court agreed with the findings of the trial court.
16. Sri Sita Ram Chaparla, learned counsel for the appellants while assailing the findings of the trial court and the appellate Court had essentially 10 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch contended that a suit for cancellation of a deed of gift could not have been filed after more than 22 years and the same was clearly barred by limitation.
17. In the aforesaid circumstances, the following questions of law, arise:
i. Whether the limitation under the Article 59 of the schedule to the Limitation Act. 1963 would commence from the date of execution of the document or from the date when the undue influence over the plaintiff ends or when the nature of the document is understood by the plaintiff.
ii. Whether the burden of demonstrating the presence or absence of undue influence would rest on the plaintiff or the 1st defendant.
18. Question No.2 is being considered first.
19. The case of the plaintiff is that, she was under the care and protection of her father till she was married and also at the time when she had executed the deed of gift, dated 19.12.1974. She contends that the relationship, of a father and daughter, is a fiduciary relationship where the father has a position of dominance over the will of the daughter and that she had executed the said gift deed on account of her father dominating her will and getting her to execute the said deed of gift on a false pretext.
20. The question of who would have to demonstrate, the presence or absence of such undue influence, had come up before the Courts. Both the trial court and the appellate court held that the burden would lie upon the 11 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch person who is said to have been in a position of dominance over the transferor of the property. For this purpose, the trial court had relied upon the Judgments of the High Court at Madras in the case of S. Rathnam Naidu & Anr Vs. Kanni Ammal & Ors1and in the case of Mannankatti Ammal Vs. Vaiyapri Udayar2, the Judgment of the High Court at Calcutta in the case of Wajid Khan Vs. Ewas Ali Khan3, the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ladli Parshad Vs. Karnkak Distillery Company4, the Judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Daya Shankar Vs. Smt. Bachi & Ors5.
21. A review of these Judgments, read with Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, reveals the following:
"Any contract between two persons, in which one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses such dominance, for obtaining unfair advantage, would have to be treated as a contract which is induced by "undue influence". Once such a relationship is shown, especially when such relationship is between that of a daughter and her father, the burden of demonstrating that such undue influence had not been pressed into service by the dominant person would fall on the dominant person only."
22. In the present case, the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased 1st defendant is that of a daughter and father. Such a relationship 1 AIR 1972 Madras 413 2 1961 (2) Madras LJ 367 3 (1886) ILR 13 cal. 545 4 AIR 1963 SC 1279 5 AIR 1982 Allahabad 376 12 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch has been treated as a fiduciary relationship. Consequently, the 1st defendant has to be treated as a person in a position of dominance over the plaintiff. The aforesaid Judgments also hold that, when an allegation of undue influence is made, the burden of denying such undue influence would fall on the dominant person. In the present case, the pleadings of the 1st defendant, in the written statement do not make out any case to dispel that undue influence had not occurred. Except a denial of such undue influence, the 1st defendant has not made out any positive case in his favour. Further, the 1st defendant chose not to step into the witness box and consequently, he has not been able to dispel the contention of the plaintiff that there was undue influence in the execution of the deed of gift.
23. The substantial question of law, that remains to be considered by this Court, is on the question of whether the suit was within limitation or not. The deed of gift was executed, on 19.12.1974, and the suit came to be filed only in the year 1997, which is about 24 years since the execution of the deed of gift. In the normal course, the suit would be barred, by limitation, by any stretch of imagination. However, the plaintiff relies upon Article-59 of the schedule, in the Limitation Act, 1963. The said provision is an enlargement, of the Articles 91 & 114 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Articles 91 & 114 of the First Schedule, in the Limitation Act, 1908 read as follows:-
Article Description of suit Period of Time from which Nos. limitation period begins to run
91. To cancel or set Three years When the facts entitling aside an instrument the plaintiff to have the nototherwise instrument cancelled or 13 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch provided for. set aside become known to him.
114. For the rescission of Three years When the facts entitling a contract the plaintiff to have the contract rescinded first become known to him.
24. Both these Articles were combined as Article-59 in the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as follows:-
Article Description of suit Period of Time from which Nos. limitation period begins to run
59. To cancel or set Three years Time from which period aside an instrument begins to run: When the or decree or for the facts entitling the plaintiff rescission of a to have the instrument or contract. decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
25. Under this Article, the period of three years, for filing a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, commences from the date on which the plaintiff gets knowledge of the facts because of which the instrument requires to be cancelled or set aside. This Article has been considered in Someshwar Dutt Vs. Tirbhawan Dutt & Ors and in the case of Ningawwa Vs Byrappa & 3 Ors.
26. In the present case, the plaintiff contends that, on account of the fiduciary relationship between her and her father, she was always under the belief that the property would revert to her, upon the demise of her father. She also contended that it was only, after her suspicion was raised, regarding the intentions of her father and after receiving the reply of her father, to the legal notice issued by her, that she became aware of the real intentions of her 14 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch father, the 1st defendant. It is her case that, her father had induced her to believe that the property would come back to her as she would be his legal heir. The plaintiff contends that she became aware of the actual intention of her father only upon receipt of his reply notice. If this contention were to be rejected, the suit would have to be dismissed and consequently, this Second Appeal would have to be allowed.
27. The case of the plaintiff is that her father, the deceased 1st defendant, had been sharing the usufruct of the suit schedule property with her, right from the date on which the deed of gift had been executed till a short period prior to the exchange of notices and the plaintiff, examined herself as P.W.1 and made the statement, while deposing as P.W.1. This statement was not shaken during her cross-examination. Neither the deceased 1st defendant nor any of the defendants had deposed as witnesses, to dispute or deny the statement made by the plaintiff, as a witness. The defendants have also not raised any pleading nor produced any evidence, to set up an alternative case, to demonstrate that the original deed of gift, executed in December-1974 was an absolute gift and there was never any understanding or assurance given by the deceased 1st defendant that the property would revert to the plaintiff, upon the demise of the deceased 1st defendant. In the circumstances, applying the principles of preponderant probabilities, the only conclusion this Court can draw is that the version of the plaintiff is correct and the defendants have not placed any material before this Court, to reject such a plea. 15
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28. Article 59 provides for a period of three years for setting aside or cancelling an instrument. This three years period would commence from the date on which the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the said instrument cancelled or set aside first become known to the plaintiff. Article-59 (erstwhile Article-91) came to be considered by the Privy Council in the case of Someshwar Dutt Vs. Tirbhawan Dutt & Ors6. In this case, the younger brother had executed a deed of gift, in favour of the elder brother conveying his entire property to the elder brother. Thereafter, the younger brother, initiated litigation, for setting aside the deed of gift executed by the younger brother. One of the issues that came up for consideration, right from the stage of trial was the question of limitation. The suit was primarily filed on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation and the weakness of mind of the younger brother, apart from the commanding position of the elder brother on the younger brother, which made the fraud feasible. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the younger brother could not prove the allegations of misrepresentation etc. However, the Appellate Court had held that a case, of undue influence, was established and accepted the case of the younger brother. The Privy Council, in the appeal before it, had held that no case, on merits, had been made out by the younger brother. Apart from this, the Privy Council had also went into the question of limitation and held as follows:-
"20. One further consideration on this head falls to be mentioned. If a substantive case of undue influence may be deemed-- contrary to their Lordships' view--to have been disclosed in the pleadings, and established in evidence, then the present suit is plainly barred by time, as the Subordinate Judge held. In the 6 Manu/PR/0145/1934 16 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch view taken by their Lordships, the plaintiff, not being of weak intellect, was aware of the character, of the transaction at the date when it was entered into. But, apart from that, the plaintiff, on his own confession, became aware of the true character of the deed which he signed within a few months of its execution. It was suggested that the phrase a deed of gift" may be ambiguous, and that in a sense a deed of management may be regarded as a deed of gift. But, even assuming that to be so, the plaintiff makes it quite clear, in the passage cited, that he came to know, a few months after its execution, that he had signed, not a deed of management, but a deed of gift of his property. If that be so, the suit is plainly out of time, and is barred by art. 91 of the Indian Limitation Act (of Rani Janki Kunwar v. Raja Ajit Singh MANU/PR/0038/1887 L.R. 14 I.A. 148. The error into which the Chief Court fell, in their Lordships' opinion, is that they thought the three years permitted by the Limitation Act began to run, not from the discovery of the plaintiff of the true nature of the deed which he had signed, but from the date when he escaped from the influence by which, according to the plaintiff, he was dominated. Whether the facts as proved bring the claim within the limitation period even on this view is a question on which their Lordships express no opinion. It suffices to say that for the doctrine of the Chief Court their Lordships are unable to find any sufficient justification. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal of the defendant should be allowed, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge of September 9, 1909, be restored. It follows that the cross-appeal fails to be dismissed. The plaintiffs must pay the costs here and in the Chief Court."
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India also had an occasion to consider the Article-59 (erstwhile Article-91) in the case of Ningawwa Vs Byrappa & 3 Ors7. In this case, a wife had executed a gift deed transferring certain plots to her husband. Subsequently, she filed a suit for setting aside the deed of gift. The case of the wife, was that she had been told that she was executing a deed of gift in relation to two plots while other properties apart from the two plots, were also included in the deed of gift. The matter reached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India considered not only the question of limitation, but also the question of whether a document executed, under undue influence of fraud would be a void document or avoidable document. The relevant passage in the said judgment as follows:-
7
1968 AIR 956 17 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch "We are accordingly of the opinion that the transaction of gift was voidable and not void and the suit must be brought within the time prescribed under Article 95 of the Limitation Act.
7. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the terminus a quo for the limitation was the date of the execution of the gift deed and claim of the appellant was therefore barred as the suit was filed more than three years after that, date.
We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Article 95 prescribe a period of limitation of three years from the time when the fraud becomes known to the party wronged. In the present case, the appellant stated that she did not come to know offraud committed by her husband in respect of plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village till his death. The trial court has discussed the evidence on this point and reached the conclusion that the case of the appellant is true. The appellant lived with her husband on affectionate terms till the time of his death. Till then she had no reason to suspect that any fraud had been committed on her in respect of the two plots in Lingadahalli village. It is only after his death when his brothers and respondent no.4's brothers removed grain from the house against her wishes that the appellant came to know that the lands at Lingadahalli village were included in the gift deed by fraud. The suit was instituted by the appellant within a few days after she came to know of the fraud. We are therefore of the opinion that the suit was brought within time prescribed under Art.95 of the Indian Limitation Act so far a plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village are concerned.
8. As regards plots nos.407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village the trial court has found that the husband of the appellant was in a position of active confidence towards her at the time of the gift deed and that he was in a position to dominate her will and the transaction of gift was on the face of it unconscionable. Section 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act says that where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a transaction with him which appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such transaction was not induced by undue influence, shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of another. Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act also states:
"Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is, on the party who is in a position of active confidence."
9. The trial court found that the respondents had not adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under these statutory provisions and reached the finding that the gift deed was obtained by the appellant's husband by undue influence as alleged by her. The finding of the trial court has been affirmed by the High Court. But both the trial court and the High Court refused to grant relief to the appellant on the ground that the suit was barred under Art.91 of the Limitation Act so far as plots nos. 407/1 and 409/1 were concerned. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the lower courts were wrong in taking this view. We are, however, unable to accept this argument as correct. Article 91 of the Indian Limitation Act provides that a suit to set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision of the Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a three year's limitation which begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside, are Known to him. In the present case, the trial court has found, upon examination of 18 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch the evidence, that at the very time of the execution of the gift deed, Ex.45 the appellant knew that her husband prevailed upon her to convey survey plots nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The finding of the trial court is based upon the admission of the appellant herself in the course of her evidence. In view of this finding of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of the appellant is barred under Art.91 of the Limitation Act. So far as plots nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned. On behalf of the appellant Mr. K. R. Chaudhuri presented, the argument that the appellant continued to be under the undue influence of her husband till the date of his death and the three year's period under Art.91 should therefore be taken to run not when the appellant had knowledge of the true nature of the gift deed but from the date when she escaped the influence of her husband by whose will she was dominated. It is not possible, to accept this argument in view of the express language of Art.91 of the Limitation Act which provides that the three years' period runs from the date when the plaintiff came to know the facts entitling her to have the instrument cancelled or set aside, This view is borne out by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Someshwar Dutt v. TirbhawanDutt(1) in which it was held that the limitation of a suit to set aside a deed of gift on the ground that it was obtained by undue influence was governed by Art.91 of the Indian Limitation Act, and the three years period runs from the date when the plaintiff discovered the true nature of the deed, and not from the date when he escaped from the influence by which be alleged that he was dominated.
10. For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal must be allowed and the appellant must be granted a decree that the, gift deed, Ex.45 is not binding on her so far as plots 91 and 92 of Lingdahalli village are concerned and she is further entitled to recover possession of the said two plots from the defendant- respondents with mesne profits. We accordingly set aside the decree of the High Court, restore the decree of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bijapur dated January 29, 1953 and allow this appeal with costs.
11. Appeal allowed."
30. The aforesaid judgments make it clear that the period of three years, for filing the suit to set aside a document would commence from the date on which the plaintiff has knowledge of the true nature of the deed executed by the plaintiff. The point of time when the plaintiff comes out of the undue influence of the beneficiary of the document, would not berelevant for determining the starting point of the aforesaid three years.
31. In the present case, the document had been executed on 19.12.1974. The plaintiff was fully aware of the fact she was executing the 19 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch deed of gift in favour of her father transferring all the property, of her mother, which had been transferred to her, by her sisters and by the 1st defendant.
32. The pleading of the plaintiff, regarding the reason why she had instituted the suit, for setting aside the deed of gift, dated 19.12.1974, is as follows:
"11. Till two years ago the plaintiff had no reason to suspect the good faith of her father. Since two years the attitude of thedefendant has thoroughly changed. The defendant has notbeen on visiting terms with the plaintiff and was keeping himself away though all these years he was frequently visiting Tirupati and taking the plaintiff to Nallamada giving her cash and kind. The plaintiff bagan to suspect the defendant since two years as the defendant was loosing affection on her and was developing lot of affection towards his second wife and children. At the instance of his second wife and her brothers the defendant has been acting prejudicially to the interests ofthe plaintiff and he was also trying to alienate the properties to third parties and trying to create rights to his step children. The plaintiff learns that the defendant has brought the brothers of his second wife to Nallamada and keeping them in his house. The plaintiff coming to know the attitude of the defendant got issued a notice on dt.27-2-1997 claiming that the gift executed by her in favour of the defendant on 19.12.74 is void under law and that it does not affect the rights of the plaintiff. The defendant gave a reply notice with false allegations. Hence this suit.
13. The cause of action for the suit arose on 19.12.74 when the plaintiff executed a gift deed infavour of the defendant giving the schedule mentioned suit, properties and in the year 1995 when the plaintiff came to know about the fraud played by the defendant at Nallamada where the defendant resides and the suit properties situate all within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court."
33. On the question of limitation, the Trial Court held as follows:-
"28) With respect to the question of limitation as rightly contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, the appropriate article applicable is Sec.95 of the Limitation Act.
As per the decision in the case of Nigawwa Vo. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and others reported in A.I.R.1968 S.C. 956 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not date of execution of gift deed but time when fraud becomes known to the party wronged. It is the date when plaintiff discovered nature of the deed and not date when he escaped from Influence by which he was dominated. A contract or other transaction Induced or tainted by fraud is not void., but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded. Until it is avoided, the transaction is valid, so that third parties without notice of the fraud may in the meantime acquire right and Interests in the matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded, The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as toits character.With reference to the former, the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable. According to the plaintiff, from 1995 onwards 20 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch when the defendant has stopped giving share to the plaintiff, failed to explain accounts and the details of the properties, the plaintiff has started getting her initial suspicionand she has issued legal notice under Ex. A-5 on 27-2-97 and therefore when the plaintiff has got doubt about the nature of the transaction the point of limitationstarts and as such the suit is within time and not barred by limitation."
34. The findings of the appellate Court, in this regard is as follows:-
"31. The learned counsel for the defendant contends that the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff filed the suit nearly after lapse of 23 years after execution of Ex.B.1. The plaintiff's counsel cited a decision reported in A.I.R.1968 SC 956 wherein it was observed that under Art. 95 of the Limitation Act- starting point of limitation. Art-91 of the limitation Act -It is not date of execution of gift deed but time when fraud becomes known to the party wronged. It is the date when plaintiff discovered truenature of deed and not date when he escaped from influence by which he was dominated. So in this case it is specific case of the plaintiff that even after execution of Ex.B.1, the defendant had been cordial towards the plaintiff and he had been supplying produce realized from the plaint schedule properties. The plaintiff also says that from 1995 onwards when the defendant has stopped giving share to the plaintiff, failed to explain accounts and the details of the properties, the plaintiff has started getting her initial suspicion and she has issued legal notice. The plaintiff came to know about the nature of document and the defendant started to act adverse to the interests of the plaintiff. The period of limitation starts from the date of knowledge of the plaintiff about the fraud played by the defendant. Therefore the suit is perfectly within time. The finding of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri is correct and I do not see any reason to interfere with the same. The points 1 and 2 are answering accordingly."
35. In the present case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was aware of the nature of the deed of gift, executed by her, as well as the contents of the deed. However, she became aware that she had been induced, into executing the deed of gift, on false pretences, only in 1995. Both the trial court and appellate courts accepted this version of the plaintiff. This court has not been shown any evidence to hold otherwise. Applying the ratio, set out in the above judgments, it must be held that the suit was within limitation.
36. The deceased 1st defendant, is said to have executed a registered deed of will, dated 07.05.2002, registered as document No.35 of 2002, 21 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch bequeathing the suit schedule property to his son of D. Kalidas Reddy. After the demise, of the deceased 1st defendant, on 17.11.2007, the revenue records were mutated in favour of Sri D. Kalidas Reddy and fresh pattadar pass books and title deeds were issued in favour of Sri D. Kalidas Reddy. Aggrieved by the issuance of the pattadar pass books and title deeds, the plaintiff filed an appeal, before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kadiri, who granted a stay of operation of the orders, of the Tahsildar, by proceedings dated 07.10.2014. Aggrieved by this Order, Sri D. Kalidas Reddy, filed a revision before the Joint Collector, who stayed the proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer, by proceedings, dated 18.12.2014 and directed the Revenue Divisional Officer to dispose of the appeal. Against this order of the Joint Collector, the plaintiff moved W.P.No.3903 of 2015 before the erstwhile Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. By an Order dated 02.03.2015, the Hon'ble Common High Court had set aside the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer as well as the Joint Collector and directed the Revenue Divisional Officer to dispose of the appeal, filed by the respondent, on merits, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the Order. The Revenue Divisional Officer, had thereupon dismissed the appeal, by an Order dated 16.06.2015 and remanded the case to the Tahsildar for a de novo enquiry. The Tahsildar, in the course of the de novo enquiry had prepared a report, which stated that about 3.5 acres of land was in the possession of persons who had purchased these lands between 1982 to 2004 and that an extent of 0.96 cents of land was also gifted out to the 22 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch APSRTC for setting up a bus stand. The report also stated that out of 8.38 acres of land in Sy.Nos.269-2 to 269-5 & 269-7, only an extent of 4.88 acres of land remains in the possession of Sri D. Kalidas Reddy. The Tahsildar refused to make any changes on the ground that the litigation over the said property, in the form of Second Appeal No.611 of 2006, remained pending and the orders could only be passed after the disposal of the Second Appeal.
37. Aggrieved by this Order of the Tahsildar dated 09.10.2015, the plaintiff moved an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer who refused to intervene in the matter, in view of the Status-quo orders passed by the erstwhile Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, in S.A.M.P.No.1429 of 2006 in S.A.No.611 of 2006 on 27.06.2006. The Revision filed before the Joint Collector also came to be dismissed on the ground that no steps can be taken while S.A.No.611 of 2006 is pending before the Hon'ble High Court. Aggrieved by the said order of Joint Collector dated 17.04.2017, the plaintiff has approached this Court by way of W.P.No.19156 of 2017. The contention of the plaintiff is that the revenue authorities ought to have corrected the revenue entries and issued the pattadar pass books and the title deeds in her favour, in view of the favourable orders received by her in the Suit as well as the First Appeal. This Court does not find any illegality in the said orders, inasmuch as the revenue authorities could not have gone into the question of title and possession, while the Status-quo order of the Court, in the Second Appeal remained in force. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed 23 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch leaving it open to the plaintiff, to approach the revenue authorities in view of the present orders in the Second Appeal.
38. C.C.Nos.68 of 2016, 700 of 2020 & 1648 of 2022, came to be filed against various sale deeds and deeds of alienation executed by Sri D. Kalidas Reddy alienating the properties which are the subject matters of the present appeal, despite the orders of Status-quo granted by the Court, on 27.06.2006, in S.A.M.P.No.1429 of 2006 in S.A.No.611 of 2006.
39. In view of the aforesaid, the cases before this Court are disposed in the following manner:-
1) Second Appeal No.611 of 2006 is dismissed.
2) Writ Petition No.19156 of 2017 is dismissed.
3) Contempt Case Nos.68 of 2016, 700 of 2020 & 1648 of 2022, are delinked from these cases and again posted for further hearing as there is a prima facie case of violation, by Sri D. Kalidas Reddy, of the order of Status-quo granted by the erstwhile Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh, dated 27.06.2006 in S.A.M.P.No.1429 of 2006 in S.A.No.611 of 2006.
There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________ R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J BSM 24 RRR,J S.A.No.611 of 2006 & batch THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO S.A.No.611 of 2006, W.P.No.19156 of 2017 and C.C.Nos.68 of 2016, 700 of 2020 & 1648 of 2022 08.04.2026 BSM