Bombay High Court
Dikshant Alias Dadu Devidas Sapkale vs The State Of Maharashtra And Others on 1 October, 2025
Author: Vibha Kankanwadi
Bench: Vibha Kankanwadi
2025:BHC-AUG:27267-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1100 OF 2025
Dikshant @ Dadu Devidas Sapkale,
Age: 20 years, Occu: Labour,
R/o. Near Office of Water Supply,
Rameshwar Colony, Mehrun,
Jalgaon, and Dist. Jalgaon ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through Deputy Secretary,
Home Department (Special),
Mantralaya, Mumbai - 400032
2. The State of Maharashtra,
Through District Magistrate,
Jalgaon.
3. The State of Maharashtra,
Through Superintendent,
Central Prison Nagpur. ... Respondents
......
Mr. Harshal P. Randhir, Advocate for Petitioner
Ms.P.R. Bharaswadkar, APP for Respondent No.1 - State
......
CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI &
HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 24 SEPTEMBER, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 01 OCTOBER, 2025
JUDGMENT [Per Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.] :-
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of all
the parties, the petition is taken up for final hearing and final disposal
at the stage of admission itself.
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2. The Petitioner who is the original detenue has preferred this writ
petition challenging the detention order dated 18.07.2024 bearing
No.Dandapra/KAVI/MPDA/22/2024 passed by respondent No.2.
3. The facts leading for filing of the present petition can be
summarized in brief is that on the date of detention order, the petitioner
was already in judicial custody in connection with C.R. No. 140 of 2024,
registered with M.I.D.C. Police Station, Jalgaon and continued to
remand in such custody for many months thereafter. The order of
detention though passed on 18.07.2024, was not served upon the
petitioner immediately. The detention order came to be served upon the
petitioner only after he was released on bail on 23.05.2025, that was
nearly after 11 months later. The petitioner, therefore, raises a grievance
that the authorities though fully aware about the petitioner is in jail,
have failed to serve the order upon him in the jail and held back the
said order till the moment, he came out of the custody, so that they can
immediately take him back in the custody on the basis of the said
preventive detention.
4. The pleadings in the writ petition and grounds mentioned therein
raises several questions upon the illegality of the detention order. The
learned advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that the grounds
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of detention demonstrates that the detaining authority has relied upon
two criminal cases, i.e. C.R. No. 140 of 2024 and C.R. No.127 of 2023,
for the purpose of considering the preventive detention action against
the petitioner. In addition to these two crimes, there are two in-camera
statements which were also recorded and certain earlier instances have
also been mentioned in the detention order in the grounds of detention
while reaching substantive satisfaction. He also argued that one of the
crimes that has been considered for the purpose of passing detention
order is C.R. No.127 of 2023. He argued that the petitioner is neither an
accused or witnessed nor even remotely connected with the said crime.
He took us through the averment made in the affidavit in reply, while
dealing with these contentions of the petitioner wherein the authorities
have explained casually by saying that this is a typographical mistake
and that the authority, in fact, have relied only on C.R. No. 140 of 2024
and upon the in-camera statements. According to the advocate for the
petitioner, such explanation cannot cure the defect because the order
itself shows reliance on that case as part of the foundation for
preventive detention. He further contends that the two in-camera
statements are absolutely vague and at the most relates to an isolated
incidents which can be said to cause law and order situation and
definitely it is not disclosed any disturbances of public order. He further
argued that several documents including remand orders and other
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crucial papers were supplied to the petitioner in English language,
though the authorities are well aware that the petitioner is a Marathi
medium student and only understands Marathi. According to him, not
supplying the translation frustrates the constitutional right of making an
effective representation guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the
Constitution of India. The learned advocate also argued that the
detention order stands vitiated on the ground of long and unexplained
delay between the making of the order and its execution thereby
affecting the very purpose of preventive detention. The very inclusion of
an offence which the petitioner has no concern, demonstrates total
non-application of mind and also reliance of extraneous material.
According to him, such reliance is fatal to the subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority. Lastly, he argued that apart from the two
offences, remaining material amounts only to breach of law and order
and does not affect the public order. In this background, he prayed for
releasing the petitioner from custody by holding that the petitioner's
detention is absolutely illegal and the detention order passed by the
respondent No. 2 is bad in law.
5. The Learned APP vehemently opposed the petition and supported
the detention order. She submitted that there is no bar for issuing
preventive detention order even against the person who is already in
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custody and the only requirement that is necessary to be satisfied is that
the detaining authority is very much aware of the custody and still is
satisfied that after his release he is likely to engage in prejudicial
activities. She further argued that these requirements were satisfied,
and therefore, the authority was justified in making the order. She has
demonstrated by pointing to Section 13 of MPDA Act to justify her
arguments that period of detention under MPDA Act has to be reckoned
from the date of actual detention and not from the date of order and
hence there is absolutely no illegality that can be attached to the fact
that the order was served only upon the petitioner's release on bail. As
far as reference of crime number 127 of 2023 which is found in the
detention order. She took us through the averments which are made in
the affidavit-in-reply on page 110, paragraph (XIII) which reads as thus:
"(XIII) With reference to the claim and contentions in
ground no. (XIII) it is submitted that as mentioned above
in answer to ground no. (III) that crime no. 127/2023 is
mentioned inadvertently. So far crime no. 140/2024 is
concerned it cannot be said that this offence does not affect
the law and order and that it is individualistic in nature. It
is submitted that when individual from the society is
involved in such crime it becomes a crime not only against
an individual but also against the society as a whole.
Besides, this crime shows the criminal antecedent of the
petitioner/detenu. Under such circumstances, the case law
sought to be relied are not applicable. Hence, it also cannot
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be said that the order of detention is not just, fair and
legal, ought to be quashed and set aside."
6. Thus, here explanation is that it was a typographical mistake
and by no stretch of imagination vitiate the subjective satisfaction since
the authorities have considered only one single offence i.e. C.R.No. 140
of 2024 for the purpose of reaching the satisfaction that preventive
detention of the petitioner was necessary. She vehemently opposes the
petition and prayed for dismissing the same stating that there is ample
material on record to show that the petitioner is a 'dangerous person'
likely to engage in prejudicial activities.
7. Having heard the rival submissions and after careful
consideration of the entire material on record, we find ourselves unable
to hold that the impugned detention order can sustain the scrutiny of
law. The preventive detention is an exceptional measure which embarks
upon the rights to personal liberty and it must directly confirm to the
constitutional and statutory requirements. Article 22 (4) of the
Constitution of India and Section 13 of MPDA provides that the
maximum permissible period of detention is to be recognized "from the
date of detention". As explained by the constitutional bench in
Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198, wherein it is held
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that the making of detention order and actual detention of the person
are distinct concepts. Detention in law commences only when the order
is actually executed and the person is physically taken in preventive
custody. The MPDA act follows the similar scale. Therefore, for
competing the period of detention, what is decisive is the date of service
or execution of the order and not the date on which it was signed.
8. Section 13 of the MPDA act reads as follows:
"13. The maximum period for which any person may be
detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under
this Act which has been confirmed under section 12, shall
be six months from the date of detention."
9. Thus, the aforesaid provision also makes it clear that the period
of detention begins from the date of actual detention of the detainee
and not from the date of passing of the order.
10. This position of law, however, does not authorize the detaining
authority to sit over the execution of an order at its pleasure. When the
person is already in a judicial custody and easily accessible, the
authority is expected either the execute the order in jail or to
demonstrate by cogent material that there was a real and proximate
possibility of release of the detainee on bail and furthermore to justify
the making of the order and its postponement of execution. The
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Honorable Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India , (1991) 1
SCC 128, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it
seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in
custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the
authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is
actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the
basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is
a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that
on being so released he would in all probability indulge in
prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain
him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes
an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such
an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the
proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and
if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to
question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in
the case of Ramesh Yadav [(1985) 4 SCC 232 : 1985 SCC
(Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention order should not
be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement
on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and
can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us
well settled that even in a case where a person is in
custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so
demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive
detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law
discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High
Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since
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they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult
to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners
that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing
the impugned orders of detention because the detenues
were in custody.
11. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid
down that three conditions must co-exist when the detention order is
made against the person already in custody (i) the authority must be
aware of such custody, (ii) there must be a reliable material to show
real possibility of release of the detainee on bail and (iii) there must be
likelihood of the detainee indulging in prejudicial activities upon such
release. Applying the aforesaid conditions, to the present case and
records before us including grounds of detention shows awareness of
the fact of custody, but is conspicuously silent on any real or proximate
possibility of the petitioner's immediate release on bail. It has to be
noted that detention order against the petitioner was made in July 2024
and petitioner was granted bail only in May 2025 that is almost 10
months later. Applying these facts to the principle laid down in the
Kamrunnisa (supra) condition No.(ii) stands stands not satisfied.
12. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao
Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed
as under:
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"53. Unfortunately, the attention of the High Court was not
invited to Haradhan Saha [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri)
816] wherein the Constitution Bench did not approve the law
laid down by this Court in Biram Chand [(1974) 4 SCC 573 :
1974 SCC (Cri) 609 : AIR 1974 SC 1161] . Referring to the
larger Bench decisions, the Court stated: (Haradhan Saha
[(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] , SCC p. 209, paras
33-34)
"33. Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention
and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are
different. The authorities are different. The nature of
proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought
to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the
past act is merely the material for inference about the future
course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu.
34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are
many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B.
[(1972) 2 SCC 550 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 888] , Ashim Kumar Ray
v. State of W.B. [(1973) 4 SCC 76 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 723] ,
Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate [(1973) 1 SCC 301 : 1973
SCC (Cri) 321] and Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. [(1974) 4
SCC 135 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 274] correctly lay down the
principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is
valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P.
[(1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609 : AIR 1974 SC
1161] which is a Division Bench decision of two learned
Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in
each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can
be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is
liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a
criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing
him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of
the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the
Government from taking action for his detention under the
Act. Second, the fact that the police arrests a person and later
on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him
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under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first
information report may be no bar against the District
Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention.
Third, where the person concerned is actually in jail custody
at the time when an order of detention is passed against him
and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may
be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on
the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such
a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the
security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere
circumstance that a detention order is passed during the
pendency of the prosecution will not violate (sic vitiate) the
order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary
measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future
behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light
of the surrounding circumstances."
(emphasis supplied)
13. Even more serious is the conduct of the authorities in keeping
the detention order in cold storage and serving upon the petitioner only
on 27.05.2025 after the petitioner was released on bail. No plausible
explanation for this long and deliberate delay has been offered.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of
Kerala, (1989) 4 SCC 741, has held as under:
"12. In the light of the above proposition of law, we shall now
examine the first contention which has been raised for the first
time before this Court. From the reading of the counter-affidavit
filed on behalf of the first respondent, it is seen that the
detaining authority has attempted to explain the laxity that has
occasioned in passing the impugned order, but miserably failed
in explaining the delay of three months in securing the arrest of
the detenu from the date of the passing of the order, and keeps
stunned silence on that score. The learned counsel appearing for
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the first respondent when queried by this Court whether he
could give any reason for this undue delay in arresting the
detenu on 18-1-1988 in pursuance of the impugned order of
detention made on 7-10-1987, has frankly admitted that he
could not do so -- rightly so in our view -- in the absence of
any explanation in the counter-affidavit. The Superintendent of
Police, Malapurram to whom the detention order was forwarded
for execution has not filed any supporting affidavit explaining
the delay in securing the arrest of the detenu. Under these
circumstances, we hold that leaving apart the question of delay
in passing the order of detention from the date of the seizure of
the gold, the fact remains that the detaining authority has failed
to explain the long delay in securing the arrest of the detenu
after three months, from the date of the passing of the detention
order and this non-explanation in our view throws a
considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority vitiating the validity of
the order of detention."
15. In the case of Rajinder Arora v. Union of India , (2006) 4 SCC
796, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"21. The question as regards delay in issuing the order of
detention has been held to be a valid ground for quashing an
order of detention by this Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of
Kerala [(1989) 4 SCC 741 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 76 : AIR 1990 SC
225] stating:
"10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be
summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial
activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of
detention is proximate to the time when the order is
made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities
and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast
rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable
under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can
be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of
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proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely
counting number of months between the offending acts
and the order of detention. However, when there is
undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities
and the passing of detention order, the court has to
scrutinise whether the detaining authority has
satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a
tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a
delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and
further the court has to investigate whether the causal
connection has been broken in the circumstances of each
case.
11. Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and
unexplained delay between the date of order of detention
and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, such a
delay would throw considerable doubt on the
genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority leading to a legitimate inference that the
detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied
as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with a
view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial
manner."
22. The delay caused in this case in issuing the order of
detention has not been explained. In fact, no reason in that
behalf whatsoever has been assigned at all."
16. Thus, unexplained delay in execution of the detention order has
not been the live link between prejudicial activities and the necessity of
the detention and renders the detention illegal. This principle in our
view squarely applies to the present case. The live and reasonable nexus
between the alleged activities and purpose of detention was
irretrievably lost by the unexplained delay of nearly over a year.
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17. Upon perusing the records, we find another fundamental
infirmity in the impugned detention order. The order in express terms
taken into account crime No. 127 of 2023 as one of the recent offence
while arriving at the subjective satisfaction to detain the petitioner
under MPDA Act. Explanation provided in affidavit in reply by the
authorities makes it clear that it is not in dispute that the petitioner is
not even remotely connected with that case. The clarificatory plea
mentioned in the affidavit stating that a typographical error and
inadvertent mistake cannot be held that there was no subjective
satisfaction order or due and proper application of mind. It is well
settled that if the detaining authority relies on material which does not
exist or irrelevant, the order stands vitiated for non-application of mind.
18. In the case of Khudiram Das v. State of W.B., (1975) 2 SCC 81,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"15. Now, the proposition can hardly be disputed that if there
is before the District Magistrate material against the detenu
which is of a highly damaging character and having nexus and
relevancy with the object of detention, and proximity with the
time when the subjective satisfaction forming the basis of the
detention order was arrived at, it would be legitimate for the
Court to infer that such material must have influenced the
District Magistrate in arriving at his subjective satisfaction and in
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such a case the Court would refuse to accept the bald statement
of the District Magistrate that he did not take such material into
account and excluded it from consideration. It is elementary that
the human mind does not function in compartments. When it
receives impressions from different sources, it is the totality of
the impressions which goes into the making of the decision and
it is not possible to analyse and dissect the impressions and
predicate which impressions went into the making of the
decision and which did not. Nor is it an easy exercise to erase the
impression created by particular circumstances so as to exclude
the influence of such impression in the decision making process.
Therefore, in a case where the material before the District
Magistrate is of a character which would in all reasonable
probability be likely to influence the decision of any reasonable
human being, the Court would be most reluctant to accept the
ipse dixit of the District Magistrate that he was not so influenced
and a fortiori, if such material is not disclosed to the detenu, the
order of detention would be vitiated, both on the ground that all
the basic facts and materials which influenced the subjective
satisfaction of the District Magistrate were not communicated to
the detenu as also on the ground that the detenu was denied an
opportunity of making an effective representation against the
order of detention."
19. In the case of Ashadevi v. K. Shivraj, Addl. Chief Secy. to the
Govt. of Gujarat, (1979) 1 SCC 222, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held as under:
"6. It is well-settled that the subjective satisfaction requisite
on the part of the detaining authority, the formation of
which is a condition precedent to the passing of the
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detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts
which would have a bearing on the issue and would
influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or
the other are ignored or not considered by the detaining
authority before issuing the detention order. In Sk.
Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal [(1975) 3 SCC 395 :
1975 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 1974 SC 2353] the order of
detention was made on September 10, 1973 under Section
3(2)(a) of MISA based on the subjective satisfaction of the
District Magistrate that it was necessary to detain the
petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and
services essential to the community and this subjective
satisfaction, according to the grounds of detention
furnished to the petitioner, was founded on a solitary
incident of theft of aluminium wire alleged to have been
committed by the petitioner on April 14, 1973. In respect
of this incident of theft a criminal case was filed inter alia
against the petitioner in the Court of the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Asansol, but the criminal case was ultimately
dropped as witnesses were not willing to come forward to
give evidence for fear of danger to their life and the
petitioner was discharged. It appeared clear on record that
the history-sheet of the petitioner which was before the
District Magistrate when he made the order of detention
did not make any reference to the criminal case launched
against the petitioner, much less to the fact that the
prosecution had been dropped or the date when the
petitioner was discharged from that case. In connection
with this aspect this Court observed as follows:
"We should have thought that the fact that a
criminal case is pending against the person who is
sought to be proceeded against by way of
preventive detention is a very material
circumstance which ought to be placed before the
District Magistrate. That circumstance might quite
possibly have an impact on his decision whether
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or not to make an order of detention. It is not
altogether unlikely that the District Magistrate
may in a given case take the view that since a
criminal case is pending against the person
sought to be detained, no order of detention
should be made for the present, but the criminal
case should be allowed to run its full course and
only if it fails to result in conviction, then
preventive detention should be resorted to. It
would be most unfair to the person sought to be
detained not to disclose the pendency of a
criminal case against him to the District
Magistrate."
It is true that the detention order in that case was
ultimately set aside on other grounds but the observations
are quite significant. These observations were approved by
this Court in Suresh Mahato v. District Magistrate, Burdwan
[(1975) 3 SCC 554 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 120 : AIR 1975 SC
728] . The principle that could be clearly deduced from the
above observations is that if material or vital facts which
would influence the mind of the detaining authority one
way or the other on the question whether or not to make
the detention order, are not placed before or are not
considered by the detaining authority it would vitiate its
subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal.
After all the detaining authority must exercise due care and
caution and act fairly and justly in exercising the power of
detention and if taking into account matters extraneous to
the scope and purpose of the statute vitiates the subjective
satisfaction and renders the detention order invalid then
failure to take into consideration the most material or vital
facts likely to influence the mind of the authority one way
or the other would equally vitiate the subjective satisfaction
and invalidate the detention order."
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20. According to us, this defect of relying upon an unconnected
crime with the petitioners goes to the roots of the subjective satisfaction
and cannot be cured by way of any subsequent explanation much less
with such irresponsible explanation like typographical error or
inadvertent mistake when the authorities are dealing with the personal
liberty of a citizen though he may be facing criminal charges.
21. Even if we decide to leave aside the C.R. No.127 of 2023, the
remaining material does not justify preventive detention of the
petitioner. The two in-camera statements even taken at their face value
merely refers to isolated incidents which at the most constitute breach
of law and order constitution.
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has provided distinction between
law and order and public order in the judgment of Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia v. State of Bihar, 1966 SC 740, wherein it is held as under:
"8. It is common place that words in a statutory provision
take their meaning from the context in which they are used. The
context in the present case is the emergent situation created by
external aggression. It would, therefore, be legitimate to hold
that by maintenance of public order what was meant was
prevention of disorder of a grave nature, a disorder which the
authorities thought was necessary to prevent in view of the
emergent situation. It is conceivable that the expression
"maintenance of law and order" occurring in the detention order
may not have been used in the sense of prevention of disorder of
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a grave nature. The expression may mean prevention of disorder
of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance only. To
take an illustration, if people indulging in the Hindu religious
festivity of Holi become rowdy, prevention of that disturbance
may be called the maintenance of law and order. Such
maintenance of law and order was obviously not in the
contemplation of the Rules."
23. Thus, a breach of law and order does not, by itself, amount to a
disturbance of public order. The material placed before the detaining
authority fails to demonstrate that the petitioner's alleged criminal
activities had the effect of disturbing the even tempo of life of the
community or of creating a general atmosphere of fear and insecurity in
the minds of the public at large. The subjective satisfaction that
detention was necessary to prevent disturbance of public order is
completely absent and subjective satisfaction carved out by the
authorities by placing the lines on this in-camera statement is therefore
unsustainable.
24. We also find yet another violation which cannot be brushed
aside. The petitioner has specifically pleaded that crucial documents
like judicial remand orders and other relied-upon papers were supplied
to the petitioner only in English language though he had studied in
Marathi medium and understands only Marathi. The state has not
shown that these documents were accompanied by Marathi translation.
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The requirement of article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is that the
grounds of detention and relied-upon documents must be effectively
communicated to the detenue in a language that he understands so as
to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. This
principle has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India , (1981) 2 SCC 427, wherein it
is held as under:
"20. It is an admitted position that the detenu does not know
English. The grounds of detention, which were served on the
detenu, have been drawn up in English. It is true that Shri C.L.
Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention on
the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully
explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati to the detenu.
But, that is not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of
Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the
grounds of detention must be "communicated" to the detenu.
"Communicate" is a strong word. It means that sufficient
knowledge of the basic facts constituting the "grounds" should
be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a
language which he understands. The whole purpose of
communicating the "ground" to the detenu is to enable him to
make a purposeful and effective representation. If the "grounds"
are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing
is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that
purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article
22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point,
which is so obvious from Article 22(5), reference may be made
to the decisions of this Court in Harikisan v. State of
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Maharashtra [1962 Supp 2 SCR 918 : AIR 1962 SC 911 : (1962)
1 Cri LJ 797] and Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate [(1969)
1 SCR 227 : AIR 1969 SC 43 : 1969 Cri LJ 274]."
25. In the case of Powanammal v. State of T.N., (1999) 2 SCC 413,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"8. The law relating to preventive detention has been
crystallized and the principles are well-nigh settled. The
amplitude of the safeguard embodied in Article 22(5) extends
not merely to oral explanation of the grounds of detention and
the material in support thereof in the language understood by
the detenu but also to supplying their translation in script or
language which is understandable to the detenu. Failure to do
so would amount to denial of the right of being communicated
the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making a
representation against the order. (See Hadibandhu Das v.
District Magistrate, Cuttack [AIR 1969 SC 43 : (1969) 1 SCR
227]."
26. Thus, failure to furnish a translation also vitiates the order of
detention. On all of the above counts, we hold that the detention order
dated 18.07.2024, suffers from multiple incurable defects.
27. Upon perusal of the entire material on record and the impugned
detention order in the present case, we are of the considered view that
this is a fit case for exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to impose exemplary costs on the detaining
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authority as well as the State Government. This is a case where the
criminal proceedings, on the basis of which the entire detention action
has been initiated against the petitioner, have resulted in the petitioner
being kept in illegal detention for over a year, thereby affecting his
fundamental rights to life and personal liberty guaranteed under the
Constitution of India. The entire course of action demonstrates an
arbitrary exercise of executive power. The detaining authority, in our
considered view, has been absolutely insensitive and careless while
initiated the proceedings against the petitioner. However, because of
this unconstitutional arbitrary behavior of the detaining authority, the
petitioner herein has suffered illegal and unconstitutional detention
which directly violates Articles 21 and article 22(4) and 22(5) of the
Constitution of India. he non-application of mind by the detaining
authority, its reliance on extraneous material, and furthermore, the act
of casual explanation by stating in the affidavit that offence is
mentioned inadvertently and the learned APP orally stating it as
typographical error is absolutely and wholly unacceptable. Because of
these serious infirmity, the fundamental right of the petitioner of
making effective representation is violated. According to us, this is an
excellent case where the authorities have abused the preventive
detention law which is an extraordinary measure and have forgotten
that the powers under this law are to be used sparingly against those
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criminals who are genuine threats to public order. Keeping the
detention order pending for several months and serving it upon the
petitioner at the moment of his release amounts to a colourable exercise
of power. We, therefore, impose heavy compensation to be paid to the
petitioner by the State Government and direct that the State
Government shall be entitled to recover the same from the salary of
respondent No. 2, who exercised powers under Section 3 of the MPDA
Act in imposing the illegal detention upon the petitioner.
28. In view of the aforesaid reasons and discussion, the writ petition
deserves to be allowed. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order:
ORDER
I) The Writ Petition stands allowed. II) The detention order dated 18.07.2024 bearing
No.DC/Desk/9C1/641/2025 passed by respondent No.2 - District Magistrate, Jalgaon as well as the approval order dated 19.07.2025 and the confirmation order dated 15.07.2025 passed by respondent No.1, are hereby quashed and set aside.
III) Petitioner - Dikshant @ Dadu Devidas Sapkale shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other offence. IV) Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
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29. We direct that compensation in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh only) be paid to the petitioner by the State Government. The State Government shall recover the said amount from the salary of respondent No. 2 i.e. detaining authority, who passed the illeggal detention order against the petitioner. [ HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J. ] [ SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI, J. ] S P Rane